University of Denver

Digital Commons @ DU
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Graduate Studies

1-1-2008

Japanese Worldviews, Ideologies, and Foreign Aid Policy
Richard Warren Shannon
University of Denver

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd
Part of the Asian Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Shannon, Richard Warren, "Japanese Worldviews, Ideologies, and Foreign Aid Policy" (2008). Electronic
Theses and Dissertations. 592.
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/592

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

JAPANESE WORLDVIEWS, IDEOLOGIES,
AND FOREIGN AID POLICY

_____________

A Dissertation
Presented to
The Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies
University of Denver

_____________

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
______________

By
Richard W. Shannon
November 2008
Advisor: Joseph S. Szyliowicz

© Copyright 2008 by Richard W. Shannon
All Rights Reserved

DEDICATION
For my parents, Warren and Jean Shannon, whose love and continuing
support enabled me to complete the project, and for Suzuki Miyoko, who first
showed me the beauty, sensitivity and love of the Japanese people when I
studied in Kyoto as a young student.

JAPANESE WORLDVIEWS, IDEOLOGIES,
AND FOREIGN AID POLICY

_____________

An Abstract of A Dissertation
Presented to
The Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies
University of Denver

_____________

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
______________

By
Richard W. Shannon
November 2008
Advisor: Joseph S. Szyliowicz

ii

ABSTRACT

This project studies the ideational factors influencing Japanese foreign aid
policy. It builds on previous research in political science on perception and
foreign policy decision-making, Japanese political economy, economic and
technological development, foreign aid, and in anthropology on perception,
worldview, and international development.
The main goal of the research is to answer the question of how Japan’s
historical experiences with technology, development, and foreign relations (and
key leaders’ views of those areas) from 1850 to 1945 have influenced current aid
policies. Second, the project aims to answer whether the Japanese development
concepts of “modernization,” internationalization and translative adaptation
accurately reflect Japan’s own experience. Third, the project asks how spirituality
and religion may be influencing current aid policies.
In the research, I review key contexts of Japan’s historical experience
from 1850 to 1945 in several important areas. I also study the beliefs and
worldviews (cognitive frameworks) of seven key Japanese leaders for the same
period: Fukuzawa Yukichi, Mori Arinori, Ito Hirobumi, Yamagata Aritomo, Kato
Hiroyuki, Yanagita Kunio, and Emperor Hirohito. I analyze these historical
experiences and leaders’ views through analytical concepts and lenses from
political science, anthropology, and economics, in three main areas: development,
technology, and cognition.

iii

Among my key findings are that there is much continuity between Japan’s
prewar culture of politics and the postwar system, including examples and ideas,
which shape the policy environment in which Japan’s aid operates. Many of these
are negative in nature, and some are ideas based on Japan’s own development
experience. Several key lessons emerge, including the importance of: 1) a strong
civil society to prevent abusive politics for the achievement of Japan’s national
interests, whether in its prewar politics or the current aid system; 2) a strong,
effective state for encouraging successful development; 3) Japan’s development
experience for other regions (if carefully applied); and 4) the concept of
translative adaptation, the idea that each nation’s development must be
customized for its own conditions and experiences. I conclude that Japan needs
better consideration of ground level factors in its assessments of ODA policy and
international affairs.
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Part One
Introductory Perspectives

1

Chapter 1
Introduction1
Introduction: Research Problem
Over the last century, Japan amazed the world with its economic development
and technology, and initiated the world's largest foreign aid budget in 1989. Political
science and economics have generated much knowledge about various aspects of
Japanese technology, development and foreign aid, but until recently, there has been
relatively little anthropological exploration of these phenomena. This project helps to fill
that gap by surveying the broad contexts of Japan's experience with these areas from
1850 to 1945, examining the historical and ideological antecedents of Japanese foreign
aid during the pre-aid period, from the dawn of Japan’s modern age (the point of the
restoration of Japan’s open relations with the whole world) to just before the start of
Japan’s aid programs in the aftermath of the nation’s defeat in World War II.
Understanding this background will help us better comprehend what Japan’s massive aid

1

Note on Japanese names and pronunciation of the Japanese language: throughout the main body of this
dissertation, when referring to Japanese names, I list them in the Japanese order, with family name listed
first, and personal name second, i.e. Tanaka Hiroshi. When listing Japanese names in footnotes and the
bibliography, however, the American order has been followed. Guide for pronouncing certain vowels in
Japanese: the use of the following symbol over the letter o (ô), creates a double length vowel. For example,
instead of saying keimo, where the o is said for one beat, one says keimô, with the o pronounced for two
beats, like “keimoh.” This is also true for the following vowels as well: a (becomes â), i (becomes î), u (û),
and e (ê).
2

program does, and why. My aim is to take a sounding of some of the most important
historical trends and contexts surrounding Japan’s experience with technology,
development and foreign relations, and the views of several important leaders about those
trends from 1850 to 1945, to try to understand their evolution over time, and finally, their
relationship with contemporary Japanese aid policy. An understanding of Japanese aid,
within a historical view of foreign policy and ideas of development, will also greatly
enrich our understanding of contemporary globalization processes.2 Cultural
anthropology3 and political science are ideal, complementary approaches for this work.
Using these disciplines, issues as diverse as technonational ideologies, development,
policy, and cultural relations can be assessed over time.4
In the first section of this chapter I introduce key concepts that underlie the
research, including development, technology, worldview and related cognitive concepts. I
also discuss the value of studying (leaders’) worldviews for connecting history and
policy, the centrality of religion and spirituality in worldview issues and their relation to
Japanese aid, and the influence of contexts on worldviews and the key themes of the
research. Next I consider how to link ideologies, history and policy outcomes, and how
Japan’s experience with technology, development, and foreign relations influences its

2

By this, I mean globalization in the form of foreign aid emanating from a non-Western source: Japan. For
more on the types of globalization flowing from Japan, see Harumi Befu and Sylvie Guichard-Anguis,
Globalizing Japan: Ethnography of the Japanese Presence in Asia, Europe, and America (London:
Routledge, 2001.
3
Within broader anthropology, I am also using some concepts drawn from two subfields, applied and
cognitive anthropology. Applied anthropology refers to anthropology put to use to solve human problems.
Historically, applied anthropology is the branch of anthropology that has investigated the issue of
international economic development the most extensively. Cognitive anthropology features several
theoretical viewpoints that are helpful for this study. See the definition of cognitive anthropology in the
Glossary.
4
See the discussion of technonationalism as ideology later in this chapter. I thank Peter Van Arsdale,
University of Denver, for several of these insights.
3

current aid policy. To answer this, I apply several important Japanese concepts of
development and technology to Japan’s own experience. Throughout the first section, I
gradually introduce the three main research questions and working hypothesis of the
project, which relate to the subjects of how Japan’s experience with technology,
development and foreign relations have affected today’s aid policies, if certain Japanese
development concepts accurately reflect Japan’s experience with development and
technology, and how spirituality has affected Japan’s aid. I argue that Japan’s experience
with these areas has indeed affected its aid.
In the remaining sections of the chapter, I review relevant literatures, discuss
my methodology and important contributions of the research. The key literatures relevant
to the research, especially in anthropology and political science, include social science
theory, work on linking ideology, history and policy, and research on Asian development,
Japan’s economic and technological development, its foreign aid policy, and the
intersection of religion, international affairs, and development. In the section on research
methodology and analysis, I review my choice of the leaders studied, data collection, and
data analysis. In the final section I review the contributions of this research to the fields
of international studies, to consideration of historical, cultural, and religious factors in
Japanese aid, and to the identification of human and ground level effects in international
relations. The primary theoretical paradigm for this project will be postpositivism, which
builds on the deterministic, naturalistic approach of positivism.5
At this point, we do not adequately understand the historical and cultural
backgrounds of Japanese aid, subjects that have been studied relatively little. We also
5

See Positivism and Postpositivism in the Glossary section.
4

need to strengthen the contribution of anthropological research to such issues. The
project’s topical framework focuses on Japanese foreign aid and development. The
“Japanese” (or “Asian”) model of development has had a massive impact on other Asian
nations, and they have tried to emulate it. Japan is the first case of a non-Western
country to “successfully” industrialize. Development has been a hot topic of
investigation by anthropologists, since the 1980s and even earlier. Perhaps
anthropologists should be attracted to the Japanese case, but while many study
development “failures”6 in other regions, few have considered the significance of this
seminal case and model.7 In this project, I define development as, first, an increase in a
society’s capacity for industrial production and the products of capitalism, and movement
toward being a “modern” society. Second, it means improving quality of life, the
standard of living, and eliminating or relieving poverty.8 It also includes “attempts to
[build] …local capacity, and [encourage] …local participation and decision-making.
Development almost always involves multiple groups, and therefore, multiple cultural
perspectives.”9 Another key concept under study here, technology, I define as tools,
knowledge, learning and information that people use to live and survive. It may also be
6

In this project, I use quotation marks in several cases: 1) to signify a direct quote; 2) to denote a somewhat
questionable use of the term concerned, as in this example; 3) to indicate a judgment about the given issue
that is controversial, unconventional, or not absolutely settled; or 4) to indicate a meaning of the term that
is figurative.
7
One of the few pioneers of anthropological research of Japanese foreign aid and development is Kikuchi
Yasushi, professor at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University in Tokyo. For an
example of his research, see his “Development Anthropology: Theoretical Perspectives,” in The Global
Practice of Anthropology, eds. Marietta L. Baba and Carole E. Hill (Williamsburg, Va.: Dept. of
Anthropology, College of William and Mary, 1997), 199-228. For a brief treatment of the role of
anthropology in Japanese foreign aid policy, see Makio Matsuzono, “International Cooperation Activities
and Anthropology: Problems in Japan’s Context,” Technology and Development 14 (2001), 5-11.
8
James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development", Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in
Lesotho (Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990), 15, 55.
9
Riall W. Nolan, Development Anthropology: Encounters in the Real World (Boulder, Colo: Westview
Press, 2002), 309.
5

seen as an interconnected system of tools and knowledge used in a society or economy to
accomplish purposes in daily life and work.10
One way I seek to understand Japan’s experiences with technology and
development is through looking at key leaders’ worldviews.11 In a recent landmark study,
theologian and philosopher David Naugle traces the roots of the worldview concept in
philosophy, theology, and the sciences, concluding that worldview has had a crucial role
in modern thought, is one of the most basic modern intellectual notions, and has extreme,
if not the greatest, cultural importance.12 Studying a topic of international relations like
foreign aid in a holistic fashion like this, through the concept of worldview, should
generate new, significant insights. For example, how have the worldviews of key leaders
affected Japan’s aid policies? Looking at leaders’ worldviews is key for this purpose.
Political scientist Carol Lancaster shares this view. She argues that among
various factors in domestic politics that influence a donor’s aid policies,13 worldview is
among the most important:
There are several types of ideas,14 shared by significant portions of the public and
political elites in aid-giving countries that can influence aid. Most fundamental are
what some scholars have called “worldviews”—widely shared values (based on
culture, religion, ideology) about what is right and wrong. These worldviews
themselves are the product of a society’s history as well as major events and trends
affecting its population. In terms of foreign aid, these might involve a view that all
10

This definition is largely anthropological. See the several treatments of technology in the Glossary.
The key keaders whose views I study are Fukuzawa Yukichi, Mori Arinori, Ito Hirobumi, Yamagata
Aritomo, Kato Hiroyuki, Yanagita Kunio, and Emperor Hirohito. For more details on these leaders, see
Chapters 3 and 7.
12
David K. Naugle, Worldview: The History of a Concept (Grand Rapids, Mich: W.B. Eerdmans Pub,
2002), 344-345.
13
The chief domestic political factors that Lancaster examines in her 2007 comparative study of foreign aid
in five countries (the United States, Japan, France, Germany and Denmark) are ideas, interests, political
institutions, and aid organizations (how “…governments organize themselves to manage their aid”). See
Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2007), 18.
14
See Lancaster’s definitions that immediately follow.
6
11

human beings have a right to liberty or a right to a minimum subsistence or that
individuals (or families) should be self-reliant and responsible to the extent possible
for their own well-being. Worldviews give rise to “principled beliefs” or norms—
“collective expectations about the proper behavior for a given identity.”15
The three main types of ideas that Lancaster identifies here are: 1) worldviews, 2) causal
beliefs, and 3) principled beliefs or norms.16
Lancaster further argues that these norms are often framed based upon
fundamental values, which in turn can give rise to different types of policy outcomes. In
Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics (2007), she presents case
studies from five different countries where “…aid-giving was framed and reframed in
terms of different basic worldviews with very different outcomes vis-à-vis aid
expenditures.” This, in turn, relates to another type of idea, what Lancaster calls “causal
beliefs,” in this case, beliefs about what types of policies result in successful
development.17 Lancaster finds that different worldviews and beliefs may bring different
(aid) policy outcomes in different societies.18 For example, Lancaster concludes that
Japan’s weak state-society tradition has limited its development of strong relief and
development NGOs, contrary to the situation in most of Europe and North America.19
Regarding ideas, based mainly on her concepts of worldview and principled
beliefs, in her study Lancaster asks two questions: 1) how basic values about the duties of

15

Ibid.
Ibid., 18-19.
17
Ibid., 19. Causal beliefs seem to be related to what anthropologists call cultural logics, which means
people’s unspoken assumptions that underlie their worldviews, especially about global phenomena such as
economic development. See cultural logics in the Glossary section.
18
Ibid. For example, Lancaster argues that beliefs that government aid is inappropriate and usually
ineffective have resulted in criticisms by the political right of foreign aid programs in the United States.
Strong norms of social solidarity and social democracy have led to strong public support for ODA
programs in the Netherlands and Scandinavia.
19
Ibid.
7
16

the wealthy to aid the poor, and about the role of the state in those duties, influence
foreign aid’s purposes in different nations, and 2) how widely held beliefs about the role
of the state in society influence the presence of civil society organizations, which can also
influence the purposes of ODA.20 These issues connect to cultural notions of charity,
duty, and giving, and about the role of religion and of charitable, often religious,
institutions, in those processes. Many of these views arise from religious and spiritual
influences and worldviews. We will note several of these issues in Chapter 2. In this
research, I am mainly dealing with worldviews and causal beliefs (cultural logics), not
principled beliefs. I am particularly interested in the views and beliefs of important
leaders in the Japanese case, the presuppositions under those beliefs, and how both have
influenced Japanese aid policy outcomes. That is partly how I connect micro- and macroissues and levels of analysis. I am not really interested in the collective expectations in
Japan about what proper behavior should be pursued (the concept of “principled
beliefs”).
I define image as the basic ideas and pictures in our minds about reality; how
we organize these ideas and pictures in our minds about reality and the world around us.
In anthropology, Michael Kearney calls images fundamental, general perceptions and
concepts of reality that together form a worldview, while political scientist Martha
Cottam defines images as “perceptual filters” or “cognitive organizing devices” we use to
conceptually organize our worldview or conception of the environment.21 Images are
20

Ibid.
Michael Kearney, World View (Novato, Calif: Chandler & Sharp, 1984), 47; Martha L. Cottam, Images
and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994), 10; and
Martha L. Cottam, “Recent Development in Political Psychology,” in Contending Dramas: A Cognitive
Approach to International Organizations, eds. Martha Cottam and Zhiyu Shi (New York: Praeger, 1992),
8
21

sometimes considered in both political science and anthropology to be subcomponents of
a worldview, and important in a worldview’s basic formation.22 In this research, I define
worldview as a set of pictures and ideas about the world, or a certain part of or thing in
the world, that mostly makes sense, but which may not be totally correct. Here,
worldview is essentially a cognitive framework about a certain topic or subject.23 It
includes complicated pictures about the world and how it works, based on deep,
previously held beliefs. What people and political actors see and believe affects what they
do.24 Cultural logics are the unspoken, unconscious, shared, frequently local assumptions

3. The anthropological sense of image relates to the basic perceptions people hold, while the political
science sense stresses how images function as perceptual filters. In their study of images, political
scientists and anthropologists have usually emphasized analysis of smaller variables, rather than larger
theoretical or cognitive frameworks. I also analyze smaller bits of information, but continually seek to
identify the larger worldview(s) into which the images fit. What kind of images do leaders have of the basic
variables under study? Into what larger frameworks do they fit? How do they function as perceptual filters
or organizing devices? I will examine images as both basic perception and perceptual filter, and seek to
understand their larger frameworks. This can be done for any domestic or international issue.
22
If one examines how anthropology and political science treat worldview, one sees that the former
emphasizes a more holistic view, while the latter stresses a more specialized view of how a political actor’s
perception of the world affects his/her understanding of events, uses of information, decisions, policies, and
actions. Worldviews provide a mostly coherent framework for the numerous images people hold, and are
relevant for any domestic or international issue.
23
The concept of worldview that I use for this research is not the approach customary to anthropology. My
concept is based on both political science and anthropological approaches. I treat worldview mainly as a
cognitive framework for a person’s beliefs on a particular topic, not as the overarching, almost
cosmological framework that most anthropologists do. As such, one might argue that the worldviews I
construct seem arbitrary. They may seem so, since I have not constructed or discerned them on the basis of
firsthand ethnographic interviews with living informants. Since the actors researched are dead, I cannot
crosscheck my findings with follow-up interviews. However, these worldviews are not arbitrary. They are
formed from historical data collected from and about the attitudes, beliefs, writings, and actions of
significant historical actors from Japan, gathered from the most relevant sources available, and based on a
series of systematic steps. My concept of worldview is based on careful reflection of relevant aspects of the
topic from anthropology, political science, and historical study on the concept since its origination in
Germany several centuries ago. It is not arbitrary.
24
Here is a slightly longer version of my definition of worldview, drawn from anthropology and political
science, used for this study: a cognitive framework or a “…a set of images and assumptions about the
world…” (or a certain part of or thing in the world); “… mostly coherent, … though not always accurate”
(Kearney quoted in Naugle, World View, 242; Michael Kearney, The Winds of Ixtepeji; World View and
Society in a Zapotec Town [New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972], 43). It includes complex
cognitions and preconceptions of the world and how it works, based on prior assumptions (Cottam, Images
and Intervention, 10; Michael T. Hayes, The Limits of Policy Change: Incrementalism, Worldview, and the
Rule of Law [Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univ. Press, 2001], 8). Interaction between policymakers’
9

and cultural patterns beneath a people’s worldviews about, and responses to, global
phenomena like economic development.25 So in this research, images are the basic bits of
perception that together form a cognitive framework called worldview. Lying underneath
the worldview framework are deeply held assumptions and cultural patterns of belief that
are called cultural logics. If people are interviewed, they can state their images about any
subject. A researcher can also construct a tentative worldview framework for any
informant if s/he has gathered enough data on the persons’ images of a certain topic.26
There is no easy way that a researcher can easily uncover an informant’s cultural logics,
since they are deep, normally unexpressed assumptions that underlie more surface
beliefs. They must be philosophically inferred from data already gathered on images and
worldviews. Nevertheless, investigating topics in a cognitive, holistic manner like this
can yield rich results.

worldviews and environments affects their policy judgments [and actions] (Martha L. Cottam, Foreign
Policy Decision Making: The Influence of Cognition [Boulder: Westview Press, 1986], 23, 26, 50). The
behavior of individuals is shaped by how their worldview defines the world’s order, its political [and other
types of] organization, and the actions, views and roles of self and others. As the cognitive structures of a
worldview form a more meaningful “whole,” they influence the (political) actor’s perceptions, uses of
information, and understandings of events and their causes (Chih-Yu Shih, “Seeking Common Causal
Maps: A Cognitive Approach to International Organization,” in Contending Dramas: A Cognitive
Approach to International Organizations, eds. Martha Cottam and Chih-yu Shih [New York: Praeger,
1992], 40-42; Kearney quoted in Naugle, World View, 242; Kearney, Winds of Ixtepeji, 43). See also the
longer treatments of Worldview (anthropology) and Worldview (political science) in the Glossary section,
upon which my definition is based.
25
See the more extended treatment of cultural logics in the Glossary. The concept of cultural logics is very
relevant to this project, which focuses on Japan’s responses to global phenomena, and how those responses
and beliefs shape its policies projected back out to the world as foreign aid. On domestic issues, the
concept of cultural logics can help us to reflect deeply on Japan’s domestic responses to outside forces. I
will follow the following procedure, in this and later chapters, to construct the cognitive frameworks of
these leaders’ worldviews and to consider how they have affected domestic aspects of Japanese society.
First, I will identify leaders’ images about a particular topic. Second, I will use images to attempt to
verbally “construct” the leaders’ worldviews about the topic. Third, I will consider if technological systems
have affected the worldviews, and if so, what aspects. Fourth, I will compare the worldviews, and fifth, try
to conceptually identify the cultural logics and patterns underlying the worldviews, and compare them.
26
It would be good if the researcher could also crosscheck his/her worldview findings with the original
informants, where the informants are still living.
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What is the relationship between worldviews and cultural logics? Paul Hiebert
recently argued that it is helpful to think of culture of consisting of several different
levels. On the most surface level, the sensory level, we find patterns of behavior, cultural
products, rituals and signs. On the second (middle) level, the explicit level, are belief
systems. On the deepest or core level, there are worldview themes, under which lie
(cultural) logics, and on the very bottom, epistemology.27 Although people commonly
rely on different logics in different contexts, some are seen as more basic and are given
more credibility. Other logics seem fuzzy and less reliable. Abstract, algorithmic logic
supports most of the sciences. Other categories include analogical, topological, relational,
and wisdom-based logics.28
In this project, the concepts of worldview and ideology are interrelated, similar,
and yet distinct. I do not mean to conflate them. Their essential meanings are different.
The origin of both concepts, within both political science and anthropology, is related.
Both derive from the German concept of Weltanshauung, or world-view, meaning one’s
overall perception of the social world and how it works. In political science, an ideology
is sometimes called a consistent set of beliefs, morals, and attitudes.29 Scholars of foreign
policy argue that ideology can be viewed as a cognitive map, worldview, or guide to
action. In my present research, I draw heavily on how Richard J. Samuels treats ideology,
as “…the ways in which history and political structure conspire to constrain the strategic
choices of nations.” Yet while ideologies and ideologies influence political outcomes,

27

Paul G. Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews: An Anthropological Understanding of How People Change
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2008), 32-33.
28
Ibid., 39-45.
29
David Robertson, A Dictionary of Modern Politics (London: Europa Publications, 1993), 232.
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they do not determine them.30 Anthropologist Michael Kearney argues that in their
nature, content and function, worldviews are influenced by ideological biases, and can
also function as ideologies. In the recent past anthropologists debated whether ideas
cause social conditions or the reverse (called the debate between cultural idealism and
historical materialism).31 This debate is now outmoded. Some anthropologists have
argued that ideology is a more current area of inquiry than worldview, while others
disagree.32 In this project, I especially focus on certain ideologies related to technology
and development, and how they relate to policies connected to historical outcomes and
processes such as colonialism.33
Why is studying the worldviews of Japan’s leaders about Japan’s experience
with technology, development, and foreign influences important, and what connection do
these views have with later policies? Leaders’ beliefs and views of these subjects, in
many cases, have had a significant influence on later policies that were eventually
enacted, though not in all cases, and not always directly. Japan studies scholar Frederick
R. Dickinson argues that it is helpful to study the earlier worldviews of key Japanese
decision-makers, such as Yamagata Aritomo,34 to understand their later behavior and
policy responses.35 As we study the worldviews of several important leaders, and the
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Richard J. Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army:” National Security and the Technological
Transformation of Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). Carol Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths:
Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 10.
31
Naugle, Worldview, 240-242, 244.
32
Thomas Barfield, “Worldview,” in The Dictionary of Anthropology, ed. Thomas Barfield (Oxford;
Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997), 499.
33
See my discussion of the work of Jean and John Comaroff later in this chapter.
34
For a detailed treatment of the life of Yamagata, see Roger F. Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of
Modern Japan, 1838-1922 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 60.
35
Frederick R. Dickinson, War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914-1919 (Harvard
East Asian monographs, 177. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), 40. In this case,
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policies that eventually followed, this influence should become clearer, though it is
challenging to prove direct linkages between historical trends and later policies.36
Leaders’ decisions on particular policies tend to be made incrementally, influenced both
by their belief systems and the historical stream of previous policies: “sharp breaks with
the past seldom occur.”37
Many young Japanese who traveled abroad in the late Tokugawa period, like
Mori Arinori, underwent a radical worldview transformation by encountering the West
firsthand. It was not “West-worshipping” (forsaking one’s own country), but rather
psychological reorientation or conversion, soberly coming to terms with a significant
outside enemy. For these individuals, it was a “… complex process of response and
Dickinson argues that the worldviews of certain leaders during World War I influenced their later policy
responses in the 1930s.
36
Joseph S. Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, and Development: Decision-Making in the Turkish Iron and
Steel Industry (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991). Szyliowicz argued this in several discussions I had
with him at the University of Denver. In his “The Ottoman Educational Legacy: Myth or Reality” in,
Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East, ed. L. Carl Brown (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996), Szyliowicz discusses how “tradition” in the Ottoman Empire confronted
modernity in the nineteenth century, treating many similar themes to those in the present research,
including worldview, education, religion, foreign cultural influences, Western knowledge, study abroad,
science, and technology. While the Ottomans were conservative and resistant to new ideas (pp. 285-286),
the Meiji leaders of Japan were also ideologically conservative but extremely open to new outside
influences. Another example of the challenges of connecting history and later political realities (pp. 303304), through a broadly comparative approach, considers the imperial legacy of the Ottoman Empire on
later behavior and perceptions in the Balkan region and the Middle East. Brown and others argue that
possible connections between the past and present can be shaped by selective memory (Ibid., 9, 12),
colonialism (Ibid., 11), the evolution of psychological perceptions of other cultures and peoples over time
(Ibid., 14; Norman Itzkowitz, “The Problem of Perceptions,” in Imperial Legacy, ed. L. Carl Brown (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 30; the historical legacy of great cultures on later civilizations
(Halil Inalcik, “The Meaning of Legacy: The Ottoman Case,” in Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on
the Balkans and the Middle East, ed. L. Carl Brown (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 17; and
stereotypes/images (Brown, Imperial Legacy, 304), among other influences.
37
Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 223. The influence of belief systems and historical
factors on policy decisions is seen in Szyliowicz’ treatment of the cognitive factors involved in
international technology transfer cases. The viewpoints and beliefs of policy and decision-makers constrain
and greatly affect the outcome of technology transfer cases and project outcomes, positively or negatively.
Belief systems can blind decision-makers to reality, and failure to adjust their viewpoints and decisions to
changing conditions can also greatly affect outcomes. Perceptions often “…diverge from the reality of the
environment.” Because radical breaks in the historical chain of decision-making are usually rare, both
history and decision-makers’ beliefs can affect their decisions for decades (Ibid., 8, 212, 223).
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adaptation.”38 There were three primary possible responses—wholesale adoption of all
things Western, selective adaptation of things that would prevent immediate invasion and
strengthen the national polity, or redefinition of Japan’s national character according to
the changing historical conditions of the nation, using the West as a model where helpful.
Mori chose the third option.39 Here the “West” serves, historically, as both a point and
counterpoint as I assess Japanese ideas of technology, development, and aid.40
Other leaders studied here, including Ito Hirobumi and Fukuzawa Yukichi, went
through a similar process as they encountered and considered the West. The particular
response of each leader was based on his/her own particular education and upbringing,
historical circumstances and context, individual beliefs, and the degree of involvement in
policymaking. So responses vary.41 Several of the leaders had significant influences on
policies enacted in Meiji Japan and later—Mori on education, Ito on politics and law, and
Yamagata on the military and politics. Fukuzawa’s influence on Japanese policies was
more indirect, since he was never a policymaker. But he had a huge impact on Japanese
attitudes concerning Western culture, foreign relations, and Western business practices,
through his best-selling books, the major university and influential enterprises he
founded.
Studying the past and present images that Japanese leaders have held about
technology, development and foreign relations/aid will help us to understand their overall
38

Alistair Swale, The Political Thought of Mori Arinori: A Study in Meiji Conservatism (Richmond,
Surrey, UK: Japan Library/Curzon Press, 2000), 175-176.
39
Ibid.
40
Peter Van Arsdale, University of Denver.
41
To better understand the worldviews of each leader, before considering each leader’s beliefs about the
major contexts of Japanese technology, development and international relations, where possible, I will
examine his/her education and early upbringing, since these are important influences shaping each person’s
later beliefs and actions.
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worldviews about these subjects, and where possible, I will mention them. At least since
World War II, Western scholarship about Japan has been afflicted with a duality of
contrasting images, such as liberalism/militarism, tradition/modernity, state/society, and
Japan as World War II villain/victim. The complexity of Japanese policymaking, and its
general lack of transparency, sometimes contributes to the lack of depth in the study of
Japanese politics (by Western scholars).42 Uncovering the underlying images and beliefs
of Japanese policymakers can help us better understand the policy outcomes they have
promoted.
Though religion43 and spirituality44 have historically been challenging and
difficult to define, they are commonly seen as a deep, enduring part of a people’s identity
or worldview, and considered to be increasingly important factors in contemporary
international relations. Therefore it makes sense to investigate the possible connections of
spirituality, worldviews, and an international affairs topic like Japanese foreign aid.
Scholars of religion have important things to say about worldview. Anthropologist
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Dickinson, War and National Reinvention, 239-241, 243-244.
An anthropological definition of religion sees it as the “…lived significance of … ideas, experiences and
institutions…” about the supernatural, and about the role of such things in human existence. Religion is a
part of culture, and is “…integral to the common understandings, activities, and circumstances that shape a
people’s way of life” (“Anthropology of Religion,” in The HarperCollins Dictionary of Religion, eds.
Jonathan Z. Smith et al. [San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1995], 891). See a more detailed treatment
of Religion in the Glossary.
44
Spirituality has been called “ …the concern of human beings with their appropriate relationships to the
cosmos” (Mary N. MacDonald, “Spirituality” in Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Lindsay Jones [Detroit:
Macmillan Reference USA, 2005], 8718), or the connections between “ ...the human and the sublime, …
the concrete and the abstract, and between man and God” (Zehavit Gross, “Contemporary Approaches to
Defining Spirituality,” in Encyclopedia of Religious and Spiritual Development, eds., Elizabeth M.
Dowling and W. George Scarlett [Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2006], 425). Spirituality
suggests feeling, thought, and practice connected with the inner, subjective world related to religion, and
the meanings of the deepest parts of human life and existence. It is the main motivating force of religion, on
corporate (organized or unorganized) or individual levels. Spirituality flourishes within living religious
traditions. Forms of spirituality vary according to social and personal conditions and tradition (Wade Clark
Roof, “Spirituality,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd ed., ed. William A. Darity
[Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2008], 59-60).
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Charles Kraft argues that our worldviews and beliefs of many things (i.e. the
supernatural) affect our experience of and reactions to/actions about them. Both Kraft and
Paul Hiebert identify conflicts between “spirituality” and “reality/science” in the common
worldviews of Westerners that are usually not found in the worldviews of nonWesterners.45 Hiebert terms this common characteristic of Western worldviews the Flaw
of the Excluded Middle. According to this concept, the worldviews of non-Westerners
commonly allow for the existence of the spiritual realm, both beyond the present world,
and in operation within it. Most Western worldviews, while possibly allowing for the
existence of a spiritual realm after death, usually do not include the active presence of
spiritual forces in everyday life.46 Possible conflicts between science and spirituality also
occurred in the worldviews of Japan’s most influential political actor of the twentieth
century, Emperor Hirohito.47 He was strongly affected by the government’s official views
of Shinto, and his own great love of and belief in science. He was also modern Japan’s
supreme political leader before 1945. These two aspects of Hirohito’s basic worldview
(Shinto and science) had great impacts on his political actions and decisions, affecting
millions of people in Asia, the Pacific, and the United States through 1945, and nearly
destroying Japan, at least outwardly. What were the implications of that conflict for
Hirohito’s policy actions and impacts?
What are the implications of these issues for current Japanese aid policy?
Spirituality is a highly important area of worldview issues, since it is one of the cultural
45

Charles H. Kraft, Christianity with Power: Your Worldview and Your Experience of the Supernatural
(Ann Arbor, Mich: Vine Books, 1989); Paul G. Hiebert, “The Flaw of the Excluded Middle,” Missiology
10, no. 1 (1982): 35-47; and Paul G. Hiebert, Anthropological Reflections on Missiological Issues (Grand
Rapids, Mich: Baker Books, 1994).
46
Hiebert, “Flaw of Excluded Middle” and Anthropological Reflections.
47
We will examine this issue further in Chapter 7.
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systems and contexts to which worldviews are connected, which they also influence and
by which they are influenced.48 Paul Hiebert defines worldview as “…the foundational
cognitive, affective, and evaluative assumptions and frameworks a group of people
makes about the nature of reality which they use to order their lives.”49 I view worldview
as a cognitive framework, so in this case, we can call spirituality a highly significant
cognitive framework that interacts with and influences the other such cultural systems in
people’s lives. As such, on some levels it also influences a society’s view of other
societies, foreign countries, and how to relate to them. Since spirituality is a key area of
worldview issues, one of my key research questions asks, how has Japanese spirituality
perhaps affected Japan’s foreign aid policies? What evidence do we see in the historical
data presented here? Are there possible conflicts between leaders’ worldviews of
spirituality and science that have affected their policy actions, and/or later Japanese aid
policies? My working hypothesis is that Japan’s experience with technology,
development and foreign relations, as seen in the beliefs of some of its important leaders
about them, has affected its current aid policies. I argue that the perceptions and policies
of key Japanese leaders, from the late Tokugawa era forward, help us to better
comprehend how technology has influenced Japan’s view of itself, its view of “the
Other,”50 and its view of how foreign policy (especially for development) should occur.51
To better understand the ideologies of key Japanese thinkers and leaders about
Japan’s experience with technology, development, and foreign affairs, it is also helpful to
48

According to Paul Hiebert, the other systems to which worldviews are connected include cultural,
biological, physical, personal and social systems (Hiebert, Transforming, 86-88).
49
Ibid., 25-26.
50
The “Other” means non-Japanese, mainly either Westerners or other Asians.
51
I am thankful to Peter Van Arsdale, University of Denver, for this last insight.
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place their beliefs within several broader contexts. Accordingly, within the historical
period covered in Chapter 3, I include a brief survey of major domestic contexts of
Japanese technology and economic development from 1850 to 1895: the roles of Japan’s
technological development and domestic society. These two contexts are especially
related to sociocultural issues. Technological development includes the state of the basic
natural sciences in Japan, scientific knowledge imported from abroad, technologies and
industrial applications (such as research and development), science and technology
policies of different governments in Japan, and how social and cultural factors have
influenced those processes. The section on domestic society contexts examines Japanese
society and socio-cultural change, especially related to technology and development
issues. In Chapter 4, my historical survey covers domestic political economy issues for
the same period. The domestic state section covers Japan’s domestic politics and the
nature of the state, and when data is available, how the state and political actors
interacted with technological development. The section on the domestic market contexts
looks at Japan’s domestic market, economic development and growth. I follow similar
procedures in additional chapters.
What additional approaches from the social sciences can I use to link ideologies,
history, and development policy outcomes? There are several strong theoretical and
methodological approaches. Development policies are implemented through projects.
Worldview is one contributing factor to project outcomes, but not a directly causal
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factor.52 Project outcomes feedback to previous stages of the process in an iterative,
circular fashion.53 Even if worldview is not a directly causal factor, it is an important one
to examine.
All of this relates to the largest research question for the dissertation: how have
Japan’s experiences with technology, development and foreign relations (and key
leaders’ worldviews of those issues) from 1850 to 1945 affected its current foreign aid
policies? In order to answer this question, I need to consider the meanings of Japanese
development concepts like “modernization,”54 translative adaptation,55 and
internationalization.56 I must do so since these concepts deeply embody Japanese notions
and interpretations of what technology and development mean, and what they mean for
the Japan case in particular. “Modernization” explores what happens to the internal
cultural core of a developing, commonly non-Western country as it enters the global
52

Political scientist and Japanologist Richard J. Samuels argues that ideologies interact with institutional
factors over time to affect policy outcomes in powerful ways. See my discussion below of Samuels’ work,
especially under the definition of ideology in the Glossary.
53
I learned these arguments about development policies implemented as projects and the circular pattern of
feedback from project outcomes in an interview (March 2003) with a Denver area anthropologist who
prefers to remain anonymous about this point.
54
In this project I define “modernization” as is the process where a rich country in the core (center) of the
world’s economy forces weaker, poorer countries in the periphery to trade with it, so it can become richer
and more developed. As a poor, non-Western country is absorbed into the world economy, on the surface,
its culture will start to look more Western (like the cultures of the rich “core”). But the core of its culture
will not change much, but stay mostly non-Western.
55
Translative adaptation is the process where a non-Western country adjusts to Western culture as it begins
“modernization” and development. As this happens, the non-Western country must carefully match and
adjust its own culture and values to the imported cultural items. If it does this well, it will have Western and
non-Western items in its new culture, and it will develop well. If not, it may not develop well, and its
culture may be destroyed. See also longer definition in the Glossary section.
56
Internationalization refers to the process where the “active” West absorbed the “passive” non-West, for
the sake of its own development. The non-West has included Asia, Africa, Oceania, and the Americas, and
much exploitation and subjugation. Internationalization focuses on external, international processes: what
happens as the powerful “core” West absorbs other peoples from the periphery into the global market. It
looks at both economic and cultural factors: what occurs as the periphery countries are absorbed into the
“cultural universe” of the West? Internationalization does not examine internal implications. It especially
considers what happened on the international level through historic processes of colonialism. It can also
study contemporary issues; i.e. what happens on the international level as Western development ideologies
affect non-Western countries?
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economic system, arguing that though on the surface its cultural form may change, in its
core, it will remain non-Western and indigenous.
According to translative adaptation, as a non-Western country develops, it must
carefully adjust its own cultural features and values to imported cultural items. What
happens to a society’s culture as it is drawn into the development process in the global
economic system? If it does so well, it will successfully develop, but if not, it may
culturally implode. A closely related idea is that each nation must customize its recipe for
development according to its own unique conditions. Japan is seen as a prime example of
successful translative adaptation.57 Maegawa Keiji, a Japanese anthropologist, argues that
if development is to truly succeed, the indigenous, core elements of a developing
society’s identity must be respected, not destroyed.58 This raises profound questions
about the viability of universalistic recipes for development and development ideologies
that continue to be preached by major international development organizations such as
the World Bank and the IMF, which in turn are largely dominated by Western nations in
North America and Europe. Japan and other Asian nations sometimes bristle at these
notions, which they often find are contrary to their own cultures, histories, and their
significant, state-led experiences of authoritarian development, some of which are still
unfolding.59 The concept of translative adaptation, drawn from development economics
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See the definition of translative adaptation earlier in the dissertation and in the Glossary. I also use the
Japanese concept of “modernization” to assess development issues on the domestic level. Note that
“modernization” is not the same as the outdated notion of modernization that was developed by leading
Western social scientists such as W.W. Rostow in the early 1960s.
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For more, see Keiji Maegawa, “The Continuity of Cultures and Civilizations: An Introduction to the
Concept of Translative Adaptation,” in Japanese Views on Economic Development: Diverse Paths to the
Market, eds. Kenichi Ohno and Izumi Ohno (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), 166-177.
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See the definition of authoritarian developmentalism in the Glossary. According to this concept,
development, as it has occurred in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and China, is an example of
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and anthropology, more from the latter, bridges those fields, plus development and
technology, very well.60
Internationalization here refers to what happens on the international level,
economically and culturally, as developing countries are absorbed into the global
economy.61 According to this concept, they will be aggressively absorbed into the world
system, in a damaging fashion. Key issues here include what happened to Japan as it
developed, what happened to Japan’s colonies and neighboring states in Asia, and what
happened and happens today through Japanese aid.
Historically, Japan has viewed technology as a key component in its economic
development, improving imported technologies in many ways. Today the nation strives
to pioneer original technologies and discoveries. In development, since ancient times, the
Japanese state has usually had a primary role in directing the nation’s overall path,
alternating between isolation from and interaction with foreign nations. More recently,
Japan’s “developmental state” shepherded the private sector toward maximum
international competitiveness. According to the “developmental state” concept, while
market dynamism is the necessary engine of development, the state has important
functions in managing the nation’s development and trade. Only an effective state and its

such a process. Similar development is underway in many nations, including China and Vietnam. The
cultural assumptions behind authoritarian developmentalism, and related concepts such as developmental
state and developmentalism, are also reflected in Asian-oriented development ideologies such as fukoku
kyôhei, shokusan kôgyô, and others (see the definitions of all of these concepts in the Glossary). Many of
the cultural assumptions behind these concepts are different from those in the development ideologies
stressed by Western-dominated international development groups such as the World Bank and other major
Western donors of aid.
60
Peter Van Arsdale, University of Denver.
61
I mean the concept of internationalization as developed in Kenichi Ohno and Izumi Ohno, Japanese
Views on Economic Development: Diverse Paths to the Market (London: Routledge, 1998), not the concept
of internationalization (kokusaika) in common usage in Japan since the late 1970s. See Internationalization
and Kokusaika in the Glossary.
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supportive institutions can do so. As Japan tailored its own approaches to technology and
development in the 1800s, Japanese scholars argue that today’s developing countries
must find “diverse paths to the market.” But how has Japan’s own experience with
technology and development affected the aid it offers other countries? It is therefore
essential to explore another key research question of this project, whether the ideas of
“modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation an accurate picture of
Japan’s experience with technology and development. If so, how much are they seen in
Japan’s aid policies of today? In this research, I also try to identify useful lessons from
Japan’s development experience as a developing country. It must be stressed, however,
that Japan is not, nor has it ever been, an LDC as they are defined today. In times of
historical memory, Japan has never been impoverished in the same way as today’s LDCs.
At the beginning of the period under study, the late Tokugawa period, Japan also had a
strong state, a national education system, and cultural unity that few of today’s LDCs
have ever matched.62 Nevertheless, it is possible to draw forth several valuable lessons
for LDCs in the present research, and when I can, I will.
An additional history-related concept in this research, technonationalism as
ideology, has long been important in Japanese thought. More specifically, Samuels uses
technonationalism to signify the belief that technology is a basic part of national security,
and that it must be carefully developed in a country to make it wealthy and powerful. He
argues that the concept provides a helpful summation of Japanese beliefs about
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Discussion with Peter Van Arsdale, Sarah Hamilton and Haider Khan, University of Denver, October 30,
2008.
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technology and security over several hundred years.63 One example of technonationalism
as ideology is the slogan fukoku kyôhei.64 While Richard J. Samuels has traced this notion
at length through political science,65 it is also helpful to consider it through the lenses of
cognition and cognitive anthropology.66
To understand Japan’s contemporary foreign and aid policies, technology and
development issues, a survey of relevant factors throughout Japanese history would be
helpful.67 1850, the beginning of modern Japan’s interaction with the West, is a logical
starting point. This study’s consideration of historical influences and trends in the pre-aid
era ends with the period encompassing the end of Japanese colonialism and World War II
(in 1945). With the entry of American forces into Japan in 1945, significantly new
influences enter the picture. It is thus logical to end this survey of pre-aid historical
influences in 1945, to get the clearest picture of how Japanese forces in particular, in the
pre-aid period, have shaped and contributed to today’s aid policies. Many scholars
logically consider the history of Japan’s aid in the postwar period only, since that is when
it began (1954), and 1945 was the beginning of significant American influence.68 Though
American influence on Japan’s culture of aid has been profound, it has been relatively
short-term (now about sixty years).
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Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army,” ix-x.
Fukoku kyôhei (“rich nation, strong army”) was one of the most important development ideologies in
Japan during the period 1868 to 1945. See fukoku kyôhei in the Glossary.
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Christopher Howe. The Origins of Japanese Trade Supremacy: Development and Technology in Asia
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Practice (New York: Praeger, 1975) and Dennis Yautomo, The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign
Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).
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But longer term, equally significant influences, particularly historical or cultural
ones, were also present from the prewar period. To better comprehend the influence of
those factors on Japan’s ODA, this project especially focuses on the pre-aid influences of
Japan’s recent past on its aid system. A hint of Japan’s long-term influence on the region
around it is seen in how many nations, including Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia and
even China, have copied elements of Japan’s economic model for their own development.
Several, including South Korea and Thailand, are also adopting the Japanese aid “model”
for their own emerging ODA donor systems. The one key element present in Japan’s own
development and aid that has carried over to several other East Asian nations is Japan’s
emphasis on economic infrastructure as the foundation of everything else. This, in turn,
links to the attitudes of several key leaders examined here, especially Ito Hirobumi and
Fukuzawa Yukichi, on the necessity of economic development as the foundation of
national growth, survival and prosperity.
Literature Review
Anthropological Theory
Into what broader theoretical debates can we situate this project?69 Chiefly, this
research straddles the main approaches to development anthropology: actor-oriented,
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Twenty years ago, the debate between cultural materialism and idealism would have been relevant
(Robert Borofsky, Assessing Cultural Anthropology [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994], 27-28). According
to cultural materialism, the material and physical concerns of human survival drive other aspects of culture.
In idealism, the symbolic aspects are seen as more determinative. In the 1980s, this debate was seen as
seminal in the analysis of worldviews (Kearney, World View, 9-40). Today’s anthropologists feel that both
material and ideational aspects of culture are interrelated, so now this debate seems outmoded
(conversations with Angelique Haugerud and Sarah Hamilton, University of Denver, late 1990s and Spring
2003).
24

postmodern and applied.70 Actor-oriented studies have studied how local peoples
reconstitute the implementation of development plans and projects.71 Postmodern
scholars have analyzed the effects of development discourse and actions,72 and question
whether development has any value.73 The applied approach stresses the identification of
ground-level effects in development.74 Few scholars have tried to bridge the gap between
these schools.75 The actor-oriented and applied approaches seem most relevant for this
project.76
This research also strengthens the contribution of anthropological approaches to
international studies. In general, the integration of anthropology and political science
work in international studies has been weak, though there have been some outstanding
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Scholars are not in universal agreement about how to divide the literature on anthropology and
development. Here I utilize the three-way division of the literature (actor-oriented, postmodern, and
applied) used by Arce, Alberto, and Norman Long in Anthropology, Development, and Modernities:
Exploring Discourses, Counter-Tendencies, and Violence (London: Routledge, 2000), 23-27. While various
scholars sometimes divide the literature differently (i.e. two approaches), or use slightly different
terminology, I find Arce and Long’s characterization the clearest and most helpful. Other scholars,
including Gardner and Lewis, refer to a similar division (Katy Gardner and David J. Lewis, Anthropology,
Development, and the Post-Modern Challenge (London: Pluto Press, 1996). It can be effectively argued
that most of the literature historically has fallen within these three approaches. There is some work that
crosses these boundaries. One example is recent work that seeks to combine postmodern and applied
approaches.
71
Ibid.
72
Ferguson, Anti-Politics Machine.
73
Arturo Escobar, “Anthropology and the Development Encounter: The Making and Marketing of
Development Anthropology,” American Ethnologist 18 (1989), 658-82; and Encountering Development:
The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
74
Emilio Moran, “An Agenda for Anthropology,” in Transforming Societies, Transforming Anthropology
(Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1996), 1-24; Michael M. Horowitz, “Thoughts on Development
Anthropology after Twenty Years,” in Transforming Societies, Transforming Anthropology, ed. E. Moran
(Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1996), 325-51; Michael M. Cernea, Putting People First; Robert
Chambers, Rural Development: Putting the Last First (London u.a: Longman, 1983); and Peter D. Little
and Michael Painter, “Discourse Politics and the Development Process: Reflections on Escobar’s
‘Anthropology and the Development Encounter’.” American Ethnologist 22, no. 3 (1995), 602-09.
75
Gardner and Lewis, Anthropology, Development, Post-Modern Challenge; Jeffrey H. Cohen and Norbert
Dannhaeuser, “Introduction” in Economic Development: An Anthropological Approach, eds. Jeffrey H.
Cohen and Norbert Dannhaeuser (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2002), xi-xxxi.
76
See my discussion below of this topic.
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exceptions.77 Historically, anthropology, with its widespread emphasis on assessing local
societies, and international relations, with its postwar, “top-down” focus on the Cold
War, found few opportunities for integration.78 Some recent explorations of politics and
culture in cultural anthropology and comparative politics have seemed more promising.79
This project integrates political science and anthropological research on perception,
cognition, worldview and foreign policy for the first time. It also applies anthropological
theory to a new topic not previously studied by many anthropologists (Japanese foreign
aid), although political scientists and economists have examined various aspects of the
subject.
Work on Perception, Worldview, Ideology, and Policy
A foundational scholar in this area was Karl Mannheim, who argued that people
in different social groups often are blinded through their interests and cultural
environments, from which they construct worldviews.80 Michael Kearney did much of
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James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1985); Janine R. Wedel, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to
Eastern Europe, 1989-1998 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).
78
George B. Thomas, “Is an Anthropology of International Relations Possible?” Anthropology News 42,
no. 9 (2001), 7.
79
Some of this fascinating work has included Aaron B. Wildavsky, Richard Ellis, and M. Thompson,
Culture Matters: Essays in Honor of Aaron Wildavsky (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1997); Pearl T.
Robinson, “Democratization: Understanding the Relationship between Regime Change and the Culture of
Politics,” African Studies Review 37(1) (April 1994), 39; Angelique Haugerud, The Culture of Politics in
Modern Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 84; Wildavsky, Ellis and Thompson,
Culture Matters; Marc Howard Ross, “Culture and Identity in Comparative Political Analysis,” in
Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, Structure, eds. Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 42-80; and John Richard Bowen and Roger
Dale Petersen, Critical Comparisons in Politics and Culture (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1999).
80
Frank Bealey, “Ideology,” in The Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science (Oxford; Malden, MA:
Blackwell. 1999), 158; Karl Mannheim, Louis Wirth, Edward Shils, Ideology and Utopia; An Introduction
to the Sociology of Knowledge (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd, 1936).
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the seminal work on worldview, and argued that it is a vibrant theoretical field.81 Others
argued that it had been replaced by ideology.82 More recent works looked at the
connections of identity, worldview, transnationalism, and global political economy.83 My
project builds on previous anthropological work on worldview and perception by
applying cross-disciplinary perspectives on perception and cognition (from political
science and anthropology) to historical perspectives on a highly significant case of nonWestern globalization. In political science, Robert Jervis did much of the pioneering
work on this area, including his studies of how states project desired images,84 and of
how perception affects decision-making in international politics.85 Martha Cottam did
important studies of how images in the worldviews of foreign policymakers affect their
reactions to the foreign policies of other states,86 how images have influenced U.S.
policymakers’ actions on Latin America,87 and how competing images and roles in
decisions affect the behavior of actors in international organizations.88
One of the most seminal studies of ideology examined the impacts of western
colonialism and Christianity in Southern Africa.89 Jean and John Comaroff’s
anthropological study of colonialism in Southern Africa offers relevant insights on
81

Kearney, Winds of Ixtepeji; Kearney, World View, Michael Kearney, “Worldview,” in Encyclopedia of
Cultural Anthropology, eds. David Levinson and Melvin Ember (New York: Henry Holt, 1996), 1380.
82
Barfield, “Worldview,” 499.
83
Edward F. Fischer, Cultural Logics and Global Economics Maya Identity in Thought and Practice
(Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 2001); Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of
Transnationality (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999).
84
Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1970).
85
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1976).
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Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making.
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Cottam, Images and Intervention.
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Cottam and Shih, Contending Dramas.
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Jean and John Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in
South Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1.
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worldview, history and ideology. Beginning in the early nineteenth century, British
colonizers sought to impose two different worldviews on the Southern Tswana—one
religious, and the other distinctly secular.90 The Comaroffs argued that dominant classes
cannot determine directly the mental conceptions of those they would dominate. But the
constellation of dominant ideas gradually sets limits, accumulates explanatory and
symbolic power to organize the world, and becomes ingrained over time.91 Through a
dialectical process of hegemony and ideology, consciousness and unconsciousness, a
new, dominant worldview emerges.92
The Comaroffs’ study raises many issues relevant for the present study—how
the “‘savages’ of colonialism” were drawn into conversation with the global cultures of
capitalism, ideology, and religion.93 How much did Japanese colonialism reflect patterns
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Ibid., 11-12. How do the Comaroffs handle history? Of Revelation and Revolution falls within the genre
of historical anthropology, and seeks to delineate the “…making of a social and cultural world, both in time
and at a particular time.” Rather than constructing a chronological history of events, it explores these
events as a multidimensional process of increasing complexity and scale, with distinct phases and levels
(Ibid., 38-39). For general details about how the disciplines of history and anthropology interact, see
Shepard Krech III, “History and Anthropology,” in The Dictionary of Anthropology, ed. Thomas Barfield,
(Oxford; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1997), 237-240. Methodological challenges here include the
integration of political economy, culture, ideology, and the relationship of structure and agency (Comaroff
and Comaroff, Revelation and Revolution, 8-10). A fundamental question is how culture, power, ideology
and consciousness affect historical processes (Ibid., 6). In this case, European colonizers sought to create
“history,” order and rationality for peoples who supposedly had none. Ethnography, colonialism, social
history and the social sciences are all the products of the nineteenth century Western “scientific worldview”
of secular modernism (Ibid., 14-15).
91
Ibid., 18-19.
92
Here the Comaroffs build on work by Gramsci, Marx, Stuart Hall and others. The Comaroffs’ definition
of ideology is similar to that of Marx in The German Ideology. For the Comaroffs’ definitions of hegemony
and ideology, see the Glossary section (Hegemony; Colonialism and ideology). What is the relationship
between hegemony and ideology? They are two extremes along a continuum (Ibid., 28-29). But in the
uncertain spaces between them, people give voice to their evolving perceptions. As the Tswana people
were drawn under European domination, they resisted in uneven ways. The Comaroffs assert that this is
the common pattern in colonialism; the process is never one of simple domination and resistance (Ibid., 3032).
93
Ibid., xi-xii. These issues include questions such the following: what happened in Japanese colonialism
and imperialism in East Asia and the Pacific in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? How much did
Japanese colonialism reflect patterns of hegemony and ideological resistance seen in Western colonialism?
How did Japanese colonizers seek to impose their worldviews? Did this include Japanese visions of
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of hegemony and ideological resistance seen in Western colonialism? It is also interesting
to compare how Japanese anthropologist Maegawa Keiji and the Comaroffs analyzed the
cultural impact of Western worldviews and processes on the non-Western world.94
Maegawa’s conception of “modernization” is very similar to the Comaroffs’ concept of
colonialism and ideology, except in the latter case, the Comaroffs argued that the
ideologies (worldviews) of the receiving culture, despite providing content, would be
subsumed under the overall form of the hegemonic worldview of the colonizer.
Maegawa seems to suggest that if “modernization” is successful, the culture or
worldviews of the receiving (non-Western) society will maintain their “persistent form,”
and not be engulfed or subsumed under the adoption or entrance of the Western
culture/worldview. The Comaroffs assumed that the Western (or colonizer’s) worldview
will dominate those of the receptor society, at least in overall form, that the receiving
culture’s ideologies (their indigenous worldviews) will be subsumed under those of the
colonizers. Perhaps Maegawa and the Comaroffs were describing the same basic process
with different words. Colonizers are not necessarily Western, as in the case of Japanese
colonialism in Northeast and Southeast Asia and the South Pacific from 1895-1945.
In anthropology, poststructural (postmodern) scholars of development offer
insights on connecting ideologies, institutions, and policy/project outcomes. To study the
ideology of development organizations, James Ferguson analyzed the discourse
embodied in agency reports, and then assesses ethnographically what happens on the

technology, development, and foreign relations? In the postwar world, has increasing Japanese economic
presence or cultural globalization in East Asia led to a re-colonization of the region, economic or cultural if
not political? In particular, what has Japanese foreign aid contributed?
94
See the definitions of “modernization” and colonialism and ideology in the Glossary section.
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ground level.95 This study incorporates more historical background, and more analysis of
how historical experience/ideologies influence the present.96 Other anthropologists
contend that we can also gain important insights about development ideology by
examining the interactions of development actors and institutions. Gardner and Lewis
argue that within planning and project ethnography,
…there is increasing recognition that the realities within which people act and make
decisions are multiple and changing. This is closely related to actor-oriented
research, in which the worldviews of individual actors (rather than passive target
groups or beneficiaries) and the interfaces between them and bureaucratic
institutions are the focus of study….97 Recognition of the need to understand (and
then change) the workings of bureaucracy… is also important.98
Actor-oriented research, developed by mostly European scholars, emphasizes the
assessment of the orientations of local actors, and of how development represents a series
of conflicts between actors of the West and developing societies.99 Gardner and Lewis
conclude that
…anthropologists need to examine the ways in which people and the discourses
they produce interact according to their different cultural, economic and historical
95

Ferguson, Anti-Politics Machine, argues that certain discourses support the work of particular
development institutions. Only supportive statements are included in agency reports. So discourse affects
actual development practice. Development discourse and practice occur within development planning, but
do not determine it; planning is only a small part of the whole development process (p. 68, cited in Gardner
and Lewis, Anthropology, Development, Post-Modern Challenge, 73).
96
Ferguson’s study incorporates little analysis of historical factors, and no analysis of how they influence
the present. Through the incorporation of historical ideologies and factors, I will add further depth to this
fascinating work by poststructuralist scholars.
97
Norman Long and Ann Long, Battlefields of Knowledge: The Interlocking of Theory and Practice in
Social Research and Development (London: Routledge, 1992).
98
Gardner and Lewis, Anthropology, Development, Post-Modern Challenge, 69-70.
99
Arce and Long, Anthropology, Development, Modernities, 23-24, 26-27. Common themes in actororiented works, relevant to this project, include the daily interactions and experiences of varied actors
involved in the development process, how these social relations and development interventions/policies
transform each other in uneven ways (Long and Long, Battlefields of Knowledge, ix-xi, 3-5, 8-9; Wedel,
Collision and Collusion); gaps in perceptions and images projected by aid donors and recipients (Wedel
ibid.); how local practices influence global ones and the reverse (Wedel ibid.); how people, in their (local)
lives, reshape and contest modernity, development and its institutional arrangements, often imposed from
the outside; and disconnections of state policy and people’s counter-tendencies (Arce and Long,
Anthropology, Development, Modernities: 1-3, 9-11, 21-22).
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contexts.100 Research must be actor-oriented, not only through those to be
‘developed,’ but [also] in terms of how individual and group agencies cross-cut,
reproduce, or resist the power relations of state and international development
interventions.101
These interventions are policy or project outcomes/implementation. Actors, whether
individual or organizational, can reproduce or subvert development policies/projects.
Actor-oriented perspectives can help us to understand why, while ethnography can show
us how. Actor-oriented approaches encourage us to tangibly examine how actors mediate
and transform development. They are more relevant to this project than poststructural
approaches. Actor-oriented research shows more effectively the connections of
worldview/ideology, institutions/organizations and policy.102
Another stream of literature, the applied approach, stresses practical responses
to the problems of anthropology and development.103 Certain applied and ethnographic
studies, especially of organizational culture, examine the connections of ideology,
institutions/organizations and policy.104 Hoben’s ethnography of USAID uncovers
important findings about the interactions of organizational culture, ideology, policy and
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I would also add that discourse is an outward, partial articulation of a worldview or ideology.
Gardner and Lewis, Anthropology, Development, Post-Modern Challenge, 74-75.
102
Comparing actor-oriented and postmodern approaches, Long and Long try to show how both can be
integrated in studies of development (Long and Long, Battlefields of Knowledge, 6-8). The two streams
differ in how they treat the usage of knowledge (Arce and Long, Anthropology, Development, Modernities,
24, 26). Awareness of how local actors and sites mediate development is basic to understanding how
development can be practically engaged, and problems solved.
103
Ibid., 25-26. This work looks at a wide variety of themes, including consumption, land and energy use,
property rights, resettlement, agricultural development, and various national and international linkages
(Suzanne Hanchett, “Anthropology and Development: The 1998 ICAES Discussion,” Practicing
Anthropology 21, no. 1 [Winter 1999], 47).
104
A fascinating essay by Carol MacLennan highlights the potential contributions of ethnographic research
for helping us to better understand barriers to democratic participation in American political life. One of
the policy areas in which this participation is the weakest is technology policy. See Carol MacLennan,
“Democratic Participation: A View from Anthropology,” in Diagnosing America: Anthropology and Public
Engagement, ed. Shepard Forman (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 51-74.
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institutional contexts in an aid organization.105 Additional studies highlight the value of
ethnographic research methodologies for investigating bureaucratic organizations.106 The
applied approach offers many significant lessons about institutional, organizational and
bureaucratic cultures.107 Comparing applied and postmodern approaches, the former is
more relevant to this project, since it is equally scientific, and more practical in the
solutions it offers.108
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Allan Hoben, “Agricultural Decision Making in Foreign Assistance: An Anthropological Analysis,” in
Agricultural Decision Making: Anthropological Contributions to Rural Development, ed. Peggy Bartlett
(New York: Academic Press, 1980), 337-69. Key sections in Hoben examine ideological changes in the
U.S. Agency for International Development in the 1970s, its organizational structure and culture, including
impacts of the external environment, decision-making processes, and USAID’s response to new foreign aid
legislation in the 1970s. Hoben also studied why new policy mandates are often resisted. USAID’s
decisions are often made based on past policies. Rather than careful analysis of all of the possible
alternatives, decisions are limited by staffers’ self-reinforcing “cultural paradigms.” To increase their own
impact, social scientists need to study decision-making processes in agencies.
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To really understand tensions in an aid agency’s organizational culture, policy and operating
environments, we need to probe beneath the surface using ethnographic and similar methods (Judith
Tendler, Inside Foreign Aid [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975]). Ethnography helps us to
better understand the inner workings of bureaucratic life by examining behavior in everyday contexts and
events, uncovering hidden networks, insiders’ views, and details about the social frameworks of decisionmaking (Gerald M. Britan, Bureaucracy and Innovation: An Ethnography of Policy Change [Beverly Hills,
Calif: Sage Publications, 1981], 20-21). As trained outsiders, anthropologists can uncover facts that policy
makers or other organizational insiders are not trained/able to see themselves (Interview with Richard
Clemmer-Smith, University of Denver, February 24, 2000). While ethnography offers valuable approaches
for understanding policies, programs, and the wider dynamics in large bureaucracies (Britan, Bureaucracy
and Innovation, 7, 10-12, 24-26), there are limits to its contributions. But they are fundamental and
important. Ethnography can show how bureaucracies work at the crucial level of daily implementation,
and therefore how such policies and bureaucracies can be improved. Ethnography also provides deep,
multidimensional understandings of the social contexts within and surrounding bureaucracies. This can
help us to understand why bureaucracies actually do what they do, not just what they say (Ibid., 142-144).
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What are some of the lessons that the applied approach offers about organizational cultures? To
understand the actions and decisions of aid policy makers, we must study the institutional contexts,
organizational structures and cultures of aid agencies, including impacts of the external environment
(Hoben, “Agricultural Decision Making”; Tendler, Inside Foreign Aid). Bureaucratic constraints on
change are not simply due to organizational inertia, but often are more affected by the social, economic and
political contexts and complexities in which organizations operate (Britan, Bureaucracy and Innovation,
137). The informal social organization of a bureaucracy can direct or hinder an agency’s attempt at rational
policy improvement, especially in the context of everyday operations and decision-making (Ibid., 7, 10-12,
24-26). Organizational rationality is contextual and limited, since it is based on the unique contexts of each
organization (Ibid., 139-141).
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Emilio Moran argues that often, applied work is just as scientifically valid, ethnographically and
theoretically rich as the work of postmodern academicians. A weakness of present abstract (postmodern)
theory is its emphases upon recent theory, rather than the history of theory, “texts” and beliefs, concrete,
ground level realities and actual practice (Hanchett, “Anthropology and Development,” 47). Postmodern
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Political scientist Richard J. Samuels’ Rich Nation, Strong Army is a key study
on history, ideology, and Japanese technology development.109 How does he link the
three? Samuels studies the evolution of Japan’s ideologies of technological development
and national security over time, and how institutions and ideologies interact.110 He does
not argue that ideas alone drive political outcomes or policies, that they are unchanging,
or that they lead directly to national policies. But through interaction with institutions,
ideology is a significant factor. This interaction is finalized in the political economy.111
As they interact with organizational, institutional and other factors over time, ideologies
result in concrete influences and policy outcomes that should be visible in the actions and
pronouncements of political actors.
Many policy studies handle the linkages between history and policy rather
weakly, though there are exceptions.112 What are some other possible approaches to

scholars rarely offer concrete solutions for development dilemmas (see Ferguson, Anti-Politics Machine;
and Escobar, “Anthropology and Development Encounter”).
109
For details about how Samuels defines ideology and its interactions with history, see Ideology in the
Glossary section.
110
Concerning Japan’s experience with ideologies, Samuels argues that Japan’s national security has been
driven by several related themes since Tokugawa Ieyasu united the nation in the 1600s. The central theme
is perhaps insecurity (fuan-anxiety) about Japan’s capacity, as a resource-vulnerable nation, to survive in a
dangerous world. National slogans from the Meiji era onward that captured Japan’s task include Oitsuki,
Oikose (catch up and surpass the West) and Fukoku Kyôhei (“Rich Nation, Strong Army”). Under the U.S.
security treaty, Japan in the postwar era has pursued technology relentlessly, as seen in three predominant
themes: kokusanka (maintaining independence through the indigenization of technology), hakyu (the
diffusion of this knowledge throughout the nation’s economy), and ikusei (the efforts on multiple levels to
nurture enterprises to which such technical knowledge can be given). Samuels argues that these three parts
are the basis of Japan’s own “technonational ideology.” Japan’s ideologies of technology and security have
endured because they renew their value continuously. They have evolved in the context of Japan’s late
development in a turbulent world. And they have survived in a challenging [domestic] environment of
political and economic institutions intended to strengthen Japan’s national security. In his book, Samuels
explores how political protocols link ideologies and institutions of technonationalism (Samuels, "Rich
Nation, Strong Army," x-xi).
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Ibid., x-xi.
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James P. Lester and Joseph Stewart, Public Policy: An Evolutionary Approach (Minneapolis/St. Paul:
West Pub, 1996), xiii-xiv. Lester and Stewart argue that while many policy texts have handled the history
of public policy poorly, an historical or evolutionary approach is more effective. An in-depth historical
study of solar energy and technology policy in the United States is Laird 2001.
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connect history and later policy outcomes? To identify connections between historical
ideologies/worldviews and current and future aid policies, in this research, I conceptually
analyze the possible relations of historical ideologies, their evolution over time, from
1850 to 1945, and later aid-related policies and ideas, especially in Chapters 9 and 10. It
might be useful to use principles from systems analysis, a common analytical approach
for technology, development and policy concerns.113
As an alternative, Rebecca Lynn Spyke offers the following figure to
summarize how various influences and experiences of Japan have combined to form
Japan’s contemporary aid policies:114

Figure 1.1

Influences

The Path to Forming Aid Policy

Motivations

Aid Policy

Spyke summarizes her approach as follows:
This study assumes that Japan’s historical experiences interacting internationally
have combined with its domestic political and economic organization to form the
Japanese view of the world. The experiences and conditions have also led to the
motivations that have inspired particular foreign policy goals. In the contemporary
context, aid has been used to attempt to attain these goals.115
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For example, one could consider both “vertical links” (historical ideologies and the contemporary scene)
and “horizontal links” (between current ideologies and contemporary policies), and analyze them through
the use of systems analysis and systems diagrams (conversation with J. Szyliowicz, March 2003). For
examples of systems analysis and diagrams, see Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 12, 15, 23,
31, 37, and the definition of systems analysis under systems theory/analysis in the Glossary section. But
following such an approach is time consuming, and beyond the scope of the present project.
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The basic steps Spyke follows to analyze this complex process, and the equally complex
Japanese aid system, are fairly clear and impressive.116 However, there are several
weaknesses in her approach. As I argue in Chapter 2, the process is more complex and
nuanced than Spyke shows, involving a multiplicity of domestic and international
contexts, historical and contemporary actors, their views and actions, and additional
forces, at both the micro- and macro-levels, and their evolution over time. Spyke’s study
only examines the macro- level, and lacks the more sophisticated, nuanced conceptions of
worldview and additional, relevant concepts, many drawing on anthropology, that the
present study includes.
In this study, I conceptually analyze how factors from Japan’s historical
experience, relevant contextual factors on the domestic and international levels, and key
leader’s ideologies/worldviews and actions interact and evolve over time, especially from
1850 to 1945. In the final two chapters, I consider how the gradual development of these
factors relates to policy concerns facing contemporary Japanese aid, and to important aidrelated ideas and themes in Japan’s recent ODA policy. I primarily connect these issues
on the conceptual and ideational levels.
Work on Asian Development
What works are especially relevant to the issues in this research? Few Western
anthropologists and similar social scientists have studied the significance of Japanese
development or foreign aid;117 my study is one of the first. In anthropology, this
116

Ibid., 284-301. Spyke’s general findings and arguments about the outcomes of this process are
interesting.
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John Clammer, “Beyond the Cognitive Paradigm: Majority Knowledges and Local Discourses in a NonWestern Donor Society,” in Participating in Development: Approaches to Indigenous Development, eds.
Paul Sillicoe, Alan Bicker, Johan Pottier (London: Routledge, ASA Monographs 39, 2002), 43-63.
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dissertation project contributes to the study of foreign aid and development, on the Japan
case in particular. And among Japanese anthropologists, the same has been generally
true, especially concerning Japanese aid. Maegawa argued that each nation must develop
according to its own conditions,118 while Kikuchi argued for the application of kinship
theory to Japanese development policy.119 Matsuzono briefly surveyed the history of
applied and development anthropology in the United States and Europe, recent work of
Japanese anthropologists studying development topics,120 and the general lack of
anthropological input in Japanese aid efforts.121 There has also been significant, relevant
work on other parts of East Asia, including Bray’s examination of the roles of
development and technology in the rice economies of East and Southeast Asia, since
ancient times,122 and Robertson’s study of state development planning in Southeast
Asia.123
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Work on Japan’s Economic and Technological Development
Political scientists and economists have analyzed Japan’s economic and
technological development and aid policy from several viewpoints. Johnson traced the
history of Japanese industrial and technology policies from 1925 to 1975, and develops
the influential concept of the developmental state, that the state has a primary role in
directing the nation’s industrial policy. He concluded that limited elements of this
concept should be institutionally transferable to other regions.124 Yet much Western and
global development research and many financial institutions have supported the
neoclassical, free market system. Their recent policy tools encouraged structural
adjustment, rapid borrowing, and viable governments in developing countries,125 while
many Japanese scholars argued that each country’s development path must be unique.126
Which are necessary, universal prescriptions or “diverse paths to the market?” Pempel
argued that the problems of Japan’s recent economic decline are best understood in a
comparative historical framework.127
Concerning technology, Hayashi surveyed Japan’s experience in technology
since the Meiji era, and offers specific lessons for other developing nations.128 Japan
views technology as a key component in its development. Morris-Suzuki argued that
Japan’s technological successes were largely due to social information networks that
124
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rapidly spread innovation throughout the nation (Morris-Suzuki 1994). Samuels
concluded that various national ideologies of technology, and successful postwar
development of both civilian and military applications of technology, contributed greatly
to Japan’s economic growth.129
Work on Japanese Foreign Aid Policy
Yasutomo assessed the strategic concerns of Japanese aid, and prominent
Japanese aid trends in the 1990s, especially Japan’s role in multilateral development
banks.130 Orr considered how Japan’s aid system reacts in response to pressure from the
U.S., and its relationship with developing countries.131 Koppel and Orr assessed how
Japanese aid is distributed to different world regions.132 Arase argued that an institutional
approach is the most effective for assessing Japanese aid, and that the institutions that
shape Japanese aid policy were influenced not merely by individuals, organizations, or
rules, but also by international, domestic, crisis and ideological factors.133 Potter’s
regional study examined in-depth the reaction of aid recipients Thailand and the
Philippines) to Japanese aid.134 These are just a few examples of the broad literature in
English and Japanese regarding Japan’s ODA policy. Works generally fall into these
areas: strategic, institutional/bureaucratic politics, comparative, perceptual/cognitive,
129
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economic, cultural/historical, and human rights approaches. More examples of these
areas of work are extensively surveyed in Chapter 2. My study adds a valuable historical
and anthropological component to all of this important work.
Work on Religion, International Affairs, and International Development
Cooperation
Scholarship on religion and international affairs is a relatively new, emerging
field. Two of the pioneering works in this field were Douglas Johnston’s 1994 study on
the contributions of various religions, including Christianity, to conflict resolution
processes in conflicts involving religion in regions around the world, and Wade C. Roof’s
1991 study of the effects of global politics and economics on U.S. religion.135 There has
recently been almost a torrent of books covering both general and specialized aspects of
the subject. Texts introducing the field include works by Dark (2000),136 Hatzopoulos and
Petito (2003),137 Carlson and Owens (2003),138 Fox and Sandler (2004),139 and Thomas
(2005).140 More specialized studies examine religion and diplomacy (Johnston 2003),141
religion and globalization (Beyer 1994),142 religion and global terror (Tétreault and
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Denemark 2004),143 U.S. diplomacy and religion (Albright and Woodward 2006),144 the
effects of religion on the global order (Esposito and Watson 2000),145 religion and global
governance (Falk 2001),146 religion and international law (Janis and Evans 2004),147
religion and global security (Seiple and Hoover 2004),148 and religion and human rights
(Lerner 2000, 2006).149 One Japanese study explores the meanings of religion, war, and
globalization for Japan (Hashizume and Shimada 2002).150 Religion and international
affairs has become a hot affair for investigation in graduate programs for international
affairs in the United States, and several major graduate schools have recently received
funding for this purpose.151 There are fewer works on religion and international
development cooperation. Recent intriguing studies include explorations of the humane
contributions of world religions to development (Harper 2000),152 cross-regional
assessment of major religions as a development aid (Haynes 2007),153 critical study of the
ethical aspects of the roles of social science and religion in global development
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(Salemink et al 2004),154 of the broad role of religion in international development and
international affairs (Goldewijt 2007),155 and of the religious aspects of economic
development and poverty (Marshall and Van Saanen 2007).156
Research Methodology and Analysis
Method of Choosing Leaders Studied
How and why did I choose the particular leaders, thinkers, and scholars I have?
The criteria for my selection are practical, objective and subjective. I began broadly by
reading about Japan and Japanese culture. After identifying influential leaders and
thinkers in many areas of Japanese politics, economics, culture, society and international
relations, I read more about them. Using a simple numerical scale, I ranked each
potential leader/thinker according to his/her relevance to the themes of the project, his/her
general importance and influence in Japanese society, and availability of sources
by/about him or her. These leaders are important examples of how technology,
development and culture were transmitted and perceived by the Japanese during their
respective eras. Many are among the most important or interesting leaders of their
respective periods.
Data Collection
Briefly, the main stages of research have included data gathering and analysis of
mostly secondary data and some primary data, theoretical analysis and reflection. My
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approach is qualitative, as are most studies of political cognition.157 The validity of
qualitative research is strengthened through multiple methods (triangulation).158
To get a broad picture of the main contexts related to Japan and its history since
1850, what happened inside and outside the country, I read broadly about Japan’s
politics, economy, science, culture, and society. From that, I identified eighty to one
hundred important Japanese leaders and thinkers involved with Japan’s technology,
development, culture and politics, 1850 to the present. Third, I carefully assessed each of
those persons, their lives, thought, the importance of their actions, relevance for this
research, and the availability of sources written by or about them in English. Next, I rated
all those factors on a series of simple numerical scales to measure and compare the
importance and relevance of each leader for the project. Then I narrowed the list to about
forty possible top leaders to research. Of those, seven are covered in this stage of the
research, 1850-1945. Next, I read key sources by or about each leader (where possible,
more contemporary ones) to gather data on each leader’s beliefs about the major issues of
the dissertation.
Relation of Data and Research Questions
To answer my research questions, what types of research methods and evidence
do I need? For the first stage of historical analysis, I have reviewed relevant literature in
the United States. This primarily involved scanning secondary sources, mainly in
English.. My research and data collection approaches have seemed focused enough to
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allow me to answer the central research questions well, partly through triangulation.159
But the key issue of perceptions of technology, development, and aid has remained my
emphasis here.
Data Analysis
To analyze the data, I began writing on each leader’s beliefs about technology,
development, and Japan’s foreign relations, comparing their beliefs, and analyzing them
in terms of important concepts relevant for the project’s major questions. Then I explored
how these beliefs and impacts have changed over time, 1850-1945. Finally, I considered
the possible impacts of the leaders’ thoughts for the Japanese government’s aid policies,
and for broader issues related to general policy issues, development policies, and relevant
social sciences such as anthropology and international studies, both in Japan and abroad.
In order to answer the major research questions, I use concepts for data analysis
that fall into three main areas: development, technology, and cognitive issues. My
approach is holistic. I use concepts mostly drawn from political science and
anthropology, and some from economics. For development, I take concepts of Japanese
economists and anthropologists and apply them to Japan’s own experience. On the issue
of how external engagement and internal adaptation to outside forces affected domestic
society, Japanese scholars’ concepts of “modernization,” internationalization (in some
cases) and translative adaptation are helpful.160 On technology, I use concepts from
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anthropology and political science to examine views of technology holistically: in daily
life, and in economic and security policies. Thomas Glick’s articulation of technology is
helpful for domestic society, since it can help us assess the effect of systemic issues on
leaders’ views of society, politics, and their relation to technology, over time.161 I also use
Richard J. Samuels’ concept of technonationalism as ideology, mentioned earlier.162 It is
a key example of how technology and international relations have affected Japan’s
domestic socio-political system. On cognition, I use concepts from political science and
anthropology. Regarding how leaders’ perceptions affected domestic society, I use
selected aspects of the concepts of image, worldview and cultural logics.163
Through this research, I gathered a lot of information about several important
leaders, their thoughts and impacts on policies, and how these things changed and
developed over time, to help me answer the research question and the working hypothesis
that concern how Japan’s experiences with technology, development and foreign
relations, and views of those, have affected its current foreign aid policies. I considered a
second research question (whether “modernization,” internationalization, and translative
adaptation are an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with technology, development,
and foreign relations) by reflecting on my data and the relevance of the three concerned
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analytic concepts to the former. The last part of that question164 concerns what Japanese
aid policy is doing today: how much its aid reflects the ideas of “modernization,”
internationalization, and translative adaptation. For the last key research question, about
the effects of religion and spirituality on Japan’s current ODA policies, I draw on my rich
findings about religion and spirituality in the data already gathered.165 Using the concept
of the Flaw of the Excluded Middle and several others, I consider how spirituality has
interacted with politics in Japan over time, and what it means for Japan’s aid policies of
the present. I note, among other things, that the current constitution requires official
separation of religion and state, and Japanese claim they are not “religious.” Yet in their
daily practice, most Japanese, aid staff and policymakers included, are profoundly
“spiritual.” As today’s Japanese become increasingly disenchanted with Japan’s
workaholic ideologies of authoritarian development, significant new avenues for
expanding political pluralism, civil society, and active “spirituality” are emerging.
Several patterns of theoretical and data analysis here evolved as the research
proceeded, and are dependent on the nature of the data I collected.166 In the course of
qualitative research (and also participant observation), hunches frequently become
hypotheses. They must be checked and rechecked against both data and the researcher’s
164
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biases. That was also the case here. The final stage of my data analysis was conclusion
drawing and verification. This refers to “…the development of ideas about how things are
patterned, how they fit together, what they mean, …what causes them… and then
returning to the data to verify that those ideas are valid, given the data available.”167
Conclusion: Contributions of the Research
This dissertation research is important on several levels. It improves our
understanding of how ideational and historical factors affect policy, and Japanese foreign
aid policy in particular. It strengthens the contribution of anthropological approaches to
international studies issues, in areas where such application has not previously occurred:
perception, cognition, and foreign policy. The project also adds a significant,
anthropologically based component to the extensive scholarship in political science and
economics on Japanese technology, foreign aid, and economic development. In sum, this
project improves the study of the role of ideological, cultural and historical factors in
foreign aid, and about the meaning of religion for international development cooperation
policy, especially on the Japan case. It also helps to pioneer new ways to strengthen the
contributions of anthropology to international studies. As we see from many
contemporary examples in world affairs, from 9-11 to Iraq, Afghanistan and beyond,
better comprehending the human, ground level components of international relations is
one of the most pressing issues of our time.
In this research, I consider how various contexts and ideas have affected Japan’s
aid policies of today by examining key leaders’ worldviews of social and cultural
167
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issues, 168 domestic and international political economy, and imperialism.169 This project
is not intended to prove the influence of particular leaders and their beliefs (worldviews)
on the project’s themes or later aid policies. Rather, I focus on the change over time of
the worldviews themselves, their ideas and content, and how they may have influenced
later policies relevant to Japanese aid.
After a survey of the Japanese foreign aid policy system in Chapter 2, this
project continues with a historical survey of the chief contexts of Japanese technology,
economic development, and foreign policy/aid from 1850 to 1895: Japan’s technological
development and domestic society in Chapter 3.170 Chapter 4 covers Japan’s domestic
state and market, and Chapters 5 and 6, its relations with the outside world, all in the
period 1850 to 1895. Chapter 7 examines domestic issues from 1895 to 1945, and
Chapter 8, international issues for the same era. Final findings on the project’s key
research questions and working hypothesis are in found in Chapter 9, and comments on
possible policy implications will be offered in Chapter 10.
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Chapter 2
Overview of Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy System
Introduction: Contexts, Concepts–Western, Japanese
Foreign aid (ODA, official development assistance) rose in the Western world
after World War II, first in the United States, as a tool to rebuild damaged European
nations, and to forestall the spread of communism.171 As Europe rebuilt, increasing
amounts of aid went to other world regions, including Asia. In Asia, Japan and India in
particular benefited from large amounts of aid, Japan through the 1960s. ODA has been
used as a tool to cultivate allies, protect friends, discourage enemies, and to begin to
attack other problems in international development, poverty, and security issues.172
After the American occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952, Japan began giving
aid (as war reparations) to other nations in non-communist Asia. As Japan grew as an
economic superpower in the postwar period, attention grew to the fact that it did not
make many contributions to global security beyond hosting American bases, mostly due
to the limitations from the peace constitution imposed on it after World War II. To
answer charges that it was a “free rider,” Japan began increasing the amounts of its ODA
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to support the foreign policy goals of its American and other Western allies. Japan also
wished to use aid to improve its relations with its Asian neighbors who remained angry
and doubtful about Japan after the suffering they experienced during World War II. Japan
felt it could also gain support as a regional leader in Asia through these efforts. Japan also
hoped to use ODA to build positive relations with far away developing countries with
which it had no historic relations, so that they might support Japan’s efforts to gain
leadership positions in international organizations such as the United Nations. Aid
assumed a prominent position in Japanese foreign policy since Japan has had few
diplomatic tools available to it in the postwar period. This is partly due to Japan’s painful
history of militarism, dictatorship, and the bombings of Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki
and other Japanese cities after World War II. There are also the limitations of the peace
constitution, which limit, in principle, Japan’s capacity to build up a strong military
beyond that needed for defense, and strict prohibitions, until recently, on dispatching
Japanese troops to overseas conflicts. So Japan has had to use ODA to build its own
international reputation and security, and to support its Western allies, among other
issues. 173
Stated simply, foreign aid is “…a transfer of resources and knowledge from
industrialized to developing countries.”174 One important form of foreign aid is ODA
(Official Development Assistance). The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines ODA as:
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1) given by official agencies, 2) provided with the enhancement of the welfare and
economic development of developing countries as its primary goal, and 3) as recipientfriendly (concessional) and refraining from imposing extreme burdens on aid recipients.
To avoid doing so, it must include at least 25 percent provided as grant aid. ODA differs
from two other kinds of financing for international development. OOF refers to “other
official flows,” which means aid given by donor nations that includes less than 25 percent
given as a grant. Export-import banks of developed countries commonly provide OOF.
PF (“private flows”) include commercial loans given by private banks.175
According to Okita Saburo, through the late 1970s, there were two prominent
lines of [Western] thought regarding foreign aid. One, the efficiency principle of
assistance, advocated aid to countries that could attain viable economic growth. The
other, the basic needs approach, emphasized giving aid to meet the basic human needs of
those in the poorest countries176. By the late 1980s, aid was also defined as having
altruistic or commercial components. Altruistic aid is often for humanitarian purposes,
and carries no expectation of repayment to the donor country.177
Japanese ODA (Official Development Assistance) refers to foreign aid that is
coordinated by the Japanese government. Japan’s ODA program began in 1954, while
Japan itself received aid from the World Bank to aid in the postwar reconstruction of its
economy. From the late 1950s to the early 1980s, Japanese ODA policy mainly focused
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on augmenting Japan’s domestic development, not the needs of LDCs.178 Japan’s aid
increased almost every year since 1954,179 until 1998, when Japan’s economic recession
forced the first aid cuts in decades. The general downward trend in Japan’s aid budget has
continued since the late 1990s.180 According to Hanabusa, through the 1980s, Japan’s
ODA was genuinely oriented toward promoting economic and social development in the
third world, and not merely commercial gain. He argues that Japan’s concept of
economic cooperation is broader then “official development assistance,” as commonly
defined by the DAC countries.181 In the Japanese concept of aid, there is also
commercially-motivated aid, which “ …entails the development of commercial relations
between the donor and the recipient that are expected to bring economic gains to both
parties, even though such gains may not be so evenly distributed.” Successful economic
development involving industry includes technologies, managerial skills, business
experience and access to markets. These are key areas in which the private, commercial
sector excels.182
Japan’s aid has gradually expanded to include recipients outside of Asia, and
strategic, political goals, in addition to economic ones. Japan’s ODA is divided into two
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forms, multilateral ODA and bilateral ODA. Multilateral ODA consists of subscriptions
and contributions to international organizations, such as the Asian Development Bank.
Bilateral ODA includes grants (grant aid and technical cooperation) and loans. Grants
are provided by JICA, while loans are released by JBIC.183 Japan’s new aid policy will
also require increased oversight (and monitoring) of the aid process on the part of Japan,
the donor nation. Usually aid has been provided on the basis of requests from potential
recipients. The majority of Japan’s ODA loans go to Asian countries. ODA loans from
the Overseas Economic Cooperation Operations (OECO) of the JBIC accounted for 40
percent of Japan’s ODA in 2003, making them the “…cornerstone of Japanese ODA
policy.” Japan’s budget for total ODA for fiscal year 1999 was $15.385 billion.184 Critics
of Japanese aid have argued that its true commercial purposes are masked by
humanitarian rhetoric. In practice, humanitarianism is not an insignificant portion of
international ODA, from Western, Japanese or other donors. But, given global
competition and the flexible nature of ODA, it really serves a wide variety of diplomatic
and other interests.185
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The forerunner of Japan’s system of official development assistance was post
World War II reparations, and came to gradually include diplomatic, political, and
humanitarian goals.186 Haider Khan has argued that
…the structure of Japanese aid has gone through several stages leading to
…[Japan’s] emergence as …[a] leading aid donor. …The motivation for giving aid
has changed from purely economic to both economic and diplomatic reasons; …
humanitarian concerns have also been given a voice. …The process of aid giving is
a complex one. Both domestic bureaucratic and interest group politics are
significant. International pressures play a major role as well.187
It is possible to identify at least five major themes in the evolution of Japan’s foreign aid:
diversification (disbursement of aid for foreign policy purposes beyond development
alone, and beyond the Asian region), politicization (the use of aid for purposes beyond
national economic gain, for broader political and strategic goals), multilateralization
(increased aid coordination with other donors, and disbursement of aid through
international organizations and other multilateral channels, beyond bilateral ones), and
philosophizing (allowing Japan to contribute more broadly to aid and development: not
just funding, but ideas too).188 A fifth stage is retraction and accountability (pressure to
decrease aid disbursements, increase aid’s efficiency and public openness, streamline the
aid bureaucracy and bring it more in line with international norms).189
Although narrow trade and economic interests drove earlier Japanese aid, by the
1990s, security became one of the most important components of Japanese foreign
policy. As Japan’s aid disbursements became increasingly globalized, they contributed to
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a broader range of issues, including environmental protection, humanitarian and refugee
assistance, peacekeeping, aid for Eastern Europe, and the dismantling of nuclear weapons
and other threats in the former Soviet Union and North Korea. Aid could be Japan’s
means to help counter global criticisms stemming from its war guilt, “closed” markets,
difficult trade imbalances, and “free-riding” through defense help from the United States.
Yasutomo concludes that the rise of Japan’s aid programs happened through “…necessity
and accident, pragmatism and idealism, fortuitous timing and opportunism,” and
pressures both abroad and at home.190
As noted in Chapter 1, I am applying largely cognitive, perceptual, and nonmaterialist models to the study of Japanese foreign aid. Is such an approach inherently
superior to a materialist, more economic approach? I do not believe it is. Earlier we noted
the now rather antiquated debate among anthropologists about whether ideas cause social
conditions or the reverse (called the debate between cultural idealism and historical
materialism). Anthropologists now choose to view this relationship in a more holistic
fashion, realizing that material and mentalist phenomena interact with and influence each
other. The influence does not go mainly one way or the other. In the anthropological
study of Western and non-Western worldviews, a divide between material and spiritual
forces is also often noted. As discussed in Chapter 1, Paul Hiebert called this distinction,
most common in the worldviews of Westerners, the Flaw of the Excluded Middle.191 In
this project, I discuss both material and spiritual aspects of Japanese worldviews about
technology, development, foreign relations, and other important themes germane to the
190

Ibid.
Hiebert, Transforming, 147-148, 152-153, 195-195, 236-237. See Flaw of the Excluded Middle in the
Glossary.
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research. My ideational approach is not meant to demean material arguments or
approaches, which also have great value. Rather, in this project I have chosen to focus on
the ideational background of Japanese aid. For the most effective understanding of
Japanese aid, and foreign aid in general, certainly both materialist and ideational
approaches are needed.
History and Philosophy of Japanese Aid192
Next I present major themes and developments in the history of Japanese ODA,
over several decades, in a series of tables. This is followed by a discussion of the major
debates over the philosophies behind Japanese aid.

Table 2.1
Theme:

History of Japanese Aid, 1950s
Time frame:
Details:

War reparations

Early 1950s to
1965193

Types of aid
interests

1950s to 1960s

192

Japanese government begins paying reparations (baisho)
to other Asian nations for war damage in World War II,
with goals to promote Japanese exports, access to their
resources, and to recover Japan’s influence there. These
efforts include public-private partnership, and
cooperation of various ministries.194 Unique publicprivate partnerships will become a permanent feature in
Japanese aid.
Economic interests in aid: strong. Political, strategic
interests: somewhat present (aid is offered to Asian
nations in the Free World camp, due to the Cold War and

For an excellent, succinct treatment of the history of Japanese aid from the 1950s through the early
2000s, see Keiko Hirata, Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Role of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid and
Development Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 164-176.
193
William L. Brooks and Robert M. Orr, Jr., “Japan’s Foreign Economic Assistance,” Asian Survey 25
(March 1985), 323, 327.
194
Beaudry, Micheline, and Chris M. Cook, Japan's System of Official Development Assistance. Profiles in
partnership, no. 1 (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1999), Chapter 1. At
http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-9308-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html#begining. Internet; accessed 9 August 2008; and
Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid, v-viii.
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Reconstruction,
recovery from
war damage
Key factors in
Japan’s growth

1950s

Types of aid
offered to other
countries

1950s

Table 2.2
Theme:

1950s to 1960s

Japan’s abundant human resources, national unity, good
education system, wise governmental economic policies,
vibrant business sector, open international economy.197
Japan’s first multilateral aid offered through its
participation in the Colombo Plan. Japan’s first bilateral
aid loan given (to India). Aid called “economic
cooperation” (not ODA) to partly conceal the relatively
small size of official aid as compared to huge private aid
flows.198

History of Japanese Aid, 1960s
Time
Details:
frame:

Aid goals, practices

1960s

Yen loans

1960s

Coordination with
international donors

1964

Regional distribution
of Japan’s aid

Through
late
1960s

195

Japan’s leadership aspirations there), but subdued in
favor of Japan’s American hegemon.195
Japan: aided by massive infusions of aid from the United
States, much borrowing from the World Bank.196

Along with export promotion,199 a main goal of Japanese
ODA is kaihatsu yunyû (the “develop-and-import formula”),
to encourage developing countries to produce primary
products and raw materials, and to improve trade imbalances
in Japan’s favor. In practice, Japanese technology and knowhow migrates to nations with greater resources and energy
supplies.200
Japan begins extending yen loans to promote purchase of
Japanese products by LDCs.201
Japan joins the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). The OECD encourages
economic cooperation among its members, and attempts to
coordinate the bilateral aid programs of its members.202
Asia receives almost 100 percent of Japanese aid.203

Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 5-6.
Ibid.
197
Ibid.
198
Ibid.
199
Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 2
200
Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid, v-viii.
201
Micheline Beaudry-Somcynsky and Chris M. Cook, Japan's System of Official Development Assistance
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1999), Chapter 1. Available from
http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-9308-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html#begining. Internet; accessed 9 August 2008.
202
Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 3.
203
Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 8.
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Table 2.3
Theme:

History of Japanese Aid, 1970s
Time
Details:
frame:

Politicization and
globalization of
Japanese aid

1970s

Japan’s aid to
Asia

19691978

204

ODA offered to various communist Asian nations, including
Mongolia, Vietnam, and China. Offers of aid to Vietnam and
Afghanistan later withdrawn in line with policies of the U.S. and
ASEAN.204 Resource diplomacy: aid offers shifted from Israel to
Arab and Palestinian interests after 1973-74 oil shock.205 The oil
crises of the 1970s lead Japan to seek to use ODA as a means to
gain access to needed natural resources.206 Late 1970s to late
1980s: new emphasis in Japan’s aid on basic human needs, poorer
countries, and on humanitarian needs of strategic countries. Late
1970s: aid policy is more politicized to include strategic and
economic objectives.207 Economic pressures on Japan increase,
due to close economic relations with the U.S., the large U.S.Japan trade imbalance, and Japan’s worries about protectionism
in the U.S. The U.S. and other Western nations put increasing
pressure on Japan to participate in “burden sharing” and to
contribute financially to global security and development. So
Japanese policymakers evolve the new concept of
“comprehensive security,”208 and political and strategic concerns
continue to be manifested in Japan’s aid. The Ohira cabinet
(1978-80) initiates aid to “countries bordering conflict,” “frontline states” of value to the U.S., such as Thailand, Pakistan,
Turkey, and China. Aid becomes a prime foreign policy tool of
Japan for both third and first world nations (late 1970s).209
Renewed emphasis on aid to Asia. Global influences on this
trend: America’s defeat in Vietnam (1975), Sino-American
thawing of relations (early 1970s), implications for Japan and
Asia of the “Nixon Doctrine” (1969), and the shock of riots in
Southeast Asia against Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s visit
(1973).210 Then ODA terms to SE Asia are softened, amounts and
recipients increased. Mid-1970s: Prime Minister Miki Takeo
announces Japan’s new “Asian Marshall Plan,” to bring a
doubling in rice production in Asia, partly through the Asian

Ibid., 7, 12.
Ibid., 6-8; and Hirata, Civil Society, 167-168.
206
Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook, Japan’s System, Chapter 1. The oil shock, plus the “Nixon shock”
(President Nixon’s 1972 surprise visit to China without consulting Japan in advance) showed Japan that the
United States would do whatever was in its own interests first, and that Japan could not necessarily count
on the latter to guarantee its access to vital resources. Japan saw the need to further globalize its
international relations, especially with regions possessing abundant natural resources (Koppel and Orr,
Japan’s Foreign Aid, 342-344).
207
Dennis T. Yasutomo, Manner of Giving, 5.
208
Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 2.
209
Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 6-9.
210
Ibid.
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Aid increases

1977

Changes in
regional aid
distribution

Late
1970s

Table 2.4
Theme:

History of Japanese Aid, 1980s
Time
Details:
frame:

Japan’s
gigantic
economic
expansion

Midto late
1980s

Increasing
globalization of
Japan’s aid

1980s

211

Development Bank. Fukuda (Manila) Doctrine announced
(1978): plan to offer $1 billion to various ASEAN projects.211
Prime Minister Fukuda’s cabinet pledges to double the amount of
Japanese aid within five (later changed to three) years.212
Middle East, Latin America, Africa each receive about 10 percent
of Japanese aid (together, about 30 percent), Asia: about 70
percent.213

Japan changes from the position of a debtor country to become the
world’s largest creditor (1985). Its surpluses near $100 billion.214
Japan’s aid budget rapidly increases after the appreciation of the yen
(1985), resulting in extensive plans to recycle Japan’s economic
surpluses as ODA.215 Late 1980s: Japan has an annual trade surplus of
$80 billion, the largest of any nation in history. It continues to face the
unusual economic problem of having to recycle its enormous surplus
funds, and responds with massive programs of domestic and
international investment, and more proposals for gigantic increases in
aid.216 Japan creates new forms of “hybrid” aid (Minkatsu), which
combine public and private sources to encourage “comprehensive
development.”217 Late 1980s: despite growth, major criticisms of
Japan’s ODA emerge: that it lacks transparency, is corrupt, has
fragmented organization, and no overarching policy framework.218
The U.S. puts more pressure Japan to increase its ODA. Japanese
policymakers increasingly view aid as a foreign policy tool, not just
one for international trade.219 Economic emphasis of Japan’s ODA
shifts from export promotion and gaining access to resources to
promoting Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI), to encourage

Ibid. The Fukuda Doctrine was important because it showed Japan’s new willingness to use aid to its aid
in Southeast Asia for political, not just economic, purposes. Fukuda’s pledge to increase aid to ASEAN
also signaled Japan’s first effort to greatly increase the quantity of its aid (Hirata, Civil Society, 169).
212
Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 8.
213
Ibid.
214
Ozawa, Recycling Japan's Surpluses; and Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 8-9.
215
Dilip K. Das, The Yen Appreciation and the International Economy [New York: New York University
Press]), 1993. Das explores economic aspects and issues related to the Plaza Accord decision by leading
industrialized nations (in 1985) to double the value of the yen in the international economy, and how
Japanese ODA was influenced by the appreciation of the yen. The recycling schemes are explored in more
depth in Ozawa, Recycling Japan's Surpluses.
216
Ibid.
217
Ibid., 7-12.
218
Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 123.
219
Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 2-3.
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Aid and
international
security

1980s

Aid
disbursement
patterns: big
increases,
continuing
focus on Asia
yet increasing
regional
diversification

1980s

220

Japanese firms to gradually shift production overseas. Mid-1980s: 4
areas selected for special attention: rural and agricultural development,
new and renewable energies, technical assistance, promotion of small
and medium-sized businesses in LDCs.220 Late 1980s: Japan’s aid
agenda begins to adopt more global concerns.221 Japanese aid becomes
more multidimensional, global, political, generous, independent, and
Japan becomes an “…international financial superpower.”222
Strategic and political objectives intensify in Japan’s aid, which the
government tends to deny. 1981: Prime Minister Suzuki pledges that
Japan will “…strengthen its aid to areas which are important to the
maintenance of peace and stability of the world.”223 His cabinet (198082) adopts “comprehensive national security” as official policy, but
calls it “ODA” to “areas that are important for the maintenance of
peace and stability in the world.” From 1982 to 1987, under Prime
Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, Japan approves a $4 billion aid program
for South Korea, and limited aid to the Soviet Union and the
Philippines, to voice opposition to the policies of the latter two.224 In
response to the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, Japan joins other
Western nations in economic sanctions against China, but soon
restores aid with quiet Western approval.225
Total Japanese aid flows, 1980: $3.3 billion, increasing to $50 billion
in 1986.226 1986-1989: Era of “capital recycling” Japan approves three
debt relief programs for third world nations to recycle its enormous
economic surpluses, to be disbursed through bilateral and international
financial institutional means.227 Late 1980s: Japan’s aid disbursements
to Asia drop to around 60 percent of the total, yet the overall amount
increases greatly, including to Asia.228 Japan surpasses the U.S. to
become the world’s largest bilateral foreign aid donor,229 partly due to
the size and growth of Japan’s economy, its position in the Western
alliance as a leading industrialized nation, and its desire to contribute
to world peace and security. Japan also needs stability in world affairs
to assure a smooth supply of raw materials.230 Japan seeks to better
coordinate its aid with other donors, and to diversify its aid recipients
beyond Asia and through contributions to international and
multilateral organizations.231
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Table 2.5
Theme:

History of Japanese aid, 1990s
Time
Details:
frame:

Major trends,
events

1990s

Japanese
ODA’s
international
trends

Early
1990s

232

Collapse of Japan’s huge bubble economy, the Gulf War, the after
effects of the Tiananmen Square incident. Increasing emphasis on
humanitarian (“soft”) aid and aid to LLDCs; continued emphasis on
infrastructural, “hard” aid for capital projects.232 Collapse of
communism in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the former Soviet
Union; Japan’s offer of aid to many emerging states in those regions,
for democratization and human rights. 1991-2001: Japan remains the
world’s largest donor of bilateral foreign aid.233 Japan approves the
1992 ODA Charter, concretely expressing goals for ODA.234
Japanese aid flow increases to $70-$75 billion by 1993.235 1990s:
Japan’s government devises creative new schemes to increase
cooperation with NGOs, i.e. postal savings donations for NGOs.236
By the mid-1990s, a new aid activism rises in Japan.237 1998: Japan
is forced to make aid cuts for the first time in decades, due to its
continuing economic retraction.238 Other problems: more public
criticisms of aid corruption, aid to China, and political scandals
related to ODA.239 Late 1990s: Japan’s aid expands to a more global
agenda, including environmental issues, conflict resolution, postconflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, humanitarian and refugee
assistance, development projects, and efforts by international
organizations.240 JBIC is established.241
International factors, along with domestic ones, began to influence
the development of Japan’s ODA system.242 Japan quietly avoids use
of aid sanctions, contrary to American views, believing that aid is
more effective as a positive political tool. Major aid is given for
humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts in the Persian Gulf region
and Africa. Japanese aid has a major role in contributing to peace
and free elections in Cambodia. For this, ODA is combined with the

Keiko Hirata, Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Role of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid and Development
Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 165, 174-176. Hirata describes the challenges for Japan of
offering soft (humanitarian) aid, as opposed to hard aid (for capital projects). Japan is much better equipped
to offer the latter, not the former.
233
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234
For more details on the 1992 ODA Charter, see the discussion later in this chapter on Japan’s aid
philosophy.
235
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Japan's Official Development Assistance White Paper 2007, “Japan's International Cooperation,”
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2007/ ODA2007/ html/honpen/index.htm, Internet; accessed 16
August 2008.
242
Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 83.
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More aid via
multilateral
avenues

Early
1990s

Japanese
ODA in Asia

1990s

243

first dispatch of the Japanese military (Self Defense Forces) to the
Asian mainland since World War II.243 New Japanese ODA to
former communist states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union further expands the global scope of Japan’s ODA.244 Despite
Japan’s large aid budget, and globalization of aid, Western aid critics
remain largely ignorant of the Japanese/East Asian development
model’s possible usefulness for other regions.245
More aid given via United Nations, multilateral development banks,
and Group of Seven nations. Spending for multilateral bank aid
especially increases. Multilateral aid in particular shows excellent
evidence of new activism in Japanese foreign policy at this time.246
Japan maintains its priority of giving aid to Asia, arguing that most
of the world’s poor still live there. Several of former aid recipients
like South Korea and Taiwan now become donors themselves. Japan
expands its aid to new Asian recipients, such as the former Soviet
Central Asian republics.247 With the Asian economic crisis of the late
1990s, Japan receives many requests for aid from other Asian
countries, briefly delays cuts in its own aid budget.248 1995, 1998:
Japan suspends some aid to China, India and Pakistan because of
their nuclear tests.249
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Table 2.6
Theme:

History of Japanese Aid, 2000s
Time
Details:
frame:

Main aid
goals, trends:
increasing
pressures for
reform, ODA
budget fall
reversed

2000s

Aid as
diplomatic,
political goal
continues

2000s

250

Japan’s aid seeks to contribute to world peace and prosperity by aid
for economic development and infrastructure. Japanese ODA
continues to emphasize spirits of self-help, self-reliance with large
emphases on ODA loans and request-based aid.250 2000: Japan
Platform group founded to encourage cooperation among the
government, business, and NGO sectors.251 Early 2000s: desire to
base Japan’s ODA on the Japanese and Asian development model
resurfaces.252 Decreases in Japan’s aid budget continue through
2003.253 Early 2000s: mounting domestic and public pressures
(naiatsu) for ODA reform lead the government to create new ODA
advisory boards and councils.254 Increased global focus of Japanese
ODA continues. 2002, 2004: Both JBIC and JICA announce new
guidelines for considering environmental and social issues.255 The
2003 ODA Charter stresses goals of aid efficiency and quality,
Japan’s own security and prosperity, and global goals of poverty
reduction and conflict management.256 2003: JICA to be turned into
an “independent administrative institution.”257 2005: Prime Minister
Koizumi Junichiro announces plan called “small government” to
downsize Japan’s aid bureaucracy, increase efficiency and
responsiveness to the Japanese public. Japan pledges to increase its
ODA by $10 billion by 2010, and to double aid to Africa by 2008.
Late 2008: JICA and JBIC’s ODA arm to merge into a new super aid
agency, the “new” JICA.258
Early 2000s: Japan announces the goal to use aid as a “diplomatic
weapon.” 2002: Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro announces goal
to use aid to promote conflict prevention and peace.259 Goals for
political development and democracy continue.260 The 2003 ODA

Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 117-119.
Japan's White Paper, “Japan's International Cooperation.” For more on the Japan Platform, see Japan
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Charter stresses goals of efficiency in Japan’s ODA and ensuring its
contribution to pressing global issues.261 2003, 2008: Two more
major aid conferences on aid to Africa convene in Tokyo as a result
of varied motives.262 Japan makes various contributions to global aid
efforts, including aid to China, Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq, Indonesia,
and global issues such as debt relief, NGOs, global health, the
environment, conflict, grassroots development, gender and disaster
relief.263 Many Western and international aid experts from groups
like the World Bank continue to offer significant critiques of Japan’s
aid and development efforts and to discount their usefulness for
other regions.264

Does Japan have an aid philosophy? This has been a vigorous matter of debate
for some time, involving scholars from both Japan and overseas.265 Official explanations
of the main objectives in aid have greatly varied through the years, often according to the
differing priorities of the various ministries that are involved.266 Dennis Yasutomo
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See further comments later in this chapter in the section on Japan’s aid philosophy in the decade of the
2000s.
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Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD IV) in Yokohama,” available
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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, available from
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August 2008. Likely motives for these conferences include the desire to support the humanitarian goals of
the global aid agenda, to increase Japan’s strategic natural resources, and to compete with China in its quest
to gain resources from and influence in Africa.
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See the critiques presented by many Western scholars in Part I of Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid. In
another example, Western aid expert Carol Lancaster calls Japan “…more a niche player in development
aid rather than a world leader” (Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 110).
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For example, Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid (1975) examines Japanese aid goals (including political
and diplomatic ones), what its ODA does in practice (p. 144), its history and accomplishments from 1953
to 1973, Japan’s aid policies, types and distribution of aid, the aid bureaucracy for multilateral and
technical assistance through the early 1970s, and aid policy administration and formulation. In the late
1970s and early 1980s, Japanese international economics expert Okita Saburo argued that aid from the
developed countries should be coupled with efforts of the developing countries to meet their own basic
needs, and that Asian developing countries, with their limited land and huge populations, face problems
different from nations elsewhere. With much surplus labor, the creation of productive employment is a key
need in both rural and urban areas (Okita, Developing Economies and Japan, 6-10, 12).
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Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, 19-21. For example, aid goals for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFA) from the late 1950s through the early 1980s focused on international and foreign policy issues,
such as the early 1970s oil crisis, and basic human needs, while the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) usually stayed with economic priorities, connected with development and humanitarian
priorities (Ibid.).
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contended in the mid-1990s that there is a “mainstream” view that argues that Japan does
not have an aid philosophy. There are five basic versions of this argument. In the first,
Japan cannot develop an aid philosophy, for several reasons. It has historically lacked a
charitable tradition, especially toward foreign nations, and its complex aid bureaucracy
and policymaking processes make the development of a holistic philosophy
impossible.267 A second argument that Japan does not have an aid philosophy is because
one is not necessary. The purpose of its aid is simply to help the Japanese economy and
Japanese firms. A third argument against a Japanese aid argument is that it should not
have one. The request-based approach is best, and Japan’s traditional policy of noninterference in the domestic affairs of sovereign nations should be maintained. A fourth
argument is that Japan has no aid philosophy because it borrows aid philosophy from the
United States or from other international sources. A fifth argument acknowledges that
Japan lacks an aid philosophy, but that it should, to defend Japanese aid policy to both the
Japanese public and to international critics.268
Others contend that Japan does have an aid philosophy. Das argues that
Japanese aid policy lacked a significant philosophy (beyond “pragmatism” and
“opportunism”) until about 1980.269 There are several arguments supporting this position.
According to the first, Japan has had an aid philosophy from the start of its aid, stressing
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An additional argument that Japan does not need an aid philosophy is that a specific philosophy would
violate the Japanese principles of request-based aid and self-help, since recipients best know their own
needs.
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Das, Yen Appreciation, 157-158. Similar to Das, Yamauchi contends that before 1990, Japanese aid was
criticized as an aid system without a philosophy, since it was largely based on the requests of recipient
countries. But as the volume and diplomatic issues surrounding aid greatly increased after 1980, domestic
debate about a philosophy for aid ensued. In the light of these pressures, the government finally prepared
Japan’s first ODA Charter in 1992 (Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 101).
64

commercialism and self-help, at first, for Japan.270 During the Cold War, Japan’s aid
philosophy incorporated Free World, anti-communist principles. After the Cold War,
these ideals have at least partially developed into goals to support leading development
ideologies touted by international financial institutions and Western donor nations,
including democratization, free markets, and civil rights. But Japan’s aid philosophy has
not been political, but development-oriented. In this view, political goals such as anticommunism, democracy, and diplomacy obstruct genuine economic development.271 So
since the 1950s, Japan’s aid philosophy has stressed
…a belief in self-reliance and self-help on the part of the recipient; a request-based
aid philosophy; separation of politics from economics; emphasis on infrastructure;
attention to the social infrastructure and the welfare of the masses. All of these
constituted a Japanese development philosophy that has guided [Japan’s] ODA all
along [through the mid-1990s]. It was practical and results-oriented rather than
political and ideological, which as a rule are obstacles to genuine and effective
development.272
A second pro-aid philosophy argument contends that Japan’s aid philosophy
developed slowly. In one version, from the 1950s to the 1960s, Japan did not have an aid
philosophy, but it has since the 1970s, when the concept of comprehensive national
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A variant on this argument is Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid. He contends that from 1953 to 1973,
the Japanese government claimed that the goals of its aid were promoting world peace and economic
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security came into being.273 The aid philosophy evolved through various stages,274 until
the early 1990s, when Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki (1989-1991) expressed it as:
“democracy, freedom and a market economy must be the framework for any country
offered assistance.”275 With the 1992 ODA Charter, Japan’s first fully formed and
articulated ODA philosophy emerged.276 According to Rix, official explanations of
Japanese aid in the early 1990s were fairly clear about the basic rationale behind Japan’s
aid, but left many questions unanswered, including the underlying, fundamental
objectives of Japan’s government.277
In a third argument, Japan’s aid philosophy finally emerged with the 1992 ODA
Charter. It could not have been developed at earlier stages. Only the unique
circumstances of the Gulf War and the end of the Cold War allowed such a philosophy to
arise.278 According to the 1992 ODA Charter, Japan became committed to working with
the least among the less developed countries (LLDCs) and other LDCs, to address
273

Japanese politicians have evolved the concept of “comprehensive national security” since 1978. It
stresses the use of foreign aid to maintain friendly international relations, to enhance national prestige, and
to show Japan’s Western allies that Japan is loyal because it aids nations that are important to Western
security interests (Yasutomo, Manner of Giving).
274
Information up to this point is from Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 29-30. Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid
Challenge, argues that Japan has had an aid philosophy since the 1950s, first clearly articulated in the 1992
ODA Charter and similar statements, such as Kaifu’s. By the 1990s, aid assumed a high profile in Japanese
society, given the large amount of taxpayer expenditures it entails. According to Rix, in the early 1990s, the
key elements of the philosophy continued to include emphases on resources (and their connection with
security), Japan’s national image, and trade—a focus more Japan’s economic security than on the needs of
LDCs. Some aspects of aid were new: goals to use aid pragmatically, for humanitarian purposes, for global
issues such as the environment, and to connect aid with political and economic reform objectives in
recipients (ibid. Rix, 13, 31, 34-35, 41-43). Inject goals for recipient reforms into ODA signaled a “new
wave,” a willingness to offer aid in a more politicized, interventionist manner, in Rix’s view (ibid. Rix, 33).
Igarashi adds that by the early 1990s, Japanese aid included seven key objectives: “…reparations, trade
promotion, comprehensive security, strategic aid, LDC economic welfare, economic power responsibility,
[and viewing] …Japan as an aid power with international status” (Igarashi, “Keizai taikoku no kadai” in
Igarashi 1990, cited in Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, 32 and 200, n43).
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Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 13-14.
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Ibid., 29-30.
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Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, 14. This suggests that deeper ethnographic research of these issues
would be helpful.
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Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 30.
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“…basic human needs (BHN), poverty, environment, human-resource development,
social and economic infrastructure, emergency humanitarian aid, support for the private
sector, and structural adjustment,” and to strengthen international peace and stability,
democratization, and market-based economies.279 Soon the Charter was augmented with
the Medium-Term Policy on ODA (1999), which stressed goals of self-help efforts in
recipients, partnership, balanced with aid for economic infrastructure, more coordination
with NGOs, local governments and other civil society governments, support for SouthSouth cooperation, coordination of major ODA efforts through the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA), and that Japan’s new ODA policies would be based on the DAC’s New
Development Strategy (focused on social development and poverty alleviation).280 A
significant question is how Japan’s 1992 ODA Charter, the related 1991 ODA guidelines
and the 1999 Medium Term Policy Outline affected the evolution of Japan’s aid.281 The
key question was: how much were these new guidelines used as key influences in aid
decisions?282 By the early 2000s, there were doubts about how much the 1992 Charter
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In addition, the ODA Charter of 1992 stated that these factors would be considered in any offers of aid:
military spending and arms trading, democratization, environmental conservation, basic human rights and
freedoms, weapons of mass destruction, and market freedoms (Ibid., 13-14; and Kevin Morrison, “The
World Bank, Japan, and Aid Effectiveness,” in David M.Arase, ed. Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities
and New Directions [London and New York: Routledge, 2005], 23-40.). Some of the above information
was also taken from these websites (all accessed 17 September 2003):
http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/base/about/overseas/ A23/p15.php;
http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/base/about/profile/index.php; http://www.japantimes.com/cgibin/getcd.p15?ed20030917al.htm; http://www.jica.go.jp/ english/about/01.html.
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Ibid.
281
Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 365, contended in 1993 that while there was little in the 1992
Charter that was new, how it was implemented might be novel, given newly emerging public pressures for
accountability and clarity. The 1992 Charter was related to four new ODA guidelines announced in 1991,
which expressed several principles to be considered before granting aid: trends in LDCs’ military spending,
production of weapons of mass destruction, import and export of weapons, and efforts for promoting
democracy, free markets, human rights and freedoms (Ibid., 360-363, 365).
282
Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, 36.
67

and the Medium Term Policy actually guided policy, since Japanese pronouncements
have, under analysis, proven to not follow actual aid allocations by sector.283

Table 2.7

Medium-term ODA Policy Outline 1999284

Basic Approaches:
Adherence to the DAC Development Partnership Strategy
Promotion of good governance practices
Priority given to individual recipient needs
Role coordination among developing countries, donor countries, international organizations,
private sector, and NGOs
Human-centered development, LLDC needs, and human security
More active domestic involvement in ODA
Priority issues:
Support for poverty alleviation and social development
Support for economic and social infrastructure
Human resources development and educational exchange
Environment, health, population, food, energy, and narcotics issues
Recovery and reform after the Asian financial crisis (1998)
Conflict, disaster, and recovery assistance
Debt relief

Another pro-aid philosophy argument contended in the mid-1990s that Japan
did not yet have an aid philosophy, but would soon. During the 1990s, Japanese
development economists and other policymakers focused on identifying common
guidelines and principles based on the experiences of Japan and Asia, and arguing for
them in multilateral banks and at other international venues. Japan’s aid philosophy,
when it emerged, would be based on Japan’s development experience and the “Asian
development model.” It would offer developing nations transferable lessons based on
Japan’s and other Asian countries’ development, “…the common features of their
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Morrison, “World Bank,” 26-27.
Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 120.
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‘economic miracles’.”285 By the late 1990s, several analysts argued that such an aid
philosophy, based on Japan’s development model, not the West’s, had emerged.286 In this
argument, Japan advocated development based on actual economic growth, self-help,
efforts, and initiative from the LDCs:
The Japanese government advocates the view that developing countries need to take
responsibility for their own development, choose their own priorities, and mobilize
their own efforts. Japanese economic cooperation changes the nature of the donor’s
relations with developing countries from one based on humanitarian assistance to
one based on a partnership for growth. Developing countries have been asking for
years for trade, not aid. Japan has been successful in using public-sector financing
under the OECD–DAC definition of ODA to leverage financing for, and investment
in, developing countries from the Japanese private sector. Japan is very proud to
point to its active involvement in bringing about the Southeast Asian miracle as a
model for other donors to pursue with developing countries.287
In the 1990s, there was also somewhat of a shift in aid policy to “results-oriented” and
“client-centered” aid approaches, with an emphasis on “measurable” and “sustainable”
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Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 30. One of the key fruits of these discussions is Ohno and Ohno,
Japanese Views, a seminal volume that explores the reflections of major Japanese scholars on Japan’s
development experiences. It has many valuable essays, such as Yonosuke Hara, “A Blueprint for Asian
Economics,” in Kenichi Ohno and Izumi Ohno, eds. Japanese Views on Economic Development: Diverse
Paths to the Market (London; New York: Routledge. 1998), 125-144; Shigeru Ishikawa, “Underdevelopment of the Market Economy and the Limits of Economic Liberalization,” in Kenichi Ohno and Izumi
Ohno, eds. Japanese Views on Economic Development: Diverse Paths to the Market (London; New York:
Routledge, 1998), 87-124; Yasusuke Murakami, “Theory of Developmentalism,” in Japanese Views on
Economic Development: Diverse Paths to the Market, eds. Kenichi Ohno and Izumi Ohno, 181-200
(London; New York: Routledge, 1998); Kenichi Ohno, “Overview: Creating the Market Economy,” in
Japanese Views on Economic Development: Diverse Paths to the Market, eds. Kenichi Ohno and Izumi
Ohno (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), 1-50; and Toshio Watanabe, “Designing Asia for the Next
Century,” in Japanese Views on Economic Development: Diverse Paths to the Market, eds. Kenichi Ohno
and Izumi Ohno (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), 201-19. Another valuable treatment is Masaki
Shiratori, “Afterword to the Japanese Translation of the World Bank Report the East Asian Miracle,” in
Japanese Views on Economic Development: Diverse Paths to the Market, eds. Kenichi Ohno and Izumi
Ohno (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), 77-83.
286
Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid (268) asserts that this development approach, based on the experiences of
Japan and other East Asian countries with industrialization, emerged as early as the early 1990s, in reaction
to Western economic neo-liberalism.
287
According to this view, the basic philosophy of Japanese aid is based on “economic cooperation” or
“development cooperation” between Japan and developing countries, not just on “aid” or “assistance”
being given by “donors” to poor “recipient” nations, the common aid philosophy of many Western donors
(Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook, Japan’s System, Chapter 1).
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outcomes.288 From the mid-1990s, Japan has sought to incorporate more accountability,
efficiency, transparency, and effectiveness into its aid, and to de-emphasize more
conventional, large-scale, state-centric programs that neglect the needs of the poor.289
By the late 1990s, several critics noted basic differences in Western and
Japanese aid philosophies. For example, they argued that most Western industrialized
nations prefer an aid approach that favors helping the poorest nations to eliminate
poverty, not helping to finance development of financial infrastructure. Japan, on the
other hand, prefers to help with the latter, providing most of its aid through yen loans, to
encourage LDC’s efforts to build economic and social infrastructure:290
Japan’s view is that many developing countries require capital to build
infrastructure for continuous economic development and that the countries cannot
build enduring democratic systems, with continuous improvements in living
standards, unless economic growth backs their efforts. Sustainably improving the
living standards of the poor through their own self-help efforts is possible only
when the economy of the country is fundamentally sound. The general belief in
Japan is that its support for development in Southeast Asia — through a
combination of ODA, trade, and private investment — played an important role in
the region’s economic development and increased standard of living.291
This emphasis on “self help” is often emphasized in Japan’s aid philosophy.292
How has Japan’s “aid philosophy” (or lack of one) evolved in the last decade?
According to official sources, the purpose of Japan’s ODA is to contribute to global
peace and prosperity through helping to stabilize the international economy, by
288

Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 117-119.
Ibid., 119. For example, under the Hashimoto cabinet, in 1998, the ODA Reform Council released a
report that called for improving aid reforms through “human-centered development” and relieving poverty,
to be accomplished through improvements in areas including: partnerships with fellow donor nations,
country-level coordination and planning, aid evaluation, field office presence, civil participation in
recipient nations. These concerns are integrated with more conventional Japanese aid goals in the Medium
Term Policy Outline (1999) (Ibid.).
290
Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook, Japan’s System, Chapter 1.
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Ibid.
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supporting “…economic infrastructures and social development in developing countries.”
Japan’s aid philosophy continues to emphasize self-help and self-reliance, often through
the provision of ODA loans,293 a request-based system,294 and goals for political
development, such as democratization and human rights.295 This system (of loans, aid
requests, and political goals) is influenced by Japan’s own experience in international
relations and development.296 Since 2000, to try to better customize aid programs for
recipient nations, Japan also initiated the preparation of Country Assistance Programs,297
following principles in the 1992 ODA Charter and the 1999 Medium-Term Policy, the
latter guiding overall aid policies for major recipient nations.298 In the early 2000s, Japan
announced goals to use aid in diplomatically strategic, assertive ways.299 The 2003 ODA
Charter stresses additional goals about the effects and efficiency of Japanese aid,
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This information is from these following websites (all accessed 17 September 2003):
http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/base/about/overseas/A23/p15.php; http://www.jbic.go.jp/
english/base/about/profile/index.php;http://www.japantimes.com/cgi-bin/ getcd.p15?ed20030917al.htm;
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/01.html.
294
Japan’s aid continues to feature a request-based system, to respect the sovereignty of recipients, and to
reduce wasteful requests. The stress on “self-help” is to encourage national pride in the minds of the
recipients. In line with this thought on self-help and reduction of waste, most of Japan’s aid is offered as
yen loans (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 268-269). A request-based system inherently gives more priority to
recipient governments than to other civic participants in an LDC (Ibid., 117-119).
295
This information is from these following websites (all accessed 17 September 2003):
http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/base/about/overseas/A23/p15.php; http://www.jbic.go.jp/
english/base/about/profile/index.php; http://www.japantimes.com/cgi-bin/ getcd.p15?ed20030917al.htm;
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/01.html.
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Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 117-119. These influences include emphases on strong, state-led efforts,
infrastructural development, the need to respect the sovereignty of other nations, and a desire to respect the
wishes of Western and other international donors.
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Some country evaluation reports of JICA’s technical aid to various countries can be found at
http://jica.go.jp/english/publication/studyreport/country (Morrison, “World Bank,” 40, n46).
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Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 101-103.
299
Ibid., 103-104. Yamauchi stresses the “unique” nature of Japan’s aid diplomacy, and the initiation, in
the late 1990s and early 2000s, of special diplomatic goals for Japanese aid in four areas: infectious
diseases, conflict and development, and aid in two regions: Africa and East Asia (Yamauchi, “Trends in
Development,” 103-104).
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especially on the international level.300 The stress on the “Japanese” or “Asian”
development model, on development as a state-led process of trade and industrial growth
driven by industrial projects that feature related technologies, seems to have resurfaced in
Japan’s aid philosophy in the 2000s.301 It has both positive and negative aspects. Among
the negative ones, critics argue that many developing countries do not have the
institutional capacity to prepare applications for the complex Japanese system, and that
the requirement for aid requests mainly from national governments shuts out other public
and civil sector actors in LDCs.302 We also gain valuable perspectives on the philosophy
of Japanese aid (in practice) by studying the perspectives of aid recipients about Japanese
aid.303
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The 2003 Charter incorporates both national and international goals. According to the Charter, the
effectiveness of Japanese aid must be improved. It defines the purpose of Japanese aid as “contributing to
the peace and development of the international community and thereby ensuring the nation’s security and
prosperity,” amid complex problems associated with globalization, including human rights, pollution,
terrorism, religious and ethnic conflicts, and the gap between rich and poor. The revised Charter continues
to affirm traditional Japanese goals of giving priority to aid to Asia, physical infrastructural problems. But
it fails to mention the MDGs (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 270, 272-273).
301
Ibid., 268-269.
302
Ibid.
303
For example, according to Chinese scholar Feng, Japan’s ODA to Asia serves as an important policy
tool for economic diplomacy. Its ODA to China serves in part to compensate China for its claims to war
reparations (Shaokui Feng, “Japanese Aid to China,” in ed., David M. Arase, Buying Power: The Political
Economy of Japan's Foreign Aid [Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995], 206). Fiji-based scholar
Sandra Tarte finds that in its aid to Pacific Island states, in principle, Japan supports such international aid
norms as poverty reduction, sustainability and self-reliance in development, human rights/security, and
advancing its own national and foreign policy interests. In practice, however, Japan’s aid has a large
presence in these nations in terms of amount, but not in political influence, due to Japan’s aid policy
emphases on self-help and on non-interference in aid recipients’ political affairs (Sandra Tarte, “Japan’s
ODA in the Pacific Island States,” in ed., David M. Arase, Buying Power: The Political Economy of
Japan's Foreign Aid [Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995], 250-251). Thai scholar Anuman
Leelasorn reports that technical Japanese aid to Thailand increasingly incorporates international,
participatory norms (Anuman Leelasorn, “ODA from Japan and Other Donors in Thailand,” in ed. Arase,
Japan’s Foreign Aid, 258-259).
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Approaches to Assessing Japan’s Aid
Overview
In Takamine Tsukasa’s analysis, there are five major approaches to analysis of
the meaning of Japanese foreign aid:304 the commercial instrument approach,305 the
approach of mercantile realism306 or strategic pragmatism,307 the reactive state
approach,308 the proactive state approach,309 and the institutional analysis approach.310
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Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 7. For more details on Takamine’s categorization of analytical
approaches to Japanese ODA, see the appropriate footnoted portions in this section.
305
The commercial instrument approach refers to analyzing Japanese aid regarding its connections to
commercial interests in Japan. Historically, Japanese aid was well known for having a high percentage of
officially tied aid (the requirement that Japanese business interests be used for the provision of services or
infrastructure connected with the aid). Scholars associated with this approach include Margee Ensign
(Margee M. Ensign, Doing Good or Doing Well?: Japan's Foreign Aid Program (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1992); and David P. Wright-Neville, The Evolution of Japanese Foreign Aid, 1950-1990:
The Impact of Culture, Politics, and the International System on the Policy Formation Process (Clayton,
Vic: Monash Development Studies Centre, 1991). Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid (7-8) criticizes the
commercial instrument approach as inadequate to explain the complex factors, especially political and
strategic elements, connected with Japanese ODA.
306
Mercantile realism, Samuel’s analysis of major Japanese foreign policy goals, is directly related to the
concept of technonationalism as ideology. See the definition of technonationalism as ideology in the
Glossary section.
307
The mercantile realism approach, developed by Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels (Eric
Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy,” International
Security 22(4) [Spring 1998], 171-203) stresses how Japan’s diplomatic and international economic
policies emphasize enhancing its economic and technological positions in the international system, rather
than its military one. According to their explanation, Japan’s technological and economic security interests
are more primary determinants than its military ones (Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 9). Mercantile
realism is based on the rational actor model, which assumes the dominance of a single, unified, rational
actor in the process (Ibid., 16). It is a variant of structural realism, the international relations theory that
mainly military interests, rather than other interests, drive the foreign policies of nations. Related to
mercantile realism is the strategic pragmatism approach, which refers to Japan’s diplomatic and foreign
economic policies focused on technology and economics. Schmiegelow and Schmiegelow argue that in the
1980s, Japan’s model of development inspired many developing countries in East Asia (including China
and the Soviet Union) and Latin America in their own development efforts (Henrik Schmiegelow and
Michèle Schmiegelow, “How Japan Affects the International System,” International Organization 44(4)
[Autumn], 553-88). Takamine concludes that mercantile realism and structural pragmatism stress how well
Japan uses it technological and economic capacities, including ODA, to enhance its global economic and
political security interests (Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 8-10).
308
The reactive state approach, advocated by scholars Kent E. Calder and Robert M. Orr, Jr., argues that
Japan’s foreign policy has tended to follow the pattern of a reactive state, where its policy change most
commonly results from outside pressure, and where “…reaction prevails over strategy…” (Calder, Crisis
and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949-1986 [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1988]). While Calder concludes that Japanese ODA tends to react to U.S. pressure, Orr
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These approaches do not address the same issues, but answer three main questions
concerning Japanese ODA policy issues: 1) the mercantile realism and commercial
instrument approaches ask what policy goals are pursued by Japan’s ODA and
international economic policies. 2) The proactive and reactive state approaches ask
whether mainly domestic or international interests drive Japan’s ODA actions. 3) The
institutional analysis approach explores how institutional structures and forces formulate
argues that Japanese ministries and political actors modulate that pressure to suit their own agendas and
battles in domestic policymaking (Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 11; Paul A. Summerville, The
Politics of Self-Restraint: The Japanese State, and the Voluntary Export Restraint of Japanese Passenger
Car Exports to the United States in 1981 [unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Tokyo: Univ. of Tokyo, 1988]
cited in Orr, Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid], 108; and Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 11).
Tsukasa Takamine argues that in the case of Japanese aid to China, especially after 1972, Japan has made
its own policies, independent of pressure from Washington. The reactive state approach tends to overassume the role of external pressure, and underestimate the input of domestic political and other factors.
309
In the proactive state approach, Dennis Yasutomo, a major proponent, stresses the independence and
“proactivity” of Japanese foreign policy, and the capacity of the Japanese state to formulate its own
coherent foreign policy that operates in its own interests (Yasutomo, Manner of Giving, and New
Multilateralism, 36-48, cited in Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 12, n58, n59). Like mercantile
realism, the proactive state approach is also based on the rational actor model of decision-making (Ibid.,
16). A major difference in the proactive and reactive state positions is disagreement on whether domestic or
international factors are more influential in Japanese ODA policymaking. The proactive state approach also
supports the concept of comprehensive security (sôgô anzen hoshô), a doctrine in Japanese foreign policy
uniting various political, social and economic goals, first articulated under the Ohira administration in 1980
(Ibid., 12).
310
In the institutional analysis approach, similar to the bureaucratic politics model of Graham Allison, the
issues of what institutional actors or procedures determine and shape policy are asked. In this approach, no
single, rational policy actor or agency is assumed (Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis [Boston: Little, Brown Co., 1971], 10-36, 145-7; and Allison and Halperin in
Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 13). Alan Rix and Robert M. Orr, Jr. use this model in their
discussions of Japan’s ODA policymaking (Ibid.). Rix, Japan's Economic Aid, identifies the bureaucratic
wrangling that occurs among the “Big Four” ministries in ODA policy (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and the
Economic Planning Agency (EPA), also known as the yonshocho (the “four ministries”) (Arase, Japan’s
Foreign Aid, 10). Orr, Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid, confirms these findings but also adds the
influential pressure from the United States In the treatment of Rix and Orr, the model used stresses the
influence of policymaking in smaller bureaucracies within the larger Japanese government. David Arase
expands this analysis by examining the ODA policy system in the broader government structure (including
the ruling political party, ministries and the Diet) and between the government and the private sector. Arase
concludes that Japanese ODA allows Japan to pursue economic, political and security goals simultaneously
(Arase, Buying Power, cited in Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 14-15). Takamine further argues that
his own study goes beyond the “Big Four” explanation of Rix and Orr, and the expanded institutional
argument of Arase (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid) by stressing the importance of competition between
MOFA bureaucrats and politicians in Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (the ruling party for most of the
postwar period) as a key determinant in Japan’s ODA policymaking, especially for aid for China in the late
1990s (Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 15, 158-159).
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Japan’s ODA policies.311 David Arase lists five rather similar approaches to analyzing
Japanese aid, including the conflict of “trade versus aid,”312 bureaucratic politics
explanations,313 strategic explanations,314 ODA as “corrupt and unaccountable…,”315 and
gaps between Japan’s ODA system and the international, Western-dominated ODA
system (Arase 2005a: 9-12).316 In this study, I categorize the major approaches analyzing
Japanese ODA as the following: strategic approaches, institutional/bureaucratic politics
approaches, comparative approaches, perceptual/cognitive approaches, economic
approaches (which focus on the effects of trade interests on ODA), cultural/historical
approaches, and human rights approaches. More details of each approach follow. I also
review some of the major findings of each.
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Ibid., 7.
“Trade versus aid” refers to the argument that Japan has been less able than other aid donors to meet the
ODA standards and expectations of the international development community, due to the historically strong
connection between its ODA and national trade interests (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 9). See also my
discussion of Arase’s treatment of this issue later in this chapter, where I discuss economic approaches to
the analysis of Japan’s ODA system.
313
Arase’s discussion (Ibid., 10-11) of bureaucratic politics mentions the work of Rix and Arase, stressing
that the huge bureaucratic involvement in Japan’s ODA has created an “…entrenched…” system that
“…ensures that Japanese ODA, barring a radical structural reform, will continue in balkanized fashion to
serve national economic and commercial interests and will stop short of meeting international ODA norms”
(Arase, Buying Power, quoted in Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 11).
314
Arase notes how MOFA began coordinating Japanese ODA with U.S. strategic interests, in response to
criticism in the 1980s that Japan was “free-riding” on U.S. security efforts to protect it. Arase puts the work
of Orr, Yasutomo, Miyashita and others in this “strategic” group (Orr, Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid;
Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid; Yasutomo, Manner of Giving; Shafiqul Islam, Yen for Development:
Japanese Foreign Aid & the Politics of Burden-Sharing [New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press,
1991]; Akitoshi Miyashita, Limits to Power: Asymmetric Dependence and Japanese Foreign Aid Policy
[Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2003]; Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 11). Miyashita argues, after
examining five historical cases of Japanese foreign aid, that Japanese aid policy is not merely reactive to
the demands of U.S. pressure on Japanese, but also proactive and strategic, that it represents intentional
action reflective of Japanese interests (Miyashita, Limits to Power).
315
On this point, see my discussion on the perceptions of the Japanese public/media/civil sector on Japan’s
ODA, later in this chapter.
316
On this item, please see the section later in this chapter where I discuss the perceptions of other donors
on Japan’s aid.
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Strategic Approaches
Japan’s ODA may be assessed through the lens of strategic analysis. Japan
became more assertive in the implementation of its aid programs and foreign policy, and
aid acquired an increasingly strategic nature since the 1980s. Japan now regularly
rewards or denies aid according to whether the behavior of the potential recipient nation
is in line with Japan’s economic and political strategic interests. While earlier motives for
foreign aid included export promotion and insuring stable supplies of natural resources,
in the 1980s, ODA became a strategic “…foreign policy tool for achieving political and
security objectives as well as economic benefits.” The government reduced or withheld
aid from Cuba, Angola and other nations for political reasons, and extended or denied
economic aid for strategic reasons deemed important to international Japanese security.317
This reflected increasing activism in Japanese foreign policy since the 1980s. Japan was
no longer willing to be “an economic giant and a political dwarf.” Because of Japan’s
1947 peace constitution, its contributions to international “burden-sharing” for most of
the postwar period have necessarily and mainly been non-military. According to
Yasutomo, no other nation so enthusiastically embraced foreign aid as a cornerstone of its
foreign policy, or increased it so rapidly, as Japan did at this time.318
But there have been several problems with “strategic aid.” Japanese prime
ministers must carefully guide it through a myriad of difficulties involving the budget, the
policy process, and the nature of Japanese aid itself. There have been problems with aid
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Yasutomo, Manner of Giving, 4, 9.
Ibid., 9-10, 14, 19, 22-24, 26-27, 34-38, 41-42, 46-47, 111-114.
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disbursement, the aid application process,319 and other areas, though the government has
been trying to address several of these areas since the 1990s. Because of the experience
of World War II, and “…the sensitivity of other Asian nations to the notion of any kind
of strategic Japanese concept for the region,” Japanese government officials in 1980s
never openly used the term “strategic” aid. They also denied the existence of the concept
to the Japanese public.320 Some scholars argue that there is no proof that foreign aid
“…produces internationally pacific conduct.”321
Historically it has often been argued that Japan’s aid policy forms in reaction to
U.S. pressure.322 J. Robert Orr emphasizes the formulation of Japan’s aid policies as
largely shaped by external pressure (gaiatsu) from the United States.323 Orr also treats the
influence of the U.S. and its strategic interests on Japan’s ODA, including attempts at aid
cooperation and joint projects between the two nations. Concerning ODA through the late
1980s, Orr’s argument sees Japan as largely a reactive, not proactive, state.324
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Ibid., 59-61, 63-64, 67, 70-71. Since the 1990s, the Japanese government has adopted many
administrative reforms to try address these problems. For example, at the end of fiscal year 2008, JBIC and
JICA will merge into one super aid agency. But the main question is, how much have these reforms
effectively addressed actual problems in aid disbursement, effectiveness, evaluation, and other areas?
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Orr, Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid, 6, 58.
321
Klauss Knorr, The Power of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1975), 200-201, quoted in Yasutomo,
Manner of Giving, 119.
322
Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 349.
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Koppel and Orr agree somewhat, but also argue that realistically, it often formed because of diverse
influences, as seen in their case studies of Japanese ODA to various Asian countries (Ibid.).
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Institutional / Bureaucratic Political Approaches
A study by Alan Rix in 1980 aims to elucidate the foundations of Japan’s aid
policy through a bureaucratic politics and organizational analysis approach.325 Rix argues
that Japan’s ODA system, explained as part of its global economic policy, is largely
driven by domestic factors: “…conditions, [bureaucratic] structures, and forces.” He
stresses the complexities of Japan’s aid decision-making processes,326 and applies many
classical arguments of political science studies of bureaucratic politics to the politics of
Japanese aid.327 In Rix’s argument, aid processes are dominated by procedures in a policy
environment in constant flux, in turn influenced by ideas of aid, aid processes and
organization, the priority of aid in Japanese domestic politics, patterns of policymaking,
and the competition of the interaction of agencies, officials and procedures versus the
Japanese government’s aid policy options.328 Rix calls the bureaucratic politics of
Japanese aid vigorous, and its organizational processes resilient.329
Concerning studies in the 1990s, J Robert Orr’s The Emergence of Japan's
Foreign Aid Power (1990) portrays Japan’s aid policies as greatly influenced by the

325

Rix, Japan’s Economic Aid (270-271), draws on the pioneering work of Judith Tendler in analyzing
organizational influences on the policy outcomes of the U.S. Agency for International Development
(Tendler, Inside Foreign Aid). Rix found that a strong factor in aid policymaking in Japan was continuous
coordination of goals, activities and perceptions at the level of the primary workgroup within a ministry or
agency, rather than coordination of decisions across agency or ministerial lines. This is similar to the
findings of Hugh Heclo and Aaron B. Wildavsky, The Private Government of Public Money; Community
and Policy Inside British Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974) who found, in their study
of British budgeting, that effective policy coordination can include “…personal ties characterized by
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complexity of Japan’s bureaucratic politics.330 David Arase’s 1995 study investigated indepth the influences of Japanese bureaucratic politics on Japan’s aid policies. He
concluded that the latter are influenced by a multiplicity of factors, and that institutions
that shape Japanese aid policy are influenced not merely by individuals, organizations, or
rules, but also by international, domestic, crisis and ideological factors.331
In the early to mid-2000s, Arase argued that there were various institutional
factors in Japan’s ODA bureaucracy that limited its capacity to change. The “entrenched”
bureaucratic structure dates back to the 1950s, the era of postwar war reparations to other
Asian nations. Larger ministries and agencies related to aid are linked by horizontal ties,
and implementing agencies, such as JBIC and JICA, by vertical connections. The
political party ruling Japan for almost all of the postwar period, the Liberal Democratic
Party, resisted attempts at major reform, and made it unlikely that effective reform
legislation would be introduced in the Diet.332 Yet Japan is continuing to attempt
aggressive reform of its aid policy system (treated further below.
Comparative Approaches
There is great value in comparative studies and approaches. The broadest, most
significant comparative study of Japanese ODA to date is Arase 2005a, though there are
others. Objective, factual comparisons of Japanese aid have high value. In his 2005
study,333 Arase notes that his contributors, from both donor and recipient nations, offer
many significant critiques of Japanese aid, largely in the light of the latest international
330
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standards for foreign aid, that to improve aid, aid policymakers must better engage and
listen to aid recipients and the poor.334 Next I survey the landscape of major works
offering comparative perspectives on Japan’s aid, including comparisons with Western
and international donors, with Eastern (other Asian) donors, comparative studies of the
effects of Japanese aid on aid recipients, and cross-regional studies of Japanese aid.335
A significant group of studies comparing Japan’s aid with major Western and
international donors, including the World Bank, Britain, Sweden, Australia, the United
States, and Canada, appears in Arase’s Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New
Directions (2005).336 They compare Japanese ODA with prevailing international norms
of ODA in such areas as “…field presence, policy coordination, user-friendly aid
procedures, priority of lowest income countries, partnership with other government
donors [and] …civil society actors…; and priority accorded to human development.”337
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Major cross-regional, comparative studies of Japanese aid include Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid;
Douglas A. Van Belle, Jean-Séb astien Rioux, and David M. Potter, Media, Bureaucracies and Foreign
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York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); and Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid. Van Belle et al explores the influence
of media coverage on how foreign aid is allotted by five major donor nations, including Japan. They find
that more media coverage of particular recipients correlates with increased aid offers. For more comments
on the other two works, see the comments that follow.
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America: Comparative Observations on Social Development Initiatives,” in David M. Arase, Japan's
Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions (London: Routledge, 2005), 95-103, presents a
comparison of social development aid from the United States, Latin America and Europe. Rix (in “Japanese
and Australian ODA,” in David M. Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions
[London and New York: Routledge, 2005], 104-116) compares Australian and Japanese ODA, while
Beaudry-Somcynsky looks at Canadian and Japanese ODA (Micheline Beadry-Somcynsky, “Japanese
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Among the findings are that Japan’s ODA focuses heavily on the construction of
infrastructure, the need for Japan to develop a more effective structure for aid
management and core competence, that it can learn valuable lessons from other donors,
and that there are possibilities for cooperation between Japan and other major donors.338
The ways in which Japan’s ODA system differs from those of Western countries include
the higher (yen) loan component in Japanese aid (to support “self-help” ideals in recipient
nations), a higher emphasis on the development of economic infrastructure, a major
regional emphasis on Asia,339 and its overall philosophy of aid.
Other notable studies comparing Japan’s ODA system with Western and
international aid systems include studies of development cooperation policies in Japan,
the United States and Germany,340 in Japan and Germany,341 of Japan’s ODA system
within the international aid system and comparisons with major Western systems,342 and
of major trends in Japan’s ODA policy compared to other national and international
donors.343 King and McGrath study the role of knowledge in the aid policies of several
major donors, including Japan.344 David Arase’s essay “Japan’s and the United States’
Bilateral ODA Programs” provides a valuable overall comparison of the bilateral aid
systems in the United States and Japan, including their aid philosophies, schemes, and
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administrations.345 Lancaster’s 2007 study Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development,
Domestic Politics explores the impact of domestic politics in five nations, including
Japan, on aid donor policy decisions.346
A new, emerging area of comparative study is comparisons with “Eastern”
(Non-Western, often Asian) donors, such as South Korea, the People’s Republic of
China, India and Taiwan.347 In their comparative study of Japanese and South Korean aid,
Kim and Seddon’s 2005 essay notes numerous similarities between the Japanese and
South Korean aid programs. South Korea’s program was intentionally structured with
Japan as its model.348 While there are several differences in the two systems,349 soon both
may face similar struggles: demands of highly varied domestic bureaucratic interests and
external pressures to meet international (largely Western) aid standards for partnership
with donors and recipients, and for poverty reduction.350 To date, there have been few
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comparative studies of the aid systems of Japan and other non-Western donors.351 There
are many interesting possibilities. Beyond comparing the histories, structural features,
philosophies, strategic functions or distribution and contribution patterns of these
emerging systems, a rich field for investigation is comparative study of the impacts of
non-Western aid systems on other regions,352 perhaps contrasted with Western and/or
international/multilateral systems.353
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Major comparative studies of the effects of Japanese aid on aid recipients
include Koppel and Orr’s 1993 study, one of the first studies to comparatively analyze
Japanese aid policy by studying how it has unfolded in various countries and regions.354
Their unique contribution is to examine what Japan’s aid does through recipient countryfocused analyses of Japan’s bilateral economic and political relations, in an attempt to
explain variation in Japanese ODA policies.355 They conclude that in the late 1980s, a
variety of bilateral relationships and influences, pressures from Japan’s obligations to the
United States and the West, and Japan’s international “obligations” influenced Japan’s
ODA policies. Japan’s ODA was not so hugely different from that of other countries, but
its management of ODA was.356 Marie Söderberg’s 1996 study examines the business
aspects and effects of Japanese aid in several Asian countries.357 David Potter’s 1996 and
1997 studies compare two Southeast Asian recipients’ experiences.358 Schraeder, Hook
and Taylor’s 1998 essay compares the effects of foreign aid flows from four major
industrialized donor nations (France, Japan, Sweden, and the United States) on Africa in
the 1980s.359 Arase 2005 study360 includes several brief studies of Japan’s aid to countries
Robert Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming); and Harsh Pant, “China in
Africa: The Push Continues But All’s Not Well,” Defense &; Security Analysis 24, no. 1, (2008), 33-43.
Yet so far there are no studies comparing the African aid efforts of these three nations. How will these
plans unfold, how do they compare, and what will be their impacts?
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84

and regions in Asia, the Pacific, and beyond, including recipients’361 and other donors’362
viewpoints.
A key area of current interest among scholars is the comparison of Japan’s ODA
system and its performance with international ODA norms and standards.363 Both
Japanese and international norms have evolved over time.364 Prevailing international
norms that emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s include a new “results-oriented”
emphasis on “development partnerships” for poverty alleviation through measurable
progress and improved “stakeholder coordination.” In 2000, the United Nations’
Millennium Summit approved eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that seek to
strengthen aid donor and recipient cooperation so that poverty alleviation may be
360

Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid.
These include Japan’s aid to Pakistan (Tahir Andrabi, “Japanese Aid to Pakistan,” in Japan's Foreign
Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions, ed. David M. Arase [London: Routledge, 2005], 193-202), to
China (Feng, “Japanese Aid to China”), to South and Southeast Asia (Haider A. Khan, “Japanese Aid to
South and Southeast Asia: a Comparative Analysis,” In Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New
Directions, ed. David M. Arase [London; New York: Routledge, 2005], 224-234]), Pacific island states
(Tarte, “Japan’s ODA”), and Thailand (Leelasorn, “ODA from Japan”). I will discuss several of these
studies later in this chapter in the section on perceptual and cognitive approaches to analyzing Japan’s
ODA.
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Commonwealth. But Japan has had to develop governance and foreign aid mechanisms for LDCs much
more rapidly (Seddon, 41-46).
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Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid (354) question the eventual effects of new ODA goals
incorporating humanitarianism, environmentalism and democratization, and Japan’s increasing multilateral
contributions. David Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid (131) finds that the bilateral ODA systems of the United
States and Japan are gradually growing similar in their mutual recognition of the value of international aid
goals encompassing areas such as aid partnerships, sustainability, gender, and NGOs.
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Some of the international norms prevalent in the past included a stress on quantitatively measured inputs
(such as aid quantity, regional, sectoral and income group-based allocations of aid, and concessionalities) in
the 1960s and 1970s. By the 1980s, knowledge of the success of industrial-led development in East Asia,
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improved.365 These new goals have resulted in new methods of aid delivery that stress
“country-led strategies” (“poverty-reduction strategy papers,” PRSPs) in development
jargon), aiming to encourage increased “ownership” over aid by recipients and
partnerships between them and other actors (domestic and international civil society
groups and others) on the local level. Donors are also expected to improve their
partnerships and coordination of aid efforts with other so all these efforts can encourage
more effective achievement of the MDGs in each nation. Meeting these goals is a
challenge for all bilateral aid donors, but particularly for Japan, which Arase contends
likely does not have the “…structures,” protocols, or staff to achieve the flexible
coordination of interests demanded by this new participatory, on-the-ground method of
aid delivery.366 Some of the major possible lessons emerging from Arase’s 2005
comparison of Japanese aid with new international aid standards are that the former is
well intended, but largely incapable of responding to international pressures for new
norms, due to the structural weaknesses of Japanese ODA administration.367 Several aid
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The Millennium Development Goals are: “1) to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 2) to achieve
universal primary education; 3) to promote gender equality and empower women; 4) to reduce child
mortality; 5) to improve maternal health; 6) to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; 7) to ensure
environmental sustainability; and 8) to develop a global partnership for development, which emphasizes
close coordination involving donors, recipients, the private sector, and all levels of civil society in each
endeavor.” These goals are further “…broken down into 18 policy targets with 48 progress indicators…” to
allow donor to better focus, monitor and measure their progress (Ibid., 8-9).
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Ibid., 7-9. Carol Lancaster asserts that in the 1970s, in its aid agencies, consulting firms and NGOs,
Japan lacked adequately trained staff to implement aid to meet basic human needs on the local level
(Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 119). Though challenging, given new priorities for social development at JICA
since 2003, and new graduate programs in international development, this situation should gradually
change.
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Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 13-14, 267. According to Arase, scholars and aid experts praise Japanese
aid projects’ overall quality and quantity, and Japan’s recent attempts to strengthen aid delivery methods,
they note other limitations. These include poor clarity and a mismatch between ODA policy goals and
implementation, due to administrative issues; poor overall policy coherence; rather inflexible policymaking
and excessively complicated implementation; a struggle to meet recipient needs in technical cooperation
programs; a generally poor capability in meeting diverse recipient needs; the need to increase policy
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practitioners from JICA take issue with many of these criticisms, arguing that somehow
Japanese aid has a big image problem.368
Perceptual, Cognitive Approaches
These approaches, consisting of the study of the perceptions of Japanese foreign
aid by Japanese, other aid donors, and aid recipients, can greatly enrich our understanding
of foreign aid, how it is seen, and how it has developed. Some of this work is
comparative. In his study of Japanese ODA to China, Takamine argues that multiple
perceived national interests, commercial, strategic, political, and diplomatic (among
others), drive Japanese ODA policy.369 Japanese aid can promote multiple interests and
policy objectives at the same time. He also argues that Japanese ODA policy is driven
more by domestic interests than by international pressures. These policies are not made
by a central or unitary, rational authority, but more determined by
…bargaining (or politics) among different domestic actors with competing
perceptions of national, organisational and personal interests. It is primarily the shift
in the balance of aid policy-making power among these different actors [and their
perceptions] that brings about changes in Japanese ODA policy and the goals of that
policy.”370

dialogue with recipients and other aid donors, especially at the national level; and the fairly weak presence
of aid staff in the field (Ibid.).
368
Yamamoto Aiichiro and Kuwajima Kyoko, “Whither Japanese Aid?” Social Science Japan Journal, Vol.
9, no. 6 (2006), 276, 280. Yamamoto and Kuwajima defend aspects of Japan’s ODA policy, arguing that it
is not excessively tied, or unconcerned for international norms of poverty alleviation. Rather, they argue it
attempts to address poverty comprehensively, through infrastructural growth including social development.
They defend JICA’s technical aid, countering that Japan has “long experience” in partnering with local
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Aid programs inevitably have certain effects on aid recipients, and perceptions of those
influence future aid policies. Assessing perceptions of Japan’s ODA is vital in analyzing
Japan’s aid policymaking.371
My study aims to uncover some of the key historical perceptions and ideas that
lay at the root of the Japanese aid system. Such a nuanced understanding is necessary, to
better comprehend what is happening in Japanese aid policymaking, and why. For more
breadth and richness of analysis, it is useful to study and compare the perceptions of four
groups, to start: 1) the Japanese public, media and civil sector, 2) Japanese ODA experts,
3) other aid donors, and 4) aid recipients, their people and communities (the grassroots
level affected by Japanese aid), both short- and long-term. Though such study is beyond
the scope of this study, I will highlight several in the following paragraphs.
Concerning the perceptions of the Japanese public, media and the civil sector,
until

the late 1980s or so, Japan’s ODA did not receive too much public or press attention

in Japan, but this changed as it gained a higher profile, both domestically and
internationally, and took more funds from Japanese taxpayers.372 In this period, Japanese
aid emerged as a key source of controversy and publicity in Japan’s popular media. Many
scandals and other reports of aid problems resulted in much press coverage, in
newspapers and books. The Japanese public also liked to hear about the achievements of
Japan’s aid. This media attention reflected increased public attention to aid. The Japanese
government could not ignore the emerging debate.373
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Non-academics in Japan’s popular media, opposition parties, civil society, and
even within the government have leveled critiques of Japanese ODA system since the
1980s.374 They have criticized the policy system as wasteful, corrupt, unclear,
unaccountable, and inconsiderate of recipients’ needs. This pressure has created more
transparency and accountability, encouraging the 1992 ODA Charter, and limited NGO
involvement in the aid policy process.375 As Japanese ODA goals have become more
public and visible due to documents such as the 1992 ODA Charter and new movements
for more public accountability, it has indeed faced increased public scrutiny.376
In the early 1990s, Japan’s young non-governmental organization (NGO)
community also reflected this rapidly emerging public concern.377 Overall, this increased
public scrutiny has put more pressure on the government for public openness than it
would have preferred. In general, aid officials and bureaucrats have borne more pressure
to respond than politicians. Increased pressure on Japan’s ODA system emerged on three
sides, from: expanded public awareness about aid, greater media coverage of aid
problems, and greater public involvement in NGOs. Greater public pressure undoubtedly
created more pressure for reform of the ODA system.378 Hirata Keiko argues that the
economic decline of Japan in the early 1990s sped the weakening of the “iron triangle” of
Japan’s postwar political establishment of the LDP, business, and the bureaucracy,
374
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creating unprecedented space for the emergence of Japan’s civil society and increasingly
assertive NGO community. Hirata sees Japan’s ODA policy as the key foreign policy
arena where NGOs and the state interact and where the former press for ODA reform.
She seeks a more nuanced understanding of state-society relations that may be a model
for other East Asian nations imitating Japan’s development model.379 She concludes that
today there are more opportunities for citizens’ involvement in Japan’s aid/development
activities, that the developmental state has weakened,380 more are involved in civil
society, political pluralism has increased, and that millions of Japanese support more
NGO involvement in ODA.381
Regarding the perceptions of Japanese aid experts, Rix’s 1980 study notes how
several past studies of Japanese aid and policy attributed its patterns to primarily
perceptual factors,382 and assumed that Japanese perceptions of aid were fairly uniform.
Rix realistically disagrees, concluding that the process of Japan’s aid policymaking is
much too complex and subject to too many influences for such an explanation to be
effective.383 The cumulative effect of varied forces and relationships concerning aid,
along with organizational influences, conflicting ideas and perceptions of aid of the
relevant ministries and agencies, has produced different processes for varied types of
379
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Hirata argues that while the developmental state successfully built the Japanese state from the 1950s to
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aid.384 Competition among ministries, ideologies, structures, and perceptions contributed
to bureaucratic change regarding Japanese aid, but Rix argues that through the late 1970s,
bureaucratic interests were the main force driving how Japanese economic cooperation
and aid policies were expressed.385 Boundaries around policies are constantly in flux as
they interact with changing structures, procedures, and bureaucratic power shifts. These
shifts affect how policymaking happens and how it is perceived. Before the late 1970s,
shifting policies and perceptions of Japan’s aid helped hide inter-ministerial conflicts, but
this became harder as public goals for aid became more visible. Rix contends that this
increased visibility would harden and narrow Japanese perceptions of aid,386 but has this
been the case? How have perceptions of aid affected the aid policy process in Japan,
whether within or outside the bureaucracy?
The first extensive treatment of Japanese ODA in mainstream literature in Japan
occurred from 1973 to 1975, before and after the first oil shock. Its general findings
pointed to economic concerns as a major factor in Japan’s ODA, the challenges of
Japan’s complex aid bureaucracy, the regional focus on Asia, and Japan’s tough
standards for granting aid. Many complained that Japan’s ODA was subservient to the
United States. A second period of extensive treatment happened in the late 1980s to the
1990s, focusing on the conditions, politics, rationales, effectiveness, impacts, and policy
processes of Japan’s ODA. Much of the second stream of literature was critical, alleging
ODA policy’s high level of corruption, negative effects on the environment, over
politicization and emphasis on infrastructural development, and selfish, consuming
384
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nature.387 A pro-Japanese school of literature also arose in the early 1990s, arguing that
Japan’s aid was the most liberal and untied of all major donors, more multidimensional
than other donors’ aid, a motivator of change in LDCs, including democratic values,
infrastructural development in Asia, a valuable diplomatic tool, an integral part in sharing
Japan’s development expertise, and a foundation of its continuing global engagement.388
A weakness of Japanese and foreign literatures on Japan’s ODA through the mid-1990s
was their emphasis on bilateral aid, to the neglect of Japan’s multilateral efforts.389 In the
early 1990s, most Japanese aid experts attributed the motives behind Japanese aid as
“…economic welfare and security, self-aggrandisement, and political influence and
leverage.” Rix also called motivations for aid a result of various gimu (duties) of Japan as
a main regional and global economic power.390
Among other subjects, Takamine studies Japanese aid experts’ perceptions of
the political, social and economic effects of Japan’s massive aid to China on that
country’s development.391 Japan’s aid to China began in 1979, with only brief
interruptions following China’s Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 and brief tensions in
387
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own work. See also the brief discussion of Japan’s regional and multilateral aid efforts later in this chapter.
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Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 29-30. Problems with these explanations included shifting priorities, unclear
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391
The two questions Takamine investigates are 1) how Japan’s China ODA policymakers, specialists, and
academics perceive the effects of Japan’s aid on China, and 2) the relationship between these perceived
effects and the Japanese government’s policy goals, seen in its aid to China. Takamine acknowledges the
impossibility of proving direct cause and effect between Japan’s ODA and China’s development in various
sectors. The chapter on the effects of Japan’s ODA on China shows how Japan’s China aid policymakers
assess those effects, and correlations between Japan’s ODA and development effects in China. Takamine
notes the importance of the perceptions of Japan’s policymakers, since they had direct effects on future
decisions on Japan’s aid to China (Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 136). From the Japanese side, he
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2006.392 Japanese aid experts generally conclude that Japan’s aid to China has brought
positive changes in China’s economic development, increased its market reforms, helped
to better integrate it into the world economy, encouraged more pluralism in Chinese
society, and opportunities for further political reforms.393 In the view of these experts,
Japan’s aid to China has encouraged the latter’s transition from Communist
totalitarianism to an authoritarian developmental state, and deepened Sino-Japanese
economic relations to the point that neither state can afford serious conflict with the
other.394
On the perceptions of other aid donors, in the early 1990s, Rix noted the general
international image problems Japan had to handle concerning its ODA.395 Canadian aid
practitioners Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook find that the Japanese aid system is highly
complex and hard for outsiders to understand.396 This hampers its cooperation with other
donors. In Marie Söderberg’s 2005 study of Swedish perceptions of Japanese foreign aid,
Swedish aid and foreign policy experts characterize Japanese aid as lagging twenty years
behind [Sweden’s system], complicated, bureaucratic, dictated by Tokyo, heavily
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unemployment, gaps between development in rural and urban areas, East and West China, and in income
(Ibid., 137).
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stressing infrastructure, and weak in transparency, human rights and democracy issues.397
Other critiques by international experts have recently stressed gaps in the effectiveness of
Japan’s ODA system compared with international, Western-dominated norms. They
commonly focus on how to improve the performance of Japanese aid by helping it to
come more in line with those standards. Critiques often look at the “policy coherence”
and “administrative organization” of Japan’s ODA (both criticized as fragmented).398 The
most common suggestions are for the Japanese government to implement a more unified,
national level aid strategy, to be carried out by a national, cabinet-level agency. Arase
concludes that such critiques may be somewhat naïve, but serve to highlight for Japanese
national policymakers key problems and possible answers for Japan’s ODA policy
system.399
In the eyes of some, despite huge amounts of Japanese ODA since the late
1980s, it has had big image problems in the West. These problems may stem from
Japan’s emphasis on state-led development, seemingly contrary to free market
preferences of the United States, the World Bank and other Western donors, poor mastery
of English, timidity in asserting its ideas in international forums, and difficulties in
realigning its ODA structures to better meet new global norms. Ultimately, Lancaster
charges that Japan has become a “niche player,” not a global leader in aid.400 Western
observers of Japanese aid have recently offered various lessons for Japan’s aid, based on
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Western and multilateral systems,401 but fail to adequately recognize lessons that
Japanese or other Eastern systems may offer their own systems,402 namely, how actual
economic development can really happen. Is this ethnocentric?403
Through the early 1990s, there were many studies of Japanese aid and of Japan
as a donor, but few studies of Japanese aid recipients, especially of the impacts of Japan’s
ODA at the grassroots level.404 Arase’s 2005 study includes several studies of Latin
American, Chinese, South Asian, Southeast Asian and South Pacific recipients’
perceptions of Japanese aid.405 While these studies note recipients’ positive appraisals of
several distinctive contributions of Japanese aid, such as its sectoral, infrastructural and
regional strengths and high levels of funding, they mention weaknesses noted by other
donors, including struggles with sustainability, adjusting to local needs, transfer of
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For example, Keith Morrison argues that Japan should decrease its economic infrastructural allocations,
increase social allocations, decentralize aid staff and decisions to the country level, improve aid
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technology, and appropriateness of project design. Among the findings are that Japanese
aid needs increased flexibility, field presence, and soft aid/social analysis capabilities.406
Several commentators note the predominantly state-to-state nature of Japan’s ODA
efforts, and its weaker capabilities on the ground.407
David M. Potter’s work on Japanese aid to Southeast Asia, focusing on aid
recipients, finds that recipients obtain funding for many desired projects as they learn to
tailor their requests to the Japanese ODA system. 408 Söderberg studies the
implementation of Japanese aid to four Asian nations,409 from donor and recipient
viewpoints.410 Recipients exercise considerable influence.411 Multiple actors in both
donor and recipient nations, including opinion makers, politicians, bureaucrats, the
business community, the media and the public, can influence the process, and do. What
transpires depends on differentials in each case, project, and country.412 On aid to South
and Southeast Asia, Haider Khan finds that while Japanese aid has contributed
successfully to budget issues for some recipient governments, it is too donor oriented,
and weak in addressing ground level recipient issues.413 Aid recipients in Bangladesh and
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levels, not grassroots development projects representing local needs. This emphasis in Japanese aid may
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Indonesia find Japanese aid to be chiefly geared toward economic and humanitarian
purposes, and better than aid from the United States, but too bureaucratic, opaque, and
donor-driven.414 Recipients in China and Thailand note positive contributions of Japanese
ODA to their nations’ development, but regret having to deal with Japan’s overly
complex technical aid schemes and bureaucracy.415
Anthropologist Kay B. Warren’s research on Latin American perceptions finds
that Japan’s economic motivations have been a primary factor behind its aid there. Latin
Americans perceive business interests as the key motivation. Though much Japanese aid
is now untied, Latin Americans continue to believe that it largely goes to Japanese firms,
especially for technical projects. It was only in the early 2000s that many Latin
Americans learned that Japan was Latin America’s number one foreign aid donor from
1985 through the early 2000s. Other cultural factors also shape Latin American
perceptions of Japanese ODA.416
Economic Approaches (Effects of Trade Interests)
Since the beginning of Japan’s postwar reparations to other Asian nations in the
early 1950s, aid has been associated with Japan’s economic development and security.417
From the mid-1960s, analysts have noted the persistent connection of Japanese aid with
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Japan’s own trade and economic interests.418 When Japan completed its postwar
reconstruction and rose as a modern industrialized nation, it gained several strong reasons
to recycle some of its capital account and structural trade surpluses to ODA, to diversify
foreign direct investment away from the United States, to improve relations with
developing countries, and to relieve trade friction with many countries. As a country for
which imports of key commodities including food, energy and key industrial inputs are
mandatory, ODA could help stabilize Japan’s economic security.419 In the 1970s, as
Western aid standards moved toward better addressing recipient nations’ needs and
interests, Japan came under increasing criticism for the strong trade component of its aid.
Hasegawa argued in the 1970s that in its aid, Japan had to balance the extremes of
internal kokueki (national interests, including domestic development and trade) and
external tsukiai (pressures for humanitarian, untied aid and other obligations imposed by
Japan’s membership in international organizations and agreements) factors.420 Although
many conventional explanations of Japan’s ODA have correctly identified the strong
connections between Japan’s economic and trade interests and its ODA, Koppel and Orr
also note great variation in Japan’s ODA policies, and in the interests of various parties
supporting the policies.421
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There are additional studies of the “trade versus aid”422 conflict in Japanese
from the 1980s to the present. Margee Ensign, Michael Hoffmann, Steven Hook, Guang
Zhang and Marie Söderberg note the national-interest aspects of Japanese ODA, while
not ignoring the “trade versus aid” dichotomy.423 Global trade pressures in the 1980s and
1990s forced Japanese corporations to move more production overseas to Southeast Asia
and China. If ODA could encourage the development of economic infrastructure to
support this, it might benefit Japan’s overall trade competitiveness.424 Yet Hanabusa
Masamichi stresses how Japan’s ODA also benefits other donors and recipient nations.425
“Trade versus aid” evolved into the question of which agency is more influential in Japan
aid policy, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, formerly MITI),
reflecting the economic/national interest side of aid, or MOFA, which leans more toward
the international/Western norms for aid.426 This conflict is real, and representative of
basic tensions in Japanese ODA policy, but Arase concludes that Japanese aid policy is
much too complex for this model to serve as the sole explanatory model of its aid
policymaking.427 Overall, the trade and economic motivations of Japanese aid can be
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partly viewed as a policy tool to encourage Japanese economic competitiveness in this
age of rapid economic globalization.428
Several studies from the 1990s and 2000s examine and compare the economic
effectiveness of Japanese aid to different world regions and nations, including Africa,
South and Southeast Asia.429 Söderberg’s Business of Japanese Foreign Aid (1996) does
not examine aid effectiveness, but comparatively studies the methodologies, procedures
and business factors connected with the implementation of Japanese ODA, as seen in
OECF loan projects in five Asian nations.430 Söderberg concludes that receiving loans,
rather than simply grant aid, complicates the process,431 but that aid processes in the mid1990s, though rather complex, were fairly open. Numerous factors, including recipient
country viewpoints, influence the process.432
Cultural and Historical Approaches
The histories and cultures of donor countries affect the types of aid they
dispense. Japan is just one example.433 Similar to my arguments, Alan Rix contends that

428

Ibid., 13.
Haider A. Khan, “Aid and Development: What Can Africa Learn from the Macroeconomics of Foreign
Aid in Some Southeast Asian Economies?” (Unpublished paper, 1998); Haider A. Khan, “How Effective is
Japanese Aid: Econometric Results from a Bounded Rationality Model for Indonesia,” (Unpublished paper,
2002); and Haider A. Khan, “Japanese Aid.”
430
Söderberg, Business Japanese Foreign Aid, 4-5. OECF was a forerunner of today’s JBIC. The five
nations studied are China, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. Söderberg’s study aims to gain a fuller
comprehension of how the Japanese ODA system operates by studying it from multiple viewpoints (the
Japanese government, the private sector in Japan, and those of other donors and recipient nations) (Ibid., 45).
431
Ibid., 277-279.
432
Ibid., 4-5, 286-289. Söderberg urges persons wishing to influence the Japanese ODA process to learn its
policy basics and get involved (Ibid., 288-289).
433
Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 83; Söderberg, Business Japanese Foreign Aid, 85-86, 90-96.
Söderberg notes how the aid systems of different donor countries reflect the sociocultural systems of their
nations. For example, Sweden’s ODA values are derived from long traditions of giving to religion
(Christianity), sending missionaries abroad, and helping the poor in their midst. They also have a positive
value of charity, that giving makes people feel good, especially when they expect nothing in return. On the
other hand, Japan’s ODA seems to reflect its business culture, where businesses value reciprocal, loyal
100
429

the objectives and philosophy of any foreign aid program emerge out of sociocultural
values, not just economic and political interests.434 According to Sato Seizaburo, five
important attitudinal (psycho-cultural) factors have been important in Japanese foreign
policy since 1890:
1) a strong sense of belonging to Japan and the Japanese race coupled with deeprooted feelings of inferiority; 2) an intense concern with improving the country’s
international status; 3) a deep anxiety over being isolated internationally; 4) a desire
to conform to world trends; and 5) an emotional commitment to Asia, which has
resulted in a policy that emphasizes the region.435
Orr sees these same basic attitudes as influential in Japan’s foreign aid policymaking
through the late 1980s. The first four factors created the “psychological climate” for
America’s influence in Japanese aid, and Japan’s experience in World War II and the
occupation only strengthened its general sense of weakness and inferiority since then.436
Culturally, Japan has sometimes seen itself as a “development bridge” or model between
East and West, North and South, and/or the first and third worlds, given its recent
development experience and influences from both Asia and the West.437

relationships, and gratitude. Sweden has a long history of transparency in governance, reflected in its ODA
system, while Japan does not. Its efforts to create more transparency in ODA are only recent.
434
Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, 15.
435
Sato, Seizaburo, “The Foundations of Modern Japanese Foreign Policy,” in Robert A. Scalapino, ed.
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), quoted in Orr, Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid, 375.
436
Ibid., 4-5. There are multiple, complex factors involved here. Orr also argues that psycho-cultural
factors in U.S.-Japan relations have influenced Japan’s attitudes toward its aid policymaking. For example,
Japan’s total defeat in World War II and the U.S. occupation created a periodic attitude of amae (big
brother-little brother dependence) toward the United States in postwar Japan. And America’s wartime
image as oni (demons in Japanese folklore who bear both gifts and potential destruction) relates to U.S.
pressure on Japanese politics, which is often seen as both positive and negative (Ibid.). These arguments fit
Orr’s characterization of Japan’s ODA policy as reactive, rather than proactive. For more on amae, see
Takeo Doi, The Anatomy of Dependence (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1971). Regarding the oni image
in Japan’s wartime images of the United States, see John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power
in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 236, 305.
437
Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 30-31, argues this has sometimes been a problem, given the historic
weaknesses of Japanese ODA regarding recipient development (as opposed to Japan’s own development).
101

The link between aid policy and cultural values is related to how predominant
cultural norms influence the behavior of nation-states in foreign policy,438 and also how
domestic influences and contexts do.439 How has Japan’s own cultural and historical
experience influenced its modern aid program? Japan’s history of foreign aid shows
influence from important trends in Japanese culture and history, including during the
Meiji period.440 A second feature of the cultural influence on Japanese aid has been
allegedly weak values of charity toward the weak in other countries,441 supposedly a
reflection of “traditional” Japanese religious and social values.442 A third cultural
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influence on aid is Japan’s sense of cultural insularity and isolationism, reflected in
Japan’s historic focus on aid to Asia, in pursuit of its own domestic self-interests.443
Additional cultural factors influencing Japan’s ODA have included Japan’s own sense of
cultural uniqueness and difference,444 its hierarchical view of nations,445 and
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Japanese authorities argue that nations with a Judeo-Christian heritage are more likely to give charitable
donations than nations that lack it (Ibid.; and Chie Nakane, Tekiô no jôken: Nihonteki renzoku no shikô
[Tokyo: Kodansha, 1972], cited in Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 18, 199, n15). Yet one should not discount
the tremendous generosity reflected in Japan’s enormous aid flows during the 1990s, even if they
originated in Japan’s own self-interests. Also related to the religious origins of charity, Orr, Emergence of
Japan’s Foreign Aid, 139, notes that Japan lacks the “missionary” sending experience common to many
Western nations with Christian traditions.
443
Toru Yano, “Kokusai Kankyô to Nihon gaikô no kadai,” Hôgaku seminâ sôgô tokushû, No. 18, 246248, and Kokusaika no imi: ima "kokka" o koete (Tokyo: Nihon Hôsô Shuppan Kyôkai), 180, quoted in
Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 16-17, Chapter 5. Rix reports that Japanese commentators note that Japan’s
historic sense of racial homogeneity and “island-nation consciousness” has contributed to tensions in its
international relations (Ibid., 16).
444
This sense of “uniqueness” is seen in MOFA reports on Japanese ODA that repeatedly stress cultural
differences between Western donors and Japan as reasons behind the uniqueness of Japan’s aid (Ibid.). One
report argues that Western European nations have historically been wealthy, had high incomes, and
extensive experience with other races [and cultural groups], while Japan has not (Gaimushô, Keizai
kyôryoku, 75). Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 24-27, notes important official aid documents from the late 1980s
that contend that, along with common global concerns of humanitarianism and interdependence, Japan has
“unique circumstances” as an aid donor: 1) a peace constitution and need for a stable trading environment
and world peace, 2) the need for official aid to balance Japan’s huge private LDC investments, 3) generous
ODA to counter Japan’s dependence on imported resources by encouraging economic stability and proJapanese attitudes in LDCs, and 4) lessons for LDCs from Japan’s “unique” experience as a recentlydeveloped non-Western nation that can help Japan be a bridge between North and South, and West and
East, “Japan’s world historical mission.” This is reminiscent of the 1930s ideology of hakkô ichiu (Japan as
a beacon of world peace and civilization) discussed in Chapter 8, and philosopher Nishida Kitaro’s prewar
treatment of Japan’s “mission” (Khan, e-mail communication with Richard Shannon, 25 March 2008).
MOFA has called Japan’s stress on “self-help” in recipients a unique aspect of Japan’s aid (Ibid., 33). Rix
counters that these arguments fail to identify fully why Japan is truly “unique” compared to other resourcepoor, industrialized donors like Germany and the Netherlands, and that they subsume concern for recipient
development under overarching concern for Japan’s long-term economic health and prosperity (Ibid., 25,
28-29).
445
I comment on the related theme of the hierarchical view of foreign nations in the worldviews of several
past Japanese leaders in coming chapters. An excellent example is Kato Hiroyuki. Herbert Passin noted in
the 1950s that Japanese ranked developing countries as far down their perceived order of nations with
influence and status (Herbert Passin, “Socio-cultural Factors in the Japanese Perception of International
Order,” Japan Institute of International Affairs Review [1952], 51-75, cited in Ibid., 17). For much of the
postwar period, Japan’s attentions in international relations have been primarily focused on attaining status
and recognition from other advanced nations, not from impoverished nations receiving aid (Ibid., 17). This
may be slowly changing, however, as Japan continues to recognize its need for resources from developing
nations, and its competition with other nations for those resources. A current example is Japan’s
“competition” with China in extending aid to Africa (King, “Aid Within”; Japan’s White Paper,
“International Cooperation”; and “Japan Vows To Double Aid to Africa by 2012, International Herald
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“exclusivity” in dealing with developing nations.446 Other cultural issues affecting current
Japanese aid include the organizational cultures of Japanese aid organizations such as
JICA,447 and how they handle such issues as democracy,448 gender,449 training and
language issues450 in the aid they disperse.451 Interestingly, Japan has given some support
for “strategic partnerships” where some Latin American nations do development projects
in others. This is seen as innovative in Latin America, and helps solve some of the
cultural and linguistic problems that Japan has faced in the region (Warren 2005: 97).

Tribune [28 May 2008], www.iht.com/articles/2008/05/28/africa/africa.php). Japan also hopes its expertise
in handling economic development, environmental pollution, and energy shortages will prove helpful for
developed and developing nations, and help it to exercise increasing leadership on the international stage.
Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo encouraged other industrialized nations attending the G-8 summit in
Hokkaido (July 2008) to embrace goals similar to Japan’s achievements in saving energy for the purpose of
controlling climate change.
446
Rix notes that regarding aid, exclusivity is especially relevant to the Japanese presence in developing
countries, as shown by anthropologist Nakane Chie (Nakane, Tekiô no jôken, noted in Rix, Japan’s Foreign
Aid, 17, 198, n12).
447
JICA’s recent organizational culture has been highly influenced by the bureaucratic concerns of the
ministry that oversees it (MOFA). Also influential is the common Japanese system of the staffing of
executive positions by retired leaders of leading ministries (amakudari). Seconded staff tend to emphasize
the Japanese system of tatewari gyosei, where decision-making and loyalties function along the lines of
their previous bureaucratic loyalties. This reportedly makes decision-making at JICA slower and more
complex. Additional organizational factors include staffing patterns at JICA headquarters, which is staffed
by a small number of professionals and field staff, augmented by outside Japanese development experts.
JICA staff are also frequently rotated (every 18 months), and under pressure to continually learn new
procedures, and new social development guidelines (Warren, “Overview Japanese ODA,” 100).
448
Regarding democracy, a major question is what kind of democracy should Japan’s ODA encourage, a
form modeled on Japan’s own system and experience, or more localized or alternative forms (Ibid., 101)?
449
Warren notes the importance and success of WID (Women in Development)/gender programs in Japan’s
aid programs in Nepal. Through the early 2000s, not many of these programs had been implemented in
Latin America (Ibid., 101-102).
450
It is challenging for aid agencies in both Japan (JICA) and South Korea (KOICA) to develop an
adequate number of personnel sufficiently trained in regional and local languages and cultures, required if
they are to successfully customize aid to meet local needs and the new international norms for participatory
development. In both cases, drawing on the expertise of returned overseas volunteers may help (Ibid., Kim
and Seddon, “ODA Policy,” 187-188). New graduate programs in international development in Japan and
South Korea seem weak in cultural training, but not in economic issues. Khan, Japanese Aid, notes that
while Japanese ODA is perceived positively in South Asia because of distant cultural links such as
Buddhism, training for Japanese aid workers in cultural knowledge (recipients’ history, cultures, languages
and geographies) and technical skills is optimum.
451
Warren, “Overview Japanese ODA,” 100-101.
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Culture can either be a boon or a barrier for aid cooperation.452 Compared with several
European donors with longer experience with imperialism and colonialism than Japan’s,
Japan has had more cultural isolation, and less extensive numbers of Japanese interacting
with foreigners, especially in foreign countries.453 Cultural values have influenced
Japan’s rationales for ODA, and Japanese aid officials often cite differences between
Japan and other cultures as a partial justification for Japan’s ODA system.454 This leads
to the important question of how cultural values and experiences like these interact with
current Japanese aid policy, beyond the scope of the present study.455
Studying the rationales and cultural logics underlying aid can help us uncover
the motives of aid donors. The literature on aid through the early 1990s lists four main
areas of donor motivation: 1) humanitarian motives to relieve third world poverty with
development, 2) the political goal of “image-enhancement” for the donor, 3) the political
goal of national security promotion for the donor,456 and 4) promoting the economic self-

452

An example of cultural boon is Leelasorn’s argument that Japan has cultural compatibility with
Thailand, another “Oriental” country, and that this helps the two countries to work together in ODA matters
(Leelasorn, “ODA from Japan,” 261). An example of “barrier” is how Swedish aid professionals assert that
Japan’s ODA work as less cooperative than other donors’ work, since the Japanese “tend to keep to
themselves,” and sociolinguistic barriers separate them from other donors (Söderberg, “Swedish
Perceptions,” 91). Tarte, “Japan’s ODA,” 243, argues that language is a barrier in the provision of Japanese
aid to education in Pacific island states.
453
Seddon, “Japanese and British,” 41. Britain is one such donor (Ibid.). Others include France, the
Netherlands, and Sweden.
454
Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 17.
455
Rix argues that cultural values interact with and helps to shape Japan’s aid policy outcomes: “social and
cultural values help set the parameters within which policies develop, and the speed at which they change.
Aid policies therefore provide a vivid reflection of a donor’s social values and culture, despite the strength
of political, economic or bureaucratic considerations” (Ibid.). To better uncover such details, ethnographic
research is required.
456
According to Rix, this argument is commonly based on the dubious idea that aid will bring economic
growth, political stability, and then benefits for the donor. The security argument has often been applied to
Japan’s policies toward Southeast Asia 1945 (Ibid., 18).
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interests of the donor.457 In a democratic society, a donor’s motives for aid must have
some social basis or public legitimacy for aid programs to continue. The interpretation of
aid objectives by aid practitioners will also influence the acceptance of aid in a donor
society’s social and political contexts.458 Comparing cultural influences on the motives of
Japanese and Western ODA systems, while some critics have called Japan’s ODA selfserving, and Western aid arising from a sense of noblesse oblige, more in-depth study
sometimes reveals these assertions to be false.459
A study that extensively investigates the cultural aspects of Japanese ODA is
Wright-Neville’s 1991 study.460 His perspective on Japanese ODA is based largely on
political science. His study aims to develop a more holistic, historical view of Japanese
ODA.461 Many of his arguments are based on culture. Wright-Neville uses a
“conventional” political science view of culture, arguing that culture is a problematic
concept, to be handled with caution.462 I find his cultural arguments fascinating and
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These economic interests of a donor may include obtaining preferential treatment regarding to an LDC’s
markets, its aid contracts, and its resources (Ibid., 18-19).
458
Ibid., 19.
459
Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 2-3, cites cases of self-serving Western aid, for example, from
France and the United States (Ibid.).
460
In his study, Wright-Neville, Evolution of Japanese Foreign Aid, 7, examines Japan’s aid through three
primary lenses: impacts of the government bureaucracy, Japanese culture, and the international
environment, over time (from 1955 to 1990). He criticizes Japanese aid in the late 1980s and early 1990s as
lacking coherent logic, having poor coordination in its delivery, and suffering from bureaucratic
complexity.
461
Ibid., 1, 7, 28-30.
462
Wright-Neville (Ibid., 31) draws on rather “conventional,” static political science notions of culture,
mentioning definitions of culture from Clifford Geertz and Max Weber, how humans are suspended like
animals caught in webs of meaning. Wright-Neville assumes that culture is static and enduring. He also
draws on Lucian Pye (Ibid., 42), a political scientist who draws on anthropological concepts of culture.
Pye’s work emphasizes the “national character” approach to analyzing Asian political cultures, how
“national” patterns of childrearing shape the later behavior of leaders. Anthropologists such as Ruth
Benedict also worked in this genre. Some of Pye’s other work focused on the “national” political cultures
of China and Japan (Lucian W. Pye and Mary W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions
of Authority [Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1985]; Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre:
China's Political Cultures [Ann Arbor, Mich: Center for Chinese Studies, the University of Michigan,
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creative, yet rather shallow.463 Some of Wright-Neville’s cultural arguments parallel my
work here. He mentions similar concepts, including cognition and worldview,464
holism,465 and comparisons of Japanese and Western cultures.466 My cultural arguments
are offered in greater depth. While Wright-Neville examines a segment of the postwar
period (1955-1990), my project covers a longer time frame (nearly one hundred years),
and focuses on precursor influences to the Japanese aid system. I disagree with Wright-

1988]). More contemporary anthropological conceptualizations of culture see it as contested and
fragmented, not static.
463
Wright-Neville, Evolution of Japanese Foreign Aid, argues that the Japanese way of handling aid that is
different from all other major donors. While this may have been largely true in 1991, above we noted the
many similarities between Japan’s and South Korea’s current ODA systems; as do Kim and Seddon, “ODA
Policy and Practice.” Other non-Western donors are likely copying at least some aspects of the Japanese
system. Wright-Neville also contends that differences in the Japanese bureaucracy and Japanese customs
regarding giving, the latter involving the Japanese concepts of on (favor, obligation), giri (duty, debt of
gratitude), and ninjo (empathy, kindness) have been especially influential in making Japanese aid unique
(Ibid., 8-9, 33-39). He applies the on argument to his treatment of Japanese aid from 1955-1972, and giri to
the period 1973-1990. Many of his observations about Japan’s bureaucracy and its “unique” features, such
as inter-ministerial competition over aid, are accurate (Ibid., 9-11, 42-54, and 62-74).
464
Wright-Neville, Evolution of Japanese Foreign Aid, 23-25, mentions the work of White (Japanese Aid,
6) and Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid. He asserts they both argued, at points, that Japanese aid is
essentially based on unique aspects of Japan’s culture and national interests: according to Hasegawa’s
findings, “Japan’s approach to aid was the product of a particular world view and an essentially Japanese
interpretation of what was after all, an idea with its roots in the West” (Ibid.).
465
Wright-Neville (Ibid., 28-30) argues for the value of using a holistic yet historical perspective that
integrates cultural and structural elements, including cultural logics, over time: “if we wish to understand
those forces that shape Japan’s aid policies it is therefore necessary to examine not only those attitudinal (or
cultural) and structural factors preeminent in Japanese decision-making, but how they interact; how the
particular logics contained within them reinforce or contradict each other over time.”
466
I have already noted Wright-Neville’s characterizations of Japanese culture that he finds relevant to aid
(on, giri and ninjo). Regarding Western cultures (primarily those of Western Europe and the United States),
he argues that they have incorporated altruistic values of sacrifice and moral imperatives to help poorer
nations, based on “Judeo-Christian culture,” and that the extensive presence of non-governmental
organizations in those countries is evidence of this. While admitting that values of altruism are not totally
absent in Japan, he argues that the “culture of giving” in Japan, based on values incorporating on, giri and
ninjo, are very different from those in the West (Ibid., 32-40). I would counter that today there is absolutely
a genuine spirit of altruism in Japan, despite shrinking aid budgets, and a growing presence of NGOs, even
if the number is still proportionately smaller than in many Western nations. Wright-Neville (Ibid.) also
notes that Japanese aid has been affected by conceptions of a “hierarchy” of nations, that the highly
developed nations are superior to “backward” nations of the Global South, and by ethnocentric notions of
racial and cultural superiority. Of course Western nations and their views of colonialism and aid have often
been similarly affected.
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Neville’s conclusions that Japanese aid system is like no other in the world, though
historically, in many respects, it has differed from Western aid.467
Another study with a somewhat similar historical approach to this study is
Hasegawa 1975. One of its analytical lenses is the “historical national evolutionist view,”
which attempts to uncover “…the objectives and nature of Japanese foreign aid…
[, through an] historical perspective [of aid] as an instrument of Japan’s evolving national
policy.”468 The approach stresses how aid is used by the Japanese state to promote
national interests (kokueki). Kokueki and national goals vary over time. Hasegawa
differentiates Japan’s kokueki from 1945 to 1972469 from those in the prewar period in
terms of “secularized postwar Japan”470 He contends there was a fundamental break in
the outlooks of prewar and postwar Japan. According to Hasegawa, kokutai (national
essence or polity), an ideology strongly influenced by religion and spirituality,471 and the
colonial ideology of Daitowa Kyoeiken (the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere)472
dominated prewar Japanese worldviews and policies. The national interests of the

467

I would counter that Japanese aid has certain similarities to the emerging aid systems of other Asian
countries, which often find the Japanese aid system as a useful model. This is the case for South Korea’s
aid system (Kim and Seddon, “ODA Policy and Practice”; Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid). As another
example, it has been noted that Chinese aid to Africa, like Japanese aid in general, has a tendency to avoid
analysis of cultural and internal factors such as human rights, and focuses more on technical and economic
aspects. This is very different from recent Western patterns of foreign aid analysis.
468
Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid, 7-8.
469
Ibid. Hasegawa’s 1975 study stops in 1972 with the return of Okinawa to Japan and President Nixon’s
historic visit to China.
470
Ibid.
471
See the brief discussion of kokutai in Chapters 4, 7, and 9.
472
This was a proposed policy designed to influence Japan’s colonial policies for China and the South
Pacific during World War II, mentioned briefly in Chapter 8 (Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of
Modern Japan [New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000], 397). Also see “Greater East Asia CoProsperity,” in Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993), 475.
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secularized kokutai and increasing influences of Japan’s regional and global communities
(chiiki kyodotai and sekai kyodotai)473 have governed postwar Japan.474 While
Hasegawa’s study examines the evolution of Japanese aid over twenty years,475 the
present study focuses on a longer time frame, preceding the aid period: the evolution of
ideas and contexts surrounding the birth of Japanese aid policy. Though legal formalities
on the mixing of religion and state changed greatly between prewar and postwar Japan (it
is now prohibited), in practice, how much have core spiritualities at the root of most
Japanese worldviews changed? I would argue they have not changed that much.
Hasegawa’s distinction, on the difference between the prewar “spiritual” Japan state and
the postwar “secular” one, seems essentially false, true only on the surface, on
institutional, formal and legal levels. This is an example of the Flaw of the Excluded
Middle.
A more recent study incorporating cultural and historical approaches similar to
this study is Spyke 1999. Spyke stresses the study of history and culture as fundamental
to providing more grounded, in-depth knowledge of international relations and foreign
473

Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid,12-13, argues that as Japan’s global trade and interaction increased in
the postwar period, it manifested an increasing desire to fit in with and get along with the international
community, to preserve the collective interests of nations, and to contribute to them as it was able.
Contemporary Japan also connects with these goals, evidenced by its desire to gain a permanent seat at the
United Nations, to gain international prestige, and to influence the international system in ways that will
contribute to the trade, peace, and prosperity of the world and for itself. In turn, these ideals have served as
motives for Japan’s huge contributions to foreign aid and various multilateral programs.
474
Ibid., 9-10, 12-13. Despite these differences between the two periods, Hasegawa argues that security,
development, and ascendancy among world powers were common Japanese goals for both eras, to varying
degrees.
475
Ibid. Hasegawa’s study concludes that through 1972, aid was much more intended to enhance Japan’s
growth than to aid developing nations in the areas of greatest need. He argues that there was a discrepancy
between what Japanese aid claimed its goals were, and what it actually accomplished. In poststructuralist
studies, Western anthropologists often explore this theme (differences between development rhetoric and
reality) for Western aid and development programs (Ferguson, Anti-Politics Machine; and Escobar,
“Anthropology and Development” and Encountering Development). Also see Teresa Hayter and Catharine
Watson, Aid: Rhetoric and Reality (London: Pluto Press, 1985).
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policy. Her study explores various influences and motivations behind Japanese foreign
aid policy:
the main emphasis… [is] on how the motivations for Japan’s aid policy have been
formed through time. Historical factors …combine with psychocultural factors to
help determine the lens through which Japanese actors view the world and also
through which Japan perceives the world views them.476
Her approach integrates various factors and contexts, including selected historical and
cultural elements since the 1500s, Japan’s economic development, U.S.-Japan relations,
domestic factors, and a case study of how these factors play out in Japanese aid to Africa.
While Spyke grounds her study in valuable fieldwork and a broad, historical lens, her
treatments of worldview and culture lack the basic anthropological perspectives that the
present study includes.477 While Spyke draws on similar ideas to this study,478 such as the
importance of culture and history in shaping Japan’s aid policies, her study only
examines the macro-level. She neglects the role of Japanese leaders and their views.

476

Spyke, Japanese Foreign Aid Policy, 10, argues that several cultural values, including Japan’s
ambivalence of superiority toward some countries and inferiority toward others, its sense of isolation from
Asia and the West, and its sense of “non-whiteness,” are important influences on Japan’s aid policy. She
explores Sato Seizaburo’s five stage explanation of cultural factors in Japanese foreign policy throughout
her study (Ibid. 12-15). See my discussion of Sato’s points earlier in this chapter.
477
At various points, Spyke mentions worldview, but never clearly defines it. Her concept of worldview
often equates with Japan’s “view of the world” (her terminology) (Spyke, Japanese Foreign Aid Policy),
not an anthropological or political science sense of worldview as defined in the Glossary section of the
present project. It would be helpful if Spyke offered clear definitions of culture and worldview.
478
Other similar ideas that Spyke mentions include the West contrasted with the non-West, Japan’s
hierarchical view of nations, the role of religion and charitable values, and of international and domestic
forces in shaping Japanese aid policy. When mentioning the influence of religion, Spyke mentions Japan’s
contentious interaction with Christianity in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and argues that it is
difficult to distinguish among Shinto, Buddhist and Confucian influences in Japan’s history (Ibid.). To a
large extent, the last point is true, but in the period studied in the present project (1850 to 1945), it is
possible to distinguish, to some degree, the influences of State Shinto from Buddhism and Confucianism on
Japanese politics and society. The Japanese state carefully created and institutionalized the influence of
State Shinto during this period, and it is particularly seen in the life and actions of Emperor Hirohito. For
more on State Shinto, see Chapters 3, 5, 7, 8, and 9, in particular.
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Human Rights Approaches
Hoshino 1999 addresses the issue of human rights conditionality in foreign aid
programs, especially Japan’s. Hoshino specifically studies the impact of the 1992 ODA
Charter on Japan’s bilateral aid allocations (Hoshino 1999: 199). He concludes that
Japanese aid is not allocated in any systematic way concerning human rights performance
in recipient nations. Although the idea exists in the 1992 ODA Charter, the situation in
recipient nations is too complex,479 and the general will in Japan is not strong enough for
this to be effectively accomplished.480
Japan’s Foreign Aid Bureaucracy and Policymaking
Key Domestic Aid Bureaucratic and Policymaking Actors
On the domestic level, in the 1980s, four main ministries and agencies (MOFA,
MOF, MITI, and the EPA) considered each loan request in the aid policymaking process.
As of 1988, Japan had no field aid missions, and no more than five or six aid officials in
any recipient country at one time. Aid implementation was principally divided between
JICA, which administered about half of all of Japan’s ODA grants, and the OECF, which
dispersed loans.481 There was also pressure from the powerful private sector that lobbied
“…the policy makers in…” particular directions, and from foreign interests, including the
United States.482

479

For example, some recipients have the human rights infrastructure but not the political will to support
human rights, and for other nations, they have the will, but not the means (Eiichi Hoshino, “Human Rights
and Development Aid: Japan after the ODA Charter,” Debating Human Rights: Critical Essays from the
United States and Asia, ed. in Peter Van Ness [London and New York: Routledge, 1999], 225-226).
480
Ibid.
481
Robert M. Orr, “The Aid Factor in U.S.-Japan Relations,” Asian Survey, 287 (1988), 743.
482
Khan, “Japanase Foreign Aid,” 6-7.
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At present, the primary domestic actors and forces shaping Japan’s ODA policy
include the national government (including the bureaucracy and the Diet), municipal
governments, public opinion, NGOs, and the private sector.483 Each of these forces has
varied in its influence in different time periods. Critics have called the Japanese
government bureaucracy handling aid cumbersome.484 At present, the most important
institutional actors in Japan’s national aid bureaucracy include the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the “new” JICA, along with
numerous other ministries and agencies.485 In recent decades, the three most important
government agencies implementing aid have been the OECF (the Overseas Economic
Cooperation Fund), JBIC (the Japan Bank for International Cooperation), and JICA
(Japan International Cooperation Agency).486
Figure 2.1
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Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 5-9; Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook, Japan’s System, chapters 3
to 6.
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Orr, “Aid Factor,” 743.
485
The two major, contemporary aid implementation agencies, JBIC (its OECO division) and JICA,
merged into one super aid agency, the “new” JICA, in October 2008.
486
For more details on these agencies, see the entries for JBIC, JICA, and OECF in the Glossary section of
the appendices.
487
Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 114.
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Aid Policymaking Process
Hasegawa’s analysis of Japan’s aid policymaking from the 1950s to the early
1970s examines inter-ministerial competition between several leading ministries and
agencies involved in aid policy.488 Competing views and interests hampered the
coordination of Japanese aid. Language and cultural struggles also somewhat limited
success for technical aid programs.489 Significant, new conflicts in Japan’s aid policy
goals have intensified since at least the early 1990s. Since the 1992 ODA Charter, Japan
has promised to improve the quality of its ODA. Later in the 1990s, there was increasing
pressure to reduce the ODA budget, which has occurred regularly since 1998. Along with
the pressure to improve aid quality in the midst of budget decreases, Japan’s ODA policy
has become more assertive in seeking to support Japan’s national interests in foreign
security and economic policy.490 Pressures exerted by Japanese public opinion, the media,
and other international donors are noted elsewhere in this chapter.
David Arase and other foreign experts identify several weaknesses in Japan’s
current aid process, making it perhaps the most complex of any major donor in the
world.491 The state of Japan’s ODA
…seems to suffer from a lack of policy coherence (i.e. a tight focus on poverty
alleviation), an unwieldy and overly complex system of policymaking and
implementation, and a limited ability to tailor aid to the specific needs of diverse
recipients.492
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Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid, v-viii. These ministries were MOFA, MITI, and MOF. The agencies
were the Export-Import Bank of Japan, the OECF, and the OTCA (Ibid.).
489
Ibid. 149.
490
Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 1.
491
Ibid., 6.
492
Ibid., 267.
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Recipients must request bilateral assistance. For them, the approval process is complex,
opaque, and lacks uniform procedures or standards.493 In another example, grant aid
administered by MOFA tends to focus on tertiary issues such as urban sanitation, urban
hospitals and higher education, rather than on primary needs where the impact for the
less-served poor would be larger. Critics find that Japan’s technical cooperation is
complicated, varies in quality, and needs improved coordination. While the traditional
part of Japan’s technical aid includes accepting trainees, sending experts and volunteers
overseas, project aid, and development analysis, JICA implements only half of such aid.
Nearly every ministry and agency in the Japanese government also has its own technical
aid programs. JBIC implements loan aid usually used for production-oriented projects,
large-scale physical infrastructure, and a limited amount of microlending.494
Coordination of this system has been difficult since Japanese has lacked a
central aid agency. Though this was assigned to MOFA in the early 2000s, MOFA still
did not make policy for all of the agencies involved, but had to shepherd numerous
bureaucratic actors toward policy consensus.495 In the mid-2000s, foreign critics further
critiqued the ‘opaqueness’ of bilateral aid policy, due to Japan’s having no central aid
agency, no Diet legislative authority over ODA, bilateral aid policy delegated to over a
dozen ministerial agencies, according to a vaguely worded ODA Charter lacking Diet
approval, and multiple forms of ODA (grant, loan, and technical aid) implemented by
different agencies.496
493

Ibid., 6.
Ibid., 267. These functions of JBIC will only continue through September 2008, after which the OECO
portion of JBIC will be absorbed into the new JICA agency.
495
Ibid.
496
Ibid., 6.
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The top policymakers in this system are usually long-term bureaucrats who are
skilled generalists but who lack in-depth training in development theory or work in the
field. Aid experts are hired for only limited tasks, and most staff of JBIC and JICA are
consumed with clerical tasks rather than significant research and analysis. Field personnel
are largely hidden. The major aid actors such as MOFA, JICA, and JBIC have had
separate field offices that seldom coordinate their efforts. Most field staff spend their time
managing relations with and documents from Tokyo. NGO involvement has been weak,
comprising less than three percent of the recent budget for NGO activities.497 Japan’s
ODA has also lacked systematic program evaluation, which could encourage overall
change. Though Japan’s aid bureaucracy, including MOFA, is attempting to tackle these
challenges,498 they are great. All of this has created problems for ODA policy
coordination and clarity, as might be expected.
Reform of Recent Japanese ODA Policy
Rix 1993 examines Japan’s capacity for institutional reform of its aid policy, in
the face of various domestic and international pressures.499 At the foundation of Japanese
ODA policy’s capacity for innovation are several ideas of aid: what Japan wants its aid to
do, and how these ideas have changed. Rix considers the concept of aid philosophy
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For more details on the involvement of NGOs in Japanese ODA policy, see Hirata, Civil Society;
Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 97-101; Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 11, 71, 92, 131, 139, 140, 268;
and Akiko Nanami, “Showing Japan's Face or Creating Powerful Challengers?Are NGOs Really Partners
to the Government in Japan's Foreign Aid?” A Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirement for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the University of Canterbury. Thesis (Ph.D.)
(University of Canterbury, 2007, 2007), http://library.canterbury.ac.nz/etd/adt-NZCU20070420.101120;
accessed 9 August 2008. For example, Nanami studies the government’s interaction with three NGOs, and
concludes that pressures favoring the bureaucracy have made genuine openness to NGOs difficult. NGOs
also face a host of new challenges, in an era of economic retraction and high staff turnover.
498
Ibid., 267-268.
499
Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 2-3.
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seminal in this.500 Closely related are domestic pressures for aid reform, both bureaucratic
and public. Rix concludes that in the early 1990s, Japan’s ODA system continued to
suffer from over-centralization and ineffectual administrative reform.501
But since the early 1990s, Japanese aid has undergone highly significant
administrative restructuring, a continuing process. Though some pressures for ODA
reform existed earlier, they accelerated in 1991 with the collapse of Japan’s bubble
economy and several scandals. The second cabinet of Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro
(in office from 1996 to 1998) sponsored six major reforms in Japanese governance, some
of which affected Japan’s ODA.502 Before certain reforms passed in 1997, nineteen
different ministries had their own ODA operations budgets.503 Other major reforms of
this period included the merger of the OECF and the Japan Export-Import Bank into
JBIC, completed in October 1999,504 passage of the 1998 Basic Law for Central
Government Reform, initiating certain reforms of Japan’s complex ODA administration
system,505 and the reorganization of MOFA’s Economic Cooperation Bureau and of
JICA, in the late 1990s to early 2000s.506 New reforms for cooperation with Japanese
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Ibid., 7. See the discussion of Japan’s aid philosophy, and Rix’s treatment of it, earlier in this chapter.
Ibid., 7-8.
502
Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 91-92. For a more detailed discussion of the many reform
initiatives for Japanese ODA in the 1990s, including cooperation with NGOs, see Ibid. 90-101.
503
Ibid.
504
Ibid.
505
Ibid.
506
Ibid. 95-97. Reforms affecting have JICA included, first, sweeping internal changes begun in 1999.
These created a new country focus in JICA’s operations (Country Assistance Programs), such as regional
departments along with sectoral departments at JICA headquarters. Regional departments are now in
charge of both making country-specific plans and implementing them. A specific goal is to technical plan
aid for entire countries and their various sectors in more holistically. More authority has been delegated to
JICA’s field offices. Second, JICA was reorganized in October 2003 as an “independent administrative
institution,” to hopefully aid in separating policy planning from implementation, to improve the success of
aid projects (Ibid.).
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NGOs were also introduced.507 Since the early 1990s, other reform issues have included
the need to delegate more authority to the field, increasing the number of ODA staff in
various agencies such as JICA, overcoming challenges presented by Japan’s
compartmentalized aid administrative system, addressing Africa’s special problems,
reconciling differences between emerging global aid standards and Japan’s, and
improving collaboration between JICA and JBIC.508 Both JBIC (its OECO division) and
JICA attempted to move toward increased public openness and accountability since the
early 2000s, and merged into one new super aid agency in October 2008.509 In practice,
what will this merger mean for the effectiveness of Japanese aid delivery and results?
Have the continuing administrative changes since the early 1990s improved Japanese
ODA? These are paramount questions, beyond the scope of the present study.

507

From 1996, important ODA agencies including MOFA, JBIC and JICA began increasing their
communication with Japanese NGOs. From 1999, JICA began assigning entire projects (of a small level) to
NGOs and other actors such as universities and municipalities. The Japanese government is also moving to
create more financial support for Japanese NGOs. It also created an initiative called “Japan Platform” in
2000, to coordinate aid Japanese aid efforts among the government, NGOs, and the business sector for
humanitarian and refugee crises (Ibid.).
508
Ibid., 107-112.
509
The new combined agency, still to be called JICA, will have an annual budget of approximately $8.5
billion, and be one of the largest bilateral aid agencies in the world. It will allow Japan to provide technical,
grant and loan assistance “all ‘under one roof’ for the first time,” so that hopefully aid can be delivered
more “effectiveness, efficiency, and speed,” along with increased sensitivity to field conditions, grassroots
initiatives, and public openness. In the words of Sadako Ogata, JICA’s current director, “when all of these
changes are completed, it will mark the most important turning point in the history of Japan’s ODA” (JICA,
http:www.jica.go.jp/English/about/pres.html; accessed 9 August 2008).
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Types and Amounts of Aid
Types of Aid
Japan’s ODA is channeled through government channels, some in cooperation
with the private sector. There are three primary elements—bilateral loans,510 mainly used
for industrial and economic infrastructure, bilateral grant aid,511 and multilateral
contributions and subscriptions.512 Bilateral aid made up the lion’s share of aid
disbursements through the mid-1990s (since the early 1990s, 70 to 75 percent of Japan’s
ODA budget).513 Bilateral loans are granted through a request-based system.514 How does
the bilateral aid given by Japan compare with that from other DAC donors? Until the
early 2000s, Japan was mainly known for the huge amounts of aid it gave, but still lagged
behind other DAC countries in most measures of the quality of aid given.515 Loans
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Bilateral loans were formerly disbursed and evaluated by JBIC’s OECO division, but since October 1,
2008, are disbursed and evaluated by the new JICA agency, which has absorbed the OECO.
511
Bilateral grant aid is provided by JICA. Grant aid includes general grant aid (aid for social and cultural
projects dispensed directly by MOFA) and technical cooperation (knowledge transferred by human
exchange and by equipment transfers, mainly handled by JICA (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 5).
512
Taken from JICA, http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/01.html; accessed 17 September 2003. Note that
the OECO will be absorbed into the new JICA agency in October 2008.
513
Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 5. For example, in 1989, bilateral flows ($6.779 billion) made up 75.6
percent of the total ODA disbursements ($8.956 billion) for that year. The remainder ($2.186 billion, 24.3
percent) was multilateral flows, which went to “…multilateral institutions such as the World Bank or the
Asian Development Bank” (Ensign, Doing Good, 27-28).
514
Ibid.
515
For example, as of the early 2000s, though its total aid amount has been large, compared to its national
income, Japan’s level of giving has been below the DAC median, far below the recommended DAC
median amount of 0.7 of GDP. The general terms of the aid that Japan offers have slowly improved, but
continue to be less generous than those of other DAC countries, due to the high amount of loans in aid it
offers. The DAC also has developed measures comparing how its members are meeting the challenges of
poverty and other humanitarian needs, by examining aid across geographic regions, recipient nations’
income levels, and sectors. Japan’s aid continues to be largely focused on Asia, continues to have a fairly
high level of focus on industrial sectors (despite some sectoral change). While Japan’s aid to the poorest
countries has increased over time, it still ranks near the bottom of all DAC members. From 1970 to 2000,
while Japan slowly increased its aid generosity and focus on the poorest nations, overall, in quality its
achievements are still below the median for DAC members in most areas (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 67).
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continue to be a very important component in Japan’s total ODA.516 What seems obvious
in Chart 2.1 (Japan’s ODA Allocation by Sector) is that aid for physical infrastructure
was a very high percentage of Japan’s ODA from 1993 to 2005, and continues to be so.
Aid for social infrastructure has consistently been lower than for the physical area. This is
graphic evidence of the long-term emphasis of Japan’s ODA on economic infrastructure.

Graph 2.1 Japan’s ODA Allocation by Sector: 1993-2005.517

Note: The figure above includes assistance to Social and Administrative Infrastructure,
Economic Infrastructure, Production and Multi-Sector and does not include Commodity
Aid and General Program Assistance, Debt Relief, Administrative Expenses and Others.

516

Though loans were 67 percent of Japan’s total bilateral ODA in 1970, they decreased to 35 percent in
2002. Yet this figure for all DAC members, including Japan, drawn from aggregate data for 2002, was only
2.3 percent (Ibid., 5).
517
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.http://www.mofa.go.jp/polcy/oda/sector/figures.html, accessed 9
November 2008.
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Multilateral aid has increased in importance. Since the early 1990s, up to 20 to
25 percent of the ODA budget has gone to multilateral programs and agencies (Arase
2005s: 5). Multilateral aid is generally less studied than bilateral aid. Yasutomo argues
that the importance of Japan’s multilateral ODA channeled through multilateral
institutions is increasing, and worthy of study, since it represents increased Japanese
assertiveness in foreign policy. This new assertiveness through multilateral ODA is the
result of a slow evolutionary policy. Yasutomo attempts to prove this through his study of
Japanese behavior in three multilateral banks providing aid for post-Soviet Russia: the
IBRD, the ADB, and the EDBRD.518
Historically, much of the aid that Japan offers has been “tied.” Japan’s ODA
program has often been criticized for its tied nature.519 Critics have long charged that
Japan’s ODA has a definite trade/commercial promotion link.520 There can be economic
or political security reasons for tying aid. In Japan’s case, Ensign argues that in the
1980s, the reason was chiefly economic, coupled with “Japan’s regional aid biases
toward the Asian countries….”521 In her study on the impacts of Japan’s tied aid to six
Asian countries from 1982 to 1989, Ensign concludes that

518

Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, vii-x, 119-148. For a study of Japan’s relationship with the Asian
Development Bank through the early 1980s, see Yasutomo, Japan and Asian Bank; for an updated version
of the topic as a reflection of Japan’s emerging multilateral aid policies, as of the early 1990s, see
Yasutomo, “Japan and the Asian Development Bank: Multilateral Aid Policy in Transition,” in Japan's
Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era, eds. Bruce M. Koppel and Robert M. Orr (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1993), 305-40.
519
This refers to its connection with promoting Japanese commercial interests and purchases from Japanese
firms. The amount of Japanese aid that is tied has been steadily decreasing, however. By 1999, almost all
ODA loans were untied (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 4).
520
Ensign, Doing Good, 32-33.
521
Ibid., 83-84.
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...Japanese aid and trade are linked. Specifically, aid to infrastructure projects
in [the six nations] …is positively correlated with trade in infrastructure. Tied aid
benefits the Japanese economy and industries. Capital projects support the exports
of Japanese goods.522
Ensign notes that from the early 1980s, most Japanese aid to other Asian countries went
to infrastructural development, and that there were potentially harmful impacts on each
nation’s environment and local groups that might hamper a nation’s capacity for
economic development.523 Tied aid has likely had mixed results, contributing to both
economic development and environmental damage in some countries.
There are several types of aid flows that make up Japanese aid and economic
cooperation. Budget-determined official flows consist of official development assistance
(ODA) and “other official flows.” They are “…administered solely by the government.”
Part of ODA consists of technical cooperation, such as the transfer of proprietary
knowledge, the education of students and trainees from LDCs, the dispatching of experts
and advisors, and help with feasibility studies in the LDCs.524
Compared with Western aid systems, Japan’s aid system has been unique for its
significant component of private sector involvement.525 Ozawa calls one type of this
“public-private aid flow” hybrid aid, defined as
…joint financing arranged by the government in collaboration with the private
sector. Examples are joint loans and syndicated equity investments that [were
formerly] …arranged by [the] …OECF [, later by JBIC] and private corporations
for investment projects in the developing countries, and by co-operative loans
organized by the Ex-Im Bank of Japan and Japanese commercial banks. [These
organizations have served] …as risk-sharers for these financial arrangements. In
522

Ibid., 84, 92-93.
Ibid., 92-93.
524
Ozawa, Recycling Japan’s Surpluses, 99, 101.
525
Das, Yen Appreciation, 167-169. See Söderberg, Business of Japanese Foreign Aid; and Arase, “PublicPrivate Sector,” for more in-depth explorations of private aid to Asia and public-private aid coordination
from Japan in the 1990s.
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addition, the commercial banks’ subscription of the bonds issued by such
international financial organizations as the World Bank, [and] the Asian
Development Bank… can …be classified as hybrid flows.526
Another form of public-private aid flow is market-coordinated flows, “generated by
market forces and include foreign direct investment, bank loans, and donations by private
institutions.” In the late 1980s there was a rapid increase in this form of aid from Japan,
due to the yen’s rapid appreciation. As production in Japan became more expensive,
more financial capital (foreign securities, real estate, and other assets) and industrial
production overseas were transferred overseas. In the 1980s, the transfer of these surplus
industries, including managerial expertise and production technologies, was especially
strong to the Asian NICS and China, but also to Europe and North America.527 Ozawa
predicted that in the 1990s, Japanese aid would move toward increasing transfer of
industrial activities to neighboring countries, especially China, which happened, and the
development of new forms of “hybrid” aid packages, combining official aid with private
sector transfers of capital, technology, know-how, and organizational skills.528

526

Ozawa, Recycling Japan’s Surpluses, 99.
Ibid., 99, 106-107. Ozawa concludes that market-coordinated flows stood at the base of Japan’s
economic cooperation with LDCs in the late 1980s, and that Japan’s government relied more upon
“privatized aid” because of budget constraints, and “…its belief that foreign direct investment is the most
effective conduit through which Japanese corporations can transfer the crucial development resources they
possess.” The drawback of such aid is that it tends to flow mainly where profits lie (Ibid., 99, 108).
528
Ibid., 7, 9-12. Ozawa believed that other Asian nations, especially China, were uniquely positioned to
benefit from this new form of aid, and that Japan was unique in pioneering such an approach. Dubbed
“comprehensive development strategy,” or Minkatsu, it aimed to make “…optimal use of private sector
vitality to enhance productivity and efficiency in the entire economy.” It seems likely that other Asian
nations, such as China and South Korea, given their strong experiences of state-led development, will also
offer similar hybrid types of aid packages (Ozawa, Recycling Japan’s Surpluses).
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Amounts of Aid
In terms of total financial flows, Japan’s aid increased from about .5 percent of
GNP in the early 1960s to almost one percent in the early 1970s.529 The rise and decrease
in the amounts of Japanese ODA have roughly followed Japan’s growth as an advanced
industrial nation (its GDP growth). After Japan joined the OECD in 1964, it increased its
ODA in concert with its increase in GDP, becoming the fourth highest OECD donor in
1973. From the late 1970s to 1999, there was an unprecedented rise in Japan’s aid budget,
followed by rapid declines from 2000 to the present.530 In 1978 Japan ranked as the third
largest donor, and after several massive increases in ODA amounts, became number two
in 1983, and in 1989, number one, cresting at $15.3 billion (net ODA) in 1999. Japan
dropped to the number two spot again in 2001, at $9.8 billion. Though Japan will stay a
fairly wealthy nation for the near future, it faces great competition from the meteoric rise
of China, and pressure from the United States, the European Union, and new powers like
Russia, India, and Brazil.531
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Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid, 145.
From FY 1997 to FY 2004, Japan’s ODA budget decreased 30 percent (Arase, Japanese Foreign Aid,

4).
531

Ibid. 3.
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Graph 2.2 Trends in Japan’s ODA Budget and Other Major Expenditures.532

It is interesting to compare the spending decreases in Japan’s ODA account
from 1997 to 2007 (about 40 percent from 1997 levels) with the Japanese government’s
public works related spending over the period, which also a somewhat similar decrease
(19 percent) (see Chart 2.2). Clearly the spending levels of Japan’s ODA have paralleled
the state of Japan’s overall economy. The chief reason behind Japan’s ODA reduction
seems to be its general economic decline since the early 1990s, when Japan’s famous
bubble economy “burst.” By 2002, various government economic stimulus packages
ballooned the national government debt to 140 percent of Japan’s GDP. Another
emerging socioeconomic crisis is the nation’s rapidly aging population. The loss of
Japan’s reputation as a global superpower was humiliating, contributing to a rising sense
that Japan was must do less for others and more for itself. There are also political
motivations for the decrease in Japan’s ODA budget, especially MOFA’s loss of face
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Ministry Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2007/ODA2007/html/zuhyo/
zu020031.htm, accessed 15 August, 2008.
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with the Japanese public. MOFA has been the chief public face for ODA. Its efforts to
decrease loan tying of Japanese aid, to bring it up to current international standards,
caused a large decrease in the number of loan contracts awarded to Japanese firms. This
made many in the ruling LDP and the Japanese business community doubt that ODA was
still crucial to their interests. Frosty relations between China and Japan from the late
1990s to 2008 increased domestic calls to end Japanese ODA to that nation, with charges
that Japan’s aid contributed to China’s economic rise and military build-up, to Japan’s
harm. MOFA was also tainted by a series of scandals from 2000 to 2002. All of this
contributes to the likelihood that Japan’s ODA budget will not be significantly increased
until the government carries out needed reforms to help renew the Japanese people’s
confidence in ODA.533 While the Japanese government is indeed carrying out quite a
number of reforms, the question remains whether they will maintain or increase the
effectiveness of Japan’s aid, in the face of continuing economic challenges. Many foreign
critics doubt they will.
Bilateral, Regional, Multilateral/International
Aid Policies and Contributions
Bilateral, Regional Aid Policies, Contributions
Please see Chart 2.3 for details on the major aspects of the distribution of
Japan’s bilateral ODA to major world regions. One thing that is obvious here is that Asia
has always occupied a high percentage of Japan’s regional giving, through 2006, yet that
is changing. It is notable that giving to the Middle East and Africa greatly increased in
533

Ibid., 3-5.
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2005 and 2006. In 2006, Japan’s bilateral ODA to Africa surpassed aid to Asia for the
first time, a highly significant change.

Graph 2.3 Trends in Bilateral ODA by Region (Net Disbursement)534

Aid to Asia
Sato Seizaburo has characterized an emphasis on Asia as one of the pillars of
Japanese foreign policy since the 1880s.535 Traditionally Japan has maintained a very
strong regional focus in its foreign aid programs, especially centered on Asia: the
ASEAN states,536 Korea, and since 1978, China. Japan feels a certain commonality in
heritage and history with its neighbors. Historically, they contained many natural
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Ministry Foreign Affairs, available from http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/
white/2007/ODA2007/html/zuhyo/zu020041.htm, accessed 9 November 2008.
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Orr, Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid, 4.
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Concerning ASEAN, Indonesia has often been Japan’s top or second highest aid recipient.
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resources, such as oil, natural gas, rubber, copper, and bauxite.537 In the late 1980s, more
Japanese aid was given to South and East Asia (65-70 percent of total aid in the 1980s)
than to other regions. 30-35 percent of the total was reserved for ASEAN, more than the
Japanese ODA given to Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America combined. The
emphasis on one world region or group of countries is not unique to Japan. In the late
1980s, 70 percent of Britain’s aid went to Commonwealth countries.538
In the mid-1980s, China developed into ASEAN’s chief rival for Japanese aid
…in terms of amounts and special treatment. ASEAN views of the growth of
intimate Sino-Japanese ties uneasily. ASEAN governments sense that Japan
considers China the real priority because of …[traditionally stronger] ties to the
mainland. Their concern is understandable since the most outstanding development
in Japanese aid policy in the 1980s …[was] the sudden rise of China as Japan’s
…largest bilateral aid recipient…. [in] record time.539
Through the early 1990s, Japan’s aid philosophy has continually stressed aid to Asia.540
In 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro announced two major initiatives designed to
enhance Japan’s economic cooperation with and aid to the ASEAN nations.541 Other
studies that examine various aspects of Japan’s aid to Asia and ASEAN include studies
by Orr,542 Potter,543 Söderberg,544 and Khan,545 many already mentioned above.
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Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 105. The first initiative, announced in January 2002, called IDEA
(Initiative for Development in East Asia), included efforts to “confirm the significance of East Asian
development, to promote intra-ASEAN cooperation, and to share their experience with other countries and
regions.” The Koizumi Initiative of late 2002, announced just before the Johannesburg Summit, stressed
that Japan would push acknowledgement of IDEA and of East Asian development as a model for other
nations, and promote growth-oriented development against the PRSP development approach supported by
the World Bank and other Western donors, among several other goals (Ibid.).
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Orr, “Rising Sun,” studies Japanese aid to ASEAN, the Pacific Rim and South Korea.
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Potter, Japan's Foreign Aid and “Accommodation and Recipient,” examine the viewpoints of two
Japanese ODA recipients in Southeast Asia, Thailand and the Philippines.
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The Söderberg, Business of Japanese Foreign Aid, study investigates Japanese aid to five different
Asian nations from largely a business point of view.
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Since the 1980s, China has often been the top recipient of Japanese ODA. Two
recent studies of Japan’s aid to China are Takamine,546 which examines Japan’s aid to
China in-depth from Japanese points of view (the donor’s), and Feng, which briefly looks
at the subject from the recipient’s point of view.547 Takamine asserts that the case of
Japanese aid to China reveals the capacity of a donor nation to pursue multiple foreign
policy goals through its aid to a recipient country. In the past, Japan used aid to China to
encourage positive economic and political developments, but since 1995, has used its aid
as a “diplomatic weapon” to support Japan’s security interests there.548 For his study of
Japanese aid to China, Takamine chooses the analytical approaches of mercantile realism,
proactive state, and institutional analysis as the best for his case.549 Takamine argues that
institutional analysis characterizes Japan’s foreign aid policymaking as
…intensive bargaining (or politics) among various Japanese policy-making actors,
each of which engages in ODA policy-making on the basis of different perceptions
of national, organisational and personal interests. In fact, the politics of foreign aid
is a battle among competing ideas that all claim to represent the national interest
[italics added].550
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Haider A. Khan investigates Japanese aid to Indonesia, Bangladesh, and to the regions of South and
Southeast Asia. See Haider A. Khan, “How Effective is Japanese Aid: Econometric Results from a
Bounded Rationality Model for Indonesia,” (Unpublished paper, 2002); Khan, “Japanese Aid.”
546
Takamine, Japan's Development Aid.
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Feng, “Japanese Aid to China.” See my comments about Feng earlier in this chapter.
548
Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 158.
549
Ibid., 15-16. These three approaches are discussed earlier in this chapter. The first approach helps
address the complex connections between Japan’s attempts to further its strategic and diplomatic concerns
in the international system on the one hand, and its international economic policy and ODA on the other.
The proactive state approach correctly stresses the input of various domestic “indigenous” factors in
influencing policy outcomes in Japan’s aid policies. So while the mercantile realism and proactive state
approaches are useful for identifying the interests within and the objectives behind Japan’s ODA, they do
not explain actual policymaking processes, and they assume the input of solitary, rational actors in the
policy process, a naïve assumption for foreign aid in democratic societies (Ibid.).
550
Ibid. Takamine concludes that the institutional analysis approach sees Japanese politics as a battle
among politicians, bureaucrats, and business leaders, and well supplements the weaknesses of the
mercantile realism and proactive state approaches (Ibid.). Hence, Takamine’s study goes slightly beyond all
of the existing studies.
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Thus, Takamine’s work on China concurs with the some of the chief arguments of the
present research, that perceptions, worldviews and ideas are paramount forces in shaping
a donor’s aid policies (in this case, Japan’s), among other factors. Since 1978, the rise of
China in Japan’s regional aid goals has been paramount.
Globalization of Aid
Japan has moved toward globalization of its aid beyond Asia since the early
1970s, resulting from a desire to contribute to stability in resource-rich areas, and second,
from its status as a great economic power. Japanese aid to Latin America increased, and
was influenced by U.S. policies.551 Japan aid to Africa increased over seventy fold from
1972 through the mid- 1980s, and was humanitarian in nature. Aid to the Middle East in
this period varied, but Egypt tended to receive a lot because of its strategic importance.552
Other regions receiving new infusions of Japanese aid since the early 1990s include
Eastern Europe and former Soviet states in Europe and Asia.553 So Japan has used
economic aid as a significant foreign policy tool. Although Japan tried to become a
global player, regional concerns, focused on Asia, figured prominently in its foreign
policy and economic aid programs. The first significant, major non-Japanese study of the
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For a more recent treatment of trends in Japanese aid to Latin America, especially on social
development issues, see Warren, “Overview Japanese ODA,” and my comments on Warren’s work earlier
in this chapter.
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Yasutomo, Manner of Giving, 81-89, Brooks and Orr, “Japan’s Foreign Economic,” 332-334.
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Note my brief comments on Japanese aid to Russia, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet states in
Central Asia in the early 1990s earlier in this chapter. Japan especially gave aid to encourage
democratization, human rights, and free markets in these regions through the late 1990s (Hirata, Civil
Society, 172-173). For the latest trends in JICA’s aid to these regions, see JICA, available from
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/countries/ index.html, Internet; accessed 30 June 2003, and click on the
appropriate links (East Asia, Europe, or Central Asia and the Caucasus).
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effects of the distribution of Japanese aid to major world regions was Koppel and Orr’s
1993 study.554
Earlier in this chapter I commented on aid trends from Eastern donors, including
Japan, to Africa.555 In the 1990s, Japan announced significant new initiatives to address
poverty and development problems in the region, in contrast to major Western donors
who temporarily began to cut their aid to the region, due to “post-Cold War aid fatigue.”
The Japanese government has also organized four major international conferences on aid
to Africa, called the Tokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD),
in 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2008.556 These efforts are laudable, but some Japanese have
complained that much of sub-Saharan Africa is not yet capable of receiving
investment.557 It is crucial that Japanese aid efforts to Africa continue to be realistic in
approach.558 Care must be exercised in offering aid to Africa in areas such as
infrastructural, agricultural and social development, transferring elements of the East
Asian and Japanese development experiences, and partnering with European donors who
have more experience in the region.559 In Africa, Japan also hopes to encourage South-
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See my comments on Koppel and Orr earlier in this chapter.
Please see my comments earlier in the chapter for references to several of the significant studies on this
subject.
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Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 104. Among these efforts, Japan has announced intentions to
increase aid on several occasions, including at the TICAD IV, held in May 2008. One of the notable new
trends emerging in the last several years is Japan’s new competition with China in offering aid to Africa,
also mentioned above.
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Ibid., 104, n.51, 110.
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Ibid., 104.
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For example, while the United Kingdom’s DFID has more experience in Africa and less in Asia, Japan
is in the opposite situation. Partnering with other donors more experienced in different regions can multiply
development’s effectiveness in lean economic times (Ibid., 110, 111, n.63).
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South partnerships, “self-motivated development,” and cooperation with other regional
development efforts, such as NEPAD.560
The Japanese government also seeks to increase partnerships with other bilateral
donors. Cooperation among donors is also a key goal in the Western-led global
development agenda. Since Japan is one of the world’s most significant aid donors,
Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook 1999 was written to encourage that process, to help
introduce the Japanese aid system to Western audiences.561 Beaudry-Somcynsky and
Cook’s 1999 study attempts to offer an overall guide to the highly complex Japanese aid
system in the mid- to late 1990s, which foreigners find hard to understand.562 A better
understanding is necessary if foreign countries are to partner effectively with Japan. The
multiplicity of ministries and agencies involved, their relations with NGOs, relations
between the public and private sectors, and complex decision-making and approval
processes all contribute to the complexity.
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Ibid., 110-111. NEPAD is a framework for the development of Africa that was approved by the
Organization for African Unity (now the African Union) in July 2001 (available from
http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.php. Internet; accessed August 9, 2008.)
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Alain Berranger, preface to Japan’s System for Overseas Development Assistance, eds. Micheline
Beaudry-Somcynsky and Chris M. Cook (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1999);
http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-32158-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html, accessed 18 June 2008. New partnerships in
development are also a goal of Canada’s IDRC. Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook 1999 was the fruit of
attempts at partnership between the IRDC and Japan’s RIDA, and between Canada’s CIDA, and JICA.
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The two main goals of the book are to “to provide a better understanding of the full range of the
Japanese ODA system and to assist those involved in initiating joint cooperation activities with Japan in
development” (Ibid.).
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Table 2.8 Top 10 Recipients of Japan’s Aid by Type in 2006 (Calendar Year)563
Bilateral ODA Total (Net disbursement basis, unit: US$ million, %)
Rank

Country or region

Disbursements

Share

1

Nigeria

1,631.61

21.80

2

Iraq

780.81

10.43

3

China

569.40

7.61

4

Vietnam

562.91

7.52

5

Philippines

263.63

3.52

6

Pakistan

225.03

3.01

7

Sri Lanka

202.73

2.71

8

Malaysia

201.92

2.70

9

Honduras

138.02

1.84

10

Afghanistan

107.42

1.44

4,683.49

62.59

Ten-country total

Table 2.9 Top 10 Recipients of Japan’s Aid by Type in 2005 (Calendar Year)564
Bilateral ODA Total (Net disbursement basis, unit: US$ million, %)
Rank

Country or region

Disbursements

Share

1

Iraq

3,502.85

33.41

2

Indonesia

1,223.13

11.67

3

China

1,064.27

10.15

4

Vietnam

602.66

5.75

5

Democratic Republic

376.26

3.59

563

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available from
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2007/ODA2007/html/zuhyo/index.htm, accessed 9 November
2008.
564
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available from
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2006/ODA2006/html/zuhyo/index.htm, accessed 9 November
2008.
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of the Congo
6

Sri Lanka

312.91

2.98

7

Philippines

276.43

2.64

8

Zambia

131.94

1.26

9

Serbia and

121.50

1.16

103.47

0.99

7,715.50

73.59

Montenegro
10

Honduras
Ten-country total

Table 2.10 Top 10 Recipients of Japan’s Aid by Type in 2004 (Calendar Year)565
Bilateral ODA Total (Net disbursement basis, unit: US$ million, %)
Rank

Country or Region

1

China

964.69

16.20

2

Iraq

662.07

11.12

3

Vietnam

615.33

10.33

4

Malaysia

256.50

4.31

5

Philippines

211.38

3.55

6

Sri Lanka

179.53

3.02

7

Afghanistan

172.52

2.90

8

Pakistan

134.11

2.25

9

Kazakhstan

130.76

2.20

10

Ghana

115.42

1.94

Ten-country total

565

Disbursements

3,442.30

Share

57.81

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available from
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2005/ODA2005/html/zuhyo/index.htm (both kinds of aid,
accessed 9 November, 08.
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Tables 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10 present data about the top ten national recipients of
Japan’s bilateral ODA in 2004, 2005, and 2006. In 2004, Asian nations made up eight of
the top ten recipients of bilateral aid from Japan. The Middle East and Africa were also
present in the top ten (one nation each). The pattern of broader globalization of the
distribution of Japan’s aid was significantly present in 2005 and 2006, but not in 2004.
Along with the broader globalization of aid, there is also a strategic element, supporting
the foreign policy goals of both Japan and the United States. In 2005, we see evidence of
a pattern of emphasis on Asia with increasing globalization in the disbursement of
Japan’s bilateral ODA. Though five Asian nations were among the top ten recipients,
other major world regions are well represented: Africa (two nations), and the Middle
East, Eastern Europe and Latin America (one nation each). In 2006, many of the nations
were highly important to Japan for economic reasons, due to their geographic presence in
Japan’s Asian market (China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Pakistan and Malaysia). Also in
2006, two of the top ten recipients were important (or potential) suppliers of oil (Nigeria,
Iraq). Several of the top recipients in 2006 were of high strategic interest for the general
foreign policy concerns of the United States (especially Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan).
2004 disbursements also reveal sensitivity to current strategic U.S. interests in several of
the recipients (again, to the same three nations).
Multilateral / International Aid Policies
By the end of the period 1953-1973, Hasegawa argues in his study of Japanese
aid that Japan had gained more influence in Asia, but not globally. Japan’s participation
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in international bodies like the World Bank was relatively small.566 Today Japan is an
active member and large supporter of many international institutions dealing with
development, such as the United Nations, the IMF, the IDA, the ADB (in which Japan
has been particularly active since its founding), the IADB, the AfDB and Fund, and the
World Bank. Japan is also one of the top contributors to international relief and food aid
organizations. It has actively joined many groups founded by other nations, yet
maintained a low profile until the 1990s, with the rise of new “assertiveness” in its
dealings in influencing multilateral banks and organizations.567 By the mid-1990s, a new
Japanese theme for its involvement in multilateral development banks arose: “ideas, not
just money.” The goal was now to contribute lessons from Japan’s own experience for
the development of other regions, both the third and former second worlds.568 By this
time, ODA became a very complex foreign policy tool; it could “…no longer be
understood in one-dimensional terms. It [had become] …a diverse, multidimensional
policy tool with multiple objectives.” But the question was why, and what the impacts on
future Japanese foreign policy would be.569
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Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid, v-viii.
Brooks and Orr, “Japanese Foreign Economic,” 334; Yasutomo, Manner of Giving, 3. For details on
Japan’s role in the Asian Development Bank, see Yasutomo, Japan and Asian Bank, 1-3, 5, 6; and
Yasutomo, “Japan and the Asian Development Bank: Multilateral Aid Policy in Transition,” in Japan's
Foreign Aid, eds. Bruce Koppel and Robert M. Orr, 305-40 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); and
Yasutomo, New Multilateralism in which Japan’s role in multilateral development banks is explored.
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Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 15.
569
Ibid., 16.
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Current ODA Issues and Trends
Recent Domestic Trends, Issues in Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA)
A major issue in Alan Rix’s 1993 study Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge is what
Japan’s capacity for ODA administrative reform means for Japan’s potential for future
global leadership.570 Rix argues that Japanese ODA practice and policy on the
international level can tell us much about this question. By studying Japan’s pattern of
aid giving, we can uncover much about Japan’s relations with and roles in other Asian
nations, other regions, its relations with other significant powers, and whether Japan can
take over the “hegemonic” role of the United States in international relations.571 The
continuing global presence of the United States, the recent rise of China, the increasing
role of the European Union, and the return of Russian influence combine with other
factors to make “Japanese hegemony” in global international relations or Asia alone
doubtful at this time.
In the opinion of Alan Rix, in the early 1990s, the complexities of Japan’s aid
bureaucracy meant that Japan was unable to effectively, completely respond to
international calls for reforms in its aid and for increased global leadership. Some aid
officials in Japan began to doubt the suitability of Japan’s “unique” approach to aid as
suitable for other donors. Rix concluded that possibilities for a “convergence” of Western
and Japanese aid models seemed doubtful. Increasingly assertive, active public relations
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Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 2-3.
Ibid., 9-11. Rix notes that Japan’s significantly increased aid amounts and aid visibility in the 1990s
(and later) do not necessarily mean that it will become a global leader. But its capacity to manage aid more
effectively might be tangible signs of its ability to manage issues in specific sectors (such as development)
or regions, i.e. Asia (Ibid.)
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efforts from the Japanese government failed to dispel domestic or international criticisms,
and reforms remained slow.572
But much has changed in the new millennium. The September 11 terrorist
attacks increased international support for ODA, even in Japan somewhat (for the short
term). Support for the MDGs has also increased in Japan. Earlier in this chapter I noted
the intense domestic pressures in Japan for ODA reform, including the reorganization of
major elements of JICA, JBIC, and MOFA, the merging of parts of the first two agencies,
and the increasing presence of social development and field/country-based initiatives.573
The overall amount of Japan’s ODA general account decreased 38 percent from 11.687
trillion yen in 1997 to 7.293 trillion yen in 2007,574 though Japan has pledged to increase
aid in certain areas, for example to Africa, in the next few years. Historically, Japan has
shown a much greater preference for aid for economic infrastructure in its aid than for
social infrastructure. This is basically the opposite of many major Western donors.575
Another major trend is that Japan’s ODA has continued to include a significant
proportion of yen loans.576
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Ibid., 190-191.
Akiyama and Kondo, Global ODA, 2-3; Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 83; Arase, Japan’s
Foreign Aid, 267-268.
574
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www/mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2007/ODA2007/
html/zuhyo/zu020031.htm, Internet, accessed August 15, 2008.
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Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 84-87.
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Yamauchi describes Japan’s motive for the high dependence on loans as due to the fact that “Japan
achieved miraculous economic development with self-help efforts and financial assistance from the World
Bank and other donors, and made sure that all debts were paid on schedule. From this experience was born
a belief that yen loans motivate recipient countries by imposing repayment obligations” (Ibid., 89).
137
573

Recent International Trends, Effects on Japanese ODA Issues
Recent international (Western) trends in ODA are moving toward increased
emphasis on human development and institutions, among others.577 Since the
announcement of the MDGs in 2000 and the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, there
is increased stress on recipient participation, institution-building, poverty reduction,
preventing poverty-related phenomena that may breed terrorism, democratization,
increased coordination of donor efforts, more comprehensive development, human
security, analysis of social and political factors in development, and a greater results
orientation.578 In Japan, there has been faltering public support for ODA, and increased
stress on aid efficiency and effectiveness, even in the light of scarcer resources, resulting
in significant administrative reforms of Japan’s ODA efforts and attempts at improved
coordination among its ODA-related agencies.579 As noted earlier in this chapter,
international critics charge that there are various gaps in how successfully Japan is
meeting current international norms for ODA. Yet such gaps exist among other donors.
David Arase notes that research has shown that even “altruistic” Sweden, noted for the
highly transparent, humanitarian nature of its aid, has historically shown preference for
socialist governments in its Africa aid. “Given the fact that bilateral ODA is influenced
by a donor’s unique combination of values, ideologies, available resources, and interests,
one might expect donors to have concerns in addition to simple poverty alleviation.”580
Japan is no exception, and neither are other donors.
577

Note that these trends are especially predominant in Western donors’ goals, and in the goals of the
international financial institutions that Western countries tend to dominate, such as the World Bank.
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Akiyama and Kondo, Global ODA, 1-8.
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Japanese development scholars have offered several critiques of recent
international trends, including the following.581 While there are significant efforts in
Japan to integrate these trends, the basic thought in many of the MDG goals runs counter
to many assumptions of Japan’s and East Asia’s own development experiences. Some
Japanese scholars argue that the MDGs put too much stress on poverty reduction, and not
enough on growth promotion.582 While the MDGs emphasize social development goals
incorporating health, the environment, and education, they neglect goals of economic
growth. In the development experiences of Japan and other nations in East and Southeast
Asia, effective economic growth in itself reduces poverty.583 Denial or reduction of aid to
countries with poor governance may leave those countries behind, resulting in even
further poverty.584 The new stress on social and political goals and institutions will
increasingly challenge the traditional loan delivery approaches of the regional and
international development banks and of Japanese yen loans. Do the organizational
structures and personnel of these institutions have the capacity to deal with the challenges
that will result?585 In the experience of East Asian nations, trade has a paramount role in
effective development. Many developing nations are begging for more trade, not more
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I devote slightly more space here to these Japanese critiques with the assumption that many of my
Western readers will be less familiar with the Japanese arguments.
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Examples of Japanese scholars offering this criticism of excessive stress on poverty reduction include
Shigeru Ishikawa, “Hinkon sakugen ka seichô sokushin ka,” Nihon Gakushiin Kiyo 56, no. 2 (2002); Izumi
Ohno, “Diversifying PRSP” (Tokyo: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 2002); and Kenichi
Ohno, “Development with Alternative Strategic Options” (Tokyo: National Graduate Institute for Policy
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(Ibid., 8).
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Ibid., 8.
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Ibid., 9-10. For example, project costs incorporating extensive political and social analysis will be
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aid.586 As the liberalization of world trade proceeds, developing countries will be allowed
fewer options in protecting their emerging markets, and in other trade issues.587
Achieving the MDGs by 2015 will be very difficult; many developing countries lack the
capacity to even measure their progress. Will questionable progress result in even more
donor fatigue in the future? International pressure for increased donor coordination may
bring more long-term aid sustainability and efficiency, but also greatly increased
complexity and costs in development projects, reform of traditional aid methods and
basic restructuring of aid agencies.588 Greater aid harmonization could also result in
fewer aid options for recipients, and in aid less customized for the needs of particular
regions, countries, and populations, a basic premise of the Japanese development concept
of translative adaptation.589
Conclusion
From our overview of Japan’s ODA system, we see that Japan has both
benefited from Western aid (especially from the United States and the World Bank), and
sought to become a highly active participant and player in the Western-dominated
international development system. While Japan has participated very actively in this
system for over fifty years, its aid has a huge image problem in the West. Though both
Japanese and Western scholars of East Asia have extensively studied Japanese aid,
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Many LLDCs have small markets, so some involvement with trade is unavoidable (Ibid., 10).
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Japan’s “unique” approaches to development and aid seem misunderstood and
underappreciated by Western scholars at large, especially by non-Asia specialists.
Japan’s aid system is highly complex, and analysts have struggled to explain
many aspects of this. Koppel and Orr conclude that variation is a big theme in Japanese
ODA policy, in practice and policy, asking two key questions: 1) does the variation result
from a central theme, or is the central policy a rational articulation of various policies and
interests? 2) What mix of domestic and international forces strongly influences these
differences? Differences revolve around the central objective of offering Japanese aid to
countries of economic, strategic or humanitarian importance to Japan, to support Japan’s
own comprehensive security, economic connections between these countries and Japan,
and recipient nations’ capacities for self-help to economic growth and development.
Reasons for variation include influences from Japan’s varied bilateral relations,
bureaucratic competition in Japan, and pressures from the United States. Koppel and Orr
conclude that there is enormous variation in what Japan’s aid does, why and how.
Variation revolves around these central themes and others, but Koppel and Orr conclude
that there is no comprehensive aid policy in Japan that can explain or account for all
change.590
Japan’s own beliefs about development and philosophy of aid are based on its
experience, which is logical. In Japan, while many factors, including a rather unique set
of postwar circumstances (i.e. an unusually open global trading system and a massive
infusion of economic support from the United States) contributed to the nation’s
redevelopment and growth, Japan’s own hard work in economic production, trade, and
590

Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 355-358.
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the strong role played by the state were all paramount. Despite the seeming incoherence
and complexity of Japan’s aid bureaucracy, domestic and international criticisms have
forced the government to articulate the goals of aid more clearly than ever before.
In several areas there is essential conflict between many of the basic
assumptions of the norms of the international, Western-dominated development agenda,
and Japan’s (and much of Asia’s) own development experience. David Arase and other
scholars find that Japan may be attempting to “harmonize” these conflicts by offering two
tracks of aid, one stressing Japan’s own growth-oriented approach, and the other focusing
on helping to meet the global agenda of poverty reduction and coordination of donor
efforts.591 Scholars using economic approaches also note this “trade versus aid”
dichotomy, seen in basic policy conflicts between MOFA and METI. Is it possible for
such a two-track approach to work? What will be the effect of the merger of JICA and
part of JBIC in late 2008? Is it realistic to expect Japan to abandon its own capitalintensive, infrastructural approach to aid, which, though based on its own experience, has
proven effective in many other Asian nations, even while the aid and development efforts
of many Western and international donors in the third world are often condemned as
failures?592 This seems unlikely.
Above we noted the massive increases in Japanese aid and its huge decline since
the late 1990s and early 2000s, due to Japan’s economic recession since the early 1990s.
The ODA program enjoyed extremely high public support for decades, but came to be
dogged by various scandals and accountability problems. The Japanese government has
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aggressively responded to domestic and international criticisms by resorting to great
fiscal and administrative reforms of ODA. Leading Western scholars of Japanese aid still
complain about many problems they observe in Japan’s system, and express doubts at
reform attempts.593 We also noted how other countries’ aid programs are not free of
problems and bias, not a surprise. But this is not to discount the many astute observations
of foreign scholars about Japan’s ODA.
Among the approaches to analyzing Japan’s aid, many factors have been studied
on the domestic and international levels, especially strategic and institutional/bureaucratic
politics aspects. Several areas can benefit from more attention, including the comparative
study of the aid systems of non-Western donors, and the effects of those systems on
developing regions. More in-depth ethnographic study of Japan’s ODA system by
Japanese and foreign anthropologists and other social scientists, both in Japan and
overseas, is sorely needed. Japan’s own development and its significant aid system are
too important for Western poststructuralist anthropologists to largely ignore, even if parts
of Japan’s experience and its effects run counter to many of their long-held assumptions
about development and its “universal” failures.594 Currently many non-Japanese aid
scholars are interested in how well Japan’s ODA system meets global aid standards.
Despite their doubts, given the rapid pace of current reform in Japan’s aid system, the
answer to this question is far from settled.
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To date, few studies have attempted to systematically examine how perception
affects Japanese aid policymaking. David Arase’s 2005 study,595 building on Koppel and
Orr’s 1993 work,596 goes a long way in some respects, noting the perceptions of
numerous other donors and aid recipients. It is especially valuable in its contribution
regarding recipient viewpoints, generally an understudied subject. As we saw in our
survey, perceptions occur on many levels, international and domestic, public and private,
expert and generalist. Unfortunately Arase’s study fails to incorporate historical factors,
especially those from before Japanese aid began, which this present study does, from the
donor/Japanese side.
Many Asian recipients praise the economic contributions of Japanese aid, but
lament the challenges it finds in meeting and assessing differences in varied field
conditions. This criticism agrees with the findings of Western donors and scholars.
Above we noted the challenges that Japan faces in developing the cultural and linguistic
expertise to properly assess ground level conditions that its ODA encounters, though
some of its responses are quite creative.597 But at least efforts to meet these challenges
have begun.598 Scholars investigating the business and economic aspects of Japan’s ODA
also note this challenge. Given the past successes of Japanese marketing researchers in
effectively analyzing highly complex business climates and consumer tastes in markets as
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varied as the United States, Europe and China, I predict eventual success for Japan in
these efforts.
Similar to perceptual and cognitive approaches, few past studies of Japan’s aid
have effectively incorporated cultural and historical factors. While astute observations of
Japanese cultural values and charitable/religious traditions have been uncovered, results
have not been systematically surveyed or assessed. The present study exceeds past efforts
by applying a more sophisticated, nuanced understanding of culture, and related factors
such as worldview and cultural logics, to Japanese aid. The cultural concepts used here
are developed from both anthropology, the social science that has investigated culture
and related concepts the most extensively, and from political science. Past studies of
Japanese aid in political science and international studies have failed to adequately
integrate crucial cultural perspectives from anthropology with those of political science,
which the present study does for the first time. More sophisticated, grounded knowledge
of the aid systems of Western and non-Western countries, especially based on
ethnography, can help free us from false stereotypes about international development and
aid. They also greatly deepen our understanding of how aid has evolved, how it
functions, what it does, and why, both on the levels of policymaking and implementation.
Previous studies of Japanese aid using cultural and historical approaches briefly
allude to religious and spiritual influences, especially in terms of how Japanese spiritual
values and traditions may have affected Japanese concepts of charity, both in Japan and
for others living abroad.599 As we noted above, religion and spirituality are highly
significant factors in worldview, one of the most significant components of culture. But
599
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previous studies fail to assess how religious and spiritual factors have affected Japanese
worldviews beyond charity, yet equally related to aid, i.e. worldview factors affecting
concepts of technology, development, and policy. Past studies also fail to adequately
assess how these religious factors have evolved over time,600 and important worldview
factors on the micro level, namely views of significant Japanese political actors, in this
case, historical ones. The present study overcomes these weaknesses by examining how
significant leaders’ views of spirituality and religion from 1850 to 1945 relate to the aidrelated themes of technology and development, among others. As noted in Chapter 1,
general study of how religion contributes to foreign aid and international development
cooperation is a fairly new field and generally understudied. The present project deepens
findings on the case of Japan, in particular.
The bureaucratic and policymaking processes governing Japan’s ODA policies
have been among the world’s most complex aid systems, the subject of much study and
criticism. Due to various domestic and international pressures since the early 1990s,
Japan has mounted significant efforts to introduce large-scale reforms. Foreign critics
such as Alan Rix have long doubted the capacity of Japan’s government to introduce
truly effective, long-term reforms. Future studies will undoubtedly investigate this current
stage of Japan’s ODA development, one of the most significant in the history of the
Japanese system. In reality, the system is under constant reform of some type.601
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Another issue presently undergoing change is the disbursement of Japan’s
bilateral and multilateral aid. As noted earlier, from October 2008, all three major forms
of Japan’s bilateral aid (loans, grants, and technical cooperation) will be disbursed
through one agency, the “new” JICA. Will this new centralization of Japan’s ODA result
in improved, streamlined policy processes, as foreign critics have argued for some years?
The new JFC will also assume responsibility for both domestic and international aspects
of Japan’s policies for finance, including public policies for foreign direct investment and
international economic cooperation activities of the private sector. In essence, this will
separate the international financial operations (IFO) and OECO activities of JBIC, while
uniting major ODA activities within the new JICA. What effects will this move have on
the effectiveness of Japan’s overall ODA, both public and private?
Amounts of aid have logically always followed Japan’s own general economic
fortunes. In the face of various economic and political pressures, though Japan’s current
ODA budget has pledged slight increases in several areas, what effects will these
pressures have on the long-term effectiveness of Japan’s aid, both its capacities to
contribute to effective development and global poverty reduction, and to support Japan’s
foreign policy and security aims? How significant a player is Japan in the global war on
terror? Can aid quality be maintained or strengthened, and the public’s confidence
restored?
Japan’s aid has made enormous contributions to the economic development of
several regions, Southeast Asia and China in particular. The latter is the perspective of
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both Japanese and Chinese aid experts,602 though public opinion in China likely varies.
Japan has contributed massive amounts of money to other world regions, increased its
efforts to contribute to the global development agenda and multilateral efforts, and to
coordinate its bilateral aid with other donors. Yet many foreign aid experts continue to
complain and critique Japan’s aid for its lack of quality and effective coordination with
global standards. One of the best-informed publics in the world on ODA, the Swedish
public, barely knows anything about Japan’s aid.603 Clearly Japan’s aid continues to have
enormous international image problems, and it is hard to know what Japan can do to
improve this, despite hiring a wonderful, well-known public diplomat like Ogata Sadako
to lead JICA in 2003.604 JICA’s extensive public relations on the domestic level in Japan
may bear better fruit.605
Another essential conflict in Japan’s current ODA involves intense international
pressure for reform of Japan’s current system to bring it more in line with the objectives
of international, chiefly Western, donors. These goals, largely revolving around increased
poverty reduction, grassroots development, and public accountability, also have much
support from the Japanese public. Japan highly values face, and the government seems to
be trying to meet as many global goals as possible. Yet enormous counter pressures flow
from Japan’s economic challenges, and the resulting large budget austerity measures
602
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imposed on most public agencies. At present, this makes significant reform of Japan’s
ODA system extremely challenging.
Despite the profound development experiences and accomplishments of Asian
societies such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China, there is a general failure of
Western scholars, aid activists and development practitioners in many Westerndominated international development institutions and NGOs to fully absorb what that
experience means, especially for other regions. Western scholars reflect on many aspects
of East Asian development, and Western scholars of East Asia study them in depth.
Japanese scholars have done much more study of what East Asia’s experiences may
mean for other regions. Western anthropologists also need to study this issue more. Is it
not obvious that we must learn from the experiences of non-Western countries where
development has worked, at least in terms of economic growth, despite the enormous
associated human costs? Similar costs have occurred in the West. To ignore these lessons
is ethnocentric and even more costly. Reforms and learning in international development
should not just be one way.
What can the West and Western-dominated IFIs learn from the development
and aid experiences of Japan and other Asian countries, for themselves and their
development work in other regions? This deserves serious, pragmatic consideration that
does not merely repeat the West’s Japan-worshipping craze that happened during Japan’s
1980s economic boom. Western scholars should also not fall into the trap of writing off
Japan as a second-rate power in the face of the recent spectacular growth of China, a
much larger nation.
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The criticisms of Japanese development scholars of recent trends in the global
development agenda, such as the MDGs, are interesting, and worth serious consideration
by Western development experts and institutions. Much more profound are the insights of
Japanese development economists and other social scientists, based on Japan’s
interaction with the West as the former developed, concepts such as “modernization,”
internationalization and translative adaptation. These concepts offer crucial findings
about how development can occur, and challenge many of the present universalistic
development assumptions of the West and its development institutions.
In coming chapters, we will explore the views of some of Japan’s most
important leaders on these subjects, and Japan’s historical experience with them, during
the pre-aid period of 1850 to 1945. What Japan’s aid is today inevitably flows from what
came before. To explore the key questions of this research, about how Japan’s
experiences with technology, development and foreign relations affect its contemporary
aid policies, how novel development concepts such as translative adaptation may reflect
that experience, and how Japanese spirituality may affect its aid, we will now proceed to
our study of historical subjects.
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Part Two
1850 to 1895: The Pre-Colonial Period
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Chapter 3
Worldviews of Selected Key Leaders (1850-1895)
Domestic Sociocultural Issues
Introduction
The purpose of Chapter 3 is to survey some of the ideologies of Japan’s most
influential key decision-makers from 1850 to 1895 (the period of pre-colonialism) about
important aspects of Japan’s experience with technology and development during that
period, especially concerning sociocultural issues on the domestic level.606 These are the
key themes relevant to this project’s overall goal of examining worldview impacts on
Japan’s later foreign aid. Chapter 4 examines the period’s domestic political economy
issues for the period, and Chapters 5 and 6 will cover Japan’s external relations in the era.
It is necessary to examine these factors starting at the dawn of modern Japan’s opening to
the outside world (about 1850), at the end of the Tokugawa period, ending approximately
two hundred fifty years of national isolation. Doing so will also give us a flavor of some
of the historical and ideological forces at work at the end of the last age of pre-modern
Japanese society.
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What is the importance of the leaders/thinkers examined in Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4? The key leaders/thinkers studied in these two chapters are: Fukuzawa
Yukichi (1835-1901), Ito Hirobumi (1841-1909), Mori Arinori (1847-1889), Kato
Hiroyuki (1836-1916), and Yamagata Aritomo (1838-1922).
Fukuzawa Yukichi was a prominent educator, best-selling writer, proponent of
Western knowledge, and influential in the formation of modern Japanese business. The
height of his career was about 1854-1901. He became a great scholar of western
learning, and accompanied some of the first missions from Japan to the West in the mid1800s. His life mission was to educate Japanese in the principles of western civilization.
Fukuzawa essentially believed that Japan lacked modern science and a spirit of
independence, and therefore was backward. He sought to replace traditional Japanese
ideas with concepts from Western positivism and liberalism. He both used and
developed concepts of keimô (enlightening the Japanese) and jitsugaku (the practical use
of foreign knowledge and sciences). Fukuzawa founded Keio University, a top university
for many of modern Japan’s business leaders, and established several prominent
businesses, including a major bank, a leading newspaper, and a future national bookstore
chain.
Ito Hirobumi was one of the most prominent leaders of Meiji Japan. He had a
highly distinguished career in public service, including the posts of foreign minister, four
terms as prime minister, and many top leadership positions in the new Meiji government,
starting in the 1860s.607 He was the major author of Japan’s first constitution (1889), and
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served as the first Japanese resident- (governor-) general of Korea from 1905-1909,
before it became a Japanese colony in 1910. The height of Ito’s career was about 18631909.
Mori Arinori was an important educator, statesman, diplomat, national
policymaker, and a leading proponent of Western thought and educational and social
reform in the Meiji period. He introduced important educational principles for Japan’s
national education system during that time. Perhaps his most controversial proposal was
for Japan to adopt English as its national language. A controversial figure, he was
assassinated in 1889. The height of his career was about 1868-1889. We can place both
Mori and Fukuzawa, mentioned above, in the bunmei kaika (enlightenment) movement of
1870s Japan. Mori’s writings reflect the liberal idealism of most members of the
Meirokusha debate society for intellectuals that he and Fukuzawa founded.608 Mori’s
thought, at its most advanced stage, also reflects social evolutionism, which Swale calls
social organicism.609
Kato Hiroyuki was a leading educator and intellectual of the Meiji period, later
a public official. As a youth, he studied briefly at a Dutch studies school.610 In 1860 he
became an official at the Bansho Shirabesho, and began studying German.611 In the late
1800s, he was a leading intellectual who applied German Social Darwinism to Japanese
608
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thought.612 He helped to introduce German studies, Social Darwinism and evolutionary
principles into Japan, and opposed movements for democracy. The major period of his
career was from 1868 to the early 1900s. Winston Davis concludes that Kato was not a
profound philosopher. Borrowing from many diverse sources, his writings are filled with
various contradictions, but he took the ethnocentric theories of German Social Darwinism
and transformed them “… into a theory of Japanese development.” He wrote almost
until 1916, but his philosophical system was developed by 1893. Academics respected
him, but his popularity decreased as more attractive, nationalistic philosophers
appeared.613
Yamagata Aritomo was a major Japanese political and military leader in the
Meiji and Taishô eras. His career was at its height from about 1873-1905. He was prime
minister twice, chief planner of the local governmental system, head of the Privy Council,
and the main architect of the army. After Ito Hirobumi’s death in 1909, Yamagata’s
faction was the most powerful in government. Yamagata was influential in many areas,
including the Imperial Rescript on Education (1890), international relations, and wars
with China and Russia. Hackett calls Yamagata “an institutional innovator and a
manipulator of men,” not a great thinker, but one of the fifteen-twenty most influential
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decision-makers on Japan’s development in the early Meiji period, contributing much.614
Yamagata used certain “traditional” ideologies and values, and Western ideas and
institutions, to strengthen Japan, reforming the military (conscription), local government
and constitutional politics.615 By 1914, he was one of four surviving elder statesmen
(genro) advising the government. Recently many historians view him as a force for
moderation during World War I, but for much of postwar scholarship, he was called the
“evil genius” of Japanese militarism.616
Below I examine the views of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato on Japan’s domestic
society. Toward the end of the Tokugawa period, they were in their years of early
adulthood. The bulk of each man’s career occurred during the Meiji era. Each
encountered the dangers facing Japan, including the need to rapidly develop
economically and quickly handle the Western cultural influences and ideologies flooding
the country. Two of them, Fukuzawa and Mori, had unusual chances to learn Western
knowledge and travel abroad when very few Japanese were able. They eagerly embraced
these opportunities and faced their uncertainties with courage. Internationally, Japan
faced a variety of perceived “threats” from distant Western powers and from its regional
neighbors. Technological systems on a very general level also affected these worldviews.
Consider the powerful image of Commodore Perry’s black ships suddenly appearing in
Edo Bay, and the amazement of Japanese when a small steam locomotive, imported from
the West, was first demonstrated. I will note further examples as we proceed.
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On the third key question of the dissertation, the possible relationship of
spirituality and Japanese foreign aid, religion and spirituality were believed to be an
important part of Japanese identity and worldview by early Meiji policymakers. One
interesting thing I find is the rather important role of religion and spirituality in some of
the policies from the Meiji period onward to protect Japan’s culture. After studying the
role of state churches in European society, politics and development, the Meiji
government chose to make Shinto, a Japanese spiritual practice, into Japan’s national
religion, to protect Japan’s core culture and identity, and to give the people more courage
and strength during the difficult reform process. Thoughts about religion and spirituality
played a somewhat important role in the thinking and actions of several of the five
leaders studied for this period, and other leaders, through 1945. Some leaders wanted
Japan to bring more Christianity, a religion they saw as “Western,” into Japan’s culture,
since they thought it played an important role in helping people in the West to work hard
and make the West stronger. Other leaders disagreed, and thought that only some form
of religion that was truly “Japanese” (for example, Shinto) could be used for that purpose.
An additional issue is the role of science and spirituality in the worldviews of significant
Japanese leaders, and whether those elements conflicted. If so, how did these conflicts
play out in the policy outcomes encouraged by such leaders throughout Japan’s modern
period? I will briefly explore these issues for this period in the conclusion of this chapter.
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Contexts of Domestic Sociocultural Issues (1850-1895): Major Trends
Contexts of Technological Development
From 1850 to 1895, important developments occurred in Japan’s natural
sciences. During the Tokugawa period, both traditional science and Western (Dutch)
learning from abroad followed what might be deemed an indigenous pattern up until
about 1868, the year of the Meiji Restoration. After the opening of Japan to the full
range of foreign influences at that time, science began to fully develop, freely and in a
manner and level of quality similar to Western science.617 Dutch learning (Rangaku),
later called Western learning (Yôgaku), refers to Western subjects learned by the
Japanese during the Tokugawa period. The chief subjects studied included medicine, the
physical sciences, art, foreign languages, and late in the Tokugawa period, military
science and international affairs.618 Late in that period, western medicine, learning and
science, especially military weaponry, were seen as very practical and useful.619
Prior to the end of the Tokugawa period, the Shogunate sent six official
missions to the West (the United States and Europe) in the 1860s. Several of the
617
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missions were sent to negotiate trade problems associated with the Ansei commercial
treaties with Western nations (signed in 1858), while the purpose of two of the missions
was to gather technological knowledge. Beyond these goals, the missions opened up
surprising perspectives for the delegates and students who journeyed to the West, causing
them to question the wisdom of Japan’s traditional sociopolitical order.620
Japan began to develop industrial technologies later than most Western nations,
and the Japanese government invested heavily in the development of technology and
industry in order to build up the wealth and independence of the nation. Success in the
Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and additional conflicts contributed to the rise of Japan’s
industries.621 The term research and development (kenkyû kaihatsu) usually refers to the
development of both industrial and military technologies. The roots of Japan’s postwar
R&D system began with the establishment of significant scientific training capabilities in
higher education during the Meiji era (1868-1912).622
In technological development in this era, the issue of Japanese response to
outside/Western influences quickly emerged, to collect, master and apply the world’s best
scientific and technical knowledge. This reaction inevitably affected Japan’s culture.
Encountering the West’s “superior” technologies and power made Japan feel weak, and
spurred it to aggressive action. In the late Tokugawa era, it also made emerging leaders
question many of their neo-Confucian assumptions. Japan’s reaction to Western
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influences changed its politics, expanded its economy and wealth, and soon led to
imperialism and wars.
Domestic Society Contexts
National identity signifies the “…sense of belonging that links individuals to the
modern nation state.” Governments develop this sense in their citizens through rituals,
symbols, ideas, education, and popular culture. Japan-leaning scholars in the late 1700s
developed some images of Japanese national identity in the Kokugaku intellectual school
by drawing on ancient myths and folk beliefs of the Shinto (“way of the gods”) spiritual
tradition.623 For the new Meiji government after 1868, developing a sense of national
unity and identity were paramount tasks, to defend the country against Western
colonialism, since in the Tokugawa period, Japan was divided into a large number of
feudal domains, and early Meiji Japan had much regional variation. The Japanese dialect
of Tokyo’s educated class became the national standard, imposed on all of Japan, in new
colonies in Hokkaido and Okinawa, and in additional colonies such as Taiwan and Korea
after 1895. Important images of national identity during the early Meiji period included
the emperor recast as a powerful royal figure, Confucian ideals applied to national life,
including loyalty, the family and its hierarchical structure (the ie system), and the idea of
kazoku kokka (the family-state). To create additional symbols, the government drew on
both indigenous and foreign sources, such as the hinomaru (rising sun flag) and the
Japanese love of nature. Debates about Japan’s racial origins followed.624
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Two social groups important in early Meiji Japan were shizoku and women.
Shizoku was the term for descendents of the former samurai class, five percent of Japan’s
population in 1873. Their hereditary stipends were a difficult public burden until ending
in the 1870s.625 The history of women in Japan reveals how their status often connects
with broader social forces. In the Tokugawa period, they were granted fewer legal rights
than men, but in more prominent families, led lives not quite as severe as those of women
in lower classes. In the early Meiji period, the spread of universal primary education
increased female literacy, but their education still lagged behind males’. With
industrialization, women began working in the textile and other industries, contributing to
Japan’s rural productivity. Some women contributed to politics, struggles for the Meiji
Restoration and democratic rights.626 Rural women in the Tokugawa era endured heavy
burdens in agriculture and making clothing for their families. In early Meiji Japan, eighty
percent of the population was rural. Changes brought by industrialization affected rural
Japan and its women in many ways.627
Important social movements and ideologies started or occurring in the Meiji era
included feminism, pacifism, and Nihonshugi.628 Feminist thought and arguments for
women’s rights began in the 1880s, part of the broader liberal movement for human
rights in Meiji Japan.629 Western missionaries introduced pacifist concepts in the late
1800s, but they found little acceptance, since most of Japan had no recent experience
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with war.630 The war with China (1894-1895) greatly affected Japanese society,
furthering Japan’s national integration.631
Important changes affecting Japanese society in the late Tokugawa and early
Meiji eras occurred in several areas. Several elements of Tokugawa society gave Japan
an excellent foundation for modern mass communications, including the nation’s
relatively compact size, relative cultural homogeneity and political centralization through
the Shogunate, and a fairly educated, increasingly urbanized citizenry.632 The newspaper
business began in the 1870s, with two types of newspapers, focused on political debate or
light entertainment.633
In the Tokugawa period, the Shogunate and feudal domains established schools,
and private schools were located at shrines and temples. Schools of “Dutch learning” for
the study of Western knowledge were also founded. Nationalism and support for
industrialization were strong forces in education in the early Meiji period. The
government founded a national system of public education, based on imported models.634
The Imperial Rescript on Education (1890) contained important principles for Japanese
education such as loyalty and filial piety for the support of the throne, and became an
essential tool for political indoctrination and nationalism.635 Military training in public
schools was introduced in the 1880s, in support of the fukoku kyôhei ideology.636
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Education included moral training, starting in 1872.637 Prestigious imperial universities
were established in Tokyo and Kyoto during this period for the training of scholars and
bureaucrats.638 Scientific learning focused on medicine from the mid-1700s, and on
military technology from the mid-1800s. After 1868, national science education was
institutionalized, and Western scientific experts brought to Japan to teach.639
Government policy established universal primary education for both genders, but there
were more opportunities for males.640
In the arts, literature in the late Tokugawa period was influenced by the
prosperity of the national economy.641 Fiction on contemporary society was popular.
Neo-Confucian scholars studied early literary texts, such as the Manyôshû and The Tale
of Genji, to clarify the Japanese worldview as it existed before the influx of Chinese
traditions. After 1868, the rapid importation of western technology and culture caused
the decline of the Chinese tradition in Japanese literature.642 The novel was reestablished as a serious genre. Colloquial Japanese language in prose, free verse in
poetry, and romantic influences on literature occurred by the mid-1890s.643 Western
influence in this period contributed to the rise of new forms of popular fiction, including
science fiction.644 Since 1868, “traditional” forms of drama such as Kabuki have
continued, but tend to stage pre-1868 productions. Modern theater was at first influenced
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by somewhat of a rejection of traditional forms, seen as stagnant, along with acceptance
of imported forms of western drama.645 The Meiji government used an imported western
cultural institution, museums, to showcase nationalistic values and new areas of
education, science and technology.646
Regarding philosophy and religion, Tokugawa era Confucianism provided a
useful tool for social and political thought that otherworldly Buddhism did not.
Confucianism was granted official status in the 1600s, and began to achieve its highest
creativity in Japan. Confucian ethics were spread in the samurai class by feudal domain
schools, and at the popular level by terakoya (“village schools”). While the influence of
Buddhism and Shinto on society was greater, the effect of Confucian ethics was
important among intellectuals.647 In the mid-1800s, as Japan faced the threat of Western
culture and ideas, the Mito School of Confucianism completed influential histories with
pro-imperial, anti-foreign arguments. After 1868, the flood of Western ideas seemed to
erase Confucian influence, but it continued in the expanded bureaucracy.648 After the
Meiji Restoration, young scholars sent abroad brought back influence from Western
movements and thinkers such as utilitarianism (John Stuart Mill), positivism (Comte),
and democracy (i.e. Rousseau). An important early Meiji intellectual group was the
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Meirokusha society of the bunmei kaika movement.649 In religion, in the Tokugawa era,
Buddhism and Shinto became more formalized, attracting broad popular participation. In
the early to mid-1800s, the phenomenon of new religions began.650 One of the most
significant developments in religion in this period was the initiation of State Shinto by the
Meiji government.651 This form of nationalism was a powerful tool for the building of
Japanese identity through the end of World War II.
Regarding the domestic society context, society’s contributions to Japanese
national identity and nation-building, and important social and cultural changes in
response to the West, are key themes in this era. Japan’s government sought to enhance
its goal of nation-building by instilling new patriotic values through various symbols,
rituals and social institutions. Key social changes included the start of the shift of labor,
including women, from farming to the industrial sector, and the emergence of modern
mass media and the national education system. Both of the latter had large influences on
the nation-building process. In the area of culture, in literature, Japanese scholars
attempted to identify authentic examples of “Japanese” tradition, in response to the rapid
influx of Western influences. To stress its chosen examples, the Meiji state responded
with new institutions such as national museums and State Shinto.
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Views of Domestic Sociocultural Issues, 1850-1895
Worldviews on Japan’s Technological Development
After noting each leader’s thoughts about and experience with technological
development, I will compare their views of Japanese technology and culture, if known,
their views of Western science, technology, culture and Japan, and each leader’s
willingness to be exposed to Western technology and culture, evidenced by each one’s
training in Japan or abroad.
Fukuzawa Yukichi. To Fukuzawa, the two parts of the slogan “eastern ethics,
western techniques” seemed irreconcilable. Japan needed both western technology, and a
new spirit. On his first trip to the United States in the early 1860s, while impressed by
technologies like gas lights, Fukuzawa was keen to understand everyday political and
cultural phenomena, such as couples dancing, life insurance, and the postal system.652
According to Fukuzawa, Japan was not blessed with the highest level of civilization. It
had emphasized Chinese ethical knowledge, to the neglect of scientific knowledge. The
new “queen bee” of knowledge should be science, not ethics. Yet Fukuzawa argued in
his concept of jitsugaku (practical knowledge) that material values should not replace
spiritual ones. Rather, a new spirit was needed.653 Fukuzawa also believed that Japan’s
independence could only be maintained through strengthening it with science and
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technology. Otherwise, it would lose to the “formidable foreign enemy”—“the
aggressive foreigners.”654
Ito Hirobumi. As a youth, like many Japanese in the late Tokugawa period, Ito
was wary of interacting with foreigners, but greatly admired Western science.655 At
about age eighteen, he went to Nagasaki to study basic western military technology.656 In
the United States in 1870, Ito studied transportation, mechanical, and electrical
systems.657 Overall, Ito felt that Japan should advance to greater strength, respect and
equality with advanced nations through absorbing their civilization and technologies.
Japan’s domestic development and growth must take precedence over potentially costly
wars of conquest, such as against Korea.658
Mori Arinori. As a young man from the Satsuma feudal domain in the late
Tokugawa period, Mori attended the domain academy of Western science and
technology. He excelled, and was secretly sent along with eighteen other male Satsuma
students in 1865 to spend three years in London, Russia and the United States.659 In the
mid-late 1800s, evolutionary thinking that influenced the cultures of Western nations and
Japan suggested human progress in society, morals, and other areas through industrial
technologies.660 All of this thought influenced Mori.
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Yamagata Aritomo. Yamagata had a mixed attitude toward modernization.661
He was open to major innovations using Western science and technology, but he
supported certain limits on the political system. In the military arena, both he and many
other major Meiji leaders supported the use of Western science and technology, while in
Japan’s political system, he supported a strong Emperor and imperial system.662
Kato Hiroyuki. Kato believed that scientific principles affected all areas of life,
and that soon mathematics and statistics would form the basis of all disciplines. Science
yields eternal principles (tensoku). The same basic laws and factors of heredity and
adaptation drive all forms of evolution, whether biological, social, or other.663
Comparison of Worldviews on Technological Development (1850-1895)
Concerning their views of Japan’s own technology and culture, all five of the
leaders studied for the period 1850-1895 highly valued Japanese culture. Each of them
loved Japan, and none felt that it should forever be “inferior” to the West. They desired
to protect and strengthen Japan for its survival. Implied in their views is that Japan was
now weaker than the West, and that if Japan did not improve its capabilities in
technology quickly, it would be subjugated to the latter. Because of the West’s
“temporary” technological superiority to Japan, several of these leaders were tempted to
feel that the culture of the West was now “superior” to Japan’s culture in certain areas.
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Kato and Fukuzawa felt that Japan was presently somewhat inferior to the West,
especially in technology, but they still felt superior to other Asians.664
The five leaders vary in their general views of Western science, technology and
culture, and their relation to Japan. They all felt that Western science and technology
were presently superior to Japan’s, and that Japan must import the former to survive. But
they differ in how positively they viewed Western products and ideas and how much they
should be absorbed into Japan. Mori and Fukuzawa felt the most positive about the value
of importing Western technology and culture. They valued Western technology because
they believed in many cases it was superior to Japanese technology. They also highly
valued certain ideas and ideologies that they believed underlie the success of Western
science and culture, concepts such as freedom, independence, human rights, and the
emancipation of women. Mori was the most extreme in the degree to which he called
Japan to westernize.665 He was strongly influenced by Western evolutionary thinking, as
were other Japanese intellectuals and policymakers of Meiji Japan, including Kato
Hiroyuki.666 Kato applied the ideologies of Social Darwinism to Japan’s situation itself.
Both Ito and Yamagata were ambivalent regarding Western technology and knowledge.
When young, Ito was very wary about its importation and its potential impact on Japan.
Later he and Yamagata argued for selective adaptation of certain Western technologies
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language instead. If Japan had become a longstanding colony of the United States or Britain, such as the
Philippines or Hong Kong, perhaps this could have happened somewhat.
666
For more in Mori Arinori’s evolutionary thought, and influence on him from Herbert Spencer and
others, see Swale, Political Thought.
169

and ideologies to certain sectors of political or military affairs, where they believed it
would definitely strengthen Japan.
All five of the leaders (1850 to 1895) realize the superiority of Western
technology in this period, and valued ideas and principles from the West to strengthen
Japan. While all five studied Western technology, culture and philosophy in Japan, they
varied in their direct exposure to the West. Fukuzawa, Mori, and Ito accompanied
various tours to the West, some official, and spent periods abroad studying Western
knowledge, culture, and technology. While neither Kato nor Yamagata had extended
periods of study and residence abroad, both desired to use Western ideas and/or
technologies to strengthen Japan.667
Conceptual Analysis of Worldviews on Technological Development (1850-1895)
Development Issues: To assess development-related aspects of these
worldviews on technological development, I will use the concepts of
“internationalization,” “modernization,” and “translative adaptation.”
Internationalization concerns leaders’ views about Japan’s external engagement,
“modernization,” the external and internal processes of Japan’s absorption into the
Western-dominated global economy, and translative adaptation, Japan’s internal
adaptation to external forces. 668 On internationalization, each of these leaders desired to
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Given Kato’s enthusiastic embrace of German Social Darwinism, it seems that he felt more strongly
about the West’s cultural and technological superiority than did Yamagata, whose acceptance of Western
ideas for Japan was more limited and qualified.
668
Several Japanese development economists and cultural anthropologist Maegawa Keiji developed these
concepts. See the definitions in the Glossary. To analyze development issues connected with technological
development, I include internationalization, “modernization” and translative adaptation. But for
development issues and the areas of domestic state, market, and society, I will only use the latter two
concepts. Briefly, internationalization refers to the process where the “active” West absorbed the “passive”
non-West, for the sake of its own development. The non-West has included Asia, Africa, Oceania, and the
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use Western technology and culture to strengthen “passive” Japan, in various ways, so
the “active” West would not invade Japan politically and economically. The period
1850-1895 was in some ways a high point of the West’s invasion of the non-West,
especially of Africa, Asia, and Oceania, though not so much for Latin America, whose
subjugation came earlier. All of these leaders realized the West’s technological
superiority to Japan at this time, but varied in their views about the West’s cultural
superiority. Japan’s external engagement with the West was unavoidable at this point;
Japan was forced open both by external pressures (such as the arrival of Commodore
Perry’s black ships in 1853), and internal ones (i.e. pressure on the Tokugawa Shogunate
from the feudal domains to open Japan to foreign trade and knowledge). These five
leaders also varied in their views about how much Japan should be externally engaged
with the West and the world.669 They were unanimous in the conviction that Japan must
use Western technology and knowledge to avoid Japan’s outright invasion and
colonization. Exactly how much external engagement was necessary for Japan to

Americas, and a high degree of exploitation and subjugation. (K. Ohno, “Overview,” 11-12.)
“Modernization” is the process where the core West forces weaker peripheral peoples into the global
economic system, for its own development. (Ibid.) Beyond internationalization, “modernization” adds this
anthropological component: it includes “…the adaptive acceptance of Western civilization under the
persistent form of the existing culture [of a non-Western society]….” (Maegawa, “Continuity Cultures,”
174). Non-Western societies will evolve and become like Western ones, adapting to Western culture and
the market, but their core areas will never become western (Ibid., 175). In translative adaptation, a nonWestern culture adjusts to imported elements of Western culture by “reinterpreting” them through its own
values. The non-Western society’s institutions continue, but are changed. For such a society to develop
economically, there must be compatibility between its indigenous institutions and values, and the imported
organizational structures and technologies. If the indigenous and foreign aspects are not effectively
integrated, the “base society” of the receiving culture may be destroyed. For development to succeed, each
society’s government must ensure that its development path is customized according to the society’s own
unique conditions (Ibid., 174-175; K. Ohno, Overview, 14-15).
669
We will examine this issue further in Chapters 5 and 6, as we consider Japan’s external relations with
the outside world (1850-1895).
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effectively absorb these areas of knowledge, and yet avoid cultural, if not political and
economic, invasion?670 These leaders varied in their conclusions.
Examined through the lens of “modernization,” 671 developed by Japanese
anthropologists, what do these worldviews on technological development show about the
West’s absorption of Japan into the global economic system, and how Japan imported
Western cultural elements? On the external side, all of these leaders worried about the
Western threat Japan faced. They recognized the powerful role of Western science and
technology in the West’s power, and their potential to help Japan resist that threat.672 The
leaders here who most overtly advocated Japan’s use of Western knowledge to repel
Western invasion and colonization were Fukuzawa, Yamagata and Ito.673 Of the three,
Yamagata most strongly supported the use of technology for this purpose. On the
internal side, Fukuzawa and Ito varied slightly in their attitudes about the internal
elements of “modernization.” Both supported the use of Western technology to
strengthen Japan, and wanted Japan’s independence and cultural integrity maintained.
But Fukuzawa seemed to support more adaptation of Western cultural elements. Mori
was a more extreme Westernizer when young. Later he moderated, desiring Japan to
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These are profound questions with which many non-Western societies, such as China, India, Vietnam,
Iran, Saudi Arabia and others, continue to struggle today. The answers that each society develops to these
questions vary greatly.
671
The assumption in “modernization” is that through the process of interaction with external (Western)
forces, both the overall form and society of the receiving (non-Western) nation/culture will remain
essentially intact, though somewhat altered.
672
It seems we can conclude this, even though I did not find any specific quotes or writing from these five
leaders concerning the issue of technological development and Japan’s absorption into the world economy.
673
Yamagata modernized Japan’s military technologies to counter the West, though not directly concerning
economic issues. Fukuzawa heavily promoted the use of economic knowledge for this purpose. As a
leading official in the national government in the 1870s, Ito promoted the development of some of Japan’s
public infrastructure. But his major reforms occurred in the areas of constitutional law and foreign
relations.
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strengthen its national pride, though not through jingoistic means.674 This suggests he
also wanted Japan to maintain its essential cultural core and identity. Yamagata was a
strong advocate of modern technology for the nation’s military defense. Given his
conservative politics, it seems he would abhor the destruction of Japanese culture in the
Western ideological invasion. Kato tried to draw on “scientific” evidence in
“indigenous” Japanese socio-cultural phenomena to protect Japan’s cultural core, while
supporting Japan’s aggressive use of Western scientific thought to strengthen itself
against the West, and to take advantage of the resources of nearby Asian countries.675
While varying in their convictions, all five leaders recognized the strong role of
technology in the West’s power to invade Japan and other non-Western societies, its
potential to help Japan defend itself against the West, and the dangers it presented to
Japan’s own cultural integrity.
Our five leaders (1850-1895) varied concerning the issue of translative
adaptation, 676 or how Japan should handle its internal adaptation to Western technology
and culture. None of them supported the wholesale invasion of Western technology and
culture into Japan, to the point where Japan’s existing culture was erased. Even the most
extreme pro-Westernizer, Mori Arinori, was highly nationalistic in his support of
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This is discussed below in the section on domestic society worldviews, and is seen in Mori’s policies for
national education in the 1880s. In these policies, Mori advocated the promotion of patriotic values in
education, in support of Japanese nationalism, but he did not support the use of the Shinto religion for this
purpose, which the Meiji state and other pre-World War II governments later did.
675
These “indigenous” institutions included Shinto and the new emperor system. I use italics because
although the Meiji government wanted Japanese to believe that these two institutions were indigenous in
their current form, it tried to revitalize them into new forms more supportive of Japanese nationalism. For
more details, see my comments on Kato later in this chapter in the section on domestic society worldviews.
676
In translative adaptation, the focus is on a non-Western society’s degree and quality of internal
adaptation to external forces. Here the assumption is that the base society of the receiving culture will
remain stable and primary, although a new dual (Western/non-Western) cultural identity in the society will
emerge.
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Western knowledge to strengthen Japan. These five leaders varied in the degree of their
“wariness” toward Western culture and its impacts on Japan. Fukuzawa, Mori, and Kato
were highly supportive of “superior” elements of Western culture and ideas, and their
ability to strengthen Japan. While Ito and Yamagata saw value in Western technology
and culture to empower Japan, they clearly valued parts of Japan’s “indigenous” or
“traditional” culture and society, and wanted to strengthen and maintain them.
Technology Issues: Regarding technology policy-related issues in these
worldviews, a helpful analytical tool is Thomas Glick’s anthropological definition of
technology, which emphasizes the social meanings and uses of technology in daily life
and work, within a technology’s broader social, political and historical contexts.677
Through this lens, we see that all five of our leaders studied technology through a
national scale of perspective—how Japan as a nation could use technology to repel
Western invasion. Kato’s thought seems more universalistic and theoretical, although he
applied Social Darwinism to a particular national context, Japan’s. Ito and Yamagata
also emphasized the analysis of technology for the national level. Fukuzawa’s
conception of technology seems the most anthropological. When he visited the United
States, while intrigued by individual technologies, he was more interested in their social
contexts, uses in daily life, and implications for American social institutions. But his
overall emphasis was national, to discern how Japan should use these technologies for its
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In the sections where I refer an “anthropological” approach to technology, I will be referring to Thomas
Glick’s definition. See my discussion of Glick’s definition in the Glossary. Many recent anthropology
scholars of technology use systems theory to study technology as a socio-technical or techno-economic
system, and how “people employ artifacts to accomplish social purposes in everyday life.” Technology is
viewed as a socially-constructed phenomenon closely connected with the organization of work. Historical
study of a technology’s cultural and cognitive aspects is also helpful (Thomas F. Glick, “Technology,” in
The Dictionary of Anthropology, ed. Thomas Barfield [Oxford; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1997], 466).
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national defense and survival. His concept of jitsugaku (practical knowledge), that
foreign knowledge must be applied for practical purposes emphasis, fits well the
pragmatic spirit of applied anthropology. Fukuzawa’s concern for a technology’s social
contexts is also seen in his conviction that the cultural context or “spirit” surrounding a
technology’s application must be mastered for the technology to be successfully
transferred. Mori was also very practical concerning technology, emphasizing its
application for the national defense of Japan, and the effective mastery of the spirit and
culture behind it.678 Most of these leaders directly examined technologies in other
cultural contexts, to varying degrees. All five grappled with how to effectively transfer
different technologies or technological principles into the Japanese cultural context.
On the issue of technonationalism as ideology, 679 all five of the leaders here
manifest the idea that Japan should defend itself through technology, especially against
the West, by becoming wealthy and strong. The strongest direct support is seen in the
views of Fukuzawa, Ito, and Yamagata. Yamagata presupposes strong, wealthy,
productive industries in Japan in order to build the strong military forces he believes are
needed to defend the country. Kato indirectly reveals support for technonationalism in his
support for the evolutionistic concept of the survival of the strongest nations, which of

678

Mori’s practical emphasis was instilled from his education about Western science at the Satsuma
domain academy. He utilized this approach in his diplomatic work in Washington to help a visiting
Japanese delegation study American science and technology, and in his later work on Japan’s national
education policy (see my discussions later in this chapter). All of these applications were intended for
Japan’s national defense. Anthropologically, like Fukuzawa, Mori was greatly concerned about the cultural
contexts and “spirit” behind the technologies and knowledge he studied. He directly observed ideals of
freedom, entrepreneurship and the emancipation of women and slaves in the United States that he found
quite astonishing. Mori’s firsthand observation of these phenomena overseas was more extensive than
Fukuzawa’s, while the former reflected and wrote more deeply about them back in Japan. Like Fukuzawa,
Mori believed that unless Japan mastered the chief contexts and factors behind the imported technologies,
its national defense would fail.
679
See the definition of technonatonationalism as ideology in the Glossary section.
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course must also be wealthy. Mori also communicates support in his extensive
documentation of America’s economic and technological resources for Japanese in his
Life and Resources in America.680
Cognition Issues. Image. Concerning worldview and cognition issues in these
views of technological development, next I will assess aspects of image, worldview, and
cultural logics.681 These five leaders’ predominant images of technological development
can be organized into five major areas. On their general images of science and
technology, all five leaders see science and technology as powerful. Fukuzawa and Kato
stress science as the basis of all knowledge and life.
Regarding images on science, technology and the nature of the world, Mori
believes that through science and industrial technologies, the West has progressed. He
and Kato support science and evolution as the basis of all progress. Kato argues that
evolution is the primary force of change in all knowledge and life. Fukuzawa, Mori and
Kato identify potential conflicts between material and ethical/spiritual values. Fukuzawa
and some of the others worry that the material power of Western technology may
overwhelm Japan’s “spirit.” Fukuzawa and Mori argue that mastering material
techniques is not enough for Japan’s survival; it also needs new spirits of freedom and
individualism. To Mori and Kato, the material-spiritual dichotomy may be false;
progress in technological development may positively affect morality and social life.
On images of the role of science and technology in modern life, Fukuzawa and
Mori imply that Japanese must understand how technologies fit into and function in
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On the point on Mori, see Van Sant, Mori Arinori, 2004.
See the definitions of image, worldview, and cultural logics in the Glossary section.
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Western societies. Kato stresses that science affects all of life. This holistic view is also
seen in images of science as the foundation of all knowledge (Fukuzawa and Kato).
Concerning scientific and technological development in Japan, prevalent images
in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji eras see its scientific development as grossly
lagging the West’s. Japan greatly needs advanced knowledge to counter the West. It
must place priority on quickly gaining it, and on its scientific and technological
development in various sectors (all five leaders).682 Japanese must apply knowledge of
Western technologies to help such technologies function better in Japan. Japan’s
weaknesses in modern science and technology make it weaker than Western societies.683
On images of Japan’s response to Western science and technology, all five
leaders see Western science as admirable and superior to Japan’s, so Japan must study
them. On reconciling perceived conflicts between Western technology and Japanese
culture, they vary.684 On science, technology and international relations, Yamagata
believes that much of the West’s power comes through modern science and technology.
For Japan to defend itself, it must also master them. By effectively absorbing Western

682

Each of these five leaders placed emphasis on gaining advanced scientific and technical knowledge in
different sectors. Fukuzawa encouraged economics and business, education, and broad social acceptance
of technology. Ito emphasized development of Japan’s public infrastructure, general science, politics and
law. Ironically, though earlier he prioritized Japan’s domestic development above foreign adventures, he
later went to Korea as governor-general, after Japan gained it as a sphere of influence following the RussoJapanese War in 1905. Mori stressed Japan’s general growth in technology, education, religion and
morality, and Yamagata, applied technology, military sciences and technologies. Kato developed scientific
theories for public policy and public morality, and tried to identify “scientific” bases of indigenous cultural
institutions for application to modern issues.
683
Both of these last two points are from Fukuzawa.
684
While more conservative leaders like Yamagata supported Tokugawa era thinker Sakuma Shozan’s
famous slogan “Eastern ethics, Western techniques,” (wakon yosai; see Wakon yosai in the Glossary
section). Fukuzawa and Mori felt that both Western ethics and techniques were needed. In his philosophy
of jitsugaku (practical knowledge), Fukuzawa argued that a new spirit integrating positive aspects of
Western culture with Japan’s was needed.
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science and technology, Japan will become stronger, gain more respect, equality, and
protect itself against the West.685
How do these images of technological development function as perceptual
filters or organizing devices? The overwhelming power, progress and benefits that the
West derived from scientific and technological development make these five leaders
emphasize science and technology as major factors as they envision Japan’s development
task. Material factors are stressed over non-material ones. Despite pressure to emphasize
the material and scientific in all areas of reform, wise leaders, including Fukuzawa and
Mori, realize that Japan cannot successfully develop, or counter the West, if it neglects its
own soul. Proper spirit and values must undergird Japan’s technological development,
both for development’s success, and so Japan’s identity will not be destroyed.686 All five
leaders grapple with how to achieve this balance. In response, they reflected on the role
of technology in Western societies, and on Japanese society in general, among other
areas.687 As I argue below, the power of the West’s technology, global military and
economic achievements has caused the Japanese to overwhelmingly favor Western over
East Asian models as the major source of their contemporary learning from the Meiji era
to the present (2000s).688
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This point is from Ito.
There is a huge literature on the role of religion, ethics, and spiritual values in development. One of the
most pioneering works in this area is Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.
687
For example, Fukuzawa and Mori wrote on the role and state of technology in the West, while Kato
reflected on how to incorporate Shinto and the emperor system into scientific and patriotic justifications for
Japanese heritage and its emerging political system.
688
In spite of the emphases on Western knowledge and learning, Japanese indigenous sources of
spirituality, such as Shinto, and sources generally considered indigenous, such as Buddhism, have remained
important and enduring in Japanese life, up to the present.
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Worldview. In the primary worldview emerging from these images,689 science
and technology are the most powerful force in the universe, regarding its origin, meaning,
and very organization. All life, knowledge, change and growth flow from and around
science and technological improvement. This new worldview, tending to de-emphasize
spiritual values, contrasts greatly with previous Japanese worldviews, which tended to
naturally assume that spiritual influences and forces are integrated with human existence.
Yet Japan as well as China became highly secularized states centuries before their
counterparts in Europe, and in various periods, Japan’s national government struggled to
contain or distance itself from religious influences.690 The fact that leaders and forces
including Fukuzawa, Mori, and the Meiji government all believed that Japan’s successful
technological (and other forms of) development must incorporate supportive “spiritual”
and ethical” values suggests that in the mind of these leaders, this material-spiritual
dichotomy was rather weak. While the leaders varied on how Japan should respond to
the challenge of balancing scientific/”Western” values and ethical/”Eastern” ones, they
689

See the definitions of worldview in the Glossary, especially my own, which I use for analytical purposes
in this project. Here are the steps I will follow as I construct worldviews (cognitive frameworks) for this
research: after identifying the basic images about the selected topic, I will note aspects of images that
identify beliefs about the nature of the world, how it works, its order (how it is organized), views of the self
(the self’s actions, beliefs and roles) and views of the non-self/others (non-selves’ actions, beliefs, and
roles). Next I will organize the images into a coherent framework or whole (perhaps a diagram), look at
how the environment and worldviews affect each other, influences on the actors’ perceptions, uses of
information and understandings of events and their causes, and any impacts from technological systems.
690
The high degree of “secularization” of contemporary Japan and China, more extreme in the Japanese
case, is discussed in R. Inglehart and W. E. Baker, “Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of
Traditional Values,” American Sociological Review 65 (2000), 19-51, though the characterization of Japan
as “secular” in the literature in English on Japanese religion may be difficult, since the common Japanese
cultural demarcation between spiritual and non-spiritual (or ‘religious’ and ‘secular’) may be different from
most Western distinctions (Timothy Fitzgerald, “‘Religion’ and the ‘Secular’ in Japan: Problems in
History, Social Anthropology, and the Study of Religion,” Electronic Journal of Japanese Studies (2003).
Database on-line: http://japanesestudies.org.uk/ discussionpapers/Fitzgerald.html; accessed 10 July 2003.
One example of the Japanese state seeking to distance itself from religious influence is when the
government relocated the national capital from Nara to Kyoto (Heian-kyo) in 794 A.D., to limit excessive
Buddhist influence on the court (“Japan,” in New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 22 (Chicago:
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1993), 280.
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all agreed that Western technology was a key source of power for the West, and should
be for Japan as well.
The environments surrounding these worldviews of technological development
included Japanese perceptions of and influences regarding the natural sciences, modern
technology and its applications, and Western knowledge and learning in the late
Tokugawa and early Meiji periods. In the late Tokugawa era, many Japanese leaders,
national and regional, recognized the power of Western technology, and its importance
for Japan. Various feudal domains, especially in southwestern Japan, took steps to
enhance their learning about Western knowledge, even in violation of the national
isolation policy. Shortly after the nation opened to the West, the Tokugawa Shogunate’s
official trade missions to the West reflected its belief in the urgency of importing Western
knowledge. This was a period of tumultuous, unusual change and urgency for Japan, and
wisdom in Japan’s leaders was crucial for the nation’s survival. The five leaders here
(Fukuzawa, Ito, Mori, Yamagata and Kato) responded with urgency, much hard work and
study to meet this challenge, but varied on how much they felt Japan should accept
elements of Western culture. How did these environments affect these five leaders’
worldviews of technological development? The power of Western economic and military
technology forced itself on Japan with the arrival of Commodore Perry’s ships in Edo
Bay in 1853. Wise Japanese leaders and scholars realized the power of Western
technology and knowledge, even earlier. When it was no longer possible for Japan to
maintain national isolation, its leaders had to discern how to respond to the Western
challenge. Japan’s historical legacy of importing knowledge from China and Korea from
over a millennium earlier inevitably influenced its eager knowledge importation
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campaign at this point. The overarching factor in the late 1800s was the urgency of the
task, and the need for a greatly accelerated, intensified response, in comparison with the
earlier process.691
How did these worldviews and their environmental interactions influence these
leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, and understanding of events and their causes?
Regarding perceptions, the actual and symbolic power of Western science and technology
led these Japanese leaders to focus on science and technology as one of the most
overwhelming forces behind the West’s military and economic strength, and as the
leading possible “savior” for Japan in its quest to avoid colonization.692 Science and
technology were the crucial forces that explained the West’s superior military and
economic achievements, and likely also the key tools that would enable Japan to
development and resist the West. On information, the West’s superior science and
technology led many contemporary Japanese scholars and leaders to prefer the West as
the leading source for their ideas and information, not seemingly backward, undeveloped
countries of East Asia, such as China. To understand events and their causes, “scientific”
ideas and theories, including evolutionism and Western political liberalism, rapidly
became influential in the Japanese intellectual landscape. As a part of their struggle to
integrate new Western knowledge with Japanese culture, more ideologically conservative
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The earlier formal process of importing knowledge from China and Korea, starting in about the sixth
century A.D., continued for centuries, not decades, as in the contemporary case.
692
Ironically, not long after, science and technology would also become tools in Japan’s own quest to
colonize and influence several nearby regions.
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scholars, such as Kato Hiroyuki, turned to Japanese sources of tradition to find
“scientific” justifications for “Japanese” cultural phenomena and institutions.693
How did technological systems affect these worldviews on technological
development, and if so, which aspects? Some relevant technological systems in operation
in this era (1850-1895) were Japanese government scientific and technological
institutions, including educational ones, similar institutions in several feudal domains and
in leading Western nations.694 There were also the technological systems in daily
operation that several of the five leaders, namely Fukuzawa, Ito, and Mori, observed in
their travels in the West.695 These Western systems greatly impressed these future
Japanese leaders. Of the leaders here, Fukuzawa devoted the most significant effort, in
his popular writings, to educating the Japanese public regarding technological issues.
The writings of leading scholars and thinkers, many from the West, can be called a part
of this system. Elements of these institutions and leading writers had a great effect on the
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I will discuss what Kato did below in the section on domestic society worldviews (1850-1895). In brief,
he sought to justify new Meiji policies for reforming Shinto and the emperor system with “scientific”
explanations.
694
One famous national institution in late Tokugawa Japan was the government’s Bansho Shirabesho, the
Institute for the Investigation of Barbarian Books. The Satsuma domain school of science and technology
that trained young Mori Arinori is a good example of a feudal domain school. In the early Meiji era,
several public universities important for research, such as Tokyo Imperial University, were organized.
Leading scholars from many Western countries, including the United States, Great Britain, Germany and
France, had an important role in training young Japanese leaders in science, scientific thought, and
technological applications. Some Western scholars came from leading Western educational institutions. A
good example is William S. Clark, a president of the forerunner of the University of Massachusetts at
Amherst, who (in 1876-1877) helped establish Hokkaido University, today one of Japan’s top universities.
695
In other parts of this chapter I discuss how technologies in San Francisco impressed Fukuzawa. Mori
documents the overall state of technology and resources across the United States (Van Sant, Mori Arinori).
Ito studied transportation, mechanical and electrical systems in the United States in 1870 (Hamada, Prince
Ito, 62).
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worldviews of several of these five leaders.696 These technological systems greatly
affected the worldviews of technological development of the five.
The sheer economic and military power of the West impressed the pragmatic
Japanese. The fact that these technologies worked so well, and brought the West so
many tangible benefits, seemed obvious proof of the truth and strength of modern science
in practice, and of modern scientific thought as the key explanatory guide to the universe.
The conflicts of Western technology with Japanese values, including the materialspiritual dichotomy, seemed overwhelming at first, due to the high intensity and speed of
entry of Western knowledge into Japan. It took great effort by Japanese leaders in the
generations after the Meiji Restoration (1868) to devise answers to these issues. Their
conclusions, and success in addressing them, varied.697
Several leaders, such as Fukuzawa and Mori, wisely recognized that Japan must
not only master techniques, but also understand the Western contexts and “spirits” behind
technology, and Japan’s contexts, to successfully transfer this knowledge and not destroy
Japan’s soul. This led to Japanese scholars to intensively study technologies and their
cultural contexts in the West. That the West’s superior technological power caused
Japanese to view Japan as a weaker nation reflects a long-standing sense of psychological
weakness in many modern Japanese, that their nation is very resource-poor and
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Two examples of this influence are the writings of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer. I discuss the
influence of Herbert Spencer on Mori Arinori below, in the section on domestic society worldviews (18501895). It is also treated in depth in Swale, Political Thought.
697
Ultimately, how successful were Japanese leaders in balancing these conflicts? The answer must wait
for the conclusion of this project.
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overpopulated, so they must work harder than other nations for mere survival.698 Despite
this momentary sense of inferiority to the West, the Japanese government quickly began
importing Western knowledge, industrializing, and building the military. Japan was not
going to be passively invaded as other non-Western nations might be.699
Cultural Logics. Regarding the cultural logics behind these worldviews of
technological development (1850-1895), the global phenomena to which they responded
included Western science, Western technology, modern scientific research and
development, Western scientific theories and ideas, military technologies, Western
medicine, modern industrial technologies, Western science education, and Western
technology in various other sectors, such as areas of public infrastructure.
The cultural logics behind the five leaders’ beliefs about technological
development can be organized into perhaps four main areas. In the logics on science, the
universe, life and human progress, observable things are more powerful than invisible
ones. Through science, they are verifiable by processes that are logical, observable, and
replicable. So science yields rules and regularity behind all natural phenomena. Science
gives us powerful ideas help us to know the origin of the universe, how it works and is
organized. Science is the foundation of everything in the universe, living and non-living,
material and non-material, because it can be seen, measured and “proven.” Science
explains everything we know; to be worthwhile, knowledge must be explainable through
698

This “sense” of Japan’s weakness vis-à-vis the West, a common theme in Japanese society since 1868,
perhaps lessoned in the 1980s, as Japan’s postwar bubble economy took off to unprecedented heights (for
Japan) of development and wealth.
699
That Japan refused to “passively” respond to the actions of the “aggressive” West suggests that it is an
exception to the characterization in the concept of internationalization of Japanese development economists
that non-Western nations have usually “passively” responded to the aggressive attempts of the West to
absorb them into the global economic system. See the definition of Internationalization in the Glossary
section.
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science. Science gives us the power to be in control of our lives, to be richer, wiser, to
change the world. We do not have to be passive victims. Evolution is the key scientific
explanation that explains processes of change, including that in humans and human
societies, proven by scientific observation in nature. Weaker species, societies and
characteristics do not survive.
Regarding logics on science, materialism, and spiritual values, science, the most
important phenomenon in the universe, causes and explains everything, including
spirituality and ethics. Neither people nor technology are merely material; without
proper motivation and spirit, scientific and economic development cannot succeed.
Scientific and Western values must complement Japan’s values and culture, not destroy
them. Christianity has perhaps been a strong force contributing positive ethics and values
for scientific and economic development in the West. Japan should learn from this,
although wholesale adoption of Christianity is probably not possible.
On logics on science, Japan, the West, and the world, modern science and
technology can make a country powerful, seen in the example of the West. To survive,
Japan must learn about science and technology. To be rich, strong, and defend itself
against the West, Japan needs modern military technologies, medicine, industrial
technologies, and a strong public infrastructure. Japan doesn’t have these technologies, is
weak, and needs them, so it can be strong and grow. If Japan is strong in technology, it
the West will respect and not attack it. It needs the West’s help to learn about
technologies, but hopefully not for long. Japan must develop its own capacities in these
areas. Japan must fit these new technologies smoothly into society, and develop itself and
its own technological capabilities, before engaging in foreign adventures. Japan needs
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these superior technologies to survive, but not destructive Western cultural influences, so
it must be very selective in what it imports, and how.
Finally, concerning logics on “conflicts” between Japanese culture and Western
science and technology, in “traditional” Chinese philosophy, normally all of life and
nature exists in harmony and unity. This differs greatly with the common Western view,
which sees essential conflict between the material and non-material worlds. Yet the West
has become very strong in science and technology, partly due to supportive ethics and
values. Japan may want to carefully import some of these values and balance them with
its own, so its culture is not harmed. Identifying the “scientific” bases of Japanese
culture will help. Balancing the conflicts between Western and Japanese cultures is hard,
but Japan must do so, or it won’t develop and survive, which it must.
The five leaders’ responses to the global phenomena identified above were to
learn relevant Western languages, study all they could through books and foreign
teachers in Japan, travel abroad for observation or learning, if possible, and/or to read and
write about the application of these technologies to Japan’s context, in terms of ideas and
at times, policy applications. And what were the cultural logics under these responses?
They included that the West has the best knowledge about science and technology.
Japanese must study their languages, to absorb the knowledge and begin to translate it
into Japanese. Without this knowledge, Japan cannot defend itself, will remain weak,
and will not remain independent, but become a colony of the West. Japanese must learn
this knowledge in the most efficient ways possible, by bringing in top foreign books and
experts into Japan, and sending a few leaders and scholars abroad to study.
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Worldviews on Japan’s Domestic Society Contexts
Fukuzawa Yukichi. To change Japan and strengthen its capacity to compete
with the West, Fukuzawa believed that it needed two things, a deep appreciation for
scientific laws, and a spirit of independence. To achieve these, a fundamental shift in the
people’s worldview, “…the whole people’s way of thinking from its very foundations,”
was necessary. Fukuzawa believed that errors in Japanese society stemmed from its
Confucian “rejection” of science and the scientific spirit. Most of Fukuzawa’s writings
of the 1870s and 1880s were meant to help Japan in this task of worldview change.700
Overall, most Japanese remember Fukuzawa as Meiji Japan’s most influential
enlightenment thinker, because of his prolific writings on the West and on the meaning of
civilization.701
Mori Arinori. Mori saw society as a growing, living organism, whose parts
must all be in proper relation. This organic thinking (social organicism) influenced his
concepts of the nation, administrative institutions, and the organization of knowledge.
One of the leaders of this thought was Herbert Spencer, with whom Mori had direct
contact. Spencer’s notions of historical gradualism and incremental social change fit
Meiji Japan’s conditions very well. It is not surprising that they influenced Mori and
other Meiji reformers.702
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Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 10-11. These writings started with Fukuzawa’s Gakumon no Susume (An
Encouragement of Learning), and many of his serialized writings in the Jiji Shinpo newspaper.
701
Ibid., xxv, 168. Fukuzawa also contributed to the worlds of Japanese business, journalism, politics and
education (Ibid.).
702
Swale, Political Thought, 4, 181-183. Meiji Japan faced the conflicting task of needing to quickly
absorb outside knowledge and technologies, and maintain its domestic social cohesion. The principles of
evolutionism fit this need well by allowing social change while prescribing particular social arrangements
at different stages of historical development (Ibid., 13).
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Concerning Japan’s domestic society, early in his career, Mori was critical of
Japan’s “inferior ways,” and wished to raise the morality and intelligence of all Japanese,
to build a modern, more advanced society. He called for Japan to abandon its language
for English, since the latter was more “rational.”703 Returning to Japan in 1868 after his
first study overseas, Mori became a Meiji government official. Soon he submitted a
proposal calling for all non-government affiliated samurai to give up their swords.704 In
early Meiji Japan, anti-Christian sentiment continued. Mori argued that freedom of
religion and Christianity must be allowed, to gain the respect of Western nations.705 Mori
viewed religion as the domain of the individual, ideally free from government promotion
or interference.706
In his proposed reforms for Japanese society, Mori took a very pragmatic,
utilitarian approach that Swale calls Keizaishugi (“economism”).707 Mori stressed
policies of duty and support for the nation and emperor in education and other areas.708
Some of Mori’s thought on educational reforms was influenced by Herbert Spencer’s
social evolutionary thought.709 Education was one of the most important elements in the
task of building a modern nation melded with the state. Mori understood that a proper,
internal spirit stood at the center of this. Only a new, comprehensive worldview could
703

Van Sant, Mori Arinori, xxix; Swale, Political Thought, 179.
At first seen as outrageous, this became national policy three years after Mori’s original proposal (Van
Sant, Mori Arinori, xix-xx).
705
Ibid., xxvi-xxvii. Soon this became official policy, but Mori’s proposal that Christianity be adopted as
the official religion of Japan was never followed.
706
Ibid., xxviii, xxxi. Mori did not support the infusion of religion-based nationalistic philosophies from
Shinto or neo-Confucianism into Japanese education, but this infusion did occur in the Imperial Rescript on
Education (issued in 1890, after Mori’s death in 1889) (Ibid.).
707
Swale, Political Thought, 180-181. Later, Mori emphasized a “kuni no tame ni” (for the sake of the
nation) spirit (Van Sant, xxix-xxx).
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Ibid. In Japanese education, the strict system of physical and moral training that Mori initiated as
Education Minister in 1885 continued its influence through 1945 (Ibid.).
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Swale, Political Thought, 18-20.
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supply this, and Spencerian evolutionism would be very useful.710 Mori believed that for
Japan to develop into a modern state, the Japanese needed a sense of individuality before
the nation’s institutions could operate effectively on a large scale. He was impressed by
the ability of Westerners to regulate their behavior, at times, through internal
principles.711 Yet his educational reforms included institutional, educational and cultural
standardization, to create citizens capable of being integrated into a modern nationstate.712
Kato Hiroyuki. Kato’s thought on Japan’s domestic society touches on
morality and religion. In his mature theory of morality, there were two types of ethics, a
priori theories founded on inborn moral knowledge (natural law), and a posteriori
theories, where morals develop in particular situations or to aid society. Kato preferred
the latter, and believed that morality evolved from natural sources, controlled by natural
laws.713 Concerning religion, although Kato was atheistic, he participated in Shinto
practices, including worship at the Grand Shrine of Ise. He defended this by arguing that
worship at Ise was merely an expression of gratitude for the “great achievements” of the
imperial ancestors. He later agreed with the government’s assertion that Shinto was not a
religion, but a patriotic “cult” practice (Shinto hishûkyô-setsu), and that comparing Shinto
gods with the Buddha or the Christian God would harm the former.714
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Comparison of Worldviews on Domestic Society (1850-1895)
Concerning society, both Fukuzawa and Kato strongly believed that Japanese
must develop an appreciation for the scientific basis of society (the former, for general
scientific laws, and the latter, for science and nature as morality’s basis). Fukuzawa
valued science as a key part of needed social change for Japan to effectively counter the
threat of the West. Kato saw morality as controlled by natural laws. Mori’s view of
society developed from a “scientific” source, Spencerian evolutionism. He saw society
as an evolving, living organism. This organic thinking also influenced his concepts of
politics, institutions, and knowledge. For Fukuzawa, weaknesses in Japanese society
stemmed from Japan’s reliance on unscientific Confucian ethics. For Mori, they
stemmed from most Japanese lacking a Westernized “scientific” education, which he
believed gave them a lower level of morality and intelligence than most Westerners. For
Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato, Japanese society was weaker than Western societies, and
needed strengthening to survive. For the last two, this view was evolutionary in origin.
For all three, the strength and superiority of Western societies came from their higher
level of scientific and technological advancement. For Mori, religion and Christianity
seemed to play a significant role in the development of Western societies. Some values
associated with Western religion might be helpful for Japan’s development. Kato
rejected this view, preferring to strengthen Japanese spiritual traditions to support Japan’s
nation-building. The religious practices and policies of the Meiji state supported his view.
Regarding social change and reform, Mori, Fukuzawa, and Kato all supported
the necessity of social change for Japan’s survival. The views of the first two developed
more pragmatically, while Kato’s mature thought was more theoretical. While Fukuzawa
190

and Mori supported the adaptation of various Western attitudes and social phenomena in
Japan, earlier in his career, Mori supported it to a more radical degree.715 Both Fukuzawa
and Mori believed that Japan needed an entirely new worldview as the foundation for all
social change, to survive. Both rejected the Confucian, “anti-scientific spirit” inherited
from Chinese society and philosophy, which they saw as a cause of failures in Japanese
society.716 Both supported a new “spirit” of independence for Japan, to undergird needed
social change and scientific endeavors. Mori believed that a spirit of self-regulation and
control must be practiced on an individual level.717 He observed this quality of selfregulation in Westerners, admired it, and thought it was a key reason for the West’s
“success.” Without the “spirits” of independence and self-control, Japan could not
successfully develop into a modern nation and defend itself. Fukuzawa also believed that
without adequate scientific “spirit,” Japan would not modernize. Mori believed that
Japanese must acquire the “spirit” of self-regulation first, to build national social
institutions to support Japan’s development into a modern nation-state, and that education
was a key tool in all these tasks.
Concerning their worldviews of morality and religion, Kato preferred a more
evolved, “scientific” morality that could be applied and strengthened to aid the practical
needs of society, which he felt “in-born” morality could not. Mori believed that the
Japanese had a lower moral standard than Westerners. Kato and Mori both believed that
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For more on the radical nature of Mori’s early reform recommendations for Japan, see the policy
impacts section on domestic society in Chapter 10 (Conclusions, Part 2).
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In Mori’s case, these two points are implied.
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Mori’s belief about Western self-control, self-reliance and independence contrasts sharply with Japanese
psychologist Takeo Doi’s famous ideal of amae, or intense psychological dependence on others. Doi
argues in The Anatomy of Dependence (Doi, Anatomy) and other works that amae is a basic characteristic
of the personality of most Japanese.
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through a more scientific, educated approach to morality, (Japanese) society could
evolve, be strengthened, and face the challenge from the West. Fukuzawa was not very
religious. Mori respected religion and Christianity in the United States, and reflected a
lot on it during his time there. It seems he felt that the “can-do” spirit of independence
and entrepreneurship in the United States in part came from Christianity. Mori supported
Western-style religious freedoms for Japanese. To him, freedom of religion closely
paralleled other basic human rights. For Mori and Fukuzawa, unless Japan acquired the
spirit of independence of the West (especially of Americans), it could not make the
progress needed to survive. Mori saw freedom of religion and belief as an important
foundation for Japan’s successful development as a society and nation, and admired the
role of religion in American society.718 Kato was an atheist, distrusted Christianity, and
rejected comparisons of “Japanese” and “Western” religious beliefs and traditions.719
Conceptual Analysis of Worldviews on Domestic Society (1850-1895)
Society, Culture, and Technology Issues. Concerning society and culture,
relevant questions emerge from the relationship of technology and culture that will help
our analysis,720 including 1) what were the social conditions and contexts in Japan (18501895) affecting its receipt of technological and related social phenomena (or specific
technologies) from abroad?721 2) How well prepared was Japanese society to receive
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It seems that Mori also believed that freedom of religion, faith, belief and religious practice were
important in America’s national development and growth [implied].
719
Yet Kato was generally negative in his descriptions of religious and ethical traditions he deemed
“foreign,” meaning any tradition that did originate in Japan, including Confucianism, Buddhism, and
especially Christianity. For treatment of this subject, see the section in Chapter 6 on Japan’s external
cultural relations.
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See the discussion and definition of Technology and culture in the Glossary section.
721
This question emerges from the arguments and evidence of several scholars that technology includes
cultural values, that its acceptance into a new society (or organization) is constrained by the existing social
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certain technologies? Did it have or develop the indigenous expertise to use them
well?722 I cannot consider these issues in depth, but will discuss relevant points from the
worldviews of the three leaders (Fukuzawa, Mori, and Kato) considered here.
About the first question, the nation had a degree of openness to receiving
Western knowledge perceived to be “scientific” or helpful for national survival, seen in
the willingness of Fukuzawa, Mori, and Kato to receive and draw on such knowledge.
The perceived weaknesses they saw in Japanese society also helped increase their
openness to importing scientific knowledge.723 Both they and Japan were open to
receiving certain cultural values associated the West’s success in science and technology,
such as democratic or religious values, to varying degrees. Some leaders and citizens
were less open. Without adequate mastery of the proper knowledge and values, needed
social change would not happen. All three of these leaders supported the social change
that they believed was necessary for Japan’s survival. Despite the emphasis on group
conformity in Japanese culture, the willingness of Fukuzawa and Mori to embrace very
individualistic concepts is notable. They argued at several different points that Japan
structures and values of the receiving society/organization, and that the technology in turn affects those
social conditions (Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52-54; Edward Holland Spicer, Human Problems in
Technological Change, A Casebook [New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1952]; Margaret Mead, ed.
Cultural Patterns and Technical Change [New York: New American Library, 1955]; George McClelland
Foster, Traditional Societies and Technological Change [New York: Harper & Row, 1973]; Pertti J. Pelto,
The Snowmobile Revolution: Technology and Social Change in the Arctic [California: Cummings Pub. Co.,
1973]; H. Russell Bernard and Pertti J. Pelto, Technology and Social Change [Illinois: Waverland Press,
1987]; Jean-Jacques Salomon, Francisco R. Sagasti and Celine Sachs-Jeantet, The Uncertain Quest:
Science, Technology, and Development [Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press, 1994], 6-8;
Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 10. See my more extended discussion under Technology
and culture in the Glossary.
722
This question is considered in a little more depth in Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52-54, and in my
discussion of Technology and culture in the Glossary. A third question that occurs is during this period,
what were the cultures and structures of relevant organizations that affected Japan’s receipt of technologies
or technological knowledge? For more on this issue, see Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development.
There is not enough evidence in the worldviews of the three leaders to consider this third question here.
723
These perceived weaknesses included Japan’s reliance on “unscientific” Confucian philosophy, and its
technological weakness compared to Western military and technological power.
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needed a whole new worldview. Did they really realize what massive changes such a
step would have meant for Japan?724 It seems they did not. Japanese admired the “fruits”
of science and Western religious and political values that the West had attained, and were
eager to gain those fruits for themselves, especially to be able to resist the West. While
the fruits were most tempting, most Japanese were highly resistant to many of their
sources.725 We see these varying degrees of resistance in the worldviews of the three
leaders examined here.
How well was Japan prepared (socially) to receive new forms of technology?726
All three leaders (Fukuzawa, Kato and Mori) were correct in asserting that Japanese
society must develop more appreciation for a scientific worldview, and that science was
724

Consider the massive changes in Chinese society since the 1840s (the time of the Opium War with
Britain), partly brought on by its encounters with the West and the ensuing changes in its predominant
worldviews. At first the approach of the British “Southern Barbarians” was an annoyance to the Qing
dynasty, which managed for a short period to keep them at the fringes of the empire, on the southern and
eastern coasts. While a few Qing officials in the late 1800s believed that China needed to import Western
knowledge in a manner similar to Meiji Japan, most did not. The Confucian worldview and sense of
China’s superiority predominant at the time did not allow effective engagement with or importation of
Western knowledge to a degree to enable China to reform enough to repel the West as Japan did. Perhaps
China’s vast size, in comparison with Japan, made this impossible. Interestingly, the importation of a
Western ideology, Marxism, was what finally helped to prepare China for the globally unprecedented,
massive degree and scale of social and economic change it has experienced since 1978. I agree with
Chalmers Johnson’s argument (Chalmers A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power; The
Emergence of Revolutionary China [Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1962]), that without
Japanese imperialism and Japan’s savage rampage in China in the 1930s and 1940s, it is unlikely that
China’s peasants could have been effectively mobilized. Mao Zedong and Chinese Marxists were the one
force with the adequate discipline to organize and channel the peasants’ rage. It is also interesting that
Marxism, a Western, foreign ideology, is the philosophy that proved sufficient for this task. While the
social, political and economic changes brought about in China after the Communist Revolution were huge,
perhaps it was the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) that perhaps finally dismantled remaining residual
elements of Chinese “traditions.” But in the midst of today’s rapid economic development in China, we see
a massive, rapid embrace of capitalism, the profit motive, a re-emergence of new and traditional Chinese
religions, and explosive growth in Christianity. Perhaps “traditional” Chinese values have proven more
enduring than was long believed. Nevertheless, today’s level and pace of change in the Chinese nation and
society, based on its encounters with Western worldviews and ideologies, are perhaps on a scale
unprecedented in human history.
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Conservative Japanese in this era were especially resistant to such sources as liberal, democratic
political values and the Christian religion. The general resistance to the latter has generally proven
enduring in Japanese society.
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It is beyond the scope of this study to consider Japanese society’s receptivity to specific technologies,
although it is relevant to consider its overall receptivity to technology in general.
194

an important foundation for many of the social and technological changes it needed to
counter the threat of the West. It is not true that all elements of Confucian philosophy or
thought were “unscientific” or had to be jettisoned for Japan to reform,727 Nor is it true
that all aspects of evolutionary theory were “scientific” or without flaw.728 The perceived
need of the Japanese to obtain scientific knowledge, and to become “scientific” in their
society and thought to resist the West, contributed greatly to the appeal of “scientific”
knowledge and philosophies like evolution. Was the view of these three leaders correct,
that Japan needed a high level of social or worldview change to become a technologically
advanced nation? Since numerous societal structures, values and institutions are needed
to support an industrial economy, they were correct. Kato and Mori in particular applied
“scientific” ideals to their goals for morality and religion needed to support Japan’s
economic and technological development to face the West. While Mori also found value
in religious values and freedoms in American Christianity that seemed to support
development, Kato resisted them, and sought such values from Japanese religious
“traditions.” In general, Japanese society seemed highly receptive to developing the
727

As I commented above, there are many profound, deep insights in Confucian philosophy, and it served
China extremely well in helping the nation to maintain social stability and growth for many centuries (with
many interruptions), to the point where China developed into the most populous, wealthiest society on earth
until about the late 1700s. Dr. Leonard Humphries, professor of East Asian history at University of the
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Japanese society today resulting from its Confucian heritage. An example of a great Japanese philosopher
who examined Japanese culture and philosophy, especially Buddhism, in the light of the modern world,
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The flaws in evolutionary thought in this period are seen in its social application in several areas. For
example, Western anthropologists in this period contributed to “scientific” arguments for the racial
superiority of certain human groups, based on their supposed evolutionary line of descent. This type of
racist argument was later used in “scientific” support of the Nazi regime in Germany. As another example,
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average volume of female human skulls, and therefore female brain size, compared to that of male human
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scientific infrastructure needed to resist the West. Evidence in the worldviews of
Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato reflects that. Did Japanese society have the indigenous
expertise to use and develop the imported technologies well? How supportive were these
worldviews on domestic society for this task?729 In general, Japanese society in this era
had this expertise, given Tokugawa society’s fairly high level of economic, capitalistic
and educational development when it opened to the West, and the economic, industrial
and technological progress that Japan made until several economic slumps in the
1920s.730
A major question that must be answered is how Japan’s interaction with the
West affected Japan’s domestic society. Did it maintain its relative distinctiveness at this
time, as the West attempted to absorb Japan into the global economic system for its own
benefit and development? Seen through the worldviews of Fukuzawa, Mori, and Kato on
domestic society, did the attempt to increase knowledge and appreciation of science in
Meiji Japan help to crush the indigenous society, social organization and social values?
And what about the impact of evolution upon Japanese society? To answer these and
additional questions here, I will again use the “modernization” concept. The attempt to
import scientific values led to the rise of new social institutions, such as public schools,
universities, research laboratories, and state-affiliated Shinto shrines. Some of these
institutions enhanced the spread of scientific values and philosophies into Japanese
729

It is beyond the scope of the project to consider how supportive Japan’s social conditions were of
indigenous expertise on specific technologies. These issues are discussed somewhat in Okawa, Kazushi,
and Gustav Ranis, Japan and the Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis (Oxford [Oxfordshire]:
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For more details on these economic conditions from 1850 to the 1920s, see my discussions of the
contexts of Japan’s domestic market from 1850 to 1895 (Chapter 4) and from 1895 to 1945 (Chapter 7).
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society. How did these affect the indigenous society? The influx of science, technology,
and scientific values gave average Japanese much more knowledge about the world and
its conditions than during the Tokugawa period. Did this or evolutionary thought destroy
“indigenous” social organization or values? According to the evidence I have studied,
they did not. As more people moved to cities, worked in factories, went to school or
served in the military, Japanese society was greatly affected by new scientific and
technological values. But in this period, it does not seem that most elements of Japanese
society were destroyed, though they were greatly altered. Did evolution make Japanese
feel inferior? Perhaps it did somewhat.731 It also provided some justification for Japan’s
actions in neighboring countries such as Korea.732
Did the view of Fukuzawa and Mori, that Japan’s “unscientific” Confucian
heritage made it weak, affect Japanese society negatively? And what effect did these
scientific worldviews have on “traditional” Japanese religious systems? Rather than
destroying Japanese ethical, moral, and religious traditions, it seems that the “threats” of
the West, Christianity, and Western technologies and philosophies in this period partly
enhanced Japanese religions and values.733 Kato’s commitment to Japanese spiritual
values increased.734
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As I note elsewhere, according to Kato’s evolutionary thought, while Japanese were evolutionarily
inferior to Westerners, they were superior to other Asians.
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We will consider this issue in chapter 5, in the sections on Japan’s external political relations and its
imperialism from 1850-1895.
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The threat of the West led Meiji officials to adopt “state” Shinto as Japan’s national spiritual tradition,
similar to the role of state religions in European nations, for the purpose of promoting Japanese
nationalism. All Japanese were expected to participate. This favoring of Shinto may have been somewhat
to the detriment of Buddhism, however. So in the area of religion, harsh competition from the West,
militarily, culturally, and philosophically, caused a large amount of “standardization” and
institutionalization of Japanese religion, especially of Shinto, than had previously occurred.
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This was noted above in the section on Kato’s views of domestic society (1850-1895). His evolutionary
thought did not lessen these spiritual convictions.
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Did the types of social and worldview change supported by these three leaders
destroy indigenous Japanese society, values or institutions? Did the total degree of
worldview change supported by Fukuzawa and Mori occur? It appears that most
Japanese citizens were willing to embrace the new social values and changes supportive
of science advocated by the Meiji state. They applied a similar degree of hard work,
devotion to and respect for learning to the new system that their Confucian heritage
encouraged. They generally did not totally embrace the “spirits” of independence or
individual self-control that Fukuzawa and Mori supported.735 The social change in Japan
caused by its engagement with the West from 1850-1895 was huge, painful, and costly.
But it did not destroy fundamental, indigenous Japanese values, social structures, or the
central worldviews of most Japanese. I will explore this further in the next section.
Development Issues. Through the concept of translative adaptation, the issue
that emerges is whether domestic Japanese society successfully adjusted to the imported
elements of Western culture and social values, and how that adjustment affected its
response to science, technology and development issues. How compatible were Western
values with Japanese social institutions and values? Did core elements of Japanese
culture continue basically intact, though perhaps altered? What evidence do we see in the
worldviews of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato here? From our limited examination of these
worldviews, we cannot reach any firm conclusions on overall social change in Japanese
society. More specifically, to the degree that Japanese society imported the scientific
735

One can certainly argue that many Japanese have exhibited a spirit of “self-control,” but given the small
percentage of Japanese who subscribe to Christianity, the group-oriented nature of Japanese society, and
the general rejection of “individualism” as a positive value in Japanese society, it is doubtful that the
Japanese learned these values/traits from the “West.” In Japan, individualism has often been equated with
“selfishness” or “egoism.”
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institutions or embraced the social changes supported by these leaders, did its “base
society” continue intact? The social changes that Japan underwent in support of
industrialization were quite traumatic, affecting labor patterns, rural-urban relations and
migration, the lives of women and families, and other areas of daily life. Did the total
worldview changes supported by Fukuzawa and Mori happen? They did not. Japanese
worldviews in many areas evolved and changed during this period (1850-1895), but it
seems likely that certain core areas of Japanese worldviews and culture proved enduring,
though perhaps articulated or institutionalized in some new ways.736
Technology Issues. To assess the technology-related aspects of these domestic
society worldviews (1850-1895), I will use Glick’s definition of technology as a sociallyconstructed, sociotechnical system related to daily life to the issue of Japan’s domestic
society. Several questions arise: 1) the effect of societal attitudes about technology upon
Japan’s reception of it, 2) the effect of general societal attitudes on Japanese views of
technology and technological change,737 3) how technology fit into the social system,
daily life and work of the time, and 4) if technology was a socially-constructed
phenomenon during this era. Do we find any answers in the worldviews on domestic
society of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato? About the first issue, clearly societal attitudes
toward science and technology could greatly affect Japan’s receipt and adaptation of
them to resist the West. From the start of the Meiji period, these three leaders argued that
Japan must have positive views of science, or its reform process would be doomed. The
736

An example of this is the new forms of Shinto worship institutionalized through the establishment of
State Shinto, as opposed to the many forms of informal, localized ujigami worship that were studied by
Yanagita Kunio in the 1920s and 1930s. See discussion of this topic below in Chapter 7, and later in the
section about policy impacts of worldviews on domestic society (1850-1895) in Chapter 10 (Conclusion,
Part 2).
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199

attitude of Japan’s leaders toward science and technology was extremely positive, and
they tried to set the example for the rest of society.738
What was the effect of general societal attitudes (and these leaders’ attitudes)
about society, social change, morality and religion on Japan’s views of technology and
technological change?739 It appears that the leaders’ highly supportive views of science
and technology helped to encourage their spread more widely in Japanese society. 740
Social change in Japan during this era, while great, did not change the basic conservative
orientation of most members of the public. Some Western attitudes (“spirits”) believed to
be behind technology, like individualism, were mostly rejected. The three leaders
supported “foreign” or Japanese religions to the degree that they could help Japan adopt
needed technologies and modernization,741 and rejected them when it seemed they would
not. Despite the public’s generally conservative (though enthusiastic) responses to the
influx of Western society and technology, Japan’s economy grew greatly, and the nation
won victories in several foreign wars. The ideologically conservative response of
Japanese society to Western technologies and knowledge in this era did not prevent
Japan’s “successful” mastery of these forms of knowledge.
Through the three leaders’ views of domestic society, do we learn anything
about how technology fit into Japan’s social system, daily life and work of the era? At
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The attitudes of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato toward technology were all positive. I am not aware of any
Meiji era leader whose attitude was negative. It is beyond the scope of this project to examine the attitudes
of other levels of Japanese society toward technology.
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I cannot respond directly to the second question about the effect of societal attitudes on technology. My
data does not include such information, only about several leaders’ attitudes toward technology.
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Given the huge popularity of Fukuzawa’s writings, Mori’s work as national minister of education, and
state support for Kato’s mature theories, this seems like a fairly accurate reading.
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Here I mean modernization in the common political science sense, not the Japanese definition we use
throughout this project.
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first, Fukuzawa and Mori saw quite a gap between how technology fit into the daily life
of the West, and how it fit in Japan.742 Western societies seemed “superior,” since they
had more advanced scientific and technological products in daily life, which seemed to
affect those societies’ advancement and standards of living. Japanese society was
therefore backward, unscientific, “Confucian,” and weaker than the West. Japan’s
rejection of science, and failure to develop technologies and science as powerful as the
West’s, seemed glaring proof of its weakness. For Japanese society to become stronger,
it must become like the West in technology, science and certain supportive value
systems, though not necessarily in spirituality.743 To become strong and absorb these
technologies, these three leaders believed that Japan must embrace a high degree of social
and worldview change.
Do the worldviews of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato suggest that technology was a
socially-constructed phenomenon in Japan at this time? Their belief that Japan must
become a more scientifically conscious society suggests that they would support the
concept that technology is, to some degree, socially-constructed.744 All three saw
science, technology and their supportive values as key to Japan’s future and survival.
Implied is that Fukuzawa and Mori believed that the social conditions conducive to
technology were partly found in certain values they saw as intrinsic to Western culture,
including independence, democracy, individualism, Christianity, and freedom of belief
and conscience. Kato believed that needed values could, to some extent, be found within
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While these worldviews suggest various possibilities about the nature of Japanese society during this
period, without studying actual accounts of Japanese society at the time, we cannot be certain.
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Fukuzawa and Kato expressly rejected the idea that Japan must adopt the main religion of the West,
Christianity, to become strong, while Mori was more open to the possibility.
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Also implied is the attitude that if Japan did not quickly develop the social conditions and attitudes
conducive to rapid scientific and technological advancement, it would not remain independent.
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indigenous Japanese society.745 But these worldviews do not concretely tell us much
about the actual social conditions or construction of technology in Japan in this era.
The worldviews of the three leaders (Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato) on Japan’s
domestic society reflect the concept of technonationalism as ideology rather strongly. On
general society, note their views that the true nature of society itself reflects science
(Mori), and that Japanese society must incorporate values supportive of science for Japan
to survive. The implication is that without science and technology Japan will be weak
and conquered by the West. With them, it can become modern, strong, and powerful.
Science and technology are two of the key tools that will enable Japan to stand up and
strengthen itself against the West. Here there is a strong connection between technology,
society, and national security. Japan also needed vital reforms, social and worldview
changes for it to master the knowledge and technologies needed for the nation’s defense.
Japan must quickly adopt the Western, “scientific” worldview, and shed its Confucian,
“anti-scientific” heritage (in the view of the three leaders). Japanese must also adopt
daily habits of self-control and regulation, for the nation to survive and flourish. Through
a more “scientific” approach to morality (Kato), and by adopting values connected with
Western scientific success, even religious ones (Mori), Japanese society can support
needed technological growth that will enable Japan to survive.746
Cognition Issues. Image. To analyze the cognition aspects of the domestic
society worldviews of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato (1850-1895), I will first examine their
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As noted above, Mori supported Christian influence in Japan, while Fukuzawa did not. Kato supported
values that he believed were found in indigenous Japanese spirituality, specifically Shinto, as did the Meiji
state.
746
These views of society include such social features as education, religion, values, and morality that we
identified above.
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images of the basic nature of society, then of Western and Japanese societies.747 They all
believed that society has a scientific basis, and evolves. The scientific nature of social
issues must be fully grasped. All saw Western societies as more scientific, technological,
positive, moral, advanced and stronger than Japanese society, which was weak and
unscientific. Weak societies like Japan and China were poor in science. An unscientific
society like Japan was weaker, negative, and therefore less moral.
Regarding social change, whatever made Japan stronger for its survival was
positive. An unchanging society was negative. Social change was mainly based on
science and new knowledge. Social stagnancy was based on (Confucian) ethics, and a
lack of science and scientific investigation. For Japanese society to change, it needed the
proper “spirits” (atmosphere and values) supporting science and social change, often
based on individualism, self-control and independence. These “spirits” were abundant in
the West. A totally new, more Western, scientific worldview would be positive for
Japan, enabling it to survive (Fukuzawa and Mori). In the view of Kato and the Meiji
government, a more scientific worldview would help Japan, but must not destroy the
extant worldview and society. Rather, scientific foundations and justifications for
Japan’s worldview and society must be highlighted. Only this would allow Japan to
survive and flourish against the threat of the West.
Views on religion contrasted. Kato, the Meiji state, and the majority of
Japanese people preferred to find spiritual and religious values supportive of science and
change from Japan’s existing spiritual traditions, especially Shinto. To them, “Japanese”
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For consideration of the overall frameworks into which these images and worldviews should be placed,
see my discussion below of the global phenomena connected with these worldviews, in the section on the
cultural logics behind these worldviews of Japan’s domestic society, 1850-1895.
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spiritual traditions seemed more positive and natural for handling social change. A
“foreign” religion like Christianity seemed unsuitable, since it did not “fit” Japanese
culture. Images held by a minority saw Christianity as a positive force for change in the
West, and capable of giving Japan positive values for change.748 To Mori, freedoms such
as freedom of religion gave some Western societies, like the United States, a spirit of
hard work, independence and entrepreneurship, all positive. Education was seen by him,
the Meiji government and others as a key tool to help Japan become more scientific,
moral, and strong to face the West.
How did these images function as perceptual filters for the three leaders, and
affect Japan’s domestic society? The heavy emphasis of science and technology in these
images caused Japan’s leaders to prefer to learn from and interact with (Western)
societies that were more scientific and materialistic than with those that were more
philosophical, ethical or spiritual. Societies with rapid technological and social change
were preferred over those with more social stability or “stagnation.” Japan’s leaders
would prefer interacting with non-Western societies that had successfully emulated the
West and grown more scientific and powerful, butt such a nation yet did not exist.
Japan’s leaders tended to scorn or look down upon societies that refused to learn much
from the West, change, or which isolated themselves, such as China and Korea. Most
Japanese leaders, such as Kato, preferred to “filter out” features of Western culture that
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This was the view of Mori, and leading Japanese Christian intellectuals including Uchimura Kanzo,
Nitobe Inazo and others. Uchimura focused on the issues of pacifism, and the need to develop an
indigenous form of Christianity in Japan. To Mori, freedoms such as freedom of religion gave some
Western societies, such as the United States, a positive spirit of hard work, independence and
entrepreneurship, all positive.
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they found incongruent with Japanese culture, such as Christianity.749 While most
leaders were not very accepting of the Christian faith, most were open to related “spirits”
of independence, hard work, and thrift that might help Japan modernize. They hoped to
identify and mobilize such values from Japan’s indigenous spiritual traditions.
What effect did these images have on Japan’s domestic society? The emphasis
on learning from scientific, material societies caused some Japanese to scorn learning
from China and other “stagnant” Asian cultures, both concerning the past and the present.
For a time, the emphasis on Western values by extreme pro-Westernizers, such as the
bunmei kaika movement, tempted some Japanese like Mori Arinori to reject some values
or ideologies seen as indigenous or “traditional,” such as Confucianism and Buddhism.
But wise Japanese realized that the positive, noble elements of Japan’s Confucian and
other heritages must be enhanced in order for Meiji Japan to withstand the almost
unprecedented onslaught of Western values into the country.750 Even so, this desire to
strengthen Japan’s indigenous cultural traditions for the nation’s survival sometimes took
an imbalanced, extremist direction in later decades, where, for example, Shinto was
manipulated as a nationalistic ideology that nearly destroyed the nation and much of East
Asia and the Pacific. But this response to enhance “Japanese” values could not negate
the power or attractiveness of many Western ideas and ideologies for leading
intellectuals.751 The social changes that resulted from the influx of new Western ideas
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This feeling was partly due to widespread prejudice against Christianity in late nineteenth century Japan.
Christianity was proscribed 1637-1873, during the entire Tokugawa period, and into the early Meiji period.
750
The only other previous period that seems somewhat similar was when Christianity began to enter Japan
in the sixteenth century. But in that time, the degree and speed of foreign influences and ideologies
entering Japan were much slower and to a less intense degree than during the Meiji period.
751
These attractive new ideas included political liberalism, democracy, modern economics, Marxism, and
evolutionary theory.
205

and Japan’s interaction with the West were tumultuous.752 Whether one looks at leaders
and scholars who favored more “indigenous” responses to the West or more “Western”
oriented ones, the impacts on Japan were enormous.753
Worldview. Based on the above images, what are some of the main aspects of
the worldviews of the three leaders (Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato) about domestic society?
About the nature of the world and how it works, domestic society is driven by science
and material concerns. Social systems change and evolve over time. Weaker societies
must improve and grow stronger (more scientific) to survive. If we want to understand,
improve or change society, we must use science as the foundation. The world’s social
organization can also only be understood through science. Japanese society is weak, but
has noble aspects that should be strengthened to support Japan’s national survival (Kato,
Fukuzawa). Western societies are more scientific, powerful, and advanced than Japan
and other non-Western, philosophy- or ethics-based societies.754 Certain scientific
aspects and values of society, many coming from the West, can strengthen Japanese
society if carefully adapted and applied (Fukuzawa, Mori, Kato). Most leaders of Japan,
including Kato, see positive aspects of indigenous Japanese spirituality that can be
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We will briefly discuss some of these changes in later sections and chapters. Some of them included
increasing urbanization, the spread of mass education, costly wars, social and economic impacts from
Japan’s rapid industrialization, several economic depressions, changes in women’s lives and roles, and so
forth. Then there was the destruction of Japan during World War II, and the rapid social and economic
changes resulting from the rebuilding and economic development of the nation in the postwar period. The
fact that Japanese society and culture, although greatly altered, have survived as intact as they have, is a
complement to their amazing durability and strength.
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We have already commented on some of the impacts resulting from the Meiji state’s adoption of Shinto
as a nationalist spiritual ideology for nation-building. Christianity has also had a large impact on education
in Japan. Western missionaries and educators helped establish many leading public (national) and private
universities in Japan, including Hokkaido University, Sophia University, Aoyama Gakuin University,
Doshisha University, International Christian University and others. Japanese Christians have also been
extremely active and influential in the intellectual life of the nation. One example is the leading twentieth
century Catholic novelist Endo Shusaku.
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In the Meiji era, such societies included China, the Indian subcontinent, and Korea.
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mobilized to strengthen the nation. They tend to reject the direct application of
“Western” spirituality (Christianity) for this purpose (Kato, Fukuzawa), even though they
recognize it offers some positive values for economic development. A few leaders
supported such application, at times, to help the nation grow (Mori and others).
The environments surrounding the three leaders’ views of domestic society
included domestic and international aspects. Domestically, these leaders faced a time of
rapid social change and an uncertain future. I noted above how all three men (Fukuzawa,
Kato, and Mori) tended to view Western nations with respect and a degree of admiration,
yet fear, about the threat of domination by the West. They tended to look down upon
Japan’s Eastern neighbors, which were less “scientific” and more “philosophical” in
nature. These environments made the three leaders’ views on domestic society more
open to input from Western scientific worldviews than from Confucian societies like
China.755 How did these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions
influence the three leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, understanding of events and
their causes? They caused the three leaders to prefer “scientific” explanations of society
and social phenomena like social change and values, and to mostly favor “scientific”
solutions and applications of “Western” values and knowledge over “Eastern” or
Confucian ones. The latter form of explanation dominated Japanese society for nearly all
of its written history, but now seemed greatly discredited. Some Japanese thinkers like
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One example of this is Mori’s extensive exchanges with Herbert Spencer on sociological issues. This
had a deep influence on Mori’s “scientific” views of society and its evolution.
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Kato worked to develop creative new “scientific” explanations for Japan’s own social
features.756
Technological systems on a broad level affected these worldviews of these three
leaders. Remember the wonder of Fukuzawa felt at various technological marvels and
their supportive social systems in San Francisco? And there is the impressive record of
Mori’s reflections on the advanced social and technological features of post-Civil War
American society.757 Whether military or civilian technologies, the West’s technologies,
power and wealth that these Meiji leaders saw in their travels to the West and its colonies
strongly impressed them. These were powerful, symbolic evidences of the power of
science and technology in the modern world, and of the wealth and power that came to
those who mastered them.758 The sheer power of these technologies was a strong
motivator to these leaders, and helped lead them to believe that Japan must master them
to survive. Since the West had produced these impressive technologies, Japanese
observers were tempted to assume that Western societies and culture were in some ways
superior, and that Japan must copy elements of Western social and cultural features to
develop similar technologies. To become a modern, technological society, Japan must
become like the West, in the view of some. Eventually most leaders, even extreme proWesternizers like Mori, realized that Japan must not jettison its entire heritage. Rather,
valuable aspects of that heritage must be enhanced to support the acquisition of new
(scientific) knowledge and technologies from abroad. Some of the social values seen to
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While Kato preferred Western, evolutionary explanations for social phenomena, he carefully crafted
those explanations to defend some Japanese indigenous institutions, including the emperor system and
Shinto worship (however, as each was newly defined by the emerging Meiji state).
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See Van Sant, Mori Arinori, which is a new, edited edition of Mori Arinori’s work Life and Resources
in America.
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These technologies were powerful both in a literal, physical sense, as well as symbolically.
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be supportive of this knowledge, such as Western individualism and the Christian
religion, seemed to clash greatly with Japanese culture. A chief problem Meiji leaders
wrestled with was how to instill (Western) social values and institutions supportive of
science and technology in Japanese society without destroying the latter in the process.
Their answers varied, but tended to be ideologically conservative, in support of existing
or renewed indigenous institutions.
Cultural Logics. Concerning the cultural logics related to these worldviews
about domestic society (1850-1895), the global phenomena to which the three leaders
(Fukuzawa, Mori, and Kato) responded included Western science and knowledge,
Western technology and technological systems,759 new ideas about the nature of society
(including Social Darwinism and Spencerian evolutionism), social values, social change,
morality, social institutions (such as education), the nation-state, the individual’s role in
society, human freedom, and “Western” religion (Christianity).760 All societies were
assumed to include certain common features. Yet these leaders believed there were
unique aspects of Japan’s culture that made it challenging to adjust to the flood of
Western ideas.
The cultural logics under the worldviews about domestic society included the
assumption that material, physical and measurable forces govern the universe, the world,
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I use the term Western here to signify that most of these specific scientific and technological ideas
originated in the West (the geographic region commonly called the West), which here refers to Europe
(including European Russia and Siberia), and North America (the United States and Canada). This is not to
suggest that technologies or science that Japan imported or observed in this era had any inherently
“Western” cultural qualities about them.
760
Here I put “Western” in quotes because while most Japanese have always conceived of Christianity as
primarily a foreign religion originating in the “West,” it originated in a Semitic culture in the Near/Middle
East (Southwestern Asia) in Israel. Today the majority of the world’s Christians live not in the West, but in
the non-West (Africa, Asia, and Latin America). For more on the demographic shift of global Christianity
to the non-West and its possible long-term implications, see Phillip Jenkins, The Next Christendom
(Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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and human and social affairs, and must be understood through science. Material and
scientific forces affect non-material aspects of human society, such as ideologies,
morality and religion. Society grows and changes similarly to a biological organism.
Any social or biological organism that is weak will not survive. For Japan to grow
strong, it must become materially and technologically rich. Japanese society must be
more supportive of science and technology in its social values and institutions, or Japan
will not grow strong, socially or as a nation. To survive, Japan must change socially and
increase its support of science. Scientifically and technologically strong societies are
superior to those that are weak in those fields. Societies that emphasize spiritual, ethical
or philosophical values are inferior. Western societies are positive models for Japan,
because they are scientifically strong, while China and other “Eastern” cultures are not,
since they are too “philosophical.” Western cultures and Eastern ones like Japan clash on
many levels. Japan must very carefully import and apply Western knowledge, or its
society and culture will be destroyed. Science and Western knowledge must be used to
strengthen Japan’s existing social institutions and values, where the latter are positive.
One reason that Western societies grew strong is that they support notions of hard work,
self-control, initiative, and innovation on the individual level. The underlying spirits of
independence and freedom, so strong in the West, seem to be the foundation of the
scientific “spirit.” Japan must also support these spirits to the degree possible, without
destroying its own society, to become a more scientific, technological society.
Japan’s response to the global phenomena just mentioned was to seek to master
the new areas of scientific and technological knowledge believed necessary for the
nation’s survival, including reflection on new thought about society and social issues.
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Some scholars studied emerging approaches overseas. Many more studied them in Japan.
Some leaders were more pro-Western, while others were more cautious about reform, and
sought to strengthen Japan’s indigenous social institutions and values. The overall desire
of Fukuzawa, Mori, Kato and other Meiji era leaders was to carefully balance Japan’s
internal social and cultural features with the imported ones, so that Japan might be
strengthened, not conquered. Among the cultural logics under the responses were that
without new areas of social knowledge, Japan would remain weak, and be colonized.
Science drives society, underlies it and other social phenomena. Without understanding
this, we cannot solve social problems. Like other areas of Western knowledge, Western
social theories are superior to “traditional” Japanese or Confucian ones. Like other areas
of modern knowledge, Japanese scholars now believed that the West had the world’s best
knowledge on social and human issues, best absorbed by study abroad. More proWestern leaders also often enthusiastically adopted the idea that Western society was
superior to Japan’s. The more cautious thinkers believed there were noble aspects of
Japanese culture that must be preserved. They agreed that Western social thought should
be studied, but only carefully applied to Japan. Behind the desire of Fukuzawa, Mori,
Kato and other Meiji leaders to balance Japan’s internal social features with imported
ones was the assumption that if they were not balanced, Japan’s culture would be erased
or destabilized.
If we compare the cultural logics under these worldviews on domestic society, a
(potential) conflict between material and non-material phenomena emerges. The three
leaders here prefer materialistic, “scientific” Western approaches. Social change and
development are viewed through “scientific” lenses influenced by evolutionary thinking.
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More “assertive,” supposedly “scientific” values, such as independence and freedom, are
preferred to the thought of “philosophical” societies like China.
Conclusion
From our broad survey of domestic contexts from 1850-1895, we saw that Japan
faced sudden, multiple challenges to its political, economic and social integrity. The first
key question of this project concerns the impact of Japan’s experiences (and leaders’
views of) technology, development and foreign relations on Japan’s current ODA policy.
Here I will treat these possible connections on a general level, while in the first
concluding chapter (9), I will draw them out more clearly. On sociocultural issues, one
lesson from 1850 to 1895 that emerges is the need for LDCs to be willing to learn
relevant, practical knowledge and institutions from more advanced countries, and to
apply them in contextualized fashion to their societies. Japan did this in this period, and it
is obvious that Japan seeks to encourage this goal in its current aid. The idea is also
consonant with translative adaptation. Despite Japan’s rhetoric that it wishes to apply
more localized aid, most critics note that it is weak in this area. A related sociocultural
issue from 1850 to 1895 was the role of nationalism and related ideologies in Japan’s
social change and economic development. Japan’s state was heavily involved in Japan’s
development during this time, including the promotion of several development
ideologies.
On the issue of culture and development, Japan’s leaders thought deeply about
how policies could protect the nation’s culture, and about what technologies and products
should be imported or rejected. But government policy placed more priority on economic
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development and international security issues. Understandably, today’s LDCs often do
the same, and historically, Japan’s ODA policies have also placed a greater priority on
economic issues than cultural ones.
On religion, spirituality and development, from 1850 to 1895, Japan’s
government studied the issue, and considered how religion and spirituality could be
mobilized to aid Japan’s development. It chose to modify a version of indigenous
spirituality, Shinto, for that task. But the government made some mistakes. It suspended
freedom of religion and conscience, and infused State Shinto with a high level of
nationalistic propaganda. This trampled on human and religious rights in Japan, damaged
Shinto itself, strangled civic sources of accountability that could have helped limit state
excesses, and helped to nearly destroy Japan in World War II. It is wise for future LDCs
to consider religion and spirituality’s role in development and aid, but coercion,
propaganda and mixing of religion and state must be discouraged.
Regarding the second key question of this dissertation, from 1850 to 1895, do
the concepts of “modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation, as
reflected in these worldviews of technological development and domestic society, present
an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with technology and development? While I
cannot yet answer this question for the whole period under study (1850 to 1945), if I
examine views for each period, eventually an answer should emerge.
What are the leaders’ basic views of the concepts of internationalization,
“modernization,” and translative adaptation in this chapter? In their worldviews of
technological development, all five leaders (Fukuzawa, Ito, Mori, Kato, and Yamagata)
reveal basic concordance with the development related concepts of internationalization,
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“modernization,” and translative adaptation, but vary in the details. All five leaders
support internationalization, that Japan must use technology to externally engage the
West, but vary on how much engagement is necessary to avoid political, economic, or
cultural invasion. On “modernization,” all five leaders agree that technology has a strong
role in the West’s power to invade Japan, in Japan resisting that threat, and that it
presents potential threats to Japan’s own culture, but vary on many points. On translative
adaptation, the leaders differ on how Japan should handle its internal adaptation to
Western technology and culture, though none wants Japan’s culture destroyed. Regarding
development issues connected with leaders’ domestic society worldviews, viewed
through “modernization,” importing scientific values led to new social institutions, partly
enhancing the former.761 “Threats” such as Christianity and Western technological ideas
ultimately strengthened Japanese religions and values. For example, Meiji officials
adopted “state” Shinto as the national spiritual tradition. Social change in Japan was
great, but did not destroy basic social structures or values. Seen through translative
adaptation, Japanese worldviews often changed, and yet many of their core areas proved
enduring, though articulated in new ways.
How well do these views reflect Japan’s experience with technology and
development from 1850 to 1895? In Chapter 3, which covers sociocultural contexts, the
primary meanings of technology here include those connected with technological
development.762 In the context section on technological development in this chapter, the
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These new social institutions included universities, public education, publicly-funded scientific
laboratories, and State Shinto.
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My own definition of technology, based mostly on anthropological sources, is: tools, knowledge,
learning and information that people use to live and survive. See also Technology (several definitions) in
the Glossary.
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main sense of technology that emerges is that of the practical and industrial application of
Western scientific knowledge in Japan for mainly industrial and military purposes. In
domestic society contexts, the primary sense of technology is the use of various forms of
social knowledge, institutions and ideas, some of it incorporating scientific theories from
the West, to encourage broad support for the new sense of national identity that the Meiji
state sought to instill in its subjects. The primary senses of development relate either to
the context of technological development, or social development. In the context of
technological development, the main meaning of development relates to Japan’s change
and growth in scientific and technological knowledge. In the late Tokugawa period, this
knowledge, called Rangaku and later, Yôgaku, was limited due to Japan’s national
isolation policy. Japan’s development of scientific and technological knowledge greatly
accelerated after 1868, due to many intentional government policies in both the industrial
and military sectors. Social development in this period includes the Meiji state attempting
to instill a sense of national identity in the Japanese people, change affecting important
social groups, such as women, social change and support for nationalistic values
encouraged by such social institutions as the new national education system and State
Shinto network.
How well do the above views of internationalization, “modernization,” and
translative adaptation reflect these experiences? The sense of internationalization related
to technological development supports the idea that technology must be used by Japan to
build up the country through science and technology, so it can counter its external threats.
On “modernization,” the main views of technology are that it can both bring Japan’s
political and/or cultural invasion, or help to prevent it (the former), and that new
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scientific and technological ideas helped to strengthen several Japanese social
institutions. Technology seen through the lens of translative adaptation reveals that
although these leaders varied on how Japan should internally adjust to the impacts of
Western technology, technology did change Japan. Yet many of its core values proved
enduring in this period. Regarding Japan’s experiences with development in this period,
viewed through “modernization,” the application of new scientific values strengthened
some social institutions, such as schools. Development seen through translative
adaptation reveals that even though technological development was huge, and changes in
social development also were great, in my analysis, many core values of Japanese society
remained fairly stable. These three concepts well reflect Japan’s experiences in this
period.
To answer the third key question of the dissertation, whether Japanese
spirituality, as an important part of worldview issues, has affected Japanese foreign aid
policies, I must consider how views of spirituality may have affected general policies in
each period, the implications of possible conflicts between views of spirituality and
science and similar conflicts, and the impacts of these issues for foreign aid over the long
run.
The views of spirituality and religion fall into four general categories here. The
first is views of general spirituality. Above, I commented on the view of Fukuzawa and
Mori of the need for proper “spirits” (atmosphere and values) such as freedom,
individuality, and independence to accompany successful science and technology
development. They observed and admired elements of these spirits in locations in the
West, including the United States. Fukuzawa and Kato wisely conclude that it is not
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necessary for Japan to blindly copy all elements of Western culture or religion. The threat
of the West and its seeming cultural clash with Japanese culture increased the resistance
of Kato and others to use Western spirituality (Christianity) and certain “un-Japanese”
“spirits” (such as individualism and selfishness) as motivators for scientific development.
In the above general worldview (cognitive framework) of domestic society I generated, it
seems that most of the leaders studied here were open to “spirits” that were positive but
not overtly Christian, for example, hard work and independence. Most Japanese were
open to such spirits. In the long run, Kato Hiroyuki, the Japanese government, and most
Japanese preferred to use Japanese spiritual traditions, such as Shinto, as sources of
inspiration for Japan’s techno-social change and nation-building, where possible.
Second, in their worldviews of spirituality, these leaders presume that science
underlies spirituality and all other phenomena, material or non-material, in the universe.
There are varied views about possible conflicts between material and spiritual forces.
Although both were seen as integrated in “traditional” Japanese worldviews, in the new
scientific worldviews of these Meiji leaders, spirituality seemed to be de-emphasized.
While several of the leaders believed that there might be conflicts between the material
and the spiritual,763 in the long run they might be false, since the material side of life can
positively influence the moral and spiritual, or the reverse.764 In these worldviews, there
is the view that Japan needs proper “spirits” for Japanese society to embrace the social
and technological change needed to properly support science. In the cultural logics under
domestic society here, these spirits and values seem closely connected to the successful
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Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato.
Mori and Kato later reached this second conclusion.
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practice of science. In the main worldview I constructed for domestic society, these
leaders preferred learning from scientific Western societies rather than from “spiritual,”
scientifically inferior Asian ones. Yet, at first, the “clashes” between Western and
Japanese values seemed overwhelming.
Regarding the views of these leaders toward religion, I noted that although in
the “traditional” Japanese worldview there was not much separation of the material and
spiritual worlds, there has long been a separation of religion and the state in Japan.765 In
the cultural logics I identified underlying Japanese domestic society, material forces
govern both the spiritual and religious realms. While a clash between Western religion
and Japanese culture is generally assumed in the worldview of domestic Japanese society
I constructed for this period,766 threats from the West strengthened Japanese religion in
some cases in this era.767
Fourth, regarding the role of spirituality and economic development, Japanese
leaders were not opposed to the use of spirituality and morality to encourage positive
social change in Japan, as long as they would contribute positively to Japanese adopting
science and technology. Some leaders were willing to use spirituality to support
economic development. While Mori was willing to look to Christianity as a source of
moral support for development,768 Kato was not. The young Meiji state observed the use
of Christianity as most European nations’ state churches, how it often provided their
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What happened in the 1930s and the 1940s, where spiritual and religious ideology mixed closely with
the state, was an aberration, not a typical pattern in Japanese history.
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I noted above how Kato disliked Christianity and preferred Shinto, and how Mori looked favorably on
what Christianity did for the West, and what it might do for Japan.
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This was the case for State Shinto.
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Mori believed that Christianity had contributed much to Western economic and social development, and
might help Japan, too.
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people courage and motivation to work hard, fight wars, and even save money. These
ideologies also served as justification for state coercion, at times. They concluded that
Japan needed a similar tool to build the nation, one that was uniquely Japanese, and
decided to create State Shinto, a nationalistic reinvigoration of Japan’s indigenous
spiritual practices, for that purpose.
What impacts did these views possibly have on policies in this period? For a
brief summary of these views, and their possible policy implications, see Tables 3.1, 3.2
and 3.3 on the next few pages. Regarding views of spirituality and possible impacts, the
spiritual views listed generally encouraged policy impacts that strengthened Japan’s
knowledge and embrace of science and technology, in the midst of navigating
challenging issues on how to respond to Western culture and influences. The views of
religion listed in Table 3.2 all list the tendency to mix religion/spirituality and politics in
this period, to a degree that is unusual in Japanese history since medieval times.
According to Table 3.3, the generally pragmatic attitudes of Japanese people and their
leaders encouraged a willingness to embrace spirituality for building of the nation’s
scientific, technological, and defense capabilities, where it could help, as long as the
spirituality was not perceived to be too incongruent with Japanese culture.
Table 3.1. Selected Views of Spirituality and Possible Policy Impacts, 1850 to 1895
View:
Possible impacts:
Japan needs proper “spirits” to support
science and technology
Japan mustn’t blindly copy all of
Western culture or spirituality
Western culture clashes with Japanese
culture. Japan mustn’t import Western

Fukuzawa, Mori had much impact on Japanese
society through culture, education, writing. Possible
impacts: great. Encouraged broad support
throughout Japanese society for science.
This is common sense. Japan has followed this, in
principle, if not always in practice.
Common sense, view of many Japanese. They likely
followed this (except for the euphoria of extreme pro219

religion and cultural values that don’t
fit it
Science underlies everything in the
universe, including the spiritual and the
material
There is a conflict between spirituality
and science
There is not a conflict between
spirituality and science

Westernizers like the bunmei kaika movement).
Would encourage the state to support scientific and
technological research, education in its policies. This
happened.
Could cause rupture in “traditional” Japanese view of
life, world. Cultural disruption. Didn’t really occur.
No problem with mixing military and religious
ideologies to promote nationalism and patriotism. This
happened.

Table 3.2. Selected Views of Religion and Possible Policy Impacts, 1850 to 1895
View:
Possible impacts:
There is no separation of the
material and the spiritual in the
“traditional” Japanese
worldview, but there is a long
tradition of separation of
religion and state.
Western religion and Japanese
culture don’t fit

Western threats strengthened
Japanese religion

The movement to create imperial ideologies, State Shinto
encouraged fusion of religion and state. Laid the foundation for
later dangers for the Japanese nation (1895 to 1945); led to
extremist political and military actions, using technological
weapons, through religious/patriotic justifications.
Led the Japanese government to resist allowing Christianity
into Japan until forced to by Western nations. General
resistance to Christianity continued (i.e., seen in opposition to
Mori’s proposal that Japan should adopt Christianity as the
national religion). Though much Christian influence entered
Japan (e.g. founding of universities, hospitals…), more might
have possibly slowed the creation of State Shinto and later
militarist/nationalist tendencies of the state (1895 to 1945).
Threats of the West on Japanese identity, culture led the
Japanese to look for spiritual sources of their own identity,
greatness. Formation of State Shinto may have partly been a
reaction to this, and encouraged some leaders’ (i.e. Kato’s)
embrace of it.

Table 3.3. Selected Views of Spirituality and Economic Development, Plus Possible
Policy Impacts, 1850 to 1895
View:
Possible impacts:
It’s okay to use spirituality and religion
to encourage development if it supports
science and technology too.
Christianity should be used to help
Japan develop economically

Most Japanese and the government are pragmatic.
Science/technology: one of the strongest things to build
Japan against the West. If spirituality/religion does this
too, then fine.
Mori: it has helped the West, can help Japan too.
Kato: no, it doesn’t fit Japan. Mori’s view did not
prevail.
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Europe has state churches to motivate
the people for development
Japanese culture and spiritual traditions
are better sources for Japan’s growth
and change than Western culture
Common sense values (hard work,
thrift…) are fine, even if from the West

Highly influential view in Meiji government. Led to the
formation of State Shinto.
Much support from Japanese government, Kato, and
most Japanese. Likely impact: high.
Support from the government, common sense from the
pragmatic spirit of most Japanese. Likely high policy
impact.

What are the implications of possible conflicts between views of spirituality and
science and similar issues for policy issues in this period? The major potential conflicts
we have identified are: 1) those between the material and spiritual worlds, 2) conflicts
between Western religion and spiritual values and those of the Japanese, 3) conflicts
between Western countries’ “scientific” knowledge and Asian countries’ ethical,
“unscientific” knowledge, and 4) conflicts between Western religion and culture and
Japanese religion and cultural values.769 In Western worldviews, there had not always
been such a strict separation between religion and the state, as we see by the power of
religion in the political affairs of many European nations, such as Russia, up through the
early twentieth century. According to the Flaw of the Excluded Middle, and the some of
the work of anthropologists Paul Hiebert and Charles Kraft, the strict separation of
spiritual and physical worlds in most Western worldviews really began with the French
Enlightenment.770 Yet I noted earlier that Japan and China have had a tradition of the
separation of religion from the state for many more centuries. It is the politico-religious
views of some mid- to late-nineteenth century European states that had more traditional
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The second category refers to specifically to religion and spirituality alone, while the fourth includes the
intersection of religion and cultural values.
770
Kraft, Christianity with Power; Hiebert, “Flaw of Excluded Middle” and Anthropological Reflections.
Their work was briefly mentioned in Chapter 1.
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mixing of religion with the state (such as Tsarist Russia) that the government of Meiji
Japan copied, rather than the progressive, secularist views of a state like nineteenth
century France.
As such, although the leaders we studied may have been momentarily disturbed
by the seeming conflicts between the material and the spiritual in the Western accounts of
science, evolution, and other studies that they read, these conflicts and the Flaw of the
Excluded Middle were not really present in the models that the Meiji state copied when it
chose to found State Shinto and incorporate both pro-religious and pro-science ideologies
of nationalism into the educational and patriotic ideals of the new Meiji state. Western
nations have never had trouble drawing on images of God and country (nor the Marxists
drawing on Mother-/Fatherland and country) to wage war and drop bombs on other
nations, and from 1895 to 1945, Japan did not either. In all cases, this has also involved
the use of technology.
While Japan in this era did not have trouble knowing that it needed Western
technology, and useful ideologies, even spiritual ones, to defend itself against the West, it
could not accept cultural values or ways of life that were too disruptive to its own. Some
of the chief cultural values that most Japanese simply could not accept included
Christianity,771 and the “extreme” Western concepts of individualism (equated with
selfishness and egotism in Japanese minds) and excessive freedoms, a concept with
which Japan had virtually no background. While a few Japanese eagerly embraced these
new, novel ideals, to most Japanese they remained quite strange and unfamiliar.
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Much of the resistance to Christianity was due to the residue of anti-Christian propaganda and
repression in the Tokugawa period, which was just ending at the start of this period.
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The preference for Western, “scientific” knowledge, against the antiquated
knowledge of Japan’s Confucian neighbors and heritage, had huge impacts on the future
course of Japan’s international relations in Asia and the Pacific, starting in this era. The
new military technologies and thought provided both the tools and justification for
attacking weaker, unscientific neighbors like China or Korea, or a more powerful one like
Russia, who stood as impediments to Japan’s “progress.” The influence of evolutionistic
thought here is not overwhelming, but present nevertheless.
Where were the possible future impacts of these issues for Japanese foreign aid,
over the long run? These will be revealed in leaders’ attitudes toward spirituality,
technology, development, and Japan’s international relations, and how they developed
over time.772 At this stage, I can say that the practical, pragmatic attitudes we see in
Fukuzawa’s, Mori’s, and Kato’s attitudes both toward spirituality, development, science
and the acquisition of Western technology and knowledge773 are manifested in several
basic attitudes of contemporary Japanese foreign aid: i.e., the prevalence of loans in
Japan’s ODA program and encouraging a spirit of “self-help” in aid recipients. We will
trace these attitudes in various areas as we survey the worldviews of key Japanese leaders
in multiple areas in the coming chapters, up through 1945. I posit that these attitudes have
evolved over time in ways that are not disconnected, and which provide key foundations
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This hints at my working hypothesis, but I cannot answer it yet, not until the last chapters of the
dissertation (9 and 10).
773
Examples of this include Mori’s view that Christianity could provide Japan practical, pragmatic attitudes
for development and reform as it had for the United States and other places in the West, his pragmatic
suggestions for social reform which Swale calls Keizaishugi (“economism”) (Swale, Political Thought,
180-181), and Fukuzawa’s philosophy of jitsugaku, knowledge put to practical use. On morality, Kato
focuses on “scientific” ethics and morality to help Japan reform. On religion, he supports the Meiji state’s
nationalization of Shinto as the national patriotic and spiritual (not religious) practice. In both these areas,
pragmatism, in both science and spirituality, is to be used for Japan’s nation-building process.
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for what Japan’s foreign aid policies are today, and for what they may become in the
future.
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Chapter 4
Worldviews of Selected Key Leaders (1850-1895)
Domestic Political Economy Issues
Introduction
In Chapter 4, we will explore important views of several key Japanese leaders
on Japan’s domestic political economy, on Japan’s domestic state and political issues,
and its domestic market and economy, in order to understand political and economic
forces in this era (1850 to 1895) that have contributed to shaping Japan’s later foreign aid
policies in the 1950s. Before examining their views in depth, I will present the major
contexts and events in Japan’s domestic politics and market for the period. On the
domestic state, we will study the views of Fukuzawa Yukichi, Ito Hirobumi, Mori
Arinori, Yamagata Aritomo and Kato Hiroyuki, and on the domestic market, the views of
Fukuzawa, Ito, and Kato. After studying the views of these leaders, to assess
development issues of domestic state and market worldviews, I will use the concepts of
“modernization” and translative adaptation. Also for both the domestic state and market
worldviews, on technology-related issues, I will use Glick’s concept of technology,
Murakami’s concept of industrial policy, and technonationalism as ideology, and for
cognition issues, the concepts of image, worldview, and cultural logics.
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Contexts of Domestic Political Economy Issues (1850-1895): Major Trends
Domestic State Contexts
After the transition from the Tokugawa period into the early Meiji period, a
small group of elite oligarchs (hambatsu, or domain cliques) from Japan’s feudal
domains dominated the political system.774 From about 1889, parliamentary models from
Britain and Germany, and Japan’s Meiji constitution, passed the same year, in particular
influenced the early Meiji political system. The Meiji constitution placed primary power
in the hands of the emperor and purposely limited the power of both houses of the Diet.
The genro, retired elder chief counselors for the emperor, influenced real power.775 The
Meiji constitution sought to balance competing principles: gradual political change
versus rapid democratic reform, and imperial sovereignty against constitutionally limited
government. The constitution finally left the latter issue’s resolution to the political
system.776 Additional forces important in early Meiji politics included the military, and
Japan’s early political parties.777 The government viewed the development of a strong
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Japan, “Hambatsu,” 495.
Japan, “Political System,” 1216.
776
Japan, “Constitution of the Empire of Japan,” 232.
777
The military exercised an important influence in Japan’s political affairs after the founding of Japan’s
modern military shortly after the Meiji restoration (1868), since many of Japan’s leaders at this time were
members of the military and often former samurai (Japan, “Gumbatsu,” 479). The ideology of militarism
(gunkokushugi), the concept that military values should dominate all areas of national life, was also
influential during this period (Japan, “Militarism,” 961). Japan’s complex system of political parties
emerged after 1868, exercising increasing impact after the Meiji constitution went into force (1890) (Japan,
“Political Parties,” 1212).
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bureaucracy during the Meiji period, modeled on Prussia’s, as important for national
unity and industrialization.778
A complex set of ideologies from both Japan and abroad influenced Japan’s
domestic politics in this period. Within Japan, ideas of nationalism (kokkashugi and
minzokushugi) were perhaps the most foundational ideological base.779 Many similar
Japan-focused ideologies emerged, including kokutai,780 patriotism,781 kazoku kokka,782
Nihonshugi,783 and State Shinto.784 Influential political ideologies originating abroad
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The government viewed democratic movements as impediments to these national goals (Japan,
“Bureaucracy,” 147).
779
A clear sense of nationalism only began to emerge in Japan in the late 1700s, through the influence of
Shinto-influenced scholars of Kokugaku (national learning), which sought, starting in the 1600s, to identify
uniquely Japanese sources of tradition through the study of Japanese classical literature and other ancient
writings (Japan, “Kokugaku,” 816-817). External pressures from the West encouraged forces within Japan
unsatisfied with the Tokugawa Shogunate’s passive treatment of the throne, including the ideology of
sonnô jôi (Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians), and patriotic movements after the Meiji Restoration
such as fukoku kyôhei (“rich nation, strong army”). After the restoration, the government developed a
strong sense of national unity through its strong influence in encouraging a national level media, economy
and education system. At this time, the two forms of nationalism that became the most influential were
statist nationalism (kokkashugi), which stressed the state as the highest target of political allegiance, and
popular or ethnic nationalism (minzokushugi), which stressed the ethnic, historical and cultural unity of the
Japanese people (Japan, “Nationalism,” 1059).
780
Kokutai (national essence or polity), a scholarly line of inquiry in the Tokugawa era, stressed the
uniqueness of the Japanese polity, through such ideas as the rule of Japan through the unbroken imperial
rule, and Japan as a “family-state” (kazoku kokka) (Japan, “Kokutai,” 819).
781
A true sense of patriotism (aikokushin) did not emerge in Japan until the Meiji era, when the nation’s
political leaders skillfully manipulated education and pre-Meiji notions of feudal loyalty to require
dedication to the emperor, state, and the newly established order (Japan, “Patriotism,” 1189).
782
According to kazoku kokka (“family-state”), developed in the Meiji era, the national structure of Japan is
similar to an extended family’s, where all the citizens (the children) are descended from the emperor (the
father). This idea was used to support the emperor’s absolute powers (Japan, “Kazoku Kokka,” 767).
783
Nihonshugi (Japanism) was a conservative ideology influential from the late 1880s through about 1912,
formed in response to the pro-Western policies of the Meiji government. Advocates of Nihonshugi sought
to preserve “traditional” Japanese institutions and values against the onslaught of Western ideas into Japan
(Japan, “Nihon shugi,” 1087).
784
State Shinto refers to the mandatory religious system developed by Japan’s government, starting in the
Meiji era (1868-1912), which organized Japan’s indigenous system of nature worship into a national
hierarchy of religious shrines dedicated to worship of the emperor and patriotic support for the state. State
Shinto was meant to strengthen the national identity of all Japanese people against the invasion of Western
culture (Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “State Shinto,” 478).
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included democracy,785 liberalism,786 and anarchism.787
Important domestic political movements, acts and events from 1850 to 1895
included the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement of the early Meiji period. In it,
former samurai (shizoku) and commoners pressed for their rights in the new political
system. The new Meiji constitution spelled the end of this movement.788 The Land Tax
Reform of 1873-1881 (Chiso Kaisei), a total revision of the land tax system by the Meiji
government that sought to standardize land values and tax burdens, provided an essential
foundation for industrialization.789 The Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors (1882)
helped to inculcate nationalistic values of absolute commitment to the emperor and the
nation that were transferred from the military to local regions as servicemen went
home.790 The first famous citizens’ protest began in the 1890s, when farmers and
fishermen in Tochigi prefecture protested against river pollution from the Ashio Copper
Mine.791
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Japan’s experience with democracy began in the 1870s, shortly after the Meiji Restoration of 1868,
when upset former samurai and landowners began a political movement for popular rights and
representative democracy (the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement). Political parties, influenced by
ideas from French radicalism and English liberalism, followed in the 1870s and 1880s, but only slowly
gained some acceptance in politics from 1898 (Japan, “Democracy,” 278).
786
Liberalism was introduced to Japan from the West shortly after the Meiji Restoration. Fukuzawa
Yukichi used jiyû, a term that originally connoted “as one pleases,” to translate the concept of liberty, and
so it was disparaged by some critics as selfish. The Meiji constitution (1889) limited individual liberties,
since it viewed the state as more important than the individual. Only members of the Freedom and
People’s Rights Movement tried to use liberalism in the early 1880s to oppose the authoritarian Meiji
government. In this period, it never became very important, since forces both on the right and left opposed
it (Japan, “Liberalism,” 889).
787
While some precursors similar to anarchy existed in earlier Chinese and Japanese thought, the modern
concept was introduced to Japan in the Meiji period, based on the thought of Russian anarchists, and the
philosophies of communism and socialism. One Japanese thinker, Kotoku Shusui, argued in 1906 that
Japanese workers should overthrow the existing political system. For the most part, anarchism lost most of
its influence in Japan by about 1923 (Japan, “Anarchism,” 36).
788
Japan, “Freedom and People’s Rights Movement,” 407-408.
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Japan, “Land Tax Reform of 1873-1881,” 877.
790
Japan, “Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors,” 596.
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Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Residents’ Movements,” 420).
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In the domestic political context, the Meiji government sought to import
relevant knowledge and institutions that would strengthen Japan against the West, for
national survival. Its response was ideologically conservative, though it adopted some
institutions that seemed quite radical at the time. The political ideologies that emerged,
especially those supported by the state, were mostly conservative. While the Western
value of democracy was fairly influential, the government limited its application.
Ideologies based upon nationalism were more prevalent.
Domestic Market Contexts
Regarding the state of Japan’s overall economy, by the mid-1800s, the mainly
agricultural Tokugawa economy had evolved into a national system of commodities and
handicrafts, with well developed commercial, monetary and transportation sectors. By
1868, Japan had several positive attributes for economic growth: a fairly well educated,
hardworking, disciplined, cooperative population, a monetized economy, a prosperous
merchant class, and talented former samurai to help administrate. The new Meiji
government initiated reforms for rapid growth.792 Emerging entrepreneurs and maturing
factors of production aided this. Particular industries given public encouragement
included textiles, iron and steel, and banking. The primary ideologies of economic
development of Meiji Japan were fukoku kyôhei and shokusan kôgyô.793 Regarding
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Areas of reform included the class system, communication, transportation, agriculture, land, and
currency systems (Japan, “Economic History,” 306-307).
793
The government of the Meiji period used the slogan fukoku kyôhei (rich nation, strong army) to
encourage the development of key industries to strengthen Japan against the encroachment of Western
powers (Japan, “Fukoku Kyôhei,” 425). Shokusan kôgyô (“increase production and encourage
management”) signifies government policy in the early Meiji period, and was intended to encourage
Japanese industries to pursue the goal of fukoku kyôhei. The Ministry of Public Works and the Home
Ministry, largely successful, were charged with introducing foreign technologies, railroads, and managing
public enterprises (Japan, “Shokusan Kôgyô,” 1409).
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problem areas, the late Tokugawa economy was plagued by low support for samurai and
daimyo, inadequate taxes, and foreign pressures for trade. And Japan’s opening in 1859
exposed the economy to potential problems of colonialism and invading Western
technologies, politics and economics. Problems in the early Meiji economy included its
dual structure of rapid industrial and slow agricultural growth. Japan’s natural resource
base was and remains weak, even today.794
In the industrial and private sectors, the foundations of early Meiji Japan’s
industries were based on Tokugawa Japan’s industrial and economic development.795 In
the private sector, Tokugawa merchants united the economy through money, with Osaka
as the economic capital. The Confucian concept of ie (“household”) was central to the
organization of Tokugawa commerce.796 From 1868 to 1882, the government strongly
promoted the development of the textile industry to decrease imports. The state-led
industrial revolution began in the late 1880s. After 1884, the private sector began to
acquire state-promoted basic industries and light manufacturing.797 The structure of
industry in the early Meiji period followed patterns typical of early national economic
development.798 In the early Meiji period, leaders brought huge changes to the economy
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Japan lacks most energy resources and resources necessary for industry, although their variety is
surprising (Japan, “Natural Resources,” 1065).
795
This development benefited from the Confucian work ethic inspired by the samurai, widespread primary
education, a national distribution system, and large amounts of capital held by landowners and merchants
(Japan, “Industrial History,” 601).
796
According to the ie concept in commerce, owner-families promised all employees lifelong employment,
in return for their absolute dedication. The system encouraged a strict positional hierarchy for those within
it (Japan, “Corporate History,” 247).
797
Japan, “Industrial History,” 601; Japan, “Industrial Revolution in Japan,” 603; Japan, “Corporate
History,” 247.
798
According to this thought, primary industries such as mining dominate the earlier stages. In Japan, the
shift of labor from the agricultural to the nonagricultural sector was fairly slow, until the early 1900s
(Japan, “Industrial Structure,” 603).
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and military, superimposing Western institutions on them.799 Business went through a
“pioneering” period (1868-1884) of pursuing financial stability and founding banks, and
a growth period (from 1884), stimulated by Japan’s pursuit of imperial expansion,
especially after the wars with China and Russia.800 Government favors encouraged huge
financial and industrial combines to develop.801 Foreign instructors and prominent
businessmen traveling abroad influenced early Meiji corporate culture. More important
was the heritage of Tokugawa Japan.802 These factors supported Confucian and
indigenous Japanese values that formed the basis of modern Japan’s corporate
ideologies.803
The employment system of the Tokugawa period divided employees into three
groups: nenki (indentured servants), fudai (hereditary vassals), and hiyô (day laborers).804
Japan’s labor movement, unions, and working class started emerging in the late 1800s.805
In the Tokugawa period, most women worked in agriculture, but after the Meiji
Restoration, some began to work in the textile industry.806 Management in the early
Meiji period emphasized the samurai spirit, service for the nation, and public support for
businessmen.807
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These changes included the abolition of samurai privileges, new freedom of movement, and the
importation of foreign experts (Japan, “Corporate History,” 247).
800
These wars occurred in 1894-1895 and 1904-1905, respectively. Japan, “Corporate History,” 247, 250.
801
These combines were called zaibatsu (Japan, “Zaibatsu,” 1768). Important zaibatsu included
Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo (Japan, “Mitsubishi,” 980; “Mitsui,” 982; and “Sumitomo,” 1471).
802
This heritage included influences from the feudal and Tokugawa bureaucracies and important merchant
trading houses (shôka) (Japan, “Corporate Culture,” 246).
803
These ideologies included allegiance to authority, hierarchy, social stability, and patron-client relations
(Japan, “Corporate Culture,” 246).
804
Japan, “Premodern Employment System,” 340.
805
Japan, “Labor,” 869; “Labor Unions,” 873.
806
Japan, “Women in the Labor Force,” 1707.
807
Japan, “Managerial Ideology,” 914.
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Concerning the domestic market context, despite the many challenges Japan
faced, especially foreign pressure to trade and open its economy, its many strengths
enabled it to emerge from national isolation and quickly begin economic reforms.
Strong state involvement was key in marshalling resources, knowledge and goals for this
purpose. State involvement in this period stressed large-scale industries and businesses,
and recognized the importance of the emerging private sector in the nation’s growth.
Neo-Confucian values from the late Tokugawa era contributed key ideologies for Japan’s
new industries and businesses. The conservatism of Japanese politics and society
encouraged government wariness concerning Japan’s new labor movement in the late
1800s. Changes brought by Japan’s industrial revolution (from the late 1880s) and shifts
in labor patterns (from agriculture to industry) were often painful and costly.
Views of Domestic Political Economy Issues (1850-1895)
Worldviews on Japan’s Domestic State Contexts
Fukuzawa Yukichi. Around 1862, after a trip to Europe, Fukuzawa Yukichi
quietly criticized the corruption and backwardness of the Bakufu.808 In 1868, the time of
the Meiji Restoration,809 Fukuzawa favored neither the Bakufu nor the imperial
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Bakufu refers to the Tokugawa Shogunate. Fukuzawa criticized the regime to his friends. He could not
do so openly, for fear of execution. In his early writings, like Seiyô Jijô (Conditions in the West, 1866,
1870), Fukuzawa did not criticize the Bakufu, although he did so in his later writings (Blacker, Japanese
Enlightenment, 8-9.
809

This refers to the “restoration” of the Japanese emperor to a position of important prominence in the
Japanese political system. For many centuries, the emperor had not occupied a very powerful position in
national Japanese politics, but this was about to change. The restoration was partly symbolized by the
relocation of the imperial court from Kyoto to the new national capital in Tokyo, and the enthronement of
the Emperor Meiji in 1867.
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restorationists.810 After the Restoration, Fukuzawa and other kemp (enlightenment)
thinkers were delighted to discover that the new government included reformers eager to
build “…a new Japan in a very western fashion,” not simply an imperialist anti-foreign
policy.811 But Fukuzawa believed that the Meiji government was ineffective in limiting
its sphere of power, and in exercising “unified” action in that sphere.812
Fukuzawa argued that no form of government is superior to others; this varies
with each era’s need. Government tends to evolve from more autocratic to democratic
forms. In a future time, government will be unnecessary. Japan should never again
revert to autocracy.813 The main duties of government are guaranteeing people’s rights,
and making laws. It should focus on limiting negative hindrances to the people’s
welfare—through the military, war and peace, and enacting laws. All other duties belong
to the private sphere, separate from the public arena. The balance between these is key to
civilization’s progress.814 The average Japanese had a very poor understanding of the
proper balance between these spheres, their rights, and the true meaning of
independence.815 Fukuzawa preferred to be independent of politics, yet remain their
critic and analyst.816
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Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 8-9.
Ibid., 28.
812
Ibid., 113. Generally Fukuzawa maintained a position of neutrality toward the Bakufu and new Meiji
regimes. Earlier, he served as an official translator, but usually he worked independently at home, so that
he could continue his intellectual [and entrepreneurial] activities (Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, xxiv-xxv, 76,
78-79). He also argued that scholars should remain independent of the government (Ibid., 141-142).
Several times the Meiji government offered Fukuzawa positions, but he usually declined them, avoiding
close contact with politicians (Ibid., 142-143, 175-176). Fukuzawa started a national newspaper, the Jiji
Shimpo, generally pro-government. On national security grounds, the paper was banned five times (Ibid.,
156-158).
813
Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 112-113, 119.
814
Ibid., 106-109.
815
Ibid., 110-111.
816
Ibid., 120-121.
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Concerning government institutions, until 1879, Fukuzawa thought that Japan
was not ready for a parliament; neither the government nor the people understood its
basic nature or functions. In 1879 he argued for a parliamentary system that would give
the Diet sufficient power, within limits, and public approval, following the constitutional
English parliamentary/cabinet model.817 The Emperor should be kept above politics.818
On human rights, in 1876 Fukuzawa argued that “people’s rights” must not
compromise state power. He believed that the state has two kinds of rights, rights of
political power and human rights. Human rights should not be neglected—eventually
Japanese would be interested in their rights and freedom to discuss political ideas.819 All
men are equal, as opposed to the traditional Japanese Confucian view, which said that
society is naturally hierarchical. Fukuzawa struggled to translate the concept of equal
rights in terms understandable to the average Japanese. If government became tyrannical,
citizens should appeal to proper reason, even to the point of death.820
Ito Hirobumi. As a youth, like many from Choshu,821 Ito felt contempt for the
Shogunate. At eighteen, he chose to fight for the restoration of the Emperor.822 Ito
contributed to many political reforms, including the legal system.823 By 1871, the
national government adopted his doctrine of “feudal renunciation/civil hegemony,” where
powers of the feudal fiefdoms were slowly reduced, and authority concentrated in the
central government. Ito believed that concentrating political power in national
817

Ibid., 118.
Ibid., 119.
819
Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 140-141. In 1879, Fukuzawa denounced and divorced himself from the
emerging Freedom and People’s Rights Movement (Ibid., 142).
820
Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 101, 104-106, 109.
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Choshu was a leading feudal domain in the Tokugawa era, located in southwestern Japan.
822
Hamada, Prince Ito, 14, 17, 19.
823
Ibid., 55-56, 75.
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governments contributes to their success.824 In the mid-1870s, Ito proposed basic
changes to alter the central government’s structure.825
By the late 1870s, as Japan’s top Councilor, Ito balanced hard political
pressures for popular rights and a parliament versus the need for political stability. He
felt that the Japanese were not yet ready for full self-government, but advised the
Emperor to grant a parliament soon.826 After his second premiership, Ito formally
renounced “bureaucratic principles” that emphasized oligarchic dominance and limited
public participation. This was the first partial opening of the political system to the
masses. Soon the first political party system was allowed.827
In the 1870s and 1880s, Ito investigated the political systems of the U.S. and
Germany.828 In 1884, he began crafting a constitution. To “protect” the nation from
drifting toward liberalism, he sought to set up a bureaucracy and institutions following
the German model.829 Ito proposed to modernize the government structure with a prime
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Ibid., 57-58, 61.
Ibid., 71-72, 74. The reforms were delayed because of a foreign policy crisis with Korea. These
included creating a Senate, an assembly of prefectural governors, a Supreme Court, and the separation of
the National Council from the administrative ministries. This was the first attempt to apply the lessons of
Western political institutions to the conditions of Japan (Ibid.).
826
Ibid., 81-83. The emperor agreed to grant a parliament by 1890.
827
Ibid., 122-123. In 1900, Ito wrote the platform of the Seiyukai, one of Japan’s earliest political parties,
which argued for the support of the constitution, the principles of the Meiji Restoration, the electoral
system, industries and commerce, friendly international relations, the national interest, education, and the
public welfare (Hamada, Prince Ito, 126).
828
Ibid., 62, 84.
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Ibid., 85-86. These included the Ministry of the Imperial Household, and the Peerage Ordinance that
established a system of nobility. The 505 peers were the basis for the Diet’s Upper Chamber. In the mid1880s, Ito was not an opponent of liberalism, but differed from some of his contemporaries about how it
should be applied in Japan. He preferred a moderate, gradual approach.
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minister and cabinet of nine ministers.830 The first constitution (1889) was neither purely
Japanese nor Western.831
Ito believed that many political and legal reforms were necessary. He had
evolving, mixed feelings about the West. Like technology, regarding political systems,
he was willing to borrow from the West, to craft a government that would earn their
respect, and enable the country to be governed effectively for modernization. The
challenge was to work this out in practice. Hamada calls Ito a “cautious realist” who
sought to craft moderate policies—midway between the powerful Emperor and the
masses eager for rights.832 Finding the right balance was extremely challenging.
Mori Arinori. There is a close structural parallel between the political and
educational thought of Mori and Herbert Spencer.833 Mori did not blindly copy Spencer,
but later developed his own distinctive patterns of political thought.834 Concerning his
political philosophy, while scholars have struggled to accurately categorize his thought
overall, Swale calls Mori a progressive, not static, conservative.835 Mori believed that
government was meant to serve citizens, who should be allowed life, liberty, and freedom
of belief without the state’s interference, except in cases of threats to political stability.
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Ibid., 90-91. Ito became the first prime minister in late 1885.
Ibid., 95-97. It divided the government into several branches, executive, legislative, judicial, and the
Privy (advisory) Council for the Emperor, and allowed for the creation of ministries. It defined mainly the
fundamentals of various rights and duties of the Emperor and the citizens.
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Ibid., 94-95.
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Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) was a prominent British sociologist, philosopher, and advocate of
evolutionary theory.
834
Swale, Political Thought, 17, 21. For Mori’s thought on education, see my discussion on Mori’s views
of Japan’s domestic society.
835
Ibid., 4-7. According to Swale, scholars have struggled to categorize Mori according to conventional
political categories. The two forms of conservatism mentioned here were both present among the
Meirokusha members. Progressive conservatives were willing to allow adaptation of the polity to current
circumstances, while static conservatives emphasized maintenance of the national polity according to
transcendent principles (Ibid., 1-2, 6). For more on how progressive conservatism developed, (Ibid., 8-11).
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He did not believe that the people and other political “outsiders” could handle much
direct influence in politics. Liberties were fine, but the “people” seemed unqualified for
public office.836 Mori supported the constitutional monarchies of Germany and Britain,
and the ideals of Japan’s first constitution (1889). A significant political task in Meiji
Japan was building Japan into a modern nation-state.837 Mori viewed the state in a nonultra-nationalistic fashion, as simply the government, one institution among many that
had limitations of function. The state “…evolved from a past and was subject to
principles of development alike with all other institutions.”838
Yamagata Aritomo. Yamagata argued in 1868 that national unity under the
new Meiji government was the first priority. He convinced the troops from some strong
fiefdoms, including Satsuma and Choshu, to join the Imperial Bodyguard in 1871. If the
military was strengthened for external threats, there need be no anxiety over internal
ones. Its modernization went beyond technology to national discipline.839 From 18801900, Yamagata argued that members of the military should be kept strictly separate from
politics, but universal military conscription should be the first basis for increasing state
power.840 Domestic reforms, based on Western models, were meant to win respect from
and equality with outside powers.841 Yamagata’s approach to political development was
gradual, cautious, and sought to strengthen national unity. To accomplish the last task, he
836

Mori did not support the democratic Freedom and People’s Rights Movement (started in the late 1870s
by dissatisfied ex-samurai) (Van Sant, Mori Arinori, xxix-xxx).
837
Ibid. According to Ernest Gellner, to build a modern nation-state, one must build a state that is
coexistensive with a certain territory, and that has a fairly homogeneous culture for the people within that
territory. Technological innovation alone is not enough; political and cultural integration are also needed
(Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1-38, summarized
in Swale, Political Thought, 11-12).
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Ibid., 184, 187.
839
Hackett, “Meiji Leaders,” 252, 254, 261.
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Ibid., 260-261, 268.
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Ibid., 244, 246.
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supported Western-type political institutions (where useful), limits on popular freedoms
and dissidence, and in the 1880s, closer connections between local and central
governments. His model was Imperial Germany. A constitution, popular rights and
political parties were needed for Japan to win Western respect, but must be limited, and
the power of the emperor protected from popular encroachment.842
Kato Hiroyuki. In his early political writings, before the late 1870s, Kato
showed interest in progressive political ideas.843 In 1868, he became an official in the
new Meiji government, and his thinking largely followed government preferences.844 In
some writings of the late 1860s, he respects both incremental political change and
Confucian virtues.845 Kato was heavily influenced by German ideas, and by 1879,
“converted” to German-influenced Social Darwinism, which argued that nations and
races, not just individuals, compete for survival. The choice of German was crucial for
the development of Kato’s worldview.846 Kato’s later thinking was rather dogmatic, and
yet he developed his own system of evolutionary thought to analyze government,
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Ibid., 261-268.
For example, in some of his earliest writings in the 1860s, Kato advocated the Shogunate’s policy of
open-door policy of trade with the West (this was long after Japan’s encounter with Commodore Perry), as
well as an independent judicial system, various civil and private rights, and the separation of government
powers (Davis, Moral and Political, 11-12).
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Kato served in several ministries, including Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Education. According to
Davis, his greatest impact was in the last (Ibid.). In the 1870s and 1880s, the Meiji government found his
writings an embarrassment, so in the 1870s, he “converted” to more conservative thought. At this point,
writers such as Thomas Buckle and Montesquieu influenced Kato intellectually. Both argued that social
phenomena developed through natural, material forces (Ibid., vii-ix, 14-17, 38, 40-43).
845
Ibid., 10-14.
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This exposed Kato to conservative German thinkers, who advocated specific limits and contexts for
human rights, different from more liberal British and French scholars (Ibid., 14-16).
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morality and society, arguing that politics and ethics should be grounded in natural,
knowable ideas.847
On national sovereignty, Kato saw the nation as a “macromulticelled organism”
(the “body”) and individual citizens as “cells.” What is right for the nation is determined
by the greatest welfare for the most people (kôan). Nations result from the struggle for
power over time. Our struggle to survive has two forms, internal (within nations,
between individuals, families and other groups) and external (among nations).
Individualism and nationalism are closely connected—the state should not ignore the
individual, but individuals may be sacrificed for the nation.848 Kato sees Japan’s state as
both a legal entity (hôjin) and as a natural, organic nation (shizen kokka). Where does the
ultimate power and sovereignty of the state lie? Japan’s “patriarchal sovereignty” lies not
with public opinion or the people, but in the “natural, filial relationship between the
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Ibid., vii-ix, 14-17, 38, 40-43. For a discussion of Kato’s concept of morality, see the section on Kato’s
views of domestic Japanese society. His theory of evolution supported the ideas of empiricism, positivism,
utilitarianism, nationalism, strict concepts of monism (the denial of many forms of dualism, such as matter
vs. mind, nature vs. culture) and universal determinism (the law of causation applied to everything). Matter
and energy form all phenomena as the “world-substance” (German: Weltsubstanz). The material “law of
substance” (Substanzgesetz) drives nature, and laws of physical nature drive culture (Ibid., 35-36, 38-39).
Regarding politics and morality, Kato argued that laws of nature (shizenhô) drive inequality and the
struggle for existence. The evolutionary struggle between human groups is more primary than that between
individuals. Power in the primitive stage is based on physical ability, and in the civilized stage, on
knowledge, wealth, and cultural ability. Primitive society was fairly egalitarian, but roles become more
specialized over time. Gender roles are an example. Scientifically, Kato saw women as inferior to men.
But he did not see this as an excuse for their mistreatment (Ibid., 38, 40-43). Kato further argued that the
behavior of all life forms is controlled by egoism, the natural instincts that drive the fight for survival. In
that fight, individual cells or organisms sometimes turn to cooperation with others (altruism). Egoism and
altruism are not static, but evolve along with society (Ibid., 43-45, 48, 52). Also related to politics, Kato’s
concept of progress is closely connected to his idea of development, expressed as evolution and
development (shinka hattatsu) or progress and development (shinpo hattatsu). Progress and political
development result from competition, the struggle for survival, conflict, and war. The strong in a society
have the right to punish and discipline the weak (Ibid., 103-106).
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Ibid., 68-70.
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emperor and his subjects.” The people form the “branch families” of the imperial “stem”
family. The emperor is the nation.849
The Jiyû Minken Undô in the 1880s met the Meiji government move to
authoritarian government to mobilize the nation for modernization.850 In response, the
government sought a “scientific” theory to limit demands for human rights. Kato wrote
Jinken Shinsetsu (A New Treatise on the Origin of Human Rights) in 1882, the first
articulation of his mature thought.851 He was the first Japanese to apply Social
Darwinism in support of an anti-democratic theory, and used it to argue that the emperor
was the fittest leader for Japan.852 Kato developed his “mature” theory of human rights
over several years, after public reaction to Jinken Shinsetsu. To him the idea of natural
rights, endowed by God or gods, was ridiculous. Animals do not have rights, so why
would only one species (humans)? Kato also felt that natural rights are based solely on
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Ibid., 71-72, 111.
Jiyû Minken Undô, the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement, was founded in the 1870s by political
liberals and radicals who claimed they had a natural right to political freedoms. They demanded the
formation of a national congress and universal suffrage for men. Natural rights and natural law were under
attack in the West, and Kato applied similar arguments in Japan (Unoura, “Samurai Darwinism,” 237, 240;
Davis, Moral and Political, 3, 9).
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In this work, Kato argues that the Jiyû Minken Undô is scientifically incorrect, because variation
naturally exists in all human and animal populations, and national equality is impossible (Unoura, “Samurai
Darwinism,” 240-242). Kato also argues that the concept of naturally endowed human rights violates the
principles of cause and effect, and the “universal law of nature” (evolution), that affect all living beings on
the earth. Superiors win, inferiors lose. Families gradually came together to form tribes, and then nations.
The “seeds of rights” were planted. As humans and their societies evolved, morality, customs and
intellectual ability raised the level of various societies. Natural selection gradually raised the position of
upper-class commoners, and later the middle classes, in several societies. Not all will have the same rights.
Rights are not natural, but are given by stronger classes to the weak as social evolution continues. Natural
selection can produce both good and evil people. The evolution of rights should be gradual. Rights
granted prematurely hamper the development of progress (Davis, Moral and Political, 25-33, 106).
852
Unoura, “Samurai Darwinism,” 240-242. The emperor was the fittest to lead since he had descended
from the long imperial line of rulers who were all the fittest to lead. Other critics contested Kato’s claims.
Supporters of democratic rights attacked his arguments in the 1880s. Another scholar, Toyama Masakazu,
in order to bolster his own support for Herbert Spencer, attacked Kato’s claim that the emperor was the
fittest leader for the Japanese people. Kato changed in his thinking from political liberalism to Social
Darwinism, and some Japanese historians have attacked him for this “conversion” (Ibid.).
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observation of civilized societies.853 Rights result from power and violence. The rights
of the strong are the ultimate origin of development, civilization and progress.854 Kato
identifies four stages in the evolution of human rights.855 But there are problems with his
arguments. Social Darwinism conflicted with the Japanese creation myth chronicled in
the ancient writings of Kojiki and Nihonshoki. Kato also argued that the emperor system
was perfect and beyond scientific analysis. His concept of the Japanese national polity
(kokutai) depended on the unbroken continuance of the imperial family line.856 Most
conservative Japanese intellectuals eventually rejected Social Darwinism because of
inconsistencies such as these. But Kato did not.857
Comparison of Worldviews on the Domestic State (1850-1895)
How do the domestic-related political views of our five leaders (1850-1895)
compare, especially related to science, technology, and foreign relations and influences?
Concerning their general views of politics and government, all five supported various
853

According to Kato, if we examine primitive societies, we may see savages have little knowledge of
counting, farming or morality. If human rights are natural, we should see wisdom and knowledge in
savages (Davis, Moral and Political, 60-68, 111). But in fact we do see their wisdom. Scholars such as
anthropologists now recognize that indigenous peoples have long had complex systems of indigenous
knowledge of fields such as the environment, agriculture, ecology, mathematics, and complex cosmologies
about the nature of life and the supernatural. Today we realize that Kato’s arguments here are ridiculous.
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The strong have a right to “use” the weak, and the weak may resist. All can act according to their own
desires and intuitions. Demands for equality occur when the weak are able to challenge the rights of the
strong, but still, ultimate power is held by the strong (Ibid.).
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The four evolutionary stages of human rights are: 1) “the violent acquisition of rights by the strong,” 2)
“the creation of new rights by the voluntary self-restraint of the strong,” 3) “the transformation of power
into genuine rights” (which emerge when the strong gain the “tacit consent” of the weak”), and 4) “the
emergence of equal rights” (Ibid.). For a treatment of weaknesses in Kato’s mature theory of rights, see
Davis, Moral and Political, 119-122.
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Kato claimed that all Japanese were descended from their tribal father emperor, related to him and each
other in the “family-state” (kokka). This conflicted with his arguments about the emperor as infallible,
because the struggle for existence was weaker among the members of the same kinship group. To
overcome these conflicts, Kato argued that individual competition for survival in Japan was manifested as
competition for the most devotion to the Emperor and the kokka. This “moral evolution by self-selection”
enabled the state to request unconditional obedience from citizens, to the point of death (Unoura, “Samurai
Darwinism,” 245-246).
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forms of political development and evolution, but varied in how fast they thought it
should occur in Japan. Evolutionary principles were especially strong in Kato’s thought,
and fairly so in Mori’s. Concerning government’s responsibilities and duties, while
Fukuzawa felt they should be strictly limited, Yamagata argued for limits on personal
freedoms. Fukuzawa and Ito argued for the need to balance various governmental
functions (the former for balance between the public and private spheres, and the latter
for balance between democratic rights and oligarchic control). Mori and Fukuzawa had
more liberal leaning political values. Both were highly supportive of Western values to
help Japan, and very nationalistic regarding the latter. Ito, Yamagata, and Kato were
more authoritarian leaning, and nationalistic. In their nationalism, Mori and Fukuzawa
supported liberal values to strengthen Japan. Fukuzawa especially supported the liberal
and scientific values (and “spirit”) behind technology, in terms of their ability to
strengthen and defend the nation. Ito, Kato and Yamagata were more conservative in
their nationalism. For Yamagata, the focal point of Japan’s domestic politics was
strengthening the military and national unity. To him, the “spirits” of Japan-focused
unity and discipline seemed more important for its defense than the Western technologies
he used to modernize the military.
Regarding Japan’s government and its institutions, Fukuzawa and Ito were
critical of the Tokugawa Shogunate; none of the five leaders supported it. Fukuzawa was
also critical of late Tokugawa imperial restorationists and the new Meiji government,
while the other four leaders supported both. Fukuzawa, Kato and Yamagata supported
the emperor system in varied ways. In his mature thought, Kato offers the most detailed
arguments about the relationship of the emperor to the Japanese people and the national
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polity, somewhat based on evolutionary principles. Mori, Ito, and Yamagata were
supportive of the Meiji constitution, though the latter two were conservative and cautious
in their approach. The former two also supported a conservative constitutional monarchy
system for Japan. Concerning political reform, Ito and Yamagata supported a more
gradual approach, while Mori, Fukuzawa, and Kato tended to support a more rapid one.
Regarding the Japanese nation and state, all five leaders supported it strongly.
Kato had the most complex view of the state, and again, his mature views were
influenced by evolutionary thought. Concerning the state’s power and authority, Mori,
Fukuzawa and Yamagata believed that the government should have limited functions or
be limited in certain ways. Ito, Yamagata and Kato highly supported the concentration of
power at the national level. For Yamagata, increased national level power would
strengthen national unity. For Kato, state power flowed from the emperor and his
relationship with the people. On the issue of democratic rights and freedoms versus
political stability and authoritarian control, Fukuzawa and Mori supported the former,
while Ito, Yamagata and Kato supported the latter (Kato called freedoms “unscientific”).
On political and human rights, Fukuzawa strongly supported individual rights,
but felt they must be carefully balanced with the state’s rights and stability. Kato
preferred state rights above the individual’s. He and Yamagata supported limits on
popular freedoms, rights and dissidence. Kato based his arguments against human rights
on evolutionary and “scientific” arguments. Fukuzawa argued in favor of human
equality, while Kato declared it scientifically impossible, based on evolutionary
reasoning.
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Concerning Western political influences, more of the thought of Fukuzawa,
Mori, Kato and Ito leaned toward Western sources and models. Of the four, the first two
were more liberal in their political values, leaning toward the “Anglo-American” system
for their ideas, and the latter two, plus Yamagata, were more conservative, gravitating
toward Germany/Prussia as the source for their political ideas. Of these five leaders
(1850-1895), only Yamagata leaned more toward Eastern (Japanese and Chinese) sources
than Western ones.
Conceptual Analysis of Worldviews on the Domestic State (1850-1895)
General Approaches. To comparatively analyze the thinking of the five
scholars (1850-1895) on domestic politics, I will use several conceptual approaches. On
the issue of how external engagement and internal adaptation to outside forces affected
domestic politics, Japanese scholars’ concepts of “modernization” and translative
adaptation, both related to development, seem helpful.858 On technology and policy
aspects, Thomas Glick’s approach to technology is helpful for domestic politics, since it
can help us assess the effect of systemic issues on leaders’ views of politics over time.859
It may also be helpful to consider the issue of industrial policy over time.860 I will also
use Richard J. Samuels’ concept of technonationalism as ideology, a key example of how
858

See the definitions of these two concepts in the Glossary. “Modernization” will be helpful since it helps
us to think both about Japan’s interaction with outside influences, and how they have affected its internal
politics. “Modernization” seems more helpful than internationalization and translative adaptation, since it
integrates both internal and external components.
859
See the definition of technology in the Glossary, and my discussion of Glick’s treatment of technology
in the section on technological development earlier in this chapter. On domestic politics, if I can see how
leaders’ views of politics are affected by technology, as part of a politico-technical system, then Glick’s
approach is relevant. This is also true for domestic economic and sociocultural aspects, if this approach
helps me to think more systemically. Finally, viewing the domestic state, market and society as part of a
technology-related system across time (the historical aspect of Glick’s definition) is also useful.
860
See Murakami’s definition of industrial policy in the Glossary. According to Murakami, industrial
policy includes all forms of (policy for) government intervention in the economy, and often involves
technology issues. Industrial policy will be relevant to domestic political issues in most time periods.
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technology and international relations have affected Japan’s domestic politics.861 On the
issue of how leaders’ worldviews and cognition affected Japan’s domestic politics, I will
use again specified aspects of the concepts of image, worldview and cultural logics.862
Development Issues. Regarding the issue of the political worldviews of our five
leaders (1850-1895) and Japan’s external engagement and internal adaptation to that
engagement, if we examine it through the concept of “modernization,” 863 we see that on
general politics and government, while the five varied in their political values (some were
liberal, some more conservative), all five were nationalistic in their political values and
goals. All wanted Japan to strengthen its internal political system to effectively repel the
threat of Western invasion. Thus all five leaders supported the concept of
“modernization.” [All five varied on what types and degrees of Western political reforms
should be imported, the pace of reform, and what degree of rights should be granted, but
all wanted the core and overall form of Japanese society to continue intact.]
What do we learn if we examine the domestic political views of the five leaders
through the lens of translative adaptation?864 From 1850 to 1895, how were the political
structures and values in Japan affected by the worldviews of these five, as they mediated
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See the definition of technonationalism as ideology in the Glossary. Samuels uses technonationalism to
signify the belief that technology is a basic part of national security, and that it must be carefully developed
in a country to make it wealthy and powerful. He argues that the concept provides a helpful summation of
Japanese beliefs about technology and security over several hundred years. (Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong
Army,” ix-x). One example of technonationalism as ideology is the slogan fukoku kyôhei (see Glossary and
discussion of fukoku kyôhei earlier in this chapter).
862
See the definitions of image, worldview, and cultural logics in the Glossary section.
863
Remember the assumption in “modernization” that through the process of interaction with external
(Western) forces, both the overall form and society of the receiving (non-Western) nation/culture will
remain essentially intact, though somewhat altered.
864
In translative adaptation, the focus is on a non-Western society’s degree and quality of internal
adaptation to external forces. Here the assumption is that the base society of the receiving culture will
remain stable and primary, although a new dual (Western/non-Western) cultural identity in the society will
emerge.
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the importation of Western political ideas and institutions into the nation? Did Japan’s
institutions and values continue intact? What effects did Western-derived scientific and
technological values have on Japan’s internal political system? The impact of Western
scientific values on the political views and values of these five leaders was fairly deep.
All five supported political change and development in Japan as necessary for Japan’s
survival. The basis of many of these ideas was Western-derived theories of evolution.
Many of the five (Yamagata, Ito, Kato) argued for more state control and fewer freedoms
for the people, to generate the rapid political and technological development believed
necessary for Japan to compete with the West. In this early stage of modern Japan’s
political development, the five were cautious, to varying degrees, about how quickly the
people could handle political freedoms.865 All five supported the reform of Japan’s
government and political institutions through the adaptation of Western type political
reforms and institutions that they felt were best suited to the Japanese context. All five
leaders supported the concept of translative adaptation in their commitment to the
strengthening and survival of the Japanese state and nation. They planned to use Western
type reforms to strengthen some of Japan’s own political institutions (i.e. the emperor),
add some new ones (a parliament and a constitution), and replace others, if necessary
(e.g. the replacement of the Tokugawa regime with the Meiji government). But at the
base of these reforms was the presumption that outsiders should not rule Japan, and that
the core of its society and worldviews must be maintained, not destroyed. On human
865

While Western scholars might argue that more political freedoms could bring more scientific and
technological advancement, most of the five leaders here would disagree. Even Fukuzawa, who strongly
supported liberal Western values that he believed underlay Western scientific and technological successes,
was generally cautious about how quickly they should be applied to Japan. In the view of these five
leaders, too many freedoms granted too quickly invited political instability and national disunity.
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rights, all of these leaders’ views were based on varied interpretations of Western
concepts, but again, with support for Japan’s national survival and independence at the
foundation. The underlying goal of Japan’s national survival was the continuance of its
core society and values. Most of the five leaders (except Yamagata) leaned heavily
toward Western sources for their political values. Yet the goal in all these areas of
political reform was Japan’s survival as a nation, a people, and a culture. Surface
appearances (of culture, technology, clothing, or the adoption of Western institutions)
were usually considered less important.866
Technology Issues. Using frameworks emphasizing technology, from Glick’s
definition of technology, I will investigate how technology affected these leaders’ views
of politics over time, as part of a politico-technical system. The five leaders’ views of
politics and government were highly influenced by Western sources and models, as were
their views of science and technology. The influence of scientific and technological ideas
on Japanese politics was great, both conceptually and in practice. Whether political or
technological in nature, most ideas or innovations for reform in this period originated in
866

One example of this was the urging of zealous early Meiji reformers that Japanese quickly adopt
Western dress, speak English, eat beef, or attend Western operas. It is interesting to compare the general
Japanese attitude toward cultural and technological reforms (of caring more about a reform’s impact on
core cultural values than about surface appearance) to the attitude of radical reformers in other regions.
Some recent societies with conservative Islamic tendencies (post-1979 Iran, and Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan), at times prohibited Western dress or outward cultural influences, in the view that such things
corrupt a society’s cultural core. The attitude in Meiji Japan and later was more pragmatic. Japan was
largely willing to learn western knowledge, technology and adopt Western institutions and attitudes in the
hope that its core cultural and national identities could be maintained. Perhaps Japan’s long experience with
importing overseas knowledge while maintaining its own distinct identity and traditions contributed to this
belief. The Meiji government policy to import foreign experts, quickly absorb their knowledge, and quickly
send them home is an example. If foreigners were kept at arm’s length and only allowed brief stays, their
knowledge could be better absorbed without corrupting Japan’s core identity. This attitude may also be a
reflection of the Japanese concepts of tatemae (surface expression of emotion and belief) and honne (true,
heartfelt conviction). But the reform process was not easy for Japan. Consider how the Meiji government
sought a Japanese version of Social Darwinism (in the work of Kato Hiroyuki), to limit the impact of
Western reforms to mainly science and technology sectors.
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the West. Science-based ideas such as evolution affected political thought in both the
West and Japan, here especially Kato’s and Mori’s. The fact that these political ideas
seemed to have the backing of Western technology and science surely gave them more
appeal in Meiji Japan. In both the nineteenth century West and Japan, ideas of
democratic politics, political philosophy, and science and technology underwent change,
some rapid, some gradual. Leading Japanese, including Fukuzawa and Mori, admired
Western democratic values assumed to be behind the West’s technological successes. The
dilemma was how to apply these ideas to Japan’s context in a way that strengthened the
country against Western colonialism and invasion, but did not destroy Japan’s core
culture and identity. To protect Japan, the Meiji government and many leaders such as
Yamagata and Ito insisted that these foreign political ideas only be very carefully applied
to Japan, if at all. Concerning Japan’s government and its institutions, the most overt
example of science influencing the five leaders’ worldviews on the domestic state here is
how Kato used evolutionary arguments to support of the emperor system. On the
Japanese state and nation, Kato’s somewhat complex views also had their origin in
evolutionary thought. The philosophical support that the three more conservative leaders
(Ito, Yamagata, and Kato) offered for power at the national level would also contribute to
the build-up of the state’s scientific and technological research capacity through the
early- to mid-1940s. The last two argued for limits against human rights and freedoms,
and Kato used evolutionary arguments to support his position. Most of the five leaders
gravitated toward Western, not Chinese, models to provide political guidance for Japan,
based partly in their belief in the superiority of Western science and technology to
strengthen Japan against Western invasion.
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Viewed through Murakami’s concept of industrial policy, the main impact of
the five leaders’ worldviews on the domestic state is seen in their desire to strengthen the
Japanese state at the national level, which would soon enable the state to strongly support
scientific, technological and economic development to a high degree. This large level of
state involvement was generally contrary to British and American political concepts of
free trade, but closer to the autocratic ideals of the late nineteenth century Prussian state.
The latter provided much inspiration for Yamagata’s military reforms, and Ito’s Meiji
constitution.
Samuel’s concept of technonationalism as ideology stresses the use of
technology to make a country rich and powerful for its own defense. Examining the
thought of our five leaders on domestic politics through this concept, we see that in their
thought on political change, the overarching goal was to make Japan powerful enough to
avoid colonization by the West. Any change in the political system in Japan, whether in
its political values, institutions, or the state, must support that end. All five leaders were
nationalistic and uniform in their support for strengthening Japan for that purpose, but
varied on what degrees and types of change were needed to accomplish it. Yamagata
most strongly supported the related ideology fukoku kyôhei (rich nation, strong army).867
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See footnotes earlier this chapter on fukoku kyôhei. Yamagata desired to strengthen the military so that
Japan could be effectively defended against Western encroachment. We may assume that he also
supported strengthening industries in Japan for that goal.
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Cognition Issues. Image. Next I will examine domestic political worldviews
(1850-1895) through analytical frameworks of cognition.868 Here images869 of Western
governments as modern, superior, strong and forceful/invasive, and of Japan’s
government as inferior, weak, stagnant and passive, predominate. The image of Western
governments’ strength in modern science and technology, and Japan’s weakness in those
areas, is related. The Tokugawa Shogunate is seen as weak and stagnant. The varied
images of the Meiji government generally support that regime. As it became more
powerful and achieved more foreign policy victories (i.e. the Sino-Japanese War, 1895),
its image in the minds of these leaders (1850-1895) improved.870 Despite areas of
stagnancy, honorable parts of Japan’s domestic political system (i.e. the emperor) may be
“saved,” if relevant political institutions and values from abroad (i.e., constitutions,
freedoms, and constitutional monarchy) can be carefully adapted and applied to Japan’s
context. The Japanese state is weak, in need of strengthening.871 On human rights, these
leaders’ images varied. More “liberal” leaders (Mori and Fukuzawa) saw them as helpful
for strengthening Japan, while more “conservative” leaders (Kato, Ito, and Yamagata)
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For a discussion of the overall frameworks into which these images and worldviews fit, see my
discussion below of the global phenomena connected with these worldviews, in the section on the cultural
logics behind these worldviews.
869
Throughout the dissertation, here are the questions I will ask as I consider what the leaders’ images of
the topic under study are: what kind of images do leaders have of the basic variables under study? Into
what larger frameworks do they fit? How do they function as perceptual filters or organizing devices? I
will examine images as both basic perception and perceptual filter, and seek to understand their larger
frameworks.
870
On the foreign policy point, an exception is Mori, who died in 1889.
871
The main question in the minds of the five leaders (1850-1895) was what could be done to strengthen
the Japanese state. They varied in their answers, both in the particular elements to be strengthened, and in
the values needed for the purpose.
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saw them as a threat to its unity. All believed they must be carefully and gradually
applied to Japan’s context.872
How did these images function as perceptual filters for the five leaders, and
affect Japan’s domestic politics? Images of Japan as weak and the West as strong foreign
threat must have blinded Japan’s leaders in certain ways, and led them to make certain
policy choices. In the view of Japan’s leaders, if Japan did not respond rapidly and
aggressively, it would not survive. Their chosen images in this period led the nation
toward increased political centralization, rapid growth in the economic and technological
sectors to support the military, and soon, Japan’s own involvement in foreign wars and
colonization.873
Worldview. Based on my own definition of worldview and the above images, I
will now construct the predominant worldview(s) about domestic politics of our five
leaders.874 About the nature of the world and how it works, our five leaders believe that
the most powerful countries, presently the West, drive the world. Strength in science and
technology will enable military power, which will make a country strong, wealthy and
successful. Countries that are weak in science, technology and military power will be
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The more conservative they were, the more cautious these leaders were about the direct application of
Western political reforms to Japan. Virtually all of the five, Mori to the least degree, shared this caution.
873
Consider Gandhi in India, and how powerfully he helped India to resist British imperialism. What if a
“Gandhi” like figure who emphasized peace and non-aggression had risen in Japan at this time? What if
Japan’s leaders had emphasized images of non-violence, non-aggression, peace, or strict neutrality, which
they often stressed in the late twentieth century? How would Japan’s political path and development have
changed?
874
Here are the steps I will follow as I construct worldviews (cognitive frameworks) for this research: after
identifying the basic images about the selected topic, I will note aspects of images that identify beliefs
about the nature of the world, how it works, its order (how it is organized), views of the self (the self’s
actions, beliefs and roles) and views of the non-self/others (non-selves’ actions, beliefs, and roles). Next I
will organize the images into a coherent framework or whole (perhaps a diagram), look at how the
environment and worldviews affect each other, influences on the actors’ perceptions, uses of information
and understandings of events and their causes, and any impacts from technological systems.
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weak, poor and conquered by stronger ones. Our leaders do not agree on which political
values will make a country strong (liberal or authoritarian ones). The militarily and
technologically powerful countries, now the West, drive the world’s political order, and
decide the rules of international trade, war and diplomacy. Japan, its government and
other Asian nations (the “East” or “non-West”) are stagnant, weak, and poor in science.
Japan is capable of learning knowledge from the powerful West, and growing strong.
Non-self (others, including the West and other Eastern countries) is strong, scientific and
modern in the West, and stagnant, unscientific, and too philosophical in the East.875
Our five viewers/actors see Japan’s surrounding environment as hostile and
unfavorable. If action is not taken, Japan will be conquered. This environment,
dominated by the scientifically powerful West, threatens to engulf and dominate Japan’s
politics and culture. This environment causes our leaders to see Japan as inferior in some
ways, though they love it, believe in it, and will fight for it. This environment makes
them rely on scientific information and technologies from the West, and doubt aspects of
Eastern knowledge and traditions.
This worldview supports the evolutionary thought predominant in the nineteenth
century Western world, and in the cultural universe beyond which is under its influence.
In this worldview, our five leaders tend to explain political events through evolutionary,
“scientific” explanations of military and technological power. Political values that
support that strength, whether liberal or authoritarian, are superior. Western
technologies, both military and consumer-oriented, powerfully impress these leaders.
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Non-self means relevant worldviews Japanese hold of others besides themselves, in this case Western
and other Eastern (East, South, and Southeast Asian) countries.
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Militarily stronger nations will stay independent. Consumer technologies and
conveniences will bring health, wealth, and comfort to a nation’s citizens.
Cultural Logics. Regarding cultural logics behind these worldviews of the
domestic state and politics,876 the relevant global phenomena about which our five
leaders held worldviews and to which they reacted were political ideas, values and
institutions from the West, including ideas about politics and government, governmental
institutions, nations, states, human rights, what the West was, how these ideas applied to
Japan, and how Japan’s political conditions compared with the West’s. Related issues
included scientific and technological ideas, military issues, and ideas behind Western
politics, such as democracy, authoritarianism, and Christianity. At the beginning of this
era, when Commodore Perry’s “black ships” arrived to open Japan in 1853, a strong,
overt manifestation of Western power appeared on Japan’s doorstep.877 Assumptions of
Confucian harmony and the superiority of Eastern and Chinese ethics and philosophy,
long questioned by some, defended by others, faced a challenge long anticipated by
leading Japanese thinkers.878 The cultural logics behind the powerful nineteenth century
Western system, including ideas of evolution, scientific rationalism, political liberalism,
constitutional monarchy, and political authoritarianism, suddenly had great appeal among
Japan’s leaders.
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Here are the steps I will use to identify cultural logics in this and other chapters: 1) What are the global
phenomena relevant to the topic under consideration, about which the Japanese leaders hold a worldview,
and to which they are reacting? 2) Try to identify the underlying cultural logics under the particular
worldviews about the relevant global phenomena and under their responses to the relevant global
phenomena (mention what the general responses were). 3) Compare the cultural logics under the
worldviews and under their responses to the global phenomena.
877
This is what Japanese called the ships of the U.S. Navy, sent by the U.S. government and led by
Commodore Matthew Perry, when they arrived off the coast of Japan to force open the country in 1853.
878
In the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods, in the thought of Fukuzawa, Japan’s weaknesses in
politics, science and technology were due to its reliance on “passive,” “stagnant” Chinese ethics and
Confucian philosophy, which he saw as weak and unscientific [quotation marks added].
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The cultural logics under these worldviews on domestic politics (identified
above) in Japan (1850-1895) were more materialistic, and less spiritual. It was assumed
that the powerful rule and control the world, and that wealth, power, technology, military
capability and knowledge make a country or people strong and successful. Without
these, a nation was weak. Underlying the desire for power was the desire for Japan to
continue its independence, not as a colony controlled by outsiders. Fukuzawa and Mori
were not just concerned with overt manifestations of politics and power, but with the
supportive culture or spirit surrounding them. Mere blind copying of Western institutions
and technologies would fail. In their considerations about the “spirit” behind Western
technology and wealth, they identified democratic freedoms, scientific inquiry, and in the
case of Mori, religious/Christian values. But the overall emphasis of the five leaders was
more on the material side.
Countries and cultures like China or India that placed more emphasis on ethics
and philosophy were weak, antiquated, unable to respond to modernity, and became
colonies of aggressor nations. If Japan did not want to be a colony, it must learn from the
powerful West, carefully import and apply its political systems, and become strong.
Practical, “scientific” political knowledge and ideas (democratic or authoritarian) that
could make a country more powerful were better than “impractical” ideas that could not
(i.e. Confucian philosophy or Buddhism). The value of ideas was their practicality and
power, not simply their truth or philosophical strength.
Despite Japan’s present weakness, there was a pride and love for the country, its
culture, and beauty. While it might be necessary to import political and other phenomena
to “save” Japan from outside control, it must be done so carefully, or the heart of Japan
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might be destroyed. Despite Japan’s weakness, there was a belief that it could rise to
this challenge. Its people could learn from the West, as they learned from China for
centuries, and make Japan stronger.
Japan was now the only Asian nation that could do this effectively. It must help
other Asian countries do this. Because other Asian countries were weak, they were
inferior. The assumption of power applied to general international relations saw them as
hostile. If Japan did not strengthen its internal political and other systems, it would be
conquered, even by other hostile Asian powers. This was the supreme motivator driving
the intense push for domestic reforms in politics and similar areas in this period in Japan.
Japan’s responses to the global phenomena mentioned a few paragraphs above
were to seek to import relevant areas of knowledge about political values and institutions
from the West to strengthen itself against invasion and colonization. By the end of this
period, Japan embarked on huge political reforms within its society, including the
importation of many Western political values and institutions. In this importation, Japan
was highly selective in what it brought in, and sought to strengthen certain “indigenous”
political institutions, such as the emperor system. The cultural logics behind these
responses were that if Japan did not import the needed areas of knowledge, it would
remain weak, be invaded and conquered. Actual political reforms must follow; imported
knowledge was not enough. If Japan was not careful, the imported knowledge could
destroy it. Internal reforms to strengthen indigenous values and institutions were also
necessary.
If we compare the cultural logics under the worldviews about the relevant
global phenomena identified above, the most obvious comparison is between the ideas
255

underlying Western power and aggression against Japan and other Eastern countries, and
the Confucian ideas so long influential in East Asia’s cultural universe. Beyond their
power as ideas, these Western ideologies seemed overtly powerful in the real world. The
fact that the Western powers were able to defeat China and other Eastern powers hinted
at their ideas’ “superiority,” despite the fact that Confucian ideas had created the most
populous, stable, and wealthiest society on earth (China) through the late eighteenth
century.879 While there was obviously power and philosophical depth in Confucian ideas,
despite their influence and success throughout East Asia for several millennia, Qing
China was in serious decline.880 In the eyes of many Japanese reformers, “Eastern”
worldviews and their supportive systems seemed incapable of matching the powerful
West. At the very least, new Western ideas must somehow be combined with the
Confucian traditions of the East.
Probably the emphasis of material values over non-material ones in these
cultural logics was unavoidable, given the West’s aggressive behavior and the powerful
success of Western military technologies against China and other Asian countries. In
these worldviews about domestic politics (1850-1895) and their underlying cultural
logics, we see a pragmatic, utilitarian emphasis on whatever would prove useful for
“saving” Japan from being controlled by others. Fukuzawa and Mori wisely understood
that the “spirit” behind these ideas, institutions and technologies must also be
comprehended and “mastered.” If not, reforms could fail, and Japanese society be
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This claim was made by Leonard Humphreys, professor of East Asian history at the University of the
Pacific in the 1970s and 1980s.
880
This refers to China under the rule of the Qing Dynasty (usually dated 1644-1911), the last dynasty of
imperial China.
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engulfed, externally and internally. The reform drive to match and repel the West would
greatly alter “surface elements” of domestic Japanese political institutions and other
societal features. But it appears that many core elements and values proved extremely
enduring.
The preference of the five Japanese leaders (1850-1895) was also for countries
that could make Japan powerful and wealthy. Because China, Korea and other Asian
cultures were now weak, they were “inferior.” If Japan could successfully modernize and
repel the West, it would be “superior” to the other weak Eastern cultures. It is interesting
to compare the varied reactions of various East Asian cultures to the encroachment of the
West, and how quickly Japan turned on its Eastern neighbors to make itself strong.881 As
we will see later, from the very beginning of the Meiji era, Japan turned its eyes to its
“weak” Eastern neighbors. Certain leaders and forces in Japan soon expressed an interest
in Japan’s involvement in those places. A natural love for their own country and culture
soon evolved into a perverse sense of “superiority” over other East Asian regions that
would justify Japan’s involvement in their affairs.882 This sense of “superiority” partly
came from Japan’s victories over China at the end of this era (1895), and additional
victories (over Russia, 1905, and Korea, formally colonized in 1910), which followed.
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The reactions of such nations as Japan, Korea, China, Thailand, Burma, Vietnam and others were quite
varied. Most of these nations, except Japan and Thailand, became colonies of the West, to varying degrees.
882
Most cultures possess a sense of ethnocentric pride over all other cultures, since any culture’s members
will tend to naturally prefer their own worldviews and ways of life, which seem most natural to the
culture’s members. But we must also not forget that Japan was not the only country to respond
aggressively to other world regions in this period. Virtually every Western country that was able to also
did so. Were these reactions due to the influence of powerful evolutionary thought, or more due to human
greed? It seems doubtful that Japanese ethnocentrism, which may have helped to inspire Japanese
aggression in Asia to some extent, was any more perverse than Western ethnocentrisms and racisms that
inspired similar adventures in other regions.
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If Japan did not import the political knowledge it needed, it was assumed that it
would remain weak, and could be destroyed. If it did not do the reform process well, or
if key elements of existing institutions were damaged in the process, it might also be
destroyed. Internal, appropriate reform was very important. The nation faced dangers
from both within and without.
Worldviews on Japan’s Domestic Market Contexts
Fukuzawa Yukichi. In the 1840s and 1850s, Fukuzawa observed the rise of
increasing trade and manufacturing among the townsmen (chônin) and members of his
lower samurai class.883 On his journeys to the West, Fukuzawa bought back many
English language books, and used many to write best-selling books, some on economics,
which introduced a wide Japanese audience to modern economic and business practices
and thought.884 His books and his translation works earned him a very large income, and
his economic accomplishments were many.885 Fukuzawa Yukichi came to believe that
economics was the highest subject every Japanese student should learn, since it explained
the necessities of daily life (production, exchange, and distribution), applicable to a state
883

Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 8.
Fukuzawa’s first two books on economics were Minkan keizai roku (People’s Economics, 1877) and
Tsuka ron (A Theory of Currency, 1878). In the first book, he explained the basic functions of a modern
(Western) economy in simple terms that even literate school children could understand (Ibid., 110). His
Bookkeeping (1873) introduced modern business practice, bookkeeping and statements of finance in
modern joint stock companies to Japan (Ibid., 92).
885
Ibid., xxiii-xxv. Fukuzawa became one of Japan’s wealthiest businessmen. Among his
accomplishments were the founding of the Yokohama Specie Bank (1880), to attract gold and silver to
Japan (Fukuzawa supported paper currency, backed by gold and silver). This aided the government in
establishing the central bank, the Bank of Japan (1882), and achieving a stable currency. Fukuzawa started
his own businesses, including a publishing firm that became the Maruzen bookstore chain, and the Jiji
Shimpo, a major, national newspaper for fifty years. Maruzen used methods of western accountancy and
modern management far ahead of other Japanese economic organizations. Fukuzawa advised two of
Japan’s future great zaibatsu (financial and corporate combines), Mitsubishi and Mitsui. He founded Keio
University, which educated most of Japan’s early business elite, contributing much to Japan’s economic
development (Ibid., xxiii, 103, 111-112). Keio graduates became top leaders in many of Japan’s leading
private firms (Ibid., 135-136, 170). Finally, Fukuzawa introduced the idea of life insurance in Guided Tour
of the West (Seiyô Tabi Annai, 1868), also a pioneering work on money and banking (Ibid., 62, 128).
258
884

or household. If effectively mastered, Japan could become rich. He believed his Keio
College would play a role, and it did.886 He also believed that modern businessmen were
a necessity for Japan. They needed to receive a proper education, learn English, read the
news, and have broad knowledge and good character. His motto “Learn and earn, earn
and learn” freed both himself and his students from the Confucian scorn for business, to
be productive, and initiated Japan’s modern business elite.887
Ito Hirobumi. While Ito’s major areas of action were Japan’s domestic politics
and foreign relations, he was briefly involved in national economic policy.888 Like
politics, it seems Ito believed economic lessons from the West must also be carefully
applied. His birth in southwestern Japan and his study in London in the 1860s exposed
him to the power of Western politics, economics, and culture.889 These events influenced
his willingness to learn from the West in those areas. On domestic economic issues, he
was happy to glean lessons from the West deemed relevant for and applicable to Japan’s
situation. He saw Japan as economically and technologically inferior to the West, and
acknowledged Japan’s need to learn as much as possible. Since he worked in the public
sector throughout his career, likely most of his economic thought emphasized the public,
rather than the private, sector.890 Based on his national policy actions that affected the
economy, it seems he believed that government intervention in the economy was
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Ibid., 83.
Ibid., xxv-xxvi, 171-172.
888
Many of these comments are implied, because I did not find much explicit commentary on Ito’s views
of economics.
889
Ito was born in the feudal domain of Choshu (present-day Yamaguchi prefecture) at the western end of
the island of Honshu.
890
I do not have enough data to surmise Ito’s thoughts about the private sector and business.
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important for national prosperity and survival.891 Given his generally conservative
political views, which permitted only gradual democratic rights for citizens, it is likely
that he took a cautious view of labor rights. Due to his support of the autocratic Prussian
system as the best governmental model for Japan, Ito supported principles of strong state
economic intervention, rather than laissez-faire capitalism with minimal intervention. On
the major economic ideologies of the Meiji period, from this analysis, it seems Ito’s
economic thought strongly supported the ideology of fukoku kyôhei, and was generally
supportive of shokusan kôgyô.892 His conservative political views suggest that he viewed
the economy as one of the main pillars of Japan’s modernization process, though not the
only one. On the economy’s social role, clearly Japanese society also needed to be
connected to and supportive of important, more frontline political and economic changes.
In the Constitution of 1889, Ito’s use of patriotic, emotive expressions and images was
meant to shore up popular and political support, throughout society, for the state’s
political and economic reform efforts.893 Ideologically, Ito’s approach in the Constitution
is conservative, appealing to “traditional” images drawn from important Shinto legends
and Japanese folklore about the people’s relationship to and descent from the imperial
line.
What do the language and expressions used in the Constitution of 1889 (the
Meiji Constitution) and related documents reveal about Ito’s attitudes about economic
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For more details on Ito’s policy actions affecting Japan’s economy in this period, see the later discussion
(in Chapter 10) on the policy effects of leaders’ worldviews on Japan’s domestic market (1850-1895).
892
The point about Ito’s view of shokusan kôgyô is implied.
893
For more on the Constitution of 1889, see the next paragraph. Remember that Ito was the Constitution’s
primary author.
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matters in the public arena? What economic principles are revealed?894 In the
Constitution, Ito employed very emotional, patriotic language and principles designed to
promote political and economic strengthening of the state.895 Through the Constitution,
he allowed the Emperor and the Imperial Government, not just the Diet, to have great
power over decisions on public finance.896 The content of the Constitution does not
reveal Ito’s thought about specific economic doctrines or policies affecting the private
sector, but it shows that his general thought on economic matters in the public sphere was
fairly conservative,897 given the great power of the Emperor and closely related political
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These documents are the Imperial Oath Sworn in the Sanctuary of the Imperial Palace (Tsuge-bumi),
sworn at the promulgation of the Constitution of 1889, and the Imperial Rescript on the Promulgation of
the Constitution (of 1889). Both of these, and the English translation of the Constitution of 1889 and its
Preamble, I took from 1889 Japanese Constitution, “The Constitution of the History of Japan”; from
http://history.hanover.edu/texts/1889con.html; accessed 13 May 2007, all excerpted from Hirobumi Ito and
Miyoji Ito, Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan (Tokyo: Igirisu-Horitsu Gakko, 1889.
All quotations and data in this section (about the Constitution of 1889 and related documents) are taken
from these sources.
895
From documents related to the Constitution of 1889 and the Constitution itself, there are official views
supporting the prosperity of the throne, Japan’s “…ancient form of government,” and the stability,
prosperity and welfare of the country, through the promulgation of the Constitution, and the Imperial House
Law. The Imperial Rescript on the Promulgation of the Constitution expresses the conservative, patriotic
desire that the nation’s subjects, descended from their “Imperial Ancestors,” will desire to “secure forever”
the glory of Japan, “both at home and abroad,” and the “stability of the work bequeathed to Us by Our
Imperial Ancestors.” The Preamble (Joyu) of the Constitution states the desire that Japan’s constitution
and laws should promote the “welfare,” moral and intellectual development, and “security of the rights and
of the property of Our people,” using quite emotive, patriotic language, even in English translation. Such
expressions include “having, by virtue of Our Ancestors, ascended the throne of a lineal succession
unbroken for ages eternal…” and “…Our beloved subjects, the very same that have been favored with the
benevolent care and affectionate vigilance of Our Ancestors….” (Japanese Constitution; Ito and Ito,
Commentaries on Constitution).
896
Issues of public finance, including taxation, expenditures, revenue, and the national budget, were
covered in Chapter VI of the Constitution. The Diet had primary responsibility for approving the budget
and major expenditures. The Imperial Government and the Emperor had extraordinary power over the
budget and other financial matters. All the Diet’s decisions also required the Government’s concurrence.
The former two actors could also enact imperial ordinances on financial matters when the Diet was not in
session. The Government also was to submit the annual accounting of the state’s expenditures and
revenues.
897
The thinking of most of Japan’s top-level national policymakers during this period could also be called
conservative, so Ito was not abnormal in this quality.
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groups to issue various economic decisions and to intervene in economic matters of the
state.898
Kato Hiroyuki. Kato’s views of economics were influenced by evolutionary
ideologies, including German Social Darwinism, which greatly affected his mature
thought on all aspects of science.899 His economic thought was slightly affected by racist
overtones from evolution, common in this era. Globally, Social Darwinism was strongly
connected with certain forms of racist ideology, and had some effect on thinkers in Japan.
One controversy was how soon Japan should allow “mixed residence” (foreigners of
different races to live in its cities). In 1893, Kato worried that implementing mixed
residence too quickly in Japan might overwhelm the “inferior” Japanese by economic
competition with “superior” Caucasians, and Chinese working for lower wages.900 We
can likely surmise that Kato’s views of economics were generally conservative, like his
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The Constitution calls the Emperor the sovereign head of the Empire. He exercised certain legislative
powers in concert with the Imperial Diet and the Constitution, such as promoting laws (their passage and
execution). He could issue emergency ordinances when the Diet was not in session (subject to later Diet
approval), and regular ordinances to aid the execution of existing laws, for “…the welfare of the subjects,”
on economic and other matters. The power to issue laws gave the Imperial government and the Emperor
enormous power over policies governing the economy and other areas. Additional political groups closely
connected to the Emperor had a significant role in lawmaking on economic and other policies. Ministers of
State were constitutionally required to advise the Emperor, and one of them had to countersign all laws,
imperial ordinances and rescripts. The Emperor could also involve his Privy Council, or group of senior
state advisors, whenever he wished (this happened frequently, at least during Hirohito’s reign before 1945).
The close ties of both of these groups with the Emperor increased his influence over economic and other
policy areas even more. Other political actors could also play an economic role. The emperor’s subjects
were legally required to pay taxes, but protected from arbitrary, extra-legal household searches or entry.
Their right to hold private property was inviolable. The Diet had to approve all laws, including those on
economic matters, submitted by the Imperial government or the Emperor, and could pass its own laws. The
Judiciary could also become involved in economic matters. Among other possibilities, according to Article
60, a special court dealing with economic or other issues might be convened, if needed.
899
From my major sources on Kato, I did not obtain much data on his thought on economic matters, even
though he served for a time in the Ministry of Finance.
900
Unoura, “Samurai Darwinism,” 244.
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political views.901 He saw Japan’s economy as inferior to the West’s, and believed that
Japan needed to learn from it. There were racist overtones here also. He saw Caucasians
as economically superior to Japanese, and the Chinese as economic inferiors. Due to
Kato’s in-depth study of German language and thought, and his mature conservative
politics, it is likely he supported strong state intervention in the economy.902 Given his
evolutionary views, he supported the ideologies of fukoku kyôhei and shokusan kôgyô,
which both argued that Japan must be rich and strong to survive. Likely in Kato’s mind,
Japanese society must support these goals too.
Comparison of Worldviews on the Domestic Market (1850-1895)
I found varying amounts of data on the economic thought of the three leaders
considered here.903 Both Fukuzawa and Ito were born in southwestern Japan, which
increased their early exposure to Western ideas. All three leaders had extensive exposure
to, and influence from, Western knowledge.904 All seemingly believed that Japan could
learn valuable economic lessons from the West, like lessons in politics. Different from
Fukuzawa, the impact of Ito’s views on the domestic economy occurred early in his
career (in the 1870s), mainly in the public sector.905 Given Ito’s lifelong involvement in
the public sector, it seems his economic thought emphasized government policy’s role in
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Given the conservative nature of his political thought, we might assume that his economic beliefs were
also conservative, but I am uncertain.
902
This point is implied. I found no data on Kato’s views of industry, the private sector, business,
employment, labor or management issues.
903
I found the most data on Fukuzawa. Data on Ito is quite a bit less, as was the case with Kato.
904
Kato also had exposure to Western knowledge through brief study at a Dutch studies school, but did not
began studying the German language until early in his adult career.
905
In Fukuzawa’s case, his involvement and reflection on economic matters occurred throughout his career,
primarily concerning the private sector.
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the economy, not the private sector’s role in it.906 Similarly, Kato’s lifelong career
remained in the public sector.907 All three leaders believed that Japan must learn much
from the technologically and economically superior West. Their economic views saw
Japan’s economic development as inferior to the West’s. They believed that Japan must
learn and grow from that superior model, somewhat as it had learned from its “more
advanced” Chinese model throughout its earlier history. The economic thought of all
three was affected somewhat by evolutionary principles, Kato’s the most strongly.
Above I noted the evolutionary, racist overtones that emerged in Kato’s brief comments
on economics. Ito and Kato drew many lessons from Germany, and were more
politically conservative than Fukuzawa.908 Ito was also aware of more liberal political
and economic systems in the United States and Great Britain. Perhaps both his and
Kato’s thought supported state economic intervention more than Fukuzawa’s.
Fukuzawa’s views of economics and Japanese nationalism highly supported the
ideologies of fukoku kyôhei (rich nation, strong army), and likely shokusan kôgyô
(“increase production and encourage management”). The Meiji government used the
latter to encourage Japanese industries to pursue the former ideological goal.909 It seems
both Ito’s and Kato’s thought also supported these ideologies. The three leaders’ views
of the role of economics in society varied slightly. Fukuzawa emphasized the role of
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Given his views supportive of a strong state modeled on the Prussian system, it seems Ito would also
have supported the state’s encouragement of public industries before the private sector was able to develop
them. This became actual Meiji government policy. See my earlier comments on Ito’s likely views on
government economic policy in the section on worldviews of the domestic market (1850-1895).
907
I found no evidence that Kato’s economic views had any impact in either the public or private sectors.
908
In Ito’s case, the main lessons emerged from Prussia’s authoritarian political system. In Kato’s case, the
lessons came from studying the thought of leading German intellectuals, the arguments of German Social
Darwinism, and the generally conservative worldview of German leaders at the time.
909
Japan, “Shokusan Kôgyô,” 1409.
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economics in the private sector, while Ito and Kato focused more on the public sector.910
While not acknowledged by most Japanese, the impact of Fukuzawa’s thought on the
economy, especially the private sector, was large.911
Conceptual Analysis of Worldviews on the Domestic Market (1850-1895)
Development Issues. To assess the development aspects of these domestic
market worldviews, I will again use the analytical concepts of “modernization” and
translative adaptation. As with other domestic features of Japan (1850-1895), the concept
of “modernization” is highly relevant to the domestic economy, since it assesses how a
“peripheral” economy like Japan’s was absorbed by “core” Western economies into the
global system, and how that process affected core Japanese cultural features and
values.912 Did core features of the domestic economy remain intact during this period?913
In their domestic market worldviews, Fukuzawa, Ito, and Kato supported the ideas of
“modernization.” All three saw Japan’s economy as inferior, admitted Japan’s need to
learn from the West in multiple areas, including economics, to prevent invasion,914 and
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Ito clearly believed that to survive, Japanese society must support economic reforms. His patriotic
language in the Constitution encouraged social and political support for these efforts. Given Kato’s
evolutionary views, it is likely that he thought that Japan must become strong and rich to survive, and that
economics was key to make this happen.
911
As I note elsewhere, most Japanese remember Fukuzawa for his extensive writings on Western
civilization. Yet he believed that economic development, growth and business had a vital role in the wellbeing of the nation. His efforts in his writings, private business and economic education helped strengthen
the role of economics and business in Japan’s daily and national life.
912
As noted elsewhere, the assumption in the “modernization” concept of Japanese scholars is that the
“core” cultural features of the receiving society will remain intact, although its overall, outward form may
become very Westernized.
913
While the worldviews of Fukuzawa, Ito and Kato supported the ideas of “modernization,” they do not
answer the question of whether core features of the economy remained intact at the end of this period. The
changes in Japan’s economy during this period and subsequent decades were enormous, and it was virtually
totally destroyed at the end of World War II, but the question of what core features of the economy endured
is not answered here.
914
Ito’s conservative views in the Constitution of 1889 all advocated the building up of the Japanese polity,
economy, and society to prevent invasion.
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none of them wanted its cultural core destroyed. In Kato’s case as well,915 we see
advocacy for empowering Japan on multiple levels, so it could evolve into a strong state
that could not be invaded.916 While Japan might develop some of the outward trappings
of the Western economies, clearly to Kato its cultural “core” and “indigenous
‘traditions’” must not be destroyed. While Japan might change greatly on the surface by
importing Western business practices, a modern constitution, and conservative policies
for public finance and government involvement in the economy, these leaders did not
want to see their society destroyed. All their work meant to assure its survival.
In their domestic market worldviews, all three of these leaders supported the
ideals of translative adaptation, that in Japan’s economic development, there must be
compatibility between its indigenous institutions and values, and the imported
organizational structures and technologies. In the process of economic development in
Japan (1850-1895), was its base society destroyed, or did it continue intact, though
altered? While I cannot examine this issue in detail, as I argue earlier in this chapter,
while many features of Japanese society underwent traumatic alterations in this era, many
deep “traditions” and values were not destroyed, but proved essentially enduring. Did the
worldviews of Fukuzawa, Ito, or Kato on the domestic economy help destroy core
elements of Japanese culture? I do not believe that they did, but that of these three
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In addition to the evolutionary, racist overtones of Kato’s economic thought (noted above), in Chapter 3
I also noted Kato’s support for nationalistic spiritual values, associated with Shinto, as patriotic and useful
for strengthening Japan.
916
This is most strongly expressed in Kato’s thought, but also in Fukuzawa’s and Ito’s, who both implicitly
argued for evolutionary, progressive development for Japan. I am tempted to assert that these evolutionary
views hint at the economic development principles of W.W. Rostow in the early 1960s. He wrote that there
are necessary, specific, sequential steps in path of economic development for every developing society.
The three Japanese leaders here did not specify what the steps are, but their thought supported the general
idea of evolutionary progress in economic development, as did Rostow’s.
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leaders, the deepest, broadest, and most direct impacts on Japan’s economy area occurred
through the actions of Fukuzawa.917 They changed the attitudes of everyday Japanese
about business and how it should be done.918 Fukuzawa’s powerful, positive portrayals
of the West encouraged Japanese to engage the economic and technological challenges it
presented with thrift, hard work, and eager learning, rather than fear and xenophobic
defensiveness.919 These are the same basic values Japan positively engaged in its
reaction to cultural input from the Asian mainland at many points in its earlier history.
Fukuzawa’s contribution to modern Japan’s business culture has had a very positive,
long-term impact on the development of Japanese business and economics, up to the
present, consonant with many positive values long associated with business and hard
work in Japan.920 In Meiji Japan, Fukuzawa also helped to weaken the widespread
Confucian scorn for merchants and entrepreneurialism long influential in Tokugawa
Japan.
Technology Issues. To analyze the technological aspects of the three leaders’
worldviews on the domestic market, I will use the concepts of industrial policy,
technology as defined by Glick, and technonationalism as ideology.921 Thomas Glick’s
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These actions included Fukuzawa’s writings, his founding of Keio University, and his entrepreneurial
activities.
918
Fukuzawa’s ideas about Western business practices were not necessarily contrary to many of the
previous ideas about business practice commonly used by merchants in Tokugawa Japan. But the Western
ideas included many practical insights about how to do business even more efficiently, and about how to do
it in a modern world economy dominated by the West.
919
These last two values were certainly strong in the reaction of the Tokugawa government to the outside
world during the period of national isolation.
920
An interesting question is to what degree these “positive” economic values may have also affected
Japan’s later policies for ODA (Official Development Assistance) and technical aid for developing
countries.
921
Since industrial policy is chiefly policy-oriented issue, I include my comments on how these leaders’
domestic market worldviews reflect industrial policy later in Chapter 10, which treats the policy
implications of the leaders’ worldviews on the various domestic and international issues.
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definition of technology is relevant.922 How does his thinking relate to the worldviews of
the leaders here? On his journeys to the West, Fukuzawa observed interaction with
technology and Western knowledge in daily life in his hometown, in the United States,
Britain and elsewhere. In these contexts, he saw the power of modern economics to
improve the lives of average citizens, and to empower entire societies. These
observations had a powerful impact on his worldviews. He wrote about economics in
many of his writings, and economics was one of his chief inspirations for founding Keio
University. Through his writings and professional efforts related to economics,
Fukuzawa had a large influence on the business culture of Japan, and on the use of
modern business practices in daily Japanese life. Ito’s involvement with economics was
at the national level, and mostly indirect, in his encouragement of popular support for
public reform efforts in economics and politics, through language he used in the
Constitution of 1889. The economic thought of neither Ito nor Kato, the latter with
evolutionary overtones, had much connection to economics or technology as systems
operating in daily Japanese life. But this was not the case with Fukuzawa.
Murakami’s concept of industrial policy means any form of government action
or intervention in the economy, often involving technology. Fukuzawa is mainly
concerned with how economics affects the private sector, while Ito and Kato’s concern is
mainly for the public sector. Fukuzawa’s views are very nationalistic, supportive of
enriching Japan, to help it resist the West. I am not sure if Fukuzawa would support much
government action in the economy; he personally chose not to be so involved himself. Ito
922

Glick notes how recent anthropologists study technology as a techno-economic or socio-technical
system, through systems theory, looking at how human groups utilize tools to achieve social goals in daily
living, often related to the organization of work (Glick, “Technology,” 466).
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supported government intervention in the economy, in his brief involvement in national
economic policy, and in what he wrote in the Constitution of 1889. Kato admired many
things about Germany and Prussia. It is likely that he also supported their ideals of strong
state economic intervention, but I am not positive. Of these three leaders, Ito’s support
for some form of government economic intervention seems the most likely.
The concept of technonationalism as ideology is relevant if these domestic
economy worldviews supported a strong role for technology in Japan’s national security,
and the idea that technology had a key role in making Japan rich and strong. Is this the
case? Fukuzawa strongly supported Japan’s successful mastery of modern economics as
a chief tool, with technology, to make Japan rich and strong, to forestall Western
invasion. It seems Ito understood that both economics and technology had a key role to
play in strengthening Japan against the West. Given his support for a strong state role in
the economy, he also seems supportive of technonationalism as ideology.923 There is no
direct evidence that Kato supported technonationalism as ideology in his economic
thought, although he clearly desired Japan’s survival, and was conservative in outlook.
Of the three leaders here, Fukuzawa emerges as the leader most strongly supporting
technonationalism as ideology.
Cognitive Issues. Image. To assess cognition aspects of these domestic market
worldviews, I will again use aspects of the concepts of image, worldview, and cultural
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Earlier I noted Ito’s conviction that Japan could improve its international stature by absorbing the
technologies of more advanced countries, and how he viewed Japan’s domestic development as taking
precedence over foreign wars and adventures (Hamada, Prince Ito, 64-68). In Ito’s thought, domestic wellbeing must come first before international issues and entanglements.
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logics.924 Regarding images of overall economics, Fukuzawa saw economic and
entrepreneurial activities as helpful for the lives of local people. He saw economics as
the most preeminent science, the foundation of daily and national life, and beneficial for
the whole nation. To Ito, economics was one of the main pillars of Japan’s reform
process, along with politics and law. Kato’s mature views of economics were influenced
by German Social Darwinism and evolution, had racist overtones, and were likely
generally conservative. The images of all three scholars of Japan’s economy saw it as
inferior to the West’s. Fukuzawa saw economic activity as important for Japan, and
believed that without improved economic and technical knowledge, Japan would not
survive. This knowledge must be imported; both he and Ito believed Japan must learn
appropriate economic lessons from the West. In the racist overtones of Kato’s thought,
Japanese emerged as economically and racially inferior to Westerners, and the Chinese as
similarly inferior to Japanese. To Fukuzawa and Ito, the Western economies were
superior to Japan’s; the West was more economically dynamic. Their early positive
exposure to Western economic activities, in their hometowns, early educations, and
through travel and study abroad, shaped their views of Western economies, making them
willing to learn from the West in this area. A hierarchical view of national economies
suggests the influence of evolutionary thought on all three leaders, especially strong in
Kato’s mature work. Concerning their images of leading economic ideologies of that era,
924

I will use the same basic aspects of these concepts that I use elsewhere in in Chapter 3 for worldviews of
domestic society (1850-1895) and in Chapter 4 for worldviews of the domestic state (1850-1895). The
images of economics used include those of economic history, economics overall, of the Japanese economy,
Western economies, government economic policy, private industry/the industrial sector; the private
sector/business, of employment, labor, and management, of leading economic ideologies of the era, and the
role of economics in society. For a discussion of the overall frameworks to which these images and
worldviews belong, see my discussion below of the global phenomena connected with these worldviews, in
the section on the cultural logics behind worldviews of the domestic market, 1850-1895.
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all three leaders were politically conservative, and likely supported the ideals of fukoku
kyôhei (rich nation, strong army) and shokusan kôgyô (“increase production and
encourage management”). Fukuzawa was especially strong in his support for economics
and Japanese nationalism.
Concerning their images of the roles of economics in society, all three leaders
saw economics as fundamental to Japan’s survival and flourishing. Fukuzawa believed
that economic development, growth and business activity had a vital role in the nation’s
well-being. His own efforts in his writings, private business and economic education
contributed to strengthening the role of economics and business in Japan’s daily and
national life. Ito believed that Japanese society must support economic reforms needed
for its survival.925 Kato believed that Japan must become strong and rich to survive;
economics was one of the key ways for this to happen.926
On their images of the public and private sectors, on government economic
policy, it seems all three leaders supported strong government intervention in the
economy. Fukuzawa supported appropriate government intervention in the economy,
meaning positive encouragement, not over-involvement, in the private sector. Sometimes
the private sector could lead the public sector in encouraging economic development and
growth. Ito positively emphasized public sector involvement in the economy, not the
private sector’s, and saw public economic intervention as important. Ito and Kato were
strongly influenced by German and Prussian thought, suggesting they likely supported
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His use of patriotic language in the Constitution of 1889 was meant to encourage social support for
needed political and economic reforms.
926
These conclusions about Kato’s views are implied.
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strong state intervention in the economy.927 Fukuzawa had the strongest images of the
private sector. He saw private sector business and industry as the prime engine of
national economic growth and development. He believed, due to his personal experience,
that through business, individuals could become successful, prosperous, and wealthy.
This could promote the same for Japan.928 Fukuzawa was not afraid of monopolies
(zaibatsu) or big business. He believed both could contribute much to the growth of the
nation.929
Fukuzawa offers the most extensive images on employment, management and
labor. He saw modern management principles as important for economic and business
prosperity, and business education as paramount for creating and strengthening a modern
business elite for Japan. Efficient, hard-working, knowledgeable managers would be a
key factor in the nation’s economic success. Fukuzawa supported human rights, but was
concerned that their rapid application could destabilize the nation. His support for state
rights and concern about emerging democratic movements likely made him wary of
labor, that it might be disruptive to the nation’s economic health. Ito likely took a dim
view of labor rights, given his rather low view of democratic rights, which he supported
granting only gradually, and his conservative political views. Also given Kato’s
conservative political views, it seems likely that all three of these leaders were
conservative and not too supportive of labor rights in this era.
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In the Constitution of 1889, Ito allowed the Emperor and related political groups to have a high degree
of involvement in many areas of public policy, including economic issues.
928
This point, about national prosperity emerging from that of individual entrepreneurs, is implied.
929
This last point is also implied from Fukuzawa’s actions.
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How did these images of the domestic economy (1850-1895) function as
perceptual filters or organizing devices? Economics is seen in these images as one of the
most basic sciences and tools to enable Japan to survive in the modern world.930 If
properly mastered, it can enrich Japan, and improve the daily lives of its subjects. These
economic images reinforce Meiji Japan’s sense of temporary inferiority to the West;
economics is an additional arena of weakness. Economic knowledge must be imported
from the West, increasing Japan’s short-term dependency on the West. In their views of
economics’ role in society and in the public and private sectors, all three leaders support
economics’ centrality for Japan’s survival and prosperity. Their conservative political
views led them to generally favor top-down solutions to economic issues. While
Fukuzawa argued for the importance of well-trained management and big conglomerates
in the private sector, Ito and Kato seemingly favored strong public intervention in the
marketplace. This suggests that all three were wary of the potential of the labor
movement to create political or economic instability.
These economic emphases also encouraged these leaders to reject “traditional”
areas of knowledge not seen as crucial for Japan’s survival, including ethics, philosophy,
religion, and Chinese studies. Areas like culture, religion and education seemed very
“uneconomic,” and were only valued insofar as they could be harnessed to enhance the
nation’s survival. These economic emphases also caused Japan to gravitate toward the
Western world in its political and economic relations, and away from its “traditional”
sources of such knowledge, namely China, Korea, and other “traditional” Eastern regions
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Additional tools of this sort, in the mind of these three leaders (Fukuzawa, Ito and Kato) include
modernized systems of politics, science and technology.
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and societies. Did the new focus of many of Japan’s leaders on Western-oriented
politics, technology, economics, and military systems cause large-scale cultural upheaval
or disorientation in Japanese society? I do not believe they did at this stage in modern
Japan’s development. In sum, I posit that the emphasis on economics in these images
underlying these three leaders’ worldviews inevitably caused them to favor certain
economic approaches to some degree in their thinking and policy actions, and to reject
other possible approaches based more on “traditional” areas of knowledge.
Worldview. Based on the above images, what are primary elements of the
worldviews of the domestic market for these three leaders (Fukuzawa, Ito and Kato)?
The nature of the world emerges as mainly economically driven—the international
system, the national one, and daily life. Without the proper goods, people cannot survive.
With efficient economics, they can prosper greatly. Economics are the lifeblood of any
nation. National economic systems compete, and must continually grow and evolve for
their nations to survive. Individual entrepreneurs compete within a nation’s economy.
Whoever controls the world’s economic system controls the world. Presently, that is the
West, which sets the economic rules of the game. If non-Western nations wish to
survive, they must master economics and prosper. Many of these views seem highly
influenced by evolutionism. This econocentric worldview tended to deemphasize
elements of the universe that are generally more non-material and non-economic, such as
religion and spiritual values.931
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But I do not mean to deny the economic aspects of religious and spiritual practice, of which there are
many. Consider the sale of trinkets and amulets for the annual visits of millions of Japanese to local
shrines and temples on New Year’s Eve, as they pray to welcome the new year. Another example is the
publication of religious books, literature and music in the United States.
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Western economic knowledge is crucial for Japan’s survival.932 Japan must
strengthen economics on both the public and private levels; both are important for
growth. Japanese society must strongly support economic reforms. As an autocratic,
“traditional” society, to succeed economically, Japan must copy lessons from similar
societies overseas (i.e. Germany).933 Economic lessons must be carefully applied for
Japan to succeed. If not, its stability may be destroyed. Economics is central to most
“productive” activity in Japan and the world, and to Japan’s reform efforts. For Japan,
economic inferiority also means national weakness and dishonor. Japan must grow
strong and rich to survive (Kato). Economics has a crucial role in the nation’s health.
For Japan to be strong, business and management must also be. As individual
entrepreneurs prosper, their success can be transferred to the national level.934 Japan
must rise up and fight for itself economically, or it will be controlled or colonized by
outsiders. Both the public and private sectors in Japan have important roles in the
economic growth process. While the emerging business world will provide much of the
energy for growth, government has a prime role in facilitating the process, in discerning
the best lessons from abroad, focusing the nation’s attention on economic reforms,
encouraging society’s support, and identifying the best policies to support major goals.
Popular support throughout society is important. Without it, public efforts may fail.
Individuals must also prosper, for the benefit of the nation.
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Similar to this thought, Fukuzawa would argue that efficient Japanese managers must learn valuable
lessons from efficient managers in the West (implied).
933
This is the thought of Ito and Kato.
934
These last two points are Fukuzawa’s thought.
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The West is superior to Japan in many areas, including economics and race.
Germany has superior knowledge in various sectors; its model seems most suitable for
Japan in politics and economics.935 Economies of “traditional” Asian powers, including
China’s, are inferior to the West’s and to Japan’s, since Japan has a better capacity for
reform. The West’s superior economic knowledge must be imported for this purpose.
Economics is central to explaining the West’s wealth, growth and superior evolution.936
The Tokugawa and Meiji governments played a crucial role in the reform process and the
importation of the West’s economic knowledge. They were key mediators of how
Japan’s domestic economy responded to foreign economies in this era, to a large degree,
since they established overall policies for trade, currency exchange, and foreign
investment overseas and domestically. This is seen in the trade missions and the students
sent abroad by several Japanese governments, both national and domainal, to learn
business and economics, and in the foreign instructors imported to teach the same fields.
Their policies favored economic knowledge from the West, not from Japan’s
“traditional” Asian sources. Earlier in this period, the government’s role was especially
primary, as the private sector had not yet fully emerged in Japan.
The environments affecting these leaders’ (Fukuzawa, Ito, and Kato’s) domestic
market worldviews included domestic and international elements. Fukuzawa and Ito
grew up in southwestern Japan, the region most open to trade with the West, and
receiving the most direct Western economic influence in the late Tokugawa and early
935

Both Ito and Kato support the points about Germany. Kato also supports the idea of Western racial
superiority. In the late nineteenth century, Germany was perhaps Europe’s most advanced society, in terms
of wealth, industrial development, level of literacy, education, cultural development and standard of living.
These factors may have also strengthened its image as a powerful model for Japan.
936
This point is implied from the thought of Fukuzawa.
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Meiji eras. It also received the most direct economic influence from Japan’s closest
Asian neighbors, China and Korea. Later in life, Fukuzawa, Ito and Kato moved to
Tokyo, experiencing the growth and frenzy of entrepreneurialism there. The major focus
of the last two was on the public arena, more on politics than economics.937 The
international arena of these worldviews was also intense, including Japan’s need to
improve its economy, compete with the West, and end unequal treaties imposed on Japan
after reopening in 1859. Another major issue was intellectual currents affecting global
trade, such as economic liberalism and pressure for open markets. Pressures for
improved labor rights and factory conditions in major industrialized countries in this era
soon hit Japan.938
How did these environments interact with and affect the actors’ worldviews on
Japan’s domestic market? The dynamism of Western economies, trade, and technology
impressed all three leaders, making them feel that Japan must learn from the West, and
that Japan was economically inferior. Trade with other Asian nations was deemphasized.
Economic growth was one of the main forces affecting Japan’s survival; so all sectors of
society must focus on encouraging its success in this arena. The “superior” nature of the
West made Japan import its knowledge, not the East’s.
How did these worldviews and their environmental interactions influence these
actors’ perceptions, uses of information, and understanding of events and their causes?
The overwhelming perception of the world as economically driven tended to make these
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For most of his career, Ito’s focus was on international and domestic politics and diplomacy, not
economics.
938
Marxism did not begin to emerge as an intellectual force in Japan or in the labor rights movement until
the late 1890s, shortly after the end of this period (1850-1895).
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leaders deemphasize non-material and non-economic knowledge, such as religion.939 It
made them favor knowledge from the West, rather than knowledge from “traditional”
Asian sources such as China. “Practical” knowledge (Fukuzawa’s concept of jitsugaku)
was the most preferred. Societies that were judged the most successful economically
became the most favored in the overall eyes of most Japanese leaders. These three
leaders tended to support Western knowledge and sources of information. Western
societies judged to be the most successful in particular sectors, such as economics, were
also considered to be the best sources of knowledge in those areas. Science, hard work,
and material forces became major determinants for understanding events and their causes.
How did technological systems affect these worldviews? Much of what
impressed the leaders of Meiji and late Tokugawa Japan about the West and its power
flowed from the West’s economic, technological and scientific achievements. In these
leaders’ eyes, the West’s wealth was a large part of what enabled it to prosper, exercise
influence in international affairs, gain colonies, and maintain independence. Japan’s
leaders experienced the power of the West when Commodore Perry’s black ships
appeared in Edo Bay. When leaders like Fukuzawa and Ito traveled to the West, they
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We noted above how Fukuzawa argued that the “spirits” behind technology and advanced Western
knowledge must be mastered, in addition to mastering the knowledge itself. Yet he was not very religious.
In the section on domestic society in Chapter 3, I noted how Kato favored the use of “traditional” Japanese
spiritual values, especially from Shinto, believing that they would best strengthen Japanese nationalism.
This meant Shinto as the new nationalistic spiritual ideology, as defined by the Meiji state. We will discuss
the profound influence of Shinto on Emperor Hirohito’s worldviews and on Japan’s foreign policies during
his reign through 1945 in Chapters 7 and 8. Westerners are sometimes amazed at how spiritual practices
and beliefs like Shinto continue to influence major events and aspects of life in “secular,” non-religious
Japan. Spiritual influence on modern life is seen in the ritual prayers offered by Shinto priests at the
dedication ceremonies for new buildings, and in household worship and prayers offered at the Shinto and
Buddhist family altars still kept in many Japanese homes. Yet in most surveys about religion, most
Japanese commonly define themselves as “non-religious.” This may be because the Japanese word for
religion, shukyo, has the sense of “sect teaching.” Since many Japanese do not practice just one sect, they
do not consider themselves to be “religious.”
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directly observed its economic power, manifested in its technologies, military prowess,
wealth, economic productivity and citizens’ daily lives, and in its colonies that they
visited en-route. All of this provided very concrete inspiration for Japan’s leaders that
the path to “success” for the West was trod in economics, science, technology, and
military power, and would be for Japan too.
Cultural Logics. Concerning the cultural logics under these worldviews of
Japan’s domestic market (1850-1895), the global (international) phenomena and actors to
which these leaders responded included the Western trading system, the global economic
system dominated by the West, the unequal treaty system, commodities Japan traded with
other countries,940 the global monetary (currency) system, foreign investments in Japan,
Japanese investments overseas, foreign technologies,941 the economic and trade policies
of foreign governments and the Japanese government, international companies and
players from overseas and Japan, Western economic knowledge, modern (Western)
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The major commodities exported by Japan in the late Tokugawa period were copper, silver and dried
marine products. Trade in this period was dominated by Korea, China, and Holland (Japan’s only official
trading partner from Europe). Major imports in the late Tokugawa period included silks, gold, Chinese
medicines and specialty products, and a few goods from Europe (William B. Hauser, “Economic History:
Premodern Economy (to 1867)” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, Vol. 2 [Tokyo and New York:
Kodansha, 1983], 150). Major exports in the Meiji era were silk, tea, cotton and woolen textiles, and
pottery, mainly to Europe and the United States. Main exports to China and other Asian countries included
primarily manufactured products, matches, soap and cotton yarn (Yamaguchi Kazuo, “Economic History:
Early Modern Economy: (1868-1945)” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, Vol. 2 [Tokyo and New
York: Kodansha, 1983], 152); Leon Hollerman, “Foreign Trade” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan,
Vol. 2 [Tokyo and New York: Kodansha, 1983], 319-320). Meiji Japan exported more manufactured
goods as its economy grew (William V. Rapp, “Foreign Trade, Government Policy on” in Kodansha
Encyclopedia of Japan, Vol. 2 [Tokyo and New York: Kodansha, 1983], 324). Main imports in the Meiji
era were equipment, ships, steel and additional products that Japan could not yet make. This created a
long-standing trend in Japanese trade, where Japan exports in order to import. The nature of particular
imports was generally driven by military and industrialization needs. These made the government promote
the importation of raw materials, and of capital and manufactured goods that Japan did not produce (Ibid.).
941
Some of the main technologies that Japan imported included industrial, transportation, military, and
scientific equipment.
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business practice(s), international segments of the labor force,942 colonialism, and
imperialism. Some of the powerful ideas behind the Western and global economic
systems included classical economics (represented by Adam Smith), theories of free
trade, international trade, industrialization, evolutionism and Social Darwinism,
imperialism, colonialism, governmental trade and economic policies, Western theories of
business, Western and international business practices, theories of economic growth,
wealth and prosperity, and values of wealth and individual entrepreneurialism.943 Some
of the important thought underneath domestic market worldviews in Japan included
Japanese thinking on economics and business in this period, concepts of importing
needed knowledge that Japan lacked, theories of individual entrepreneurialism and hard
work,944 ideological support for sending trade missions abroad, and concepts of political
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These international segments of the labor force included foreign instructors and businessmen, traders,
and migrant workers in Japan who came from countries like China.
943
Several streams of economic thought, important in the West (1850-1895), affected Japan’s economic
system, directly and indirectly. Two of these streams were the classical economics of Adam Smith, and the
Malthusian principle of political economy and the doctrine of comparative advantage on international trade,
developed and applied by David Ricardo. Adam Smith’s thought, formerly called the “English classical
school of political economy,” is developed in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations (1776). In this work, Smith studies how a private enterprise-based economic system works. He
sees it as driven by the self-interest of individual consumers, which ultimately determines prices, in a
framework of supportive laws and institutions. His work offered simplistic theories of value, distribution,
international trade and money, and enabled the development of classical and modern economics. In the
early 1800s, David Ricardo developed the concepts of the economic model, the doctrine of comparative
advantage, and applied the Malthusian principle to economics. Essentially, he argued, based on the work
of Thomas Malthus, that economic expansion would finally stop due to the rising expense of growing food
on shrinking plots of available land. To handle this, countries should import needed foodstuffs from other
countries able to produce them more productively. Countries should specialize in agricultural or
manufactured goods that they are most advantaged to produce. The benefits of international trade are
shown by comparing the costs within each individual nation, rather than by comparing costs between
nations. This thought became the primary basis for nineteenth century arguments for free trade. Ricardo’s
thought was powerfully re-argued by John Stuart Mill in 1848 in Principles of Political Economy. Also in
the late 1800s, Western economists began to try to explain why goods trade at particular prices, and how
resources are apportioned in situations of perfect competition (“Economics,” Encyclopaedia Britannica,
2007. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-236756; accessed 21 June
2007).
944
One example of this is Ninomiya Sontoku (1787-1856), a Japanese agricultural reformer whose own
hard work and common sense principles helped improve his own family’s welfare and that of the farming
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authoritarianism allowing strong state economic involvement, protectionism, and import
substitution.945
What were the cultural logics (unspoken, shared assumptions and patterns)
underlying these leaders’ worldviews of the major global phenomena affecting Japan’s
domestic market (1850-1895)?946 On theoretical issues connected with these global
phenomena, the key beliefs and underlying logics concern Western social science
theories and knowledge related to Japan’s domestic economy, including economics,
evolutionism, colonialism and imperialism.947 Cultural logics beneath these theoretical
beliefs (about economics) included the idea that money and material things drive the
world.948 For global influence, independence and development, Japan needs those things.
As a proud nation, Japan must survive by fighting hard and developing itself first,
internally, economically and in other areas, before it can successfully face the West.
Trade with nearby regions and perhaps gaining colonies can help Japan’s economy grow
stronger. Developing empires made Western countries rich, and will enrich Japan too.

regions whose development he assisted (“Ninomiya Sontoku,” Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, http://0www.search.eb.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu:80/eb/article-9055889; accessed 27 June 2007.
945
Some protectionist thoughts may have been based on concepts of economic nationalism (mercantilism),
developed in Europe from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Mercantilism argued in support of trade
protectionism (Ibid., “Economics”).
946
The global phenomena related to Japan’s domestic market in this period are many and complex. To
make better sense of these phenomena and their related cultural logics, I have organized them into several
categories: theoretical issues, broader issues, and more focused issues. Within the category of broader
issues, related to Japan’s domestic market, I have also organized them as follows: mainly domestic issues,
public sector issues, and private sector issues. Predominantly international issues are included later in my
discussion of worldviews of Japan’s external economic relations, 1850-1895.
947
Economic theories included classical economics, theories on free trade, international trade,
industrialization, economic growth, wealth and prosperity.
948
What were some of the major theoretically influenced beliefs to which I refer? A major phenomenon
strengthening the West is economics. To be strong, Japan must also master economics, and fight hard for
survival. To compete with the West, Japan must develop its own house first. Helping nearby regions and
nations like Hokkaido and Korea can also strengthen Japan’s economy. While Hokkaido, now Japan’s
northernmost island, had long been a major sphere of Japanese influence, it did not formally enter the
nation until the late 1800s.
281

Beliefs about broader market issues on the domestic level included those on
economics and business. 949 Cultural logics underneath these beliefs saw economics as a
major controlling force of the world. For Japan to become wealthy, it must become
economically powerful, but first its people must prosper. Internal prosperity precedes
external prosperity. In rich nations like the West, many people know business well, work
hard, and are smart. Japanese are also smart, so they can learn the business ways of the
West. Doing so, as Japan learned from China before, will make Japan strong.
Beliefs on broader domestic market issues included those about general
business practice, entrepreneurialism and labor.950 The cultural logics supporting these
beliefs included the conviction that business and hard work are honorable. Through
them, people and nations prosper. Confucianism, in condemning commerce, has become
a bankrupt philosophy that has failed Eastern nations. While Confucianism long worked
well for social relations, Eastern nations are now weaker than the West. Successful
business generates wealth that strengthens all of society. For example, Ninomiya
Sontoku showed much practical wisdom, courage and hard work that strengthened his
own family, and the regions he helped to develop. So thrift, hard work, and perseverance
will make Japan and its people strong. Strong business at the grassroots is really what

949

Most of the beliefs and supporting cultural logics that concern Japan’s international economic relations I
will discuss later in Chapter 5, and some in Chapter 8. Beliefs about international economic phenomena
that primarily affected Japan’s domestic market are included here. Beliefs on basic economics and
business related to Japan’s domestic market include the conviction that economics drives every nation and
the world. Japan too must be wealthy to survive, both its people and the nation. Creative, aggressive ways
of doing business have helped strengthen the West, so Japan must study those ways. Japanese are clever,
and their ingenuity can help Japan to grow as well.
950
According to these beliefs, hard work is seen as especially honorable. Business is not shameful, and the
ethical norms of Confucianism that condemned commerce are wrong. Business can strengthen individuals,
their families, communities, and the whole nation. Ninomiya Sontoku is a hero and model for all Japanese.
Individual entrepreneurs and companies that succeed are necessary to help the nation become rich.
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invigorates a nation. The government’s role is important for setting the stage for what the
market can do, but the market is central around the world, and will be in Japan.
Broader beliefs and their underlying logics on how the public sector affects
Japan’s domestic market included those on relevant economic policies of the
governments of foreign countries and Japan, and on public policies on Japan’s internal
economic reforms.951 In the cultural logics behind these beliefs, Japan is a great country
that must be saved. It will learn best from economically successful countries with
experiences most like its own. If Japan copies from countries too different, it risks its
social stability. Japan can learn valuable lessons from such countries (i.e. the United
States), but must do so carefully. The governments of economically successful Western
countries should be emulated, as culturally appropriate. The governments of economic
failures should not be. Japan will succeed and learn best through hard work, using the
best information from the world’s economic successes. The government, the people, and
the private sector must learn these lessons, working together to help Japan grow.

951

Government economic policy includes ideas about the state’s economic role, protectionism, and import
substitution. The broader beliefs on how governments and their economic policies affected Japan’s
domestic market included the idea that for the soundest path to economic development, Japan must learn
economic lessons fitting its own culture, history, and context from countries with similar experiences. Since
Japan was seen as a highly traditional, authoritarian country, leaders such as Ito and Kato believed it would
learn the best from countries with similar systems, such as Germany. Some countries’ cultures were very
different from Japan’s, including extremely successful economies (i.e. the United States). Japan might
learn and apply lessons from such countries, but must do so very carefully. The Japanese best understand
their own society, so they can best apply these lessons. Japanese, not foreigners, must control their
country. Japanese must reform their government to gain more qualities of the governments of
economically successful Western countries, or Japan will not be able to apply their lessons well. Both
Japan’s government and people must work hard to learn the world’s best lessons in every sector, including
economics, and wisely apply them in both the public and private spheres (Ito and Kato stressed the former,
and Fukuzawa the latter).
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Japanese know their country best, and can best define how it should develop. Foreigners
can assist, but they cannot have ultimate control.952
Beliefs on broader market issues affecting Japan’s domestic private sector
included those about Western business, international firms (Japanese and foreign), and
international segments of the labor force.953 According to the cultural logics under these
beliefs, economics and wealth are the foundation of prosperity and well-being, seen in
examples from the West, their economies and rich people. If it works for the West, it can
work for Japan.954 Through modern business and hard work, if Japanese prosper, then
Japan (as a nation) will.955 For modern business to truly succeed in Japan, Japanese must
master its techniques, technologies, social and ethical factors, and encourage them in
society. While Japan must change in this process, if it destroys its heart and soul, or it
will not survive. Western firms are the key practitioners of Western business. Japan
must study their practices and ideas, overseas and in Japan. Foreign experts in Japan are
vital for quicker mastery of Western economic knowledge. But they must not stay too
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It is implied that this would be the case for any country seeking to develop.
According to these beliefs, by learning Western business, Japan can become powerful and rich.
Western-type business can make nations and individuals very rich. Japan must master the techniques of
Western business and economics, the “spirit” behind them, and create a society supportive of business and
entrepreneurship (Fukuzawa). But in doing so, it must not give up its own soul. The purpose of mastering
Western (economic) knowledge is so that Japan can survive. Business is the new lifeblood of Japan, the
foundation to increase its power, internally and externally. Foreign firms have a key role to play in
economic reform, bringing in vitally needed knowledge and technologies. They must be carefully
managed, and not allowed to get too much of a foothold in Japan. Foreign experts can be a key source of
modern economic knowledge; Japan must find the best experts to teach its brightest students. This can
enable Japan to leapfrog certain stages in the development process. Foreigners must not stay long.
Japanese must quickly master their knowledge and send them home.
954
Through Western business and “scientific” economics the West became rich, and through them, Japan
can too. Wildly successful Westerners, such as Andrew Carnegie and the Rothschilds, became rich through
business.
955
There are also examples of hard work and prosperity in Japan, including Ninomiya Sontoku and the
founders of Japan’s zaibats u.
284
953

long. Japan must be for the Japanese, and “cultural contamination” from outsiders is a
danger.956 Japan is not Western.
More focused issues affecting these three leaders’ worldviews on the domestic
market and their related cultural logics include their views of foreign technologies and
knowledge and their roles in the domestic economy.957 The cultural logics supporting
these beliefs include the conviction that strong public involvement in major areas of the
economy is needed to accomplish major goals, such as importing knowledge. At this
early stage, the weak private sector will do better if the government helps. But the
private sector also has key roles. It will be the key engine of growth, and can often
respond more quickly and flexibly than the government.
The basic response of these three leaders (Fukuzawa, Ito, and Kato) to the
global phenomena identified above was to study and learn from the powerful economic
example of the West, to seek to understand the principles and social contexts of the
West’s economic achievements, and to reflect upon how to apply those lessons to Japan.
This necessitated study and reflection on two levels, on the contexts, ideas and
accomplishments of modern economics and business internationally, and on Japan’s

956

For example, foreigners, their cultures and beliefs, such as Christianity, may pollute and corrupt Japan
and its people. So while Japanese absorbs their knowledge, foreigners should be kept at arms’ length,
staying as briefly as possible. Recall the “mixed residence” controversy over how soon to allow foreigners
to reside in Japanese cities, and Kato’s comments on the issue (see Kato’s comments in this chapter in the
section on domestic market worldviews).
957
According to these beliefs, the government plays a key role in importing and setting policies for foreign
knowledge and technologies, and mediating the process. The major purpose for these policies is to
strengthen Japan and its economy domestically so it will not be invaded. The government must set major
policies on training through foreign experts and choosing the best foreign models. It helped set the tone for
importing knowledge through trade missions. The government must play these roles now since the private
sector is still weak. But that sector also has key roles. It is more dynamic, can better generate wealth and
real growth, and affects the daily lives of Japanese more directly. Private business training, through
schools like Keio, can help spread knowledge of modern economics and business. Sometimes business can
set the lead for the public sector. These points about the private sector are implied from Fukuzawa.
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current economic capabilities, available resources, and social conditions. Second, these
leaders sought to apply these lessons in their own writings and policy recommendations
for what Japan should do.958 Applications included developing economics education
programs for the nation, and devising successful policies to encourage Japanese trade,
industrialization, and business development, including development of the relevant public
infrastructure. Generally, on the domestic level, the response of Japan to the Western
economic challenge in this era paralleled the response of these three leaders, along with
supporting the application of modern economic and business principles to daily business
practice, and the huge growth of private sector business and industry that began in the
Meiji era.959
The cultural logics under these responses included assumptions that the West
was more economically successful than Japan, that economic and business success was
key to the West’s power (and power in general), that it would be for Japan, and that
similar success for Japan was needed for it to remain free. For Japan to achieve this, it
must learn from the already “successful.” The learning process involved absorbing
relevant technical and social knowledge on economics and business from abroad,
958

As noted before, on economic matters, Fukuzawa developed his main recommendations for the private
sector, by writing widely for popular consumption and education in Japan, founding a university highly
influential on Japanese business (Keio), and several successful businesses. Ito and Kato’s main work
concerned the public sector, and their involvement in economic issues was less than in political affairs.
Kato also wrote extensively on social issues (morality and ethics).
959
While modern accounting principles and others were widely applied throughout Japan, the application
of these principles occurred within the overall context of Japanese business culture. While modern
Japanese corporate and business cultures adopted many modern business practices and techniques from the
West, Japan’s business culture did not disappear. Rather, it incorporated these techniques into the overall
framework of relevant Japanese values, which have continued to evolve over time. Evidence of this
adaptation process includes the fierce loyalty to the company (their lifelong employer) required of
“salarymen” in the corporate culture of late twentieth century Japan. This was highly reminiscent of the
loyalty expected of Tokugawa era samurai for their lords. Today, the expectation of lifelong employment
in major corporations has lessened, due to Japan’s economic slowdown of the 1990s and early 2000s. This
is also affecting the loyalty of contemporary young Japanese to their employers.
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gathering data on Japan’s relevant conditions, and reflecting on how to best apply the
foreign knowledge to Japan. Japanese also assumed that Japan could learn from foreign
cultures, apply their knowledge, improve it, and “catch up,” as it had done for centuries.
In the cultural logics behind their response to foreign phenomena, Japanese reacted partly
on the basis of their previous experience with and response to similar phenomena,
knowledge and technology from China and other Asian regions. There was pride that
Japan, a great nation, should, could and must survive. Foreign economic knowledge
must be applied in culturally appropriate ways. If not, it would not function well in
Japan, whose society, culture and national identity would be threatened. Japanese leaders
assumed that it was appropriate and useful to have strong public intervention in the
private sector that would enable and enhance the social environment the private sector
needs to flourish. Judging from the spread of modern business practices and Japan’s
economic growth in the Meiji era, it seems they were correct.
Comparing the cultural logics under Japan’s response to the global phenomena
affecting its domestic market, the new theory-related logics focus on assessing the
meaning of economics for the West, and their application to Japan. Modern economics
made the West more powerful and wealthier than Eastern nations. While economics
were influential in late Tokugawa society, and the state of its economy was fairly
advanced, due to the influence of Confucian ethics, economics and commerce did not
enjoy the prestige they gained in the new Meiji world.960 Commerce was somewhat
scorned in the Confucian and Buddhist worldviews, and merchants did not have a place

960

I discuss the general state of the late Tokugawa economy in the domestic markets contexts section
earlier in this chapter.
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in the official social hierarchy of the late Tokugawa period. There is also the more
material focus of these new cultural logics, as opposed to the more ethical and spiritual
focus of late Tokugawa Neo-Confucian logics. In the Neo-Confucian logics, proper
social hierarchy, harmony, honor, and duty drove society, but in the new Meiji world,
entrepreneurialism, wealth and power did. Earlier in Japan’s history, the overwhelming
wealth, power, beauty and wisdom of China and its cultural universe impressed the
ancient Japanese. From the sixth century A.D., they began actively importing and
absorbing these treasures from Korea and China. Somewhat similarly, the wealth, power
and technology of the West impressed modern Japanese, and led them to embark on a
new but greatly accelerated learning program in the late 1800s. The earlier experience
with China influenced modern Japan’s response to the West, and somehow prepared it to
embark on its new knowledge importation campaign. Hard work, necessary for the
survival of each generation, has always been valued in Japan. Peasant farmers had
always grown the rice that fed the nation, but were not given a position of honor in the
social hierarchy of the late Tokugawa era.
In the Meiji era, business, commerce and the “science” behind them received
unprecedented honor throughout society. Belief in a strong state is one assumption of
pre-Meiji worldviews that carried into the new cultural universe of the Meiji era. The
logic that Japan should learn from the “most successful” and powerful foreign models is
another carry-over from Japan’s experience in the China-dominated universe to the
Western one. The cultural leap the Japanese had to make in adjusting to the Westerndominated universe seems greater than that they made in adapting ancient Chinese
influences. The receipt of the latter was the active choice of Japanese, and happened over
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centuries, as opposed to Japan’s accelerated learning from the West in the late 1800s.
Japanese took pride that they had imported, saved and/or improved key cultural and
political features from China, many of which had long died out in China.961
Japanese had a deep confidence, from their China experience, that they could also
indigenize and improve Western imports. So prolonged involvement of foreigners was
viewed as strange, obstructive, and unnecessary. In its experiences with ancient China
and the modern West, Japan valued what appeared most powerful at the time. In the
ancient world, it was the military and economic power and gigantic size of China, the
depth and practicality of Confucianism and other Chinese philosophies, and the esoteric
beauty and power of Buddhism and its artistic influences. In the late 1800s, Japanese
were impressed with the military power, economic and technological strength of the
West, from which they had isolated, by choice, for so long. The new Western-dominated
cultural universe was largely “forced” on Japan, requiring a more accelerated, focused
response from Japan’s leaders. Japan had less luxury of choice and time in the modern
case. The new case placed almost exclusive emphasis on the material world, and
comparatively little on the ethical or spiritual world.962 Foreign knowledge of the
material realm, including technologies, science, and business techniques, gained an
unprecedented place of honor in Japan. The “private sector” did as well.
In comparing the cultural logics under these domestic market worldviews
identified above, on theoretical economic issues, the new Meiji assumption that money
961

One example of this is the national cultural treasures from ancient China and Japan stored and
maintained at the Shôsô-in national treasure storehouse at Todaiji Temple in Nara, from the eighth century
A.D. up to the modern age.
962
In spite of this, I have noted above the belief of Fukuzawa and Mori that Japan must master the “spirits”
or cultural components surrounding Western political, economic and cultural achievements, and not mere
techniques.
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and material things drive the world contrasts with the older Confucian view, prevalent in
the Tokugawa period, that proper harmony, social order, attention to ritual, duty and
ethical behavior would save the nation. In the New Meiji view, Japan must work very
hard and develop itself, but in the more traditional view, honor, order and proper ethical
behavior were the primary characteristics of advanced societies. The new Meiji world
focused on trade and external engagement, where the Confucian world focused on
attaining the highest level of proper harmony and order within each society, believing,
from the powerful example of China, that societies which did so would honor the proper
ritual order of the universe, and prosper greatly. Societies that did not honor nature’s
proper harmony and order, and those farthest from the greatest nation that did (China),
were the most primitive and barbaric. A new logic emerging in late Tokugawa Japan
began to doubt the benefits of Confucianism, since it now failed China, which was
becoming a colony of the West. Though the Westerners were generally barbaric, they
were very clever and powerful; therefore Japan must learn from them, so as not to suffer
China’s fate.
Comparing the cultural logics on economics and business in Japan’s domestic
market, we see in the new Meiji view, a nation’s power in the world is driven by material
and economic productivity in society, based on the people’s hard work. In the Confucian
cultural universe, national well-being is based on proper order, ritual and harmony in a
nation.963 Hard work is the basis of survival, but the life of a scholar or bureaucrat who
uses his mind, not just his muscles, is more honored.

963

In Japan’s case, this wisdom was absorbed from a much more powerful external force, China, though in
China’s case, it was not.
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In the new Meiji cultural logics on business practice, entrepreneurialism and
labor, business and hard work are highly honored. Confucianism, which has failed East
Asia, is seen as backward and corrupt. Most fundamentally, hard work and solid
business build a nation, not just ethics and philosophy. The market drives the prosperity
of the nation and its people. In the Confucian universe of the late Tokugawa era, hard
work is necessary for survival, but people of honor should be more than hard working,
ignorant peasants. The universe has overall laws governing its operation and balance, for
which we need careful study by scholars, or we will not understand the lessons of history
and ourselves. To flourish, a society needs proper order, ethics, rituals and social
relations on all levels, orderly government and wise rulers. If not, it will perish.
Commerce is necessary for the functioning of society, but is cruder than ethical
reflection. Japan is no exception. It needs all these things, and the hard work of its
people. But they are unwise. They need the guidance and protection of wise leaders,
their father the Emperor, and a harmonious society. Out of deep love, affection and
thanks for their country and ancestors, Japanese must work hard, and maintain their
families’ and nation’s honor.964
On the public sector, governments and their economic policies, the cultural
logics of the Meiji period stress that Japan is a great country, currently weaker than the
West, from which it faces a great threat. For successful development policy, Japan’s
government must be strong and reform itself, learning best from governments of
economic powerhouses most like Japan. Hard work, outstanding knowledge and
964

The new Meiji state emphasized new patriotic values of devotion to the emperor and nation. They built
on the Confucian-influenced bushido (samurai ethic) values of commitment and duty that were
predominant in the Tokugawa period.
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cooperation between sectors (public, private, and popular) will help Japan grow. Much
knowledge can be gained from foreign experts, but Japanese know Japan best, and can
best help it grow. In conservative Confucian views in the late Tokugawa era, those
geographically furthest from the Confucian world are seen as most barbaric. Yet many
Westerners are very smart, have impressive technology, and are gaining increasing power
that threatens the East. Japan will soon have to face them, change, and grow. The
Tokugawa regime is increasingly weak and corrupt. Japan must figure out how to open
itself to Western knowledge, improve itself and grow, without being destroyed. How can
Japan receive foreign knowledge, improve it, and make it its own? Does Japan need
Western techniques yet Eastern spirit (wakon yosai),965 or both Western techniques and
Western spirit?
In the Meiji era’s cultural logics of the international segments of business,
firms, labor and their roles in the domestic market, economics and wealth are the basis of
well-being of nations and their people, as seen in the West, and will be for Japan too.
Japan must learn from the West’s economies, technologies, and societies. Japan must
change, but not destroy its soul. Since foreign firms are the chief experts in business
practice, Japan must learn from them. Their knowledge is crucial to help Japan grow and
survive. The temporarily superior culture of the West has allowed its superior economic
and scientific success. To succeed economically and technologically, Japan must change
and become more like the West, culturally, or master certain (Western) social features
965

Wakon yosai (Japanese/Eastern ethics, Western techniques) is an important ideological slogan of the late
Tokugawa period coined by Sakuma Shosan (1811-1864), a leading scholar of Western learning at the
time. Sakuma used the phrase to signify that Japan urgently needed to learn Western science and
technology, while maintaining its own Japanese spirit (“Sakuma Zosan,” in New Encyclopaedia Britannica,
Vol. 10 [Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1993], 345).
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that support such success.966 In the more “traditional” and Confucian-influenced cultural
logics of the late Tokugawa period, while Japan desperately needs foreign knowledge to
survive, it does not desire many cultural aspects. Foreigners must not stay in Japan too
long; their prolonged presence is a danger to Japan’s political, economic, and cultural
survival. In China, India, and other parts of Asia, foreigners dictate to local governments,
control and exploit their economies, and trample their cultures and religions. Westerners
are culturally inferior to Japanese. They are smelly, hairier, “stinking of butter,” much
cruder, and their religion (Christianity) believes in an intolerant god who cannot respect
or allow Japan’s gods to coexist. Christianity is an imperialist tool that the Westerners
tried to use before to invade, control and conquer Japan. Westerners have often nearly
destroyed societies they have invaded. This must not be permitted in Japan. They must
not overly contaminate the culture of Japan.967
On the roles of foreign technologies and knowledge in the domestic economy,
the Meiji era’s new cultural logics see Western technology and science as superior to
Japan’s, as what made the West so powerful. Japan needs them to survive. It is the
government’s duty to help Japan to import them.968 Business will become the most
powerful tool to help Japan grow, the key factor behind economic growth and wealth,
often more flexible and dynamic than government. Now Japan’s business sector is
weaker than the West’s, but will grow stronger. The government must help business at

966

The points about the West’s cultural superiority and mastering some of its social features are from
Fukuzawa and Mori.
967
Some of the points about the cultural logics behind “traditional” and Confucian logics here sound
stereotypical and extreme. To a degree, they may be, but many Japanese held such views during this
period.
968
This flows from the government’s most basic duties to effectively rule the nation and guarantee its
survival in the face of extensive (foreign) threats and other national emergencies.
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this stage of Japan’s development. In more “traditional” and Confucian logics in the late
Tokugawa and early Meiji periods, Japan needs the West’s powerful technologies and
knowledge to survive. Japan cannot stay isolated now. It must learn from these “clever
barbarians,” without importing many of their ways. Hopefully Japan can keep them at
arms’ length. The state must be strong, to stand up against foreigners and internal
divisions. Without a strong state, Japan will not survive. Business was seen as ignoble in
traditional Confucianism, but Japan must now use it to compete with the West.
For a brief summary comparing selected findings generated from this discussion
of likely cultural logics underlying these domestic worldviews, see Table 4.1 below,
which compares cultural logics of the knowledge importation campaign from mainland
Asia (starting about the sixth century A.D. onward) with logics in the early Meiji era, and
Table 4.2, which compares important cultural logics on the domestic market from the late
Tokugawa era with those from the early Meiji era. From Table 4.1, we see that the earlier
campaign placed more emphasis on spiritual, ethical and artistic items than the Meiji
campaign did. The former campaign also took much, much longer than the latter
campaign. The latter campaign was considered a matter of national survival. In Table 4.2,
we observe a higher emphasis on ethical, philosophical-based knowledge, legal
prohibition on interaction with foreigners, and an official scorn for business during the
late Tokugawa period. In contrast, in the early Meiji era, there is a much greater focus on
material and economic knowledge, learning and importing foreign knowledge, and
encouragement of business.
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Table 4.1: Comparison of Cultural Logics, China/Korea Importation Campaigns (6th
Century A.D. onward) and Meiji Knowledge Importation Campaign (late 1800s-early
1900s).
China, Korea Campaigns
Early Meiji Era Campaign
Wealth, power, technology, religion, arts from
Asia mainland greatly impresses Japan
Importation campaign took centuries
Japan must learn from the most powerful,
successful foreign model(s)
“Moderate,” less drastic cultural leap to adjust
to Asian sources
Whatever is most powerful, beautiful, and/or
philosophically appealing is worth copying
Japan chose to learn and copy from Asian
sources, models
Emphasis on importing many ideas and
“spiritual” items, also many techniques

Wealth, power, technology, arts from the West
greatly impresses Japan
Importation campaign took decades
Japan must learn from the most powerful,
successful foreign model(s)
“Drastic” cultural leap to adjust to Western
sources
Whatever is most powerful is worth copying
Japan forced to copy and learn Western
sources, models
Heavy emphasis on importing technological
items, little interest in Western spiritual ones

Table 4.2: Comparison of Important Cultural Logics on the Domestic Market: Late
Tokugawa Era and Early Meiji Era
Late Tokugawa (NeoEarly Meiji Logics
Confucian) Logics
More ethical focus
Business scorned, merely tolerated by the
Tokugawa state; ethics/morality preferred by
state
Belief in a strong state
Strong emphasis on ethical, moral issues of
Japanese origin, lesser interest in material issues
Stronger emphasis on ethical, moral world
“Japanese,” indigenous knowledge of ethics,
philosophy highly valued, Confucian, Buddhist
knowledge less valued, Western knowledge least
valued
Business, commerce has low social status
Proper harmony, order, ritual, duty, ethics,
behavior save a nation
Stability, political and social order are the basis
of Japan’s prosperity; wealth: not unimportant
Foreign knowledge helpful for Japan, somewhat
desired (especially military, medical knowledge)
Foreign cultural knowledge restricted by Japan’s
state, highly desired in certain cases and by some
individuals
Presence of foreigners is legally banned, except
for limited trade in limited locations in Southwest
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More materialist, economic focus
Business, economics, science behind them
highly honored in Japan; needed for Japan’s
survival
Belief in a strong state
Heavy emphasis on material knowledge,
items, little on spiritual items, issues
Stronger emphasis on material world
Western materialist, scientific, economic,
other knowledge highly valued; Mainland
Asian knowledge often devalued
Private sector honored, nurtured
Money, material things, power, hard work
empower a nation, drive the world
Economics, wealth are the basis of a nation’s
well-being, international status
Foreign knowledge mandatory for Japan’s
national survival
Foreign knowledge highly desired by the
state, which embarks on aggressive
importation campaigns
Presence of foreign experts is highly
encouraged, but only for short periods.

Japan
Overseas travel by Japanese is banned; a small
number slip abroad anyway
The West’s science, technology: highly desired,
imported as Japan is able. Yet protecting Japan’s
national isolation cannot be compromised.

Continuing fear of “cultural contamination”
by the West
Overseas travel and study by Japanese highly
encouraged, though few can go
West’s science, technology are highly
desired, have made it strong; aggressive
imports encouraged by the state.

Conclusion
Regarding the first main question of this research, the influence of Japan’s
experience in technology, development and foreign relations (and key leaders’ views
about them) from 1850 to 1945, here I will trace general connections, while I will attempt
to identify more specific linkages in Chapters 9 and 10, the concluding chapters. On
sociocultural issues, in this era, Japan was definitely willing to look abroad to absorb
foreign knowledge (during the late Meiji and Taisho eras), but as it got closer to World
War II, it was less willing and able. Today’s aid follows this lesson well. Japan’s aid
encourages openness and foreign learning by LDCs. Another key issue, not considered in
Japan in this era, was what the state of an LDC can do to try to relieve the social costs of
development, if anything.
On domestic political economy issues, in facing political development and
reforms, in this era, Japan resorted to repression somewhat, and sought to limit
democracy and other possible forms of dissention. Unfortunately most leaders did not
really worry about what kinds of economic development might be the most appropriate
for Japanese society at the time. Japan did maintain its overall goals for independence
and national unity. Despite the destruction brought by the nation’s authoritarian system
by 1945, Japan’s national unity served it very well.
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On economic policy and development, from 1850 to 1895, Japan did not pursue
a balanced approach to industrialization, but focused on heavy industrialization and
encouraging large parts of the private sector, such as the zaibatsu. On the role of
development ideologies, during this era, Japan was willing to aggressively borrow
foreign ideas and ideologies to help with its economic growth. Japan also used several
indigenous ideologies to encourage growth and management, influenced by samurai and
Confucian values.
Next, on the second key question of the dissertation, I will consider if the ideas
of “modernization” and translative adaptation, as seen in the worldviews of the domestic
state and market in Chapter 4, present an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with
technology and development from 1850 to 1895.969 All five leaders support the concepts
of “modernization” and translative adaptation in their views of the state, and the three
leaders studied on the domestic market also support the two concepts. Regarding
“modernization” in worldviews of the domestic state, all five leaders studied (Fukuzawa,
Mori, Ito, Kato, and Yamagata) supported it. All were nationalistic in their political goals,
wanting Japan to strengthen its internal politics so that it could repel the West. While they
varied in their views of the exact form political reforms should take, none wanted
Japanese society destroyed. On “modernization” and the domestic market, Fukuzawa, Ito
and Kato all supported the concept. All knew that Japan’s economy was weak, that Japan
needed to learn from the West in economics to prevent invasion, and none wanted to lose
Japan’s identity. On translative adaptation and the domestic state, all five leaders studied
supported political change and development for Japan’s survival. So all five supported
969

The concept of internationalization is not considered in Chapter 4.
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translative adaptation in their goal to strengthen Japan through political reforms, and
assure its survival as a people, a nation, and a culture. And the three leaders studied on
the domestic market also supported translative adaptation, that imported Western
economic practices and technologies must enhance, not destroy, deeper features of
Japanese culture.
Regarding technology issues and the domestic state, rapid political reforms
allowed Japan to quickly rebuild the Japanese government after the Meiji Restoration.
The rapid development of an effective bureaucracy, and the strong emphasis on the
military, meant that Japan marshaled its forces fairly rapidly to build up the nation’s
capacities in military, economic, industrial, scientific and technological capacities. The
Meiji state also used these capacities to limit movements and protests pressing for more
political rights. Technology also played a very major role in the growth of Japan’s
domestic market in this period. Faced with the possibility of intense competition from
abroad, certain industries such as textiles and iron received key input from the state, and
Japan’s industrial revolution started in the late 1880s.
Concerning development, in domestic political development, Japan adopted
several political institutions that were mainly modeled on authoritarian, monarchical
systems in late nineteenth century Europe, especially from Germany, including a
constitution, a limited parliament, extensive bureaucracy, autocratic emperor, and a large,
powerful military. Political development encouraged by the state included a set of
nationalistic ideologies that were conservative in nature. More liberal ideologies were not
yet allowed to take root. On economic development, by the mid-1800s, the late
Tokugawa economy had developed to a very sophisticated pre-industrial level. After the
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Meiji restoration (1868), the Meiji government aggressively targeted particular heavy
industries for initial emphasis and growth, promoting development ideologies such as
fukoku kyôhei for this purpose. The private sector slowly began to emerge. Government
emphasis in this period especially targeted large-scale industries and businesses for
development.
While international contexts of politics and economics (1850 to 1895) will
mostly be discussed in Chapter 5, regarding Japan’s experiences in the domestic state,
there are many examples of foreign models for Japan’s parliament, constitution,
bureaucracy, the military, and of political ideas and ideologies. The most influential ideas
and models in this period came from Europe, while some came from the United States. In
the domestic market, influential economic forces included various industrial
technologies, principles, theories, and practices of economics, finance, business and
banking. Ideas regarding the labor movement and workers’ rights also entered Japan,
though they were heavily suppressed by the state during this period.
All of the leaders studied in Chapter 4, five on domestic state issues, and three
on domestic market issues, support the basic concepts of “modernization” and translative
adaptation in the worldviews we have studied. In the domestic contexts surveyed here, do
the ideas of “modernization” and translative adaptation in these worldviews well
represent Japan’s experiences in technology, development and foreign relations? On
“modernization, while all of the leaders studied in the chapter agree that Japan must
import needed political and economic ideas and technologies, all want Japan’s essential
cultural integrity in these areas to remain intact. From the items imported, what happened
in practice? The military and industrial technologies inevitably began to greatly alter
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Japan’s rural and urban landscapes. The creation of a new extensive, national
bureaucracy did as well. The spread of various new values, including nationalism,
patriotism, and market-oriented production norms could not help but change many
aspects of Japanese life, since in Tokugawa Japan, culture, politics and much of daily life
operated on a highly regionalized level, given the division of the nation into numerous,
rather isolated feudal domains. Economics was more integrated on a national level than
were politics or culture. There is little evidence that many aspects of Japan’s core culture
were fundamentally changed, though. For example, most of the new corporate ideologies
that emerged for Japan’s new private sector were based on neo-Confucian values of the ie
system and the bushido code. In development, the imported political items were carefully
designed to match Japan’s conservative culture of politics, and liberal political and
economic ideologies were discouraged by the state. However, the state, in its major
emphasis on promoting large-scale industries, did not seem very cognizant of the need to
protect small-scale and localized agriculture, cottage industries or merchants. For the
most part, practices seem sensitive to the issues of “modernization,” except on the need to
protect local industries.
Though all of the leaders also supported the theory of translative adaptation,
what happened in practice? As Japan imported various new political and economic
technologies and items, did its culture adapt well? Though review of grounded,
ethnographic data would be needed to authoritatively answer this question, from my
study here, it appears that Japan’s basic culture adapted fairly well to the huge influx of
foreign technologies, institutions and ideologies promoted for development. Though
inevitably altered, I wish to argue that the deepest aspects of Japanese culture remained
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mostly intact through this period of tumultuous change. This is also the conclusion of
many Japanese scholars. The foreign items that were imported were particularly chosen
on the basis of helping Japan to quickly modernize, but also to not clash too greatly with
Japan’s conservative politics and culture. The latter, in particular, had been extremely
isolated from foreign, especially Western, input for so long. In general, the economic
imports seem less sensitive than the political ones on the need to protect Japan’s cultural
core. The primary emphasis there is on quickly enriching the country so it can defend
itself economically and militarily, to simply survive.
In the data in the historical worldviews of the domestic state and market
presented here, is there evidence of how Japanese views of spirituality may have affected
policies in general? On the issue of spirit and spirituality, in my discussion about
domestic politics, I note Fukuzawa’s and Mori’s concern for mastery of the supportive
“spirits” (values) surrounding technology, and how the cultural logics behind worldviews
of the domestic state seem more materialistic than spiritual in tone. In my treatment of
spiritual values and domestic market worldviews, I noted how there seemed to be a
general de-emphasis of spiritual values in the economic worldviews, and a more ethical
focus in late Tokugawa cultural logics contrasted with a greater emphasis on the material
world in Meiji logics. There was also a need for Japanese to master the spirit behind
Western political, economic, business and cultural achievements.
Regarding the contrasting theme of the role of material phenomena in these
worldviews, in the cultural logics on domestic politics (1850 to 1895), material values are
emphasized more than spiritual ones, likely partly because of the strong images of the
sheer power of the West’s technologies displayed in conflicts with China and other
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countries, and Western technology’s power to conquer and control many of them as
colonies and areas of influence. The domestic market worldview here de-emphasizes
non-material phenomena, sees the world as primarily economically driven, and offers
material causes as the major explanation for world events. Money and material things
drive the world in the cultural logics under these domestic market worldviews. These
cultural logics had a mostly material focus, while the domestic market cultural logics of
the late Tokugawa era were mainly ethical and neo-Confucian in orientation. The foreign,
Western items favored for importation in the Meiji era were generally more material in
emphasis than items imported from Asia since the sixth century A.D. Foreign knowledge
of material things was more valued in the Meiji era. In the new Meiji world and
worldview, money and material things drove the world (and determine a nation’s power),
but in the late Tokugawa era, harmony and proper ritual did.
In the brief comments on religion in this chapter, I note while a few of the Meiji
leaders970 identified Western religious values and Christianity as having a major role
associated with the “spirits” behind Western scientific and technological success, the
economy-focused worldview of the domestic market tended to de-emphasize nonmaterial phenomena and knowledge, such as religion. The economic images in the
domestic market data would also tend to encourage Japanese leaders to reject traditional
fields not seen as crucial for practical Japanese knowledge acquisition, such as religion.
These were only valued if they seemed to contribute to Japanese survival. In their
observations of Westerners, Japanese saw that the former tended to trample the cultures
and religions of those they invaded, and Christianity seemed highly intolerant. In spite of
970
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all these factors, I noted how in contemporary Japan [and actually in late Tokugawa and
Meiji era Japan as well], the Japanese practice of spirituality, even if often not defined as
“religion,” is quite pervasive.971
What possible impacts did these views have on policies from 1850 to 1895?
There seemed to be pressure against spirituality in the worldviews and cultural logics in
this period, in domestic state and market views. The material-oriented worldviews and
logics on politics and economics of the early Meiji era seemed to dominate the more
ethical/philosophical ones that were predominant in the late Tokugawa period. The
general discouragement of spirituality seen in these worldviews would also tend to
discourage religion. Religion was only valued where it was seen as practical, i.e. where it
might contribute to the construction of the nation. The policies likely to result from these
views would focus on practical economic and political concerns centered on building
Japan as a nation. Religion and spirituality would not be much of a concern unless they
would contribute to that cause. Compared with the views of spirituality that I mentioned
in Chapter 3, these views seem less encouraging of them. But in both cases in Chapters 3
and 4, we see a willingness to use spirituality and religion if they will contribute to the
supreme national goal of building the nation to avoid colonization by the West. This
indeed happened when the state chose to create State Shinto as the national religion and
patriotic practice. This is the most direct policy application in this period seen here.
The major conflicts identified here are between the emphasis material and
economic concerns over spiritual and ethical ones, noted in the major worldviews and
cultural logics on the domestic state and politics. There is also the conflict between the
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more ethical/philosophical/spiritual orientation in late Tokugawa worldviews and logics
here, and the more material concerns that were predominant in the early Meiji era.
Japan’s urgent need for survival helped to generate this shift. But I also noted above that
in actual practice, in everyday life, it is highly likely that the daily practice of religion and
spirituality did not diminish. So while there was a much more overt emphasis on political
and economic concerns in the policy actions of most Japanese leaders, the knowledge that
Japan must not abandon its own heritage, culture or spiritual identity was assumed,
though not overtly.
What were the possible future impacts of these issues for Japanese foreign aid,
over the long run? What we see here is that pressures to separate consideration of
spiritual factors from the nation’s daily activities in political and economic affairs may
have entered along with the Western, materialist, scientific worldviews and assumptions
behind Japan’s political and economic reform programs in this era. Although the political
and economic policies that Japan attempted to copy from the West may have included
some policies of Western, especially European, countries that assumed the integration of
church and state (several authoritarian political models), the Flaw of the Excluded
Middle972 was also present, the secularizing influence of the French Enlightenment. In the
actual policies for politics and economics that Japan enacted, there is little overt
consideration of religion and spirituality, especially in the economic areas.
Where secularizing tendencies may have occurred, it is hard to say whether they resulted
from the Western-generated “Flaw,” and Japan’s own secularizing political tendencies.
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See the definition of the Flaw of the Excluded Middle in the Glossary, and the brief discussion of the
issues it entails in Chapter 1.
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In contrast, though, in the early Meiji period, the state instituted State Shinto to help build
and motivate the nation. If anything, this seems to have represented somewhat of a
reversal, from whatever secularizing source. There is no indication that the integration of
spirituality with everyday life, even in things that could be called “political” or
“economic,” disappeared. Given the presence of such practices in Japan today (noted
above), I would argue that such practices remained during this era.
All of this suggests that although the postwar Japanese state and bureaucracy
have been required to de-link all formal connections between religion and the state, some
subtle connections might still remain. There is the famous case of Yasukuni Shrine,
where the spirits of Japan’s war dead are enshrined. Many other Asian countries have
complained that the visit of many prime ministers to the shrine to pray to the spirits of the
war dead amounts to glorification of war crimes, mixing of religion and state, and
ignorance of the feelings of the peoples of many of Japan’s Asian neighbors. Does this
mean that some subtle signs of spirituality might be present in Japanese aid, or shape how
the contemporary aid policymaking process occurs? Or are there subtle hints about
spirituality in the aid policies, programs, loans and grants that are offered, or the aid
outcomes that are generated? Although I cannot this question fully in the present
project,973 it is interesting to ponder. We will see what insights emerge in Chapters 5 and
6, where I consider leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s external politico-economic and
cultural relations, 1850 to 1895.
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policymaking process.
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Chapter 5
Worldviews of Selected Key Leaders (1850-1895)
International Political Economy Issues
Introduction
This chapter, on Japan’s external relations (1850-1895), examines decision
makers’ notions of how Japan interacts with influences from outside Japan in its political
and economic relations, and in its emerging imperialism. As we begin our examination of
influences and contexts that are specifically international, and of views about them, a
major point is that most of the change that occurred in Japan came because of its
increasing contact and interaction with foreign influences, cultures and technologies. The
massive influx of these forces into Japan began in this era. What major changes occurred
as a result of Japan’s interactions with these forces? In Chapter 5 we will study the
influence of Japan’s external relations in politics and economics, and of Japanese
imperialism, while Chapter 6 examines issues connected with Japan’s external cultural
relations in this period. What connection might these changes have with Japan’s
contemporary aid policies? Several possible significant lessons for development and aid
policies emerge, which I offer in the conclusion. Below I also argue that although several
of these leaders were strongly convinced that spiritual factors were potentially important
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contributors to aiding Japan’s reform process in this era, several forces fought against
these contributions. But those forces could not prevent the significant emergence of State
Shinto during this period, nor did they limit the powerful influence spirituality exercised
on various policies from 1895-1945. Exploring these issues for this period will help us
further lay the foundation for their implications for current Japanese aid.
After briefly surveying the contexts of Japan’s external political and economic
relations (1850-1895), we will examine the views of selected leaders. On worldviews of
external political relations, I discuss the views of all five leaders studied for this era
(Fukuzawa Yukichi, Ito Hirobumi, Mori Arinori, Yamagata Aritomo and Kato Hiroyuki).
On external economic relations, we will briefly examine the views of Fukuzawa, Ito and
Kato. Leaders’ views of imperialism emerge more fully in 1895-1945, so I will consider
them in Chapter 8, which covers that period.
Here imperialism includes the general thought of Japanese thinkers and leaders
about colonialism and imperialism, Japanese government policies for building
colonialism and empire, important imperialist doctrines and ideologies, and the state of
Japanese-controlled or heavily influenced colonies, territories and possessions. In
Chapter 5, I include two territories that were eventually incorporated into Japan proper:
Hokkaido island and Okinawa/the Ryukyu Islands.974 Briefly, colonialism refers to
“control by one power over a dependent area or people,” or “a policy advocating or based
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I consider the contexts of mainly domestic Japanese expansion in Chapter 4. Similarly, Richard Van
Alstyne treats the domestic territorial expansion of the United States, within international contexts, in
Richard Warner Van Alstyne, The Rising American Empire (The Norton Library, 750. Oxford: Blackwell,
1960).
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on such control.”975 Imperialism may be defined as “the policy, practice, or advocacy of
extending the power and dominion of a nation [,] especially by direct territorial
acquisitions or by gaining indirect control over the political or economic life of other
areas; broadly: the extension or imposition of power, authority, or influence….”976
Japanese overseas imperialism did not fully emerge until after the close of the period
covered in the present chapter (1850-1895), after Japan’s victory over China in the SinoJapanese War in 1895, when Japan was awarded its first overseas colony in Taiwan.
Nevertheless, relevant antecedents of overseas imperialism occurred when the Japanese
government chose to colonize first Hokkaido, and then Okinawa/the Ryukyu Islands,
both of which were soon fully incorporated into the main part of Japan. I will examine
the issue of imperialism more fully in Chapter 8, which covers the period of major
Japanese colonialism and imperialism (1895-1945), including analysis of the worldviews
of relevant leaders. I did not gather much data on the views of the five leaders studied for
this chapter on imperialism and colonialism for the period 1850-1895, so I will not
discuss and analyze leaders’ views of imperialism until Chapter 8. However, contexts
related to imperialism are included here in Chapter 5.
For consistency of analysis, when possible, I will use the same analytical
concepts to assess leaders’ worldviews of international issues and contexts as I used for
domestic ones. In Chapter 5, I use the same three concepts for analysis of cognitive
issues: image, worldview (my definition), and cultural logics. But using the same
analytical concepts for international issues is not always possible. To analyze
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development-related aspects of the leaders’ worldviews of international issues, I will
draw mainly on the concept of internationalization, and on “modernization,” where
appropriate. The two concepts are very similar. Translative adaptation is not so relevant
for external issues, so it will not be used. In this chapter, I will not really look at domestic
issues, including those of the regions and countries that came under the influence of
Japanese imperialism and colonialism. “Modernization” tends to focus more on global
economic processes, on the global economic system dominated by Western countries,
and their effect on the internal cultural evolution of non-Western countries, as they are
absorbed into the economic system.977 “Modernization” stresses the cultural effects of
global economic processes, of the West upon the non-West, integrates both global and
local (external and internal, international and domestic) factors, and concepts from
development economics and anthropology.
Internationalization focuses more on external, international processes, on what
happens as the more powerful West in the “core” absorbs other peoples from the
periphery into the global economic system. As this happens, the West, assumed to be
more “active,” dominates the weaker, more passive “periphery” countries. This concept
not only looks at economic factors, but also considers cultural issues, to a degree. What
happens as the peripheral countries, from non-Western regions such as Asia, Africa, the
South Pacific and Latin America, are absorbed into the “cultural universe” of the West?
While “modernization” considers the cultural effects of the global economy on the
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The key question with “modernization” is what happens to the (internal) cultures of non-Western
countries as they are absorbed into the Western-dominated global economic system. “Modernization”
answers that the cultures of the non-Western countries will be “Western” on the surface, but not in their
core areas, if development succeeds. If their core areas are destroyed, then development can be called a
“failure.”
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domestic cultures of peripheral nations, internationalization does not really consider the
internal implications at all. It especially examines what has happened on the international
level through historic processes of colonialism. “Modernization” does not really look at
issues of colonialism. And internationalization’s focus is not exclusively on historical
issues. It also looks at contemporary issues, of what happens on the international level as
Western/international development ideologies978 such as free markets, democracy, good
governance, sustainability, participatory development, human rights, and WID (women in
development) impinge on non-Western countries. Internationalization is also relevant for
examining imperialism, though on a historic level, not on a contemporary one. Can these
contemporary processes (such as the imposition of Western/international development
ideologies on peripheral countries) be called “imperialism”? That seems rather a strong
charge. Perhaps the term global hegemony (or domination) might be more appropriate.979
After reflecting on technology concepts in several different disciplines,980 I
came up with basic questions in six categories to consider the technological implications
of these worldviews on the international level: 1) General concepts of technology: what
are the most important technology-related ideas and phenomena associated with each
international worldview studied here? 2) Technology in the international system: what
978
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are the most significant political (economic, social, other) factors present in the imported
technologies and related ideas in the international worldview studied here?981 And did the
international system affect these technologies/issues positively or negatively? Why? 3)
Technology transfer: what were the important ideas/technologies transferred here, in the
worldviews under consideration? Who were the main international actors in the external
environment, or domestic actors, individual or state, involved, and what impacts did they
have on the transfer outcomes? What lessons or chances for improvement do we learn? 4)
Technology, culture, and the international system: what are the most significant cultural
factors and values present in the imported technologies and ideas in these international
worldviews?982 In these worldviews, how did the leaders concerned use these
technologies/ideas as means or agencies to cope with and transform Japan’s (material)
environments on the international level?983 How did these technological issues affect or
enhance Japan’s survival in the international system or environment?984 5) Technology,
cognition, and international relations: do the belief systems of any of these leaders (on
technology issues on the international level) blind them to certain realities? If yes, which,
and how? Do the leaders fail to adjust their decisions or viewpoints to changing
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conditions and reality? If so, how do these factors affect transfer or policy outcomes?
And 6) Technonationalism as ideology: in these worldviews on external relations, is the
concept of technonationalism as ideology manifested? If so, how?
Above I noted that I will use the same analytical concepts for cognition issues
on the international level as I used on the domestic level. Also in this chapter I introduce
an additional analytical framework related to globalization. Key aspects identified in my
anthropological treatment of globalization include speeded up and intensified global
connections, including economic, social, cultural, and political linkages. Globalization
can be ethnographically and comparatively assessed on the micro-level (how it is
perceived by individual, human actors) or the macro-level (public, shared perceptions). It
does not spread from one center or cultural tradition, but from several.985 From this
definition, we see that globalization applies to our contemporary age, but what about
Japan in the period 1850-1895? The period of 1850 to 1895 represented unprecedented
globalization for Japan, as evidenced by its return into the global system in 1868, and the
spread of global communications (i.e. the telegraph) and transport (rail, ships) in this era,
among other things. Here are the key questions I will explore to uncover the globalization
aspects of international worldviews in this chapter, Chapter 6 and Chapter 8: 1) How do
some of the most important worldviews here reflect and/or affect processes of
globalization (intensified or speeded up flows of ideas, peoples, money, media, or
technology)? And how does globalization affect the worldviews? 2) If we consider these
985
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global processes as people experienced them, on micro- (personal) and/or macro- (shared,
public) levels, what do we learn? 3) Do these important global processes represent a form
of Japanese or non-Western globalization? If yes, what is their significance?
Contexts of Japan’s Foreign Relations (1850-1895): Major Trends
Contexts: Japan’s External Political Relations
To enhance its authority in Japan and East Asia, the Tokugawa Shogunate
adopted a policy of national seclusion (sakoku) from 1639 to 1854. The policy banned
Christianity and its missionaries from Japan, most Japanese travel overseas, and limited
foreign trade to four countries (with China, Holland, Korea and the Ryukyus), through
just a few ports.986 In 1853, “black ships” from the United States helped to force open
Japan. Japan officially opened in 1854, signing treaties of diplomatic relations with the
United States, Russia, Great Britain, and others. In 1858, Japan signed several unequal
trade and friendship treaties that granted foreign powers extraterritorial rights, and limited
Japan’s capacity to tax foreign trade. Through these Japan was absorbed into an unequal
system of foreign relations dominated by Western nations. This led to an outflow of gold
from Japan, raising commodity prices, internal unrest, and anti-foreign feelings. The
Shogunate was overthrown in 1867.987
After 1868, the new Meiji government began a program of aggressive internal
westernization, to strengthen the nation and prevent its colonization by the West. Soon
Japan began negotiations to end the unequal treaties, not achieved until 1911. Japan was
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also involved in significant events on the Asian mainland. In 1876, Japan forced Korea
to sign a treaty granting the former unequal rights of trade, ahead of all other foreign
powers. Korea was a significant sphere of Chinese influence. Various events led to war
with China over Korea (1894-1895), which Japan finally won, gaining colonies in
Taiwan and the Pescadore Islands. Reparations from China contributed significantly to
Japan’s industrialization, and gave greater access to the Chinese market for Japanese
business. 988 Japan also sent several significant official missions to tour the United States
and Europe in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods, including six Shogunate
missions in the 1860s, and the famous Iwakura mission (1871-1873). The missions
provided the government the opportunity to attempt to renegotiate the unfair commercial
treaties (to no avail), and to obtain technological knowledge.989 The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, founded in 1869, stood at the height of the bureaucratic pyramid in the early
Meiji period, and was the only bureaucracy with the foreign expertise to translate and
negotiate treaties and other external matters.990
Japan’s closest foreign relations in this period were with the United States. The
United States is the country that has perhaps most influenced Japan for the last one
hundred fifty years. The two societies were very different at their first contact in the
1853, and their subsequent relations might be called, for the most part, “distant but
harmonious.” In the 1870s, both possessed modernizing militaries, industries, and
political systems. At first, Japan learned much more from the United States than the
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reverse; many American teachers and other foreign visitors helped Japanese to gain their
first (direct) exposure to Western knowledge, science and culture.991
In Asia, until the late 1800s, Japan was continually influenced by Chinese
traditions that it reshaped into a distinctive civilization. With China’s loss of the Opium
War (1840-1842), many Japanese saw China as increasingly backward. Meiji Japan and
Qing China signed a treaty of friendship in 1871, but tensions erupted over Japan’s
interests and actions in the Ryukyus (Okinawa), Taiwan, and finally in Korea, significant
areas of Chinese influence. Events in Korea resulted in the Sino-Japanese War (18941895) that Japan won. By 1895, Japan gained colonies in all three areas.992 Japan had
had distant relations with Korea during the Tokugawa period, but after the Meiji
Restoration, the latter maintained its seclusion policy.993 Japanese pressure for influence
there led to conflict with China.994 Japan’s relations with Russia were also important.
After 1868, both nations competed and occasionally cooperated regarding influence in
Northeast Asia, especially in China, Manchuria and Korea. After Japan’s victory in the
Sino-Japanese War, the Russians became increasingly concerned.995 Toyotomi
Hideyoshi, an important Japanese leader, attempted unsuccessfully to invade Taiwan in
1593. After 1868, Japanese interest in Taiwan increased as Japan contemplated resisting
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Western colonialism and acquiring its own colonies.996 Japan also began to restore trade
and diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian regions. These relations had ended with
the national isolation period (1639-1854).997
Regarding Europe, Japan’s relations with Great Britain were the most
important. Britain was an important model for Japanese industrialization. Important
Japanese scholars studied in Britain, and British teachers in Japan made significant
contributions to Meiji Japan’s development.998 Germany and France both had a
significant influence on early Meiji Japan, in the areas of medicine, law, politics,
economics, education, and the military.999
Concerning intellectual trends in international relations from 1850 to 1895, the
ideology of sonnô jôi (“revere the emperor, expel the barbarians,”) expressed the goal of
national unity under imperial rule and shunning contact with foreigners. This political
doctrine was used to encourage the overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate, to support the
Meiji Restoration, and to contribute to the building of the modern Japanese state.1000 In
1873, a major debate (Seikanron) broke out over whether Japan should punish Korea for
refusing its overtures for improved relations. Pro-attack supporters lost the debate.1001
After 1868, former samurai organized the imperial army and navy on Western
principles into one of the world’s most formidable armed forces. In line with fukoku
kyôhei and the importation of advanced technologies to prevent Western invasion, the
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government founded a modern army drawing on all classes of society in 1869.1002 The
army was modeled on Prussia’s, and the navy on Great Britain’s. Before 1870, the
military focused on internal security, but soon began preparing for foreign wars.
National conscription began in 1873, and large-scale build-up in 1884. “The
independence of the supreme command” concept and active military leaders in the
cabinet would have profound effects on Japan’s politics.1003 In the Sino-Japanese War
(1894-1895), Japan totally defeated China, and became the Far East’s superior power.
For Japan, the war meant the point when the military began decisive influence in politics,
when power politics came to influence foreign policy, with empire building in China as a
primary target, and intensified industrialization. These trends greatly affected Japanese
society and Asian international relations for the next half-century.1004
Contexts: Japan’s External Economic Relations
During the Tokugawa period, the Dutch were the only Europeans allowed to
trade with Japan. During national seclusion, the Dutch became the main source of
Western knowledge for Japan.1005 Japan opened to more extensive foreign trade in 1858,
with the signing of the Harris Treaty with the United States. At first, Japan’s largest
exports were raw silk, raw material goods and foodstuffs, and semi-manufactures. Key
imports included textiles, ironware, ships, and guns. Major trading partners were Great
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Britain (which received eighty percent of Japan’s trade), the United States and
Holland.1006
After 1868, the first major goal of Meiji Japan’s trade policies was to achieve
equality with the West. Unequal treaties signed with major Western powers limited
Japan’s negotiating power. Japan did not attain tariff independence until 1911. After
1868, Japan’s foreign trade, including exports and imports, grew every year. The
government’s first promotion of trade occurred in 1873. The Meiji government
supported Japan’s modernization with loans, subsidies and technical help. Japan had to
import commodities, equipment and other materials that it did possess, paid for through
exports. From 1868 to 1912, there were only twelve years when Japan had a surplus
balance of trade.1007 In the early Meiji era, both the Japanese government and private
firms viewed foreign investment in Japan as a means for Japan to acquire access to
foreign markets, technology, capital, and management experience, so they actively sought
foreign technical assistance. Many foreign instructors and engineers came to Japan, and
brought a great deal of industrial expertise, but Japan was wary of foreign domination, so
most foreign instructors did not stay long.1008 The first Japanese businesses to operate
overseas were trading companies that opened branches in China, Europe and the United
States, from 1876. Early businesses also included those related to silk and textiles,
banking and insurance.1009
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In the Meiji era, Japan gained much of its knowledge of foreign technological
and economic systems through American teachers visiting Japan, and young Japanese
going abroad. Very soon this economic relationship would become important for Japan,
the United States, and the security of the whole Asia-Pacific region.1010 Limited trade
between Japan and Korea continued during the Tokugawa period. After 1868, Japan
pressured Korea to open itself to diplomatic and trade relations, which Korea resisted.
Eventually the two countries signed an unequal treaty in 1876 that granted Japan
dominant trading power. Competition with China over Korea led to the Sino-Japanese
War (1894-1894), and formal Japanese colonization in Korea from 1910.1011 Limited
trade between Japan and Taiwan (via the Dutch) earlier in the Tokugawa period greatly
decreased after 1683. Taiwan became a Japanese colony after the Sino-Japanese War, so
its economic importance for Japan would soon increase. Britain dominated Japan’s
foreign trade in the early Meiji period, and British instructors and engineers aided Japan’s
industrialization and railroad development.1012 Instructors from Germany and France
also had significant input in Japan’s technological and economic growth in this
period.1013
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Contexts: Japan’s External Relations: Imperialism
Japan’s first attempts at colonialism began soon after the Meiji Restoration
(1868). The Meiji government realized the strategic importance of Hokkaido and other
northern islands (including Sakhalin and the Kuriles), and established the Kaitakushi
(Hokkaido Colonization Office) in 1869.1014 In a treaty signed with Russia in 1875,
Russia gained control of Sakhalin, while the Kaitakushi controlled Hokkaido and the
Kuriles.1015 The Kaitakushi hired many foreign advisors who helped to found the
forerunner of Hokkaido University. The Kaitakushi aggressively advocated the
development of Hokkaido, but in doing so, systematically denied the indigenous Ainu
population their hunting, fishing and land rights. A political scandal erupted in 1881, and
the Kaitakushi was disbanded in 1882. By 1886, all of Hokkaido became a modern
Japanese prefecture.1016 To help develop Hokkaido, in 1873 the national government
established the Tondenhei (Colonist Militia), composed of former samurai from various
northern prefectures, to settle in Hokkaido. By 1882, over 2,400 settlers had moved to
Hokkaido under the program. By 1890, as Russia’s interests in the Far East became much
more visible, Japan ramped up efforts to increase the number of settlers and its military
presence in the region. Over 40,000 people, both former samurai and commoners, were
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recruited. By 1904, with an adequate increase in population and the presence of an army
division in the territory, the Tondenhei system ended.1017
The Ryukyu Islands had paid regular tribute to China since the fourteenth
century. Although Japan exercised much influence in the Ryukyu Islands since 1609, the
year of an invasion by the Satsuma domain, it was not until 1872 that the Meiji
government designated the islands as a daimyo domain and announced to Western
governments that it would take responsibility for diplomatic affairs. In 1879, the
government declared the Ryukyus to be Okinawa prefecture under the new prefectural
system, and China’s Qing dynasty complained. It was not until the end of the SinoJapanese War (1895) that China agreed to Japan’s acquisition of the Ryukyus.1018
One of the doctrines guiding Japanese expansion starting about this time was
the Nanshinron (“Southern Expansion”) school of thought. It argued that Japan should
extend its influence into Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands, “legitimate” spheres of
Japanese influence.1019 The Nanshinron doctrine became influential in thought about
Japan’s overseas influence from the Meiji era through 1945, and was eventually used to
justify political and territorial influence into Southeast Asia and the Pacific, including
concepts that free trade, immigration, and sea routes to the region were important for
Japan. Nanshinron was also used to justify the expansion of the Imperial Navy.1020 The
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Hokushinron (or Northern Expansion, Advance-to-The-North) doctrine advocated
Japanese expansion into Korea and Manchuria.1021
Views about Japan’s Foreign Relations, 1850-1895
Worldviews on Japan’s External Political Relations
Fukuzawa Yukichi. Fukuzawa Yukichi believed that it was wrong for Japanese
to think of foreigners as an inferior species, only intent on invasion and
“exploitation.”1022 This thinking was supported by the Kaikoku school of thought,
according to which Japan should peaceably open her doors to foreign contact and trade,
and absorb Western knowledge, technology and science to defend itself.1023 In this view,
China was defeated in the Opium War and in other confrontations with the West because
it ignored Western techniques.1024 According to Fukuzawa, both duty and self-interest
required Japan to renounce its isolation and to restart its international relations.1025
Fukuzawa’s top priorities for Japan’s foreign relations were its interests and
independence.1026 In the early Meiji period, some Japanese scholars argued that
international relations was based on a universal moral principle, that countries never
intentionally harmed other countries, and would not suffer harm unless they behaved
dishonestly. In 1876, Fukuzawa criticized this view, arguing it might apply to
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individuals, but not to nations. Rather, strong ethnic sentiments (jôjitsu) and an
“irrational bias” (hempashin) bound people together in clans and nations.1027
In his writings before 1876, Fukuzawa believed that as reason deemed that all
men should have equal rights, so should all nations. A “law of nations” governed the
behavior among Western nations, in principle and practice.1028 The first school of
Western international law introduced to Japan (in 1865) stressed that international
relations are based on international law, derived from immutable human reason.1029 This
idea was likened to the Confucian doctrine of human good nature, similar to the
Confucian ethical path.1030 In order for Japan to attain adequate “country rights”
(kokken), her people must have adequate minken (people’s rights). Only then would
Japan be strong enough to defend itself.1031 By 1876, Fukuzawa concluded that the
rational law of nations had no correspondence with reality, and that international relations
were entirely different from interpersonal relations. Rather, the former were based on
“quarrels over power and profit.”1032 International relations in practice have no relation
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with theory. If necessary, a nation must use violence or trickery to gain victory.1033 In
1878, Fukuzawa argued that international relations were governed by jakuniku-kyôshoku
(the strong devouring the weak). Only by adopting Western civilization could Japan
become strong enough to defend itself.1034
From 1882 until the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Fukuzawa’s
writings changed, stressing the primary importance of strengthening Japan in
international relations. Internal government issues like people’s rights took on a
secondary importance.1035 After 1895, Fukuzawa’s worries about Japan’s independence
disappeared, since it had proved its strength. Now it could concentrate on building an
ideal civilization.1036
Fukuzawa’s generally pro-government Jiji Shinpo newspaper took an
aggressive stance about Japanese foreign policy in Asia.1037 He claimed that Japan was
“major and … civilized” while Korea was “minor and … uncivilized.” Japan should
“leave Asia” and join the West, treating China and Korea as the West treated them.
Fukuzawa was angry at both countries.1038 He believed that Japan had taken off an “old
coat” and put on a new one—Western civilization. After the start of the Sino-Japanese
War, he called the Japanese those who tried to “advance civilization,” and the Chinese
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those who tried to “hinder” it. Here he seems to have lost the rationality seen in his
writings on Western civilization.1039
Ito Hirobumi. Shortly before the Meiji Restoration, Ito supported the
Shogunate’s overthrow and strengthening foreign relations.1040 Early in the 1870s, there
were two main competing viewpoints among Japan’s leaders about foreign policy. Ito’s
group wished to solve the problem of unequal treaties quickly. The other group called for
a punitive expedition to Korea, for perceived insults to Japan.1041 In 1884, China and
Japan clashed over Korea, which the former saw as its “vassal state.” Ito showed what
Hamada calls a protective, paternal attitude toward “impotent” Korea, reserving Japan’s
right to intervene.1042
Mori Arinori. In 1871, the Japanese government sent Mori to the United States
as its first resident diplomat in Washington, to help prepare for the arrival of the Iwakura
Mission.1043 At twenty-three, Mori was fluent in English, already had experience with
the United States, and was a high status samurai. With no diplomatic experience, he had
to rely on several older prominent Americans for advice about diplomatic issues.1044
Yamagata Aritomo. To protect Japan externally, in Meiji Japan, it was quickly
accepted that a national, modernized military must be developed. Yamagata saw the
abolition of feudalism and restored national unity as prerequisites.1045 Fear of external
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invasion drove his thought about the buildup of the national power infrastructure,
reflecting his goal to strengthen the military.1046 Yamagata supported universal
conscription, the model of European nations. To defend the nation, Japan’s military must
compare well with those of other nations.1047
On foreign affairs, in 1890 he argued that Japan must possess a line of
sovereignty (territorial integrity—shukensen) and a line of advantage (riekiesen) beyond
Japan, for the protection of its national interests.1048 By 1895 he viewed the growing
power of Russia and other Western nations in East Asia with concern. Therefore he
supported large military budget increases, and throughout his career, the strengthening of
the military due to the external threat by Western nations in general, later by Russia.1049
For much of the Meiji period, Yamagata viewed Russia as a threat, and supported an
alliance with Britain.1050
Kato Hiroyuki. Kato’s mature thought on Japan’s international relations was
based on German Social Darwinism.1051 His thought is steeped in political realism and
power issues.1052 International law results from the international battle for survival, and
is essentially unstable. Kato’s understanding of international relations involves several
levels of morality: 1) between civilized and uncivilized peoples, 2) among civilized
nations (Volkermoral), and 3) that of one nation or people (Volksmoral). About the first
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level, concerning race, although the exploitation of weaker peoples by the strong is good
for progress, the strong should not totally dominate “savages.” Since we are all the same
species, eventually “natural sympathy” (shizenteki dôjô) will govern race relations.1053
Relations between civilized states are characterized by immorality; there is no
“superstate” to control them. Their interactions are as “natural” as those in the physical
environment. Nations also operate in terms of self-interest, cooperating only when they
wish.1054 Self-interest allows attacking others, yet a new spirit of international
cosmopolitanism sometimes replaces it.1055 On the last level, citizens fulfill their highest
duty by commitment to the welfare and happiness of their country. Seeking a citizen’s
highest dignity and rights also usually benefits the nation, since whatever benefits an
individual without harming the nation or other individuals is good (Davis 1966: 73-74).
In Japan, willingness to die for the Emperor is the highest form of evolved devotion to
the state. Kato combines this interpretation of Social Darwinism with the samurai ethical
code of bushido, and applies it to international affairs.1056
Non-Western Social Darwinists like Kato often saw Europeans as the most
advanced peoples. Kato argued that Asia was more submissive, “feminine,” and
backward than Europe. China achieved a high level of civilization in the past, but had
stagnated. Only Japan had an assertive, sufficiently “masculine” culture to break from
1053
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the bonds of tradition, modernize, escape Asia, meld with the West, and join the modern
world.1057 This was “proven” in the transformation of Japan since the Meiji Restoration,
and victories in wars against China and Russia (1895 and 1905).1058 Eventually Japan
and China will join the coming world-state (Weltreich), dominated by Europe. Due to
enhanced economic relations and international development, by the late 1800s, the
nations of Europe showed the first signs of the world-state, seen in increasing
international ties in many fields. Eventually each state in the international system will
become the cells or organs of the “single great organism” (ichi daiyûkibutsu),1059
international rights will progress, and morality will experience a tremendous change.1060
Comparison of Worldviews on Japan’s External Political Relations (1850-1895)
In their views of international relations, all five leaders wish to strengthen Japan
so it can survive and flourish in the international system. To do so, all five realize that
Japan must borrow needed political ideas, institutions, and military technologies.
Fukuzawa, Ito, Yamagata, and Kato are political realists, Yamagata the most
conservative. Fukuzawa and Yamagata view the international system as driven primarily
by the hunger of various state actors for power. Yamagata is the most overtly supportive
of a strong military. He sees military reform as Japan’s top priority, international or
domestic, to be preceded by ending feudalism and uniting the country. In their language
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and images here, Fukuzawa and Kato in particular show evolutionistic influence.
Regarding Japan’s reforming itself to better function in the international system,
Fukuzawa, Mori and Ito were highly supportive of borrowing Western political ideas,
institutions, and innovations. The first two were highly influenced by Western, liberalleaning political values. Early in his career, American influence on Mori’s diplomatic
thought and practice was strong. Fukuzawa and especially Ito show more caution
regarding reforms than Mori.1061 Kato is the leader with the most complex views of
international relations. While his views were often racist and sexist, current trends of
globalization seem to be somewhat imitating his estimation of how the international
system would evolve into a world “super-state” controlled by the West. Fukuzawa, Ito
and Kato were also realists in how they viewed international law. Ito had the most
practical view. He knew that the West dominated the current system of international law,
and believed that for Japan to survive, it must become strong, fit in, and earn a high place
of honor in that system.1062
On the philosophical and cultural foundations of their views of international
relations, all five leaders except Mori show a high degree of political realism.1063 The
influence of Western political thought is great upon each leader, except Yamagata. In his
case, Western military thought was more influential. Fukuzawa and Mori show more
liberal political influence, Mori from the United States. German thought especially
influenced Ito and Kato. Fukuzawa and Mori were more liberal leaning, while the other
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three leaders were more conservative. Mori, Fukuzawa, and Kato were influenced by
evolutionary thought in their views of international relations, Kato the most profoundly
and directly. Of the five leaders, Kato combined Western political ideologies with Asian
ones to the highest degree.1064
Regarding their views of the Japanese nation, Japanese nationalism, and of
Japan in the international system, all five leaders desire to support and build up the
Japanese nation and assure its survival, yet vary in how much they are willing to borrow
Western ideologies or institutions to do so. To strengthen Japan as a nation, Fukuzawa,
Mori and Ito are more willing to borrow Western ideas, while Ito, Yamagata, and Kato
are willing to borrow Western institutions and some ideas, more cautiously. Fukuzawa’s
definition of Japanese nationalism as driven by strong ethnic and “irrational” emotional
ties seems conventional. Earlier, Mori showed a more liberal view of the nation, and later
became more conservative.1065 Concerning Japan’s place in the international system, all
five leaders wish to build up Japan as a nation so that it can successfully compete and
survive. For its survival, both Fukuzawa and Yamagata stressed Japan’s international
relations and external defense as more primary than domestic issues.1066 To survive in the
international system, Japan must open itself to foreign knowledge, and study the West’s
appropriate political systems and constitutions, applying them carefully (Fukuzawa and
Ito). Without adequate reform and modernization, Japan cannot defend itself or survive.
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Earlier in his career, Mori suggests the most radical degrees of reform for Japan, but later,
his approach moderates. Kato’s extensive arguments, marrying evolutionary ideas,
biological terminology and Confucian ideology, seem the most creative here.1067
All five leaders vary in how they view the West, and acknowledge that it
dominates the international system (1850-1895). Fukuzawa and Mori are the most
positive of the five. Yamagata is the most wary, viewing Russia and the West as Japan’s
greatest security threat. For international relations, all five are willing to enthusiastically
borrow from the West: general knowledge and technology (Fukuzawa), diplomatic
thought and practice (Mori), political theory, ideas and institutions (Ito), military strategy
and technologies for defense (Yamagata), and evolutionary theory to explain Japan’s
place in the international system (Kato).1068
Four of the five leaders see Japan’s neighbors as inferior to Japan, even China
(Fukuzawa, Ito, Yamagata and Kato). Kato again applies his evolutionary, gendered ideas
of international relations in his image of Asia as the passive, feminine East. Yamagata
and Ito suggest that Japan has a right (or duty) to intervene in the affairs of other Asian
states.1069
Four of the five leaders draw heavily on modern science and technology at
various points in their thought on international relations. Fukuzawa sees the West’s
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currently superior knowledge and technology as crucial for Japan’s survival in the
international system. Mori greatly admires the West’s/America’s superior science and
technology, cataloguing it in Life and Resources in America. While Yamagata
acknowledges the superiority of Western military and scientific technologies and wants
Japan to master them for survival, Kato draws concepts from Western “scientific”
thought to explain the international system, Japan’s place in it, and the system’s future.
Concepts of morality and religion somewhat affect three of the leaders’ views of
international relations. Fukuzawa has no specific ideas relating spirituality or religion to
international relations, though he feels Japan must develop proper “spirits” of freedom
and individual initiative to master technology, key to guarantee Japan’s independence.
Mori admires Christianity and what he perceives to be its role in making the West great,
so earlier, he urged Japan to adopt it as the national religion. Kato has a complex,
multilevel concept of morality underlying his explanation of international relations,
incorporating ideas about race, civilization, survival, nature, and instinct. He also wants
to use State Shinto to build up Japan, for it to gain a stronger place internationally.
Conceptual Analysis of Worldviews on Japan’s External Political Relations (18501895)
Development Issues. To analyze the development-related issues of these
leaders’ views of Japan’s external political relations, as noted above, I will use the
concept of internationalization here, supplemented by “modernization,” if relevant. What
do we uncover in the views of these five leaders (Fukuzawa, Mori, Ito, Yamagata and
Kato) on Japan’s external political relations (1850-1895), in light of internationalization?
In their view, is it true that the West was attempting to subjugate Japan into its own
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cultural universe as it drew Japan into the global trading system, to put Japan in an
inferior position, dominate and exploit it? In this process, would Japan be colonized?
It is obvious that these five leaders accept the premises of internationalization:
the West wishes to dominate and control Japan, economically and politically. This belief
motivated these leaders to work and study hard, and take many urgent actions. They are
generally pragmatic in their political realism, and in their assessments of how Japan
should respond to the challenge. Since Western nations were the most successful and
powerful in international politics, these leaders were eager to borrow from Western
political thought and institutions, presumed to be part of the West’s success in
international relations. Some of the leaders (Fukuzawa and Mori) are attracted to liberalleaning “Anglo-American” thought, given the huge success of the United States
economically and technologically, and of Britain in technology and empire building.
Others (Kato, Ito, and Yamagata) are attracted to German political thought and military
technologies, due to Germany’s military and technological successes, and the greater
“suitability” of its systems for Japanese culture. None of the five leaders wanted the
pressure of the Western-dominated global economic system or cultural universe to crush
Japan and its culture. Their reflection on cultural issues focused more on protecting
Japan’s domestic culture, not really on international aspects. The exceptions were their
view that Western culture must not destroy Japan’s culture, and the earlier view of proWesternizers in the bunmei kaika movement, that Western culture was vastly superior,
and must be rapidly acquired to make Japan modern. In the tension of whether internal
development or external defense should take precedence, several of the leaders wavered
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in priority at various stages (Fukuzawa, Mori), while Ito and Yamagata put more
emphasis on the external throughout their careers.
In his complex views of the global system, including its moral underpinnings
and future development, Kato accepts that in the long run, the process of
internationalization, of the West absorbing and dominating the passive, peripheral East,
will continue until the West totally dominates the future world-state.1070 The five leaders
admit the present superiority of the West over Japan and the rest of Asia in various
international arenas and issues, including the international system (economically and
politically), colonialism, science and technology, and the presumed religious and moral
underpinnings of international strength.1071 In their hierarchical views of the international
system, several of the leaders held racist views about the West’s superiority over Japan,
and Japan’s superiority over the rest of Asia.1072 It is ironic that as these leaders were
wary of the threats that internationalization and possible Western colonialism presented
to Japan and the rest of Asia, Japan in some ways repeated a similar pattern with many of
its neighboring regions and states, some before 1895, and some after.1073
Is it relevant to use the concept of “modernization” to examine what happened
in the worldviews of Japan’s external political relations, 1850-1895? The key question
would be: in the international relations processes connected with the absorption of Japan
1070

With the rise of China and other non-Western powers, this belief should not go unquestioned.
Fukuzawa and Mori viewed many of the strengths of the West as partly stemming from “spiritual”
factors: strength of spirit, independence, morality and initiative. They also attributed some of the
international strengths of the West as flowing from these internal factors. Other leaders here (Yamagata and
Kato) admired the strengths of Japanese morality and spirit, and believed them to be superior to the West’s.
They likely also hoped that these qualities would be a source of international strength for Japan.
1072
Regarding Asia, the views of Fukuzawa and Kato in particular were racist. For Fukuzawa’s views, see
Narsimhan, Japanese Perceptions.
1073
Is this true, that Japan repeated the pattern of Western colonialism in East Asia and the Pacific? This is
an interesting question, but one that seems beyond the scope of the present study, though I reflect on it
briefly in Part 4 of the dissertation.
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into the global economic system, what happened to Japan culturally, especially in the
international arena? Did it become more “Western” on the surface? Did the core of these
cultural features stay Japanese? It seems hard to apply very much “modernization” here.
On external political relations, I cannot really examine domestic political or cultural
features, the main feature that “modernization” covers. In their views of international
relations, these leaders wanted to enthusiastically adopt Western political ideas and
military technologies. Japan quickly learned to function effectively in Western diplomacy
and especially in the use of Western military technologies (consider its victory in the
Sino-Japanese war and other wars soon to follow). There are several cultural elements
and angles connected with other aspects of the leaders’ views of Japan’s external political
relations that we have examined here (such as the philosophical foundations of their
views of Western diplomacy, and their views of nationalism), but the connections to
“modernization” seem rather indirect.
In their thought about science, technology, and international relations, all of the
leaders drew on modern scientific and technological principles from the West in various
ways. In this area, it is implicit in their thought that Japan will be able to master and draw
on these principles and technologies without culturally disintegrating and losing its soul.
In these external political issues, what happens to Japan’s internal culture does not seem
to really seem to be an issue of concern. Rather, in science and technology used for
Japan’s international relations, the focus is more on using them to strengthen Japan’s
external defense capabilities. This does not mean that these leaders did not have concerns
about how Japan’s interaction with the West could affect the identity, integrity, and
culture of Japan. As we noted in Chapter 3, they were highly concerned about these
335

issues, but when considering Japan’s culture, their focus seems to have been more on
internal issues rather than external ones.
What about applying “modernization” to the spiritual and moral underpinnings
of Japan’s international relations? Three of the leaders (Fukuzawa, Mori, and Kato) wish
to use elements of religion or “spirit” to motivate the Japanese people for the ardors of
the development task. Fukuzawa and Mori are more willing to draw on “Western”
sources, and Kato on “Japanese” ones. With a properly strengthened cultural core, Japan
would have the fortitude to develop economically, compete successfully in international
trade, and maintain its political independence. It seems the priority of these three leaders
is to strengthen Japan’s internal cultural fortitude first, to withstand the onslaught of
Western culture. Fukuzawa, Mori, and Kato imply that the internal cultural side is
important. But placing priority on first strengthening Japan externally, in its diplomatic
and trade capabilities, rather than internally, might go further in protecting its identity and
cultural core. Yamagata and Ito placed priority on addressing the external factors first,
since foreign political or economic invasion and control threatened Japan’s very
existence as a nation. A balance of external and internal processes may have been
optimum. It seems that none of these leaders explicitly contemplated these issues,
because they were in the “thick” of the battle, and many of these concepts had not yet
been well formulated.
Technology Issues. To analyze the technology-related aspects of these leaders’
worldviews of Japan’s external political relations (1850-1895), I will ask several
questions in six major categories: 1) general concepts of technology, 2) technology in the
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international system, 1074 3) technology transfer, 4) technology, culture, and the
international system, 5) technology, cognition, and international relations,1075 and 6)
technonationalism as ideology.
On general concepts of technology, what are the most important technologyrelated ideas and phenomena associated with the worldviews of external political
relations studied here? In general, each of these leaders recognized the importance of
Japan becoming a modern, scientifically and technologically advanced nation in order to
win a position of respect in the international system, especially Fukuzawa, Kato,
Yamagata, and Mori. Above we noted how four of the five leaders draw quite a bit on
modern science and technology in their ideas on foreign affairs. In most of their minds,
especially Yamagata’s, military ideas and technologies were one of the key forces that
Japan must master and use to strengthen its position in the international system.
Fukuzawa, Kato, and Mori show the influence of “scientific” thinking in their
evolutionistic ideas about political development and international relations. In his
arguments about the Japanese nation, Kato again draws on evolutionary theory.
Fukuzawa also greatly values the mastery of modern technology as key in helping Japan
to defend itself and grow in the international system. Three of the leaders stress
“spiritual” values (from the West, Fukuzawa, Mori, or the East, Kato), to help Japan
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According to Szyliowicz, technology inherently operates as a part of various systems. It is also a
system of inputs, throughputs, and outputs. Inputs include raw materials, parts, and knowledge,
throughputs the organization and control of the manufacturing process, and outputs the completed product
(Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 8).
1075
The main emphasis here, in the concept of technology and cognitive factors articulated by Szyliowicz,
is that the viewpoints and beliefs of policy and decision-makers constrain and greatly affect the outcome of
technology transfer cases and projects, positively or negatively. Belief systems can blind decision-makers
to reality, and failure to adjust their viewpoints and decisions to changing conditions can greatly affect
outcomes (Ibid., 8, 212, 223).
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strengthen itself for development and the mastery of technology, so that it can survive in
the international system.
Second, concerning technology in the international system, what are the most
significant political factors present in the imported technologies and related ideas in the
international worldview studied here?1076 In the five leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s
external political relations, there are many connections between political and
technological issues. To survive and strengthen its position in the international system,
Japan needs both advanced political knowledge and development relevant for its society,
and strong technological advancement. The pragmatism of most of these leaders makes
them political realists, and exceedingly practical in their approach to technological
decisions and importation. They also show much influence from scientific and
evolutionary thought as they formulated their political convictions, and their views of the
West. They saw technology as a major source of the West’s political power, and believed
that it would be for Japan as well. I noted earlier in this chapter how heavily several of
the leaders draw on scientific and technological principles in their thought on
international relations. Two of them, Fukuzawa and Mori, also attributed superior
spiritual values or beliefs as partial sources for the West’s scientific and technological
capabilities.
Also regarding technology in the international system, how did the international
system affect the technology-related issues in the worldviews of external political
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Ibid., 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52.
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relations studied here?1077 The effect of technology in the international system affected
these worldviews in two primary ways. The first way concerns the sheer physical power
of technology in the international system. The capability of the United States to send a
small fleet of ships to Japan and “force” it open in 1853 did not depend on the power of
technology alone. Internal corruption in the Tokugawa regime, the dynamism of
Tokugawa society, and pressure from restless feudal domains such as Satsuma and
Choshu also played huge roles. But the 1853 event was a powerful, ominous warning of
future dangers that forward-thinking Japanese had long anticipated—Japan must open up
and engage the world. Isolation could only last for so long. They knew that eventually
Japan must end sakoku. Foreign knowledge and technology, and the ability to import,
learn, and apply them, would also be key in defending Japan and maintaining its
independence. If Japan did not modernize many aspects of its society quickly,
maintaining independence would be impossible in the face of the West’s superior military
and economic power. Events in China, India, the Philippines and Southeast Asia made
that very clear. Technology was one of the key tools Japan must quickly master to stay
free. To develop the modern economy and military defenses required, technology was
also required. Indeed, Japan quickly mastered the technical and physical aspects of this
science and technology very well.
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In my answer to the question above on the general concepts of technology in these worldviews on
external political relations, I identified several significant themes: 1) the importance of Japan becoming a
modern, scientifically and technologically-advanced nation, to win a position of respect in the international
system; 2) the importance of modern military technologies and principles; 3) the importance of technology
in Japan’s defense systems; 4) the influence of evolutionistic thought on leaders’ ideas about political
development and international relations; and 5) a belief in the role of strong “spiritual” and moral values to
strengthen Japan in its scientific and technological growth, which would in turn enhance and maintain its
position in the international system.
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A second major way that technology in the international system affected these
worldviews was in the mental or attitudinal arena. The physical power of technology
encouraged Japanese scholars and leaders to presume that the scientific laws and
principles behind modern science and technology, as developed in the West, made them
superior to the “ethical” and “philosophical” emphases of Asian philosophies.1078 This
encouraged Kato, Mori, Fukuzawa and others to investigate Western knowledge and
scholarship, to discover just what drove the West, and what had allowed it to leap so far
ahead of the East in many areas. We explored a few details about their exploration of
Western thought in earlier chapters. Top Japanese leaders and thinkers eagerly embraced
many elements of Western culture and “scientific” thought, including, at times,
Christianity, Western dress, diet and mannerisms, and evolutionary theory.1079 Early in
the Meiji period, some leaders, such as those in the bunmei kaika movement, tended
toward extreme Westernization. Soon, in the battle to confront modernity, many of these
thinkers and others would turn back toward a search for Japanese and Asian sources of
scientific and philosophical greatness.
Were these “physical” and “mental” effects of the international system on the
technological aspects of these external political worldviews positive or negative?
They were both. Positively, on physical effects, these events forced Japan’s leaders to
face the reality of the West’s power, and the international conditions that Japan faced and
encouraged political realism. They also encouraged the commencement of vitally needed
political, social and economic changes in Japanese society, necessary for Japan to
1078

Recall my reflections in Chapter 3 on how Fukuzawa in particular rejected Confucian thought as
backward.
1079
We explore many of the details of these cultural phenomena in Chapter 6 and elsewhere.
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maintain its independence. And they laid the foundations for contemporary Japan and its
many strengths, but they came only after many trials, costly losses, and the near
destruction of the nation in World War II. The physical effects of the international system
on the technology-related features of these worldviews on Japan’s international politics
also included negative effects. The process of realistically confronting the West caused
massive social and political changes in Japanese society that were extremely costly and
traumatic. The human costs were huge. This also forced the West to further engage Japan
and Asia as they “awoke,” and the rest of Asia to further confront the West, Japan, and
modernity. Again, the costs were gigantic. And the growth in Japan’s power seemed huge
confirmation of the wisdom of the nation’s chosen political and reform paths, which led
to aggressive actions on the part of Japan’s military and government (similar to actions of
the West) in nearby Asia. The positive mental effects of the international system on the
technology-related issues of these external political worldviews included the need to
confront the West. This caused many more Japanese to become knowledgeable about the
West and global conditions. Also, many more Japanese became aware of modern science
and technology, so industrial, scientific and health standards in Japan were raised.
Negatively, the sheer power of the West and its technology caused nearly idolatrous
“West-worshipping” by some of Japan’s leaders, at first, and caused some to briefly
reject their Asian and Confucian heritages. These attitudes, coupled with evolutionary
thought, brought increased feelings of nationalistic ethnocentrism, which eventually led
to colonial and imperial actions in nearby regions. In the coming decades and World War
II, the costs of these actions would be huge.

341

How did these technological issues affect Japan’s external political
relations?1080 The conviction (Yamagata’s, in particular) that military ideas and
technologies were key for Japan to master for its survival, and to strengthen its position in
the international system, caused Japan to place priority on its military build-up in the
domestic economy. The build-up was effective. Japan grew enough in military
technology and prowess that it was able to defeat China in the Sino-Japanese War. This
victory hugely increased respect for Japan among the Western powers and in the
international system, though of course it angered and perplexed China. The influence of
scientific and evolutionistic ideas in the thinking of Japanese leaders caused some of
them like Fukuzawa and Kato to artificially, racially elevate Westerners to a higher
position of honor and power than they deserved, and to downgrade the honor of Chinese
and other Asians. In the early Meiji period, Japan gave much more preference to
interaction with the West than with China and other Asian nations. This type of thinking
helped pave the way for Japanese imperialism and colonialism. The stress on the
importance of science and technology in the nation’s defense led to the modernization of
Japan’s military, and contributed to Japan’s military victories over China (1894-1895)
and later over Russia (1904-1905). These victories also helped further validate the
militaristic policy preferences of the state, and contributed to respect for Japan in the
international system and in the West, though they did not improve Japan’s position in the
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Recall that the four main effects of technology-related issues identified above (associated with
worldviews of external political relations) are that: 1) military ideas and technologies are one of the key
forces that Japan must master survive, and to strengthen its position in the international system; 2) the
influence of scientific and evolutionistic thought in several of these leaders about political development,
international relations, and the nation/Japanese nationalism; 3) the importance of modern science and
technology in Japan’s defense; and 4) spiritual and moral values are needed to help Japan strengthen itself
for development and mastery of technology, for its survival in the international system.
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eyes of its Asian neighbors. The idea that spiritual and moral strength could enhance
Japan’s development and position in the international system on some levels seemed to
suggest to some Japanese that in battle, Japanese soldiers had more discipline and
fortitude than the less well-organized, lumbering forces of its larger neighbors (China and
Russia).1081
On technology transfer, what were the important ideas/technologies transferred
here, in these worldviews of external political relations? There were many technologies
transferred from the West and the international system to Japan, more than from Japan to
the international system or its colonies in this period.1082 Major political and military
technologies and ideas related to external politics transferred into Japan in this period
included military technologies (ships and armaments), military theory, strategy, training
and organizational principles, industrial technologies supporting militarism, Western
political ideas, institutions, innovations, and philosophy,1083 evolutionistic theory/Social
Darwinism, racist views of international relations, and modern concepts of diplomacy.
The major technology-related items and ideas on international relations transferred from
Japan to other nearby regions and the international system (1850 to 1895) were fewer.
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One also thinks of Japan’s surprise attack on and victory over Russian forces at Port Arthur (Lüshun) in
southern Manchuria, China (February 1904) that later served as a model for the Japanese attack on
Americans at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii in 1941. Japanese, including Hirohito, were also tempted to believe in
their own moral and spiritual superiority over Americans, though those qualities did not lead to final
victory in World War II.
1082
Remember that this period (of pre-colonialism) goes through the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895,
just before Japan acquired Taiwan and the Pescadore Islands, its first two major foreign colonies.
1083
These Western political ideas and concepts included democracy, political liberalism, political
authoritarianism, authoritarian rule by royalty, the concepts of European-style aristocracy, a constitution,
national parliament, principles of local governance, German political theory and philosophy and
institutions, British and American political and diplomatic thought, and modern concepts of nationalism),
the study of contemporary diplomacy and international law, and the building of diplomatic bodies and
institutions for Japan’s foreign relations. For more on the nature of the Western political ideas and
institutions that were imported into Japan, see Chapter 4.
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Specifically, Japan used many modern military technologies and areas of knowledge in
the Sino-Japanese War in Korea, China, Manchuria and Taiwan.1084
Who were the main international or domestic actors in the external environment
involved in these transfer cases? For military technologies, theories, strategies, and
training, on the international level, the main individual actors were foreign engineering
instructors, military experts, and teachers who taught briefly in Japan, Japanese military
officials who briefly studied or traveled abroad, and government officials who arranged
to import these technologies. On the domestic level, the main individual actors included
Japanese engineers and scientists who taught in colleges or did research in public and
military institutions, and Japanese military officials and thinkers in Japan who studied
foreign military writings. On the industrial technologies supporting militarism, the key
individual actors on the international level included foreign scientists and teachers in
Japan, and Japanese students, experts, and government officials who studied abroad and
returned to Japan. On the domestic level, the key individual actors connected with these
industrial transfers were Japanese teachers, engineers, scientists, and public/military
officials in Japan.
Regarding Western political ideas, institutions, innovations, and philosophy,
evolutionary and diplomatic theory, the primary individual actors on the international
level were foreign teachers in Japan, and Japanese teachers/scholars who studied abroad.
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There are additional significant items of knowledge and technologies that Japan transferred to its new
overseas colonies and the international system after the period of overseas colonialism started. For more on
that period, see Chapters 8 and 10. I am not really aware of very significant political ideas or military
technologies exported out of Japan until about 1895, though Japan did send some political ideas to Korea
after its influence there began in the 1870s.
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On the domestic level, the primary actors included Japanese teachers and scholars who
studied foreign writings in Japan.
State or institutional actors involved with military technologies, strategy, theory
and training and their industrial applications at the international level chiefly involved
Japanese government ministries related to the military and defense, foreign governments
and armament sellers. On the domestic level, state and institutional actors involved with
military technologies and issues again included the Japanese military and defense
ministries, imperial colleges and government military research institutions. State and
institutional actors promoting military industrial technologies on the domestic level were
the Japanese government, several of its ministries, and largely public-related industries.
The institutional actors supporting the transfer of Western political ideas,
evolutionary thought, and diplomacy at the international level included foreign
educational institutions sending foreign instructors to Japan, the Japanese government
and relevant ministries (education, foreign affairs, and others), and foreign governments
and entities supporting Japanese scholars studying abroad. The state/institutional actors
connected with the transfer of these areas of knowledge at the domestic level were mainly
the Japanese government, colleges and schools, the Ministry of Education, and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
What impacts did the actors involved in these transfer cases have on the transfer
outcomes? Based on the worldviews of the five leaders studied here, concerning the
transfer of military technologies and theories by individual actors on the international
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level, all of the actors1085 had a profound impact on the Japanese importation of military
technology and knowledge. Judged by what Japan did in the Sino-Japanese War, it
mastered them extremely well. On the transfer of industrial military technologies by
individual actors on the international and domestic levels, by the time of the war, Japan
imported significant military technologies, and developed the capacities to build them,
seen in the impressive fleet sent to attack China. The efforts of individual actors on the
international and domestic levels1086 were very successful. And on the transfer of
Western political ideas and innovations at the international level by individual actors,
both the foreign scholars in Japan and Japanese scholar returnees were highly successful,
given the many innovative political institutions that Japan adopted, such as the
Constitution and the Diet. Japan soon developed the capacity to function
diplomatically.1087 The ideological nature of all these developments was conservative.
What were the impacts of individual actors on these transfers at the domestic
level? For military technologies and theories, Japan-based scientists, engineers, teachers
and military officials also worked extremely hard, and again judged by what Japan
accomplished in the Sino-Japanese War, did an amazing job in mastering and applying
these areas of knowledge.1088 In the transfer of Western political ideas and innovations, at
the domestic level, individual actors helped Japan to absorb these ideas. Some of them,
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These actors included foreign instructors, Japanese military officials and scholars who studied abroad.
As a reminder, the actors on the international level were mainly foreign instructors and Japanese
scholars returned from abroad, and on the domestic level, Japanese teachers and engineers.
1087
While Japan developed these diplomatic capacities, it is interesting to remember how young Mori
Arinori, the first Japanese diplomat posted to reside in the United States, relied upon leading Americans for
guidance in learning the nuts and bolts of diplomacy.
1088
Regarding the transfer of Industrial military technologies at the domestic level by individual actors, see
the comments in the immediately preceding paragraph.
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like Mori and Kato, developed fairly sophisticated applications. The conservative nature
of Japanese society in this period limited the application of more liberal ideas.
Concerning the impacts of actors on the transfers by state or institutional actors
at the international level, regarding military technologies, theories, and their industrial
applications, in general, the Japanese government actors did an outstanding job in
acquiring and transferring the technologies they judged needed for Japan’s military. The
foreign suppliers of this knowledge were usually willing to supply them. On Western
political ideas, evolutionary thought, and diplomacy, the foreign entities sending foreign
instructors to Japan, the relevant Japanese government ministries, and foreign entities
supporting Japanese scholars abroad also did a generally effective job in transferring
these political and social ideologies. Some officials, like Kato, were very creative in how
they applied them to the Japanese context, which was not easy.
On the impacts of state and institutional actors on the transfers at the domestic
level, regarding military industrial applications, the main actors (Japanese government
ministries, educational and military research institutions) were again generally successful
in transferring these technologies. The Japanese government agencies and educationrelated institutions transferring concepts of Western political ideas, evolutionary thought,
and diplomacy to the Japanese context also did fairly well, though the task was certainly
not simple.
What major lessons or improvements can we learn from these transfer cases?
These political and military “transfers” went mainly to, not from, Japan. Items imported
were of a highly pragmatic and utilitarian, not esoteric nature, to strengthen Japan’s
internal political system and military defenses for survival and respect in the international
347

system. The military skills were used well in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895.
Foreign teachers and engineers also contributed greatly to Japan’s transfer of political and
military knowledge for its international relations, and yet Japanese scholars, teachers, and
scientists also made crucial contributions. The Meiji state was the key driver in the
process. Japan’s success in the war, and its rapid adoption of innovative political
institutions, point to its overall success in this endeavor to import technologies to allow
Japan’s survival in the international system. Both state and individual actors were highly
successful in transferring these areas of knowledge.
Fourth, on technology, culture, and the international system, what are the most
significant cultural factors and values present in the imported technologies and ideas in
these international worldviews?1089 The primary cultural factors affecting these
worldviews fall into several main areas. Views of politics include Japanese ideas and
concepts of Western politics,1090 the cultures of international law and diplomacy, the
Japanese culture of politics in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji eras,1091 and linguistic
and cultural contexts and their influences on the translation of these political concepts
from other languages into Japanese. Another important cultural factor was views of
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Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52.
These include views of democracy, political liberalism, and authoritarianism.
1091
The Japanese culture of politics in this era included new notions of national identity drawing on new
and ancient sources, including State Shinto, the new emperor ideology of the unbroken imperial line and of
the emperor descended from the gods, ancient chronicles of Japan’s creation, and notions of Japanese
ethnicity (such as Japan’s divine creation by the gods, and Japan as a family-state descended from the
imperial family). Japan’s culture of politics also included the concept held by Japanese of Japan compared
with other nations, and their self-concept of Japan as a nation. In that view, Japan was currently weak,
technologically poor, and must build itself up quickly to compete with the West. Many of these aspects of
Japan’s culture of politics are noted in the domestic political contexts section of Chapter 4. See Culture of
politics in the Glossary section.
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militarism, including the Japanese cultures of militarism,1092 and the influence of the
military cultures of various countries, such as Britain, the United States, and Germany.
Views of science, technology, and politics and international relations were another
notable cultural feature here: the cultures of modern science and technology, Japanese
views of evolutionism and Social Darwinism, and their influence on Japan’s views of
politics, race, international relations, and the “hierarchy” of peoples and nations in the
international system. A final area of relevant cultural factors is general views of other
countries and regions.1093
In these worldviews, how did these leaders (Fukuzawa, Mori, Ito, Yamagata,
Kato) concerned use these technologies/ideas1094 as means or agencies to cope with and
transform Japan’s (material) environments on the international level?1095 Fukuzawa
contributed most to spreading Western, liberal political ideas in his popular writings. This
in turn had a meaningful impact had what Japanese needed to do to build their country
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The Japanese cultures of militarism in this era included post-samurai culture, the bushido ethical code,
and neo-Confucian thought.
1093
Views of other countries included Japanese views of the West and specific Western countries, of
Western religion and its role in Western political and scientific development, of Asia, China, and Korea, of
Confucian thought and political philosophy, and Western countries’ views of Japan and of Asia.
1094
The major transferred ideas and technologies were 1) military technologies (ships and armaments); 2)
military theory, strategy, training, and organizational principles; 3) industrial technologies supporting
Japan’s militarism; 4) Western political ideas and philosophy (democracy, political liberalism, political
authoritarianism, German political theory and philosophy, British and American political thought,
evolutionistic theory/Social Darwinism); 5) Western political institutions, innovations, systems (such
authoritarian rule by royalty, European-style aristocracy, a constitution, national parliament, principles of
local governance, German political institutions); and 6) Western diplomacy and international relations (i.e.
British and American diplomatic thought, modern concepts of nationalism, the study of contemporary
diplomacy, international law, building diplomatic bodies and institutions for Japan’s foreign relations,
racist views of international relations, and modern concepts of diplomacy).
1095
Asnoted earlier, this can be called the “international cultural ecology approach” to technology. This
question is drawn from this anthropological definition of technology: “the means and agencies by which
human societies cope with and transform their material environment” (Glick, “Technology,” 464). This
definition is based on the theory of cultural ecology in anthropology, which I apply that idea to the study of
international relations, how a particular nation-state or national actor uses technology and related
phenomena to adapt to and transform its surrounding environment in the international system.
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internally so it could face external challenges on the international level. In this period, Ito
contributed to Japan’s external political relations in his service as a foreign minister and
diplomat, and his work on strengthening Japan’s internal political system through his
work on the Meiji (1889) constitution. Mori did not have a large impact on strengthening
Japan’s capacity to function in its external political relations, beyond functioning as a
diplomat in Washington, DC in the early 1870s, and helping the Iwakura Mission when it
arrived in the United States.1096 Yamagata had a huge impact on Japan’s external political
relations, in his efforts to lead Japan’s military build-up, and its massive importation of
military technologies in the early Meiji era. I did not find any direct evidence that Kato’s
complex thought on international relations had any direct influence on Japan’s
diplomacy. So of the five leaders, Yamagata contributed the most strongly, in the
technological arena, to strengthening Japan’s external political relations.
How did the technological issues or features in these worldviews of external
political relations affect or enhance Japan’s survival in the international system or
environment?1097 Military technologies, theories, training, and military-related industrial
technologies enabled Japan to attack and intervene in the affairs of neighboring countries
and regions including Korea, China and Taiwan near the end of 1850-1895. This
enhanced Japan’s relations with Western countries (won their respect, to some degree),
but it greatly increased hostility with Japan’s Asian neighbors, including China and
Korea, who were both highly wary of Japan. Western political ideas, institutions, and
1096

Although Mori prepared his Life and Resources in America to educate Japanese about the advanced
conditions in the United States, it was written in English, and was never translated into Japanese (Van Sant,
Mori Arinori).
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Again, this is the cultural ecology approach to technology, applied to international relations. See
Clemmer, Myers, and Rudden, Julian Steward, and Cohen, Man in Adaptation, for some explorations of
the concept of cultural ecology.
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diplomatic innovations helped to modernize Japan’s own domestic political system
somewhat, brought greater recognition from the West, and enabled Japan to basically
function in the system of Western-dominated international diplomacy. In sum, these
technologies paved the way for greatly increased warfare and imperialism by Japan in
Asia and the Pacific in the next period examined in this project (1895-1945), improved
Japan’s capacity to relate diplomatically to the West, and increased Japan’s presence in
the international system, especially in the East Asian region.
On the issue of technology, cognition, and international relations, 1098 do the
belief systems1099 of any of these leaders (on technology issues on the international level)
blind them to certain realities? If yes, which, and how? Do the leaders fail to adjust their
decisions or viewpoints to changing conditions and reality? If so, how do these factors
affect transfer or policy outcomes? While Fukuzawa had a fairly balanced view of the
West, his negative views of Asia blinded him to the dignity of those cultures. In his era,
China and Korea went through periods of relative stagnation or decline. Both struggled,
as Japan did, to adjust to the onslaught of the West. This bias toward mainland Asia, seen
in several of the other leaders’ writings, affected Japan’s actions toward mainland Asia in
very powerful ways, most specifically in this era, in the Sino-Japanese War. The
politically conservative attitudes of Ito, Yamagata, and Kato predisposed them to copying
a more authoritarian model like Germany or Prussia, not toward a more liberal model,
such as Britain. Somewhat similarly, Mori’s extensive experience traveling to and living
1098

For a discussion of technology, cognition, and international relations, see Chapter 5.
Belief systems include a decision-maker’s beliefs about another actor’s strategies, tactics, motivations,
and goals (Keith Shimko, Images and Arms Control: Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Reagan
Administration [Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1991], 45). They are a part of an actor’s
worldview, but not the same thing (Cottam, Images and Intervention, 10). See also Belief Systems in the
Glossary section.
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in the United States and Britain, and Kato’s long-term study of German language and
thought, predisposed them to the models each chose to copy, and inevitably influenced, to
some degree, the policy outcomes each finally encouraged. I do not see any overt
evidence that these leaders’ blind spots caused them to fail to adjust to rapidly changing
international conditions. Rather, I would argue that while their backgrounds and beliefs
caused them to move in certain directions in their policy decisions, they did not lack a
capacity to move fairly rapidly, when conditions warranted it.1100
Finally, in these worldviews on external relations, is the concept of
technonationalism as ideology manifested? If so, how?1101 Implicit in the concept of
technonationalism as ideology is the idea that a nation must strengthen itself internally, in
terms of its economy and technologies, so that it can be strong and secure in the
international system. How much did the external politics worldviews of these five leaders
reflect the international aspect of technonationalism as ideology, and how much did they
reflect domestic factors? For Japan to strengthen itself in the international system in this
era, it must first import needed areas of technology and knowledge from the international
system (from the West, in particular). Second, it must learn, master and apply the
technologies in its own context. Finally, it must use the relevant technologies to improve
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For example, while Mori’s exposure to the liberal the United States and Britain caused him to propose
radical social policies when he was young (i.e. that Japan should adopt English as its national language), he
moderated his proposals later in his career (for example, his conservative educational policies in favor of
Japanese nationalism). The general rapidity of Meiji Japan’s response to the onslaught of the West,
reflected in the actions of all five leaders studied here, is impressive, compared to the slower responses of
China and Korea.
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Technonationalism as ideology is the idea that technology is an important, basic part of protecting a
country by making it wealthy and strong. See also the definitions of technonationalism as ideology in the
Glossary section.
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its own position and interaction in the international system.1102 While Yamagata and Ito
emphasize this last point the most, all five of the leaders strongly acknowledged Japan’s
vital need to import needed technologies to strengthen itself internally, for national
survival in the international system.1103 Similarly, in their views on nationalism, all five
of the leaders support building up the Japanese nation so it can be strong in the
international system. For that process, they all recognize that Japan must import the
world’s best knowledge, science and technology, now possessed by the West, no longer
by Asia. In sum, in examining the leaders’ external political worldviews through the lens
of technonationalism as ideology, the possibility of Japan gaining strength and surviving
in the international system is strongly connected with its own internal strength and
reforms. Most of these five leaders care most about the domestic aspects, for the basic
reason that if internal reforms are insufficient, external strength will never follow.
Cognition Issues. Images. The primary images about general international
relations that emerge here reflect strong political realism and instrumentalism (Fukuzawa,
Ito, Yamagata, Kato). International relations are seen as driven by the powerful
(Fukuzawa, Kato), by economics (Ito), with nations fighting for their own interests and
their own survival (Fukuzawa, Kato), cooperating only when they wish (Kato). The
international system is chaotic (Kato; Yamagata (implied)). Japan’s capacity to conduct
international relations and diplomacy must be strengthened (Ito, Mori). Regarding nations
and nationalism, Japan must modernize and restore its national unity in order to survive
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This could include using the technologies to project into the international arena, as the West did.
Yamagata in particular agreed with this point.
1103
See also my discussion (earlier in this chapter) of the five leaders’ views of international relations, at
the beginning of the section, Comparison of worldviews on Japan’s external political relations (1850-1895).
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(Yamagata). Fukuzawa believes that strong feelings and emotions, even irrational ones,
connect people with nations, while Kato argues that the bonds of the Japanese people are
both emotional and due to blood.1104 The nation is more important than individuals;
people have a duty to sacrifice their lives for the state (Kato, Mori (implied), and
Yamagata). Similarly, the rights of the nation are more important than those of
individuals (Fukuzawa). Images of international relations also reflect, to a large degree,
the influence of scientific, technological, and evolutionary thinking. Biological imagery
permeates Kato’s arguments about international relations. He sees the international
system as a “jungle” where civilized and uncivilized peoples, nations and races compete
for survival. International relations represents a competition between stronger and weaker
nations, and like nature, only the strong will survive (Fukuzawa, Yamagata). There are
also a few images of morality and international relations. To Kato, international relations
often involve moral components which, though complex, are mostly driven by the
survival instinct. Fukuzawa sees idealistic, moralistic or Confucian images of
international relations, presuming human goodness, as unrealistic and flawed.
Another group of images relates to military and defense issues. In the early
Meiji era, Japan’s military is seen as backward, in need of modernizing, while Europe’s
military is strong and superior to Japan’s (Yamagata). Modernizing and strengthening the
military for the nation’s survival is the government’s supreme task (Yamagata,
Fukuzawa: 1882-1895). Japan must also adopt and develop modern military technologies
from the West to survive (Yamagata, implied). Fukuzawa also argues that only through
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Recall Kato’s argument that all Japanese are descended from the emperor, and connected with each
other in a “family-state.”
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acquiring Western civilization can Japan defend itself. Yamagata implies that Japan must
exercise influence in nearby countries to defend itself against the West. There are
generally no negative images of war here, especially regarding Japan and Asia, only the
certainty that Japan does not want the West to invade it or Asia. To Kato, aggressive wars
and attacking other nations, to enhance survival in the international “jungle,” are
acceptable.
A final category of images on Japan’s external political relations (1850-1895)
concerns foreigners, foreign countries and regions. One gets the impression that Japanese
in the late Tokugawa period were highly wary of foreigners, especially Westerners, and
interaction with them. Contrary to many others, Fukuzawa concludes that foreigners are
not inferior to Japanese, and not solely bent on invading other countries. Images of the
West are both positive and negative. In some images, the West is seen as admirable, and
these Japanese leaders admit that Japan can learn much from it (Mori, Fukuzawa,
Yamagata). Fukuzawa calls the West a desirable “new coat,” from which Japan can learn.
On the other hand, the West is a huge threat that may invade Japan (Yamagata). In the
future, the world will become a world-state, dominated by Europe (Kato). Images of Asia
are also somewhat conflicting, though mostly negative. Asian civilization is now an “old
coat” (Fukuzawa). Asia and China are uncivilized and backwards, though China used to
be civilized (Fukuzawa, Kato). Japan is now superior to both Asia and China (Fukuzawa,
Ito, Yamagata, Kato). It is now acceptable for Japan to intervene in and influence
mainland Asia (Yamagata, Ito).
How do these images function as perceptual filters or organizing devices? These
images of international relations show a preference for pragmatic, power-oriented images
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that would tend to provoke materialist, realist, power-oriented policy responses: massive
study of Western knowledge and importation of useful technologies, and the rapid
buildup of Japan’s military. This happened. In line with this realism, the leaders here
mostly prefer “scientific” and “technological” explanations for everything, including
social and political phenomena. As we observed earlier, this helped encourage a rejection
of Japan’s philosophical, ethical Asian/Confucian heritage by these leaders. These types
of images would make state leaders prefer more strong state, autocratic solutions to
diplomatic dilemmas, rather than diplomatic, carefully negotiated ones, and make them
have less preference for individual human rights. All of the images regarding the military
and war support a rapid increase in Japan’s military and defense capabilities, and
aggressive actions regarding both the West and Asia. They do not suggest a pacifist
response. The images on the West suggest the ambivalent response that Meiji Japan gave:
great admiration for much of Western technology and culture, but a fierce determination
to protect Japan’s political integrity and cultural autonomy, at all cost. There is also near
anger or disgust expressed toward Asia and China (Fukuzawa), and paternalistic
sympathy for its “inferior” state (Ito). These attitudes suggest Japanese intervention,
which soon occurred. The concept of non-interference in other state’s affairs does not
apply here.
Worldview. What do these images of Japan’s external political relations suggest
about the nature of the world, and how it is driven? The world is chaotic, driven by
power, and only the strong survive. It resembles a biological system, a “wild jungle.”
Only through unity as a nation can people survive. To be strong, a nation must have
power: money, resources, military, and so forth. The West controls the world. The world
356

outside Japan is strange and dangerous. The lifeways of the strongest, the West, are best;
the lifeways of the weak (Asians) are inferior. Japan needs to fight hard to grow strong
and make its way in this world. How does this world work? Wealthy, militarily strong
countries drive the world. The weak are devoured by the strong. Unified nations are
strong, and can fight. Through success in war, victors become stronger. The temporarily
weak, such as the Japanese, must study the strong (the West) to get stronger. In this view,
it is allowable for the strong to invade the weak, though Japan does not want to be, or
intend, to stay weak. The world is politically controlled by the politically, economically
and militarily strong: the West. In these worldviews in the early Meiji era, the self
(Japan) is weak in international and military affairs. Japan must become strong, is
capable of doing so, and by 1895, has done so. Japan can learn, has a noble culture, and
can teach the rest of Asia. Regarding non-self (other countries and regions), the West is
strong in all these areas, threatens Japan, Asia, and other weak nations. It wants to invade
and control Japan like the rest of Asia and many other countries.
What are the relevant environments surrounding the leaders who hold these
worldviews? How have these environments interacted with or affected the their
worldviews? The surrounding environment includes Western countries (such as the
United States, Britain, France, Russia), East Asian countries and regions (China, Korea,
the Ryukyus, Southeast Asia), Western views of international relations, and international
relations and political theories that seep into Japan at the time. Those theories were
highly influential on the views of Japan’s leaders working in politics and diplomacy.
These outside philosophies interacted with existing Japanese views inherited from the
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Tokugawa era1105 and Dutch studies for over two hundred years. The power and threat of
the West made these leaders know they must learn and master Western diplomatic and
military knowledge, or Japan could become colony like India or China.
How these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions influence
the leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, and understanding of events and their
causes? Regarding perceptions, the power of the West made Japanese leaders favor
Western views of politics, international relations, diplomacy, military technology,
science, and related areas. They tended to reject the Confucian and Asian foundations of
previous Japanese knowledge. They highly favored knowledge from the West.
Concerning information, most of these leaders and the Japanese government drew on the
best, latest Western knowledge that could be obtained abroad or brought to Japan. They
often ignored Asian sources. They used power-, scientific, biological, evolution-leaning
and economic-oriented explanations of international events.
How may have technological systems affected these worldviews? The power of
Western military technology greatly influenced the Japanese military, and both its and the
Japanese government’s actions in international relations in mainland Asia in this era.
Western political knowledge transformed Japanese domestic politics to encourage the
rapid industrial and military buildup that supported military actions against Asia,
indirectly against the West.
Cultural Logics: The global phenomena to which these leaders responded
included foreign governments (Western and Asian), Western political ideas (including
those on international relations) and institutions, Western military technologies and
1105
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forces, Asian military forces (China and Korea), Western diplomatic institutions and
structures, Western writings on politics, diplomacy and military affairs, and Confucian
ideas about politics and political relations that had influenced Tokugawa Japan and still
influenced Qing China and Korea.
The cultural logics under the worldviews of these global phenomena suggest
that governments that have more military power are superior. Those that lose battles or
do not have such power are weaker and thus inferior; those with power are superior.
Asian governments are weak, passive, and therefore inferior. Western political ideas
support these Western victories and power, and therefore are superior. Western political
ideas are based on logic and science, and therefore better. The West and the strong rule
the world and “call the tune.” Thus Japanese must adopt their systems of international
politics and diplomacy to fit into that system. The West’s main culture of politics and
ideas mostly conflicts with Japanese culture, so Japan must only very carefully adapt
Western political ideas and institutions, or its culture may be damaged. The West is
stronger. Therefore if Japan wants to survive politically as a nation and in the
international system, it must have the West’s military technologies and Western-type
military forces to survive. Hard work brings rewards. Those who are weak, passive (ie.
Asia countries and their militaries) are inferior. Political ideas based on science are better
than ones that are not. Therefore Western political ideas are better than Asian or
Confucian ones. Western cultural and political ideas conflict with Japanese politics and
culture. Only ideas closest to Japanese culture can work at this time, despite their
intellectual appeal. This reflects an attitude of cultural relativism. Political ideas and
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philosophies that do not stress action, power, bring more power, or wealth are passive,
weak, and inferior. Confucian ideas and societies are therefore weak and inferior.
What were the leaders’ responses to these global phenomena? As quickly as
possible, Japan must learn these new political and military ideas, institutions, and
systems, quickly industrialize, and build up its own military, political and diplomatic
systems. Japan must quickly use these to its own advantage, for its own interests in the
international system. That is what these leaders believed, and what they did. Japan then
imitated the West, and used these new ideas and technologies it had mastered to attack
China, Korea and Taiwan before the end of this period (1895).
In the cultural logics under these responses, if Japan is not strong and does not
modernize quickly, those who are stronger, the West, will conquer it. It may become an
inferior colony or vassal state, such as India or China. Japan must learn the best
knowledge and technologies to survive. Only the powerful, learned, and technologically
strong survive and flourish. To survive, it is permitted for Japan to import knowledge that
it needs. Japan can take these imported ideas and technologies, and improve them, based
on its past experience with Chinese and Korean knowledge. To survive, Japan must
become a strong, aggressive power like the West. A strong country is allowed to be
involved in the internal political and economic affairs of inferior powers. Japan knows it
does not want this itself. But it is the right of a strong country. The strong can exploit the
weak and do. Japan will be great and strong. It also has this right.
What do we learn by comparing the cultural logics of the worldviews about the
global phenomena with the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to
them? The cultural logics under the worldviews stress evolutionary ideas, power and
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strength, especially military ones. Science and technology are preferred. We should
assume that science, materialism and technological strength bring tangible, true benefits.
Japan must have these to survive. There is also the assumption that though Japan is also
technologically weak, it is more assertive than other Asian countries. It can learn, work
hard, and improve. Additional assumptions include those of Western superiority over
Japan, Japan’s superiority over other Asian countries, and that imported technologies and
ideas must be compatible with the receiving society’s culture, or they will not work. The
cultural logics under the responses are very similar to the cultural logics under the
worldviews themselves. Many of the same assumptions about the superiority of power,
strength, materialism, and knowledge are also here, and that Japan is superior to other
Asian countries, that it can import these technologies and ideas, learn, master, and
improve them. The former cultural logics under the worldviews seem of a more general
nature, while the cultural logics under the responses are more specific to Japan’s actual
current conditions.
Globalization Issues. How do these important worldviews on external political
relations reflect and/or affect processes of globalization (intensified or speeded up flows
of ideas, peoples, money, media, or technology)? The intensified speed of global
communication and transportation in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji period meant that
Japan and its leaders now could have knowledge of the world’s greatest political and
military ideas and technologies, and possibly learn them, if it wished. This had never
before been possible for a nation as geographically isolated as Japan, on such a scale, and
so quickly. While Japan had very interesting, intense encounters with the West in the
period just preceding the Tokugawa period, this period was much more intense and
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urgent compared with the former.1106 Decisions had to be made quickly, or the nation
could be invaded. Absorbing the political theories and ideas was not as urgent as building
up the country’s military defenses, in the thought of Yamagata. The leaders’ attitudes on
nationalism do not reflect the input of these global processes at such an intense rate. Both
the intense threat that Japan now faced in its international relations, and its ability to
respond so rapidly, were a result of these global processes. In the minds of these leaders,
the power of the West, and the speed at which it and its forces now threatened Japan,
helped to emphasize the threat of the West, and de-emphasize threats from Asia. Science
and technology were a primary reason for this intensified globalization. Morality and
religion did not really affect these globalization factors. And how did globalization affect
the worldviews? The unprecedented speed of communication and transport links in this
age intensified the speed at which Japan must respond to the Western threat of invasion,
and even the speed at which Japan’s worldviews were hit. Like China and Britain during
the Opium War, Japan now faced war with global powers like Britain on an
unprecedented scale, in just a matter of months, where not long before, encounters with
such a distant power at such a scale were unknown.
If we consider these global processes as people experienced them, on micro(personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? The global processes
I refer to here are the intensified speed at which Japan and other non-Western nations like
China, India and Korea had to respond to political and military ideas, forces, and
technologies. Individually, all of these five leaders responded with hard work and study,
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British traders, and the entry of Christianity into the country.
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to try to understand aspects of the Western threat, and to determine how Japan should
best respond. Fukuzawa focused on understanding the meaning of international relations
on a general level, and international law. Kato attempted to understand these issues on a
“scientific” level, and some of his writings were used by the Meiji state to support its
own policies. His own estimation that the world would eventually evolve into a single
world-state dominated by Europe actually predicts the process of political
globalization.1107 Several of the leaders took personal action on Japan’s diplomatic and
military policies. Ito concentrated on learning European political and legal systems, so
they might be applied effectively in Japan, and participated in direct negotiation in
foreign diplomacy with other nations in several occasions. Mori also briefly served as a
diplomat. Yamagata took aggressive action on building up Japan’s military. Several
traveled overseas to observe the West directly (Fukuzawa, Ito, and Mori). On a public
level, the actions of these leaders represent an urgent, collective response in the face of a
huge threat almost unprecedented for Japan. The Japanese people at large did not seem to
have the capacity to picture the complexity and exact nature of this threat, but their wise
leaders did so rapidly, and very well.
Do these important global processes of external political relations represent a
form of Japanese or non-Western globalization? If yes, what is their significance? These
Japanese responses only represented a Japanese form of globalization at the end of this
period, with the start of the Sino-Japanese War, when Japan battled Chinese and Korean
forces in Korea, China, and Taiwan. At this point, the Japanese response to the forces of
Western globalization boiled over, resulting in Japanese invasion of several neighboring
1107
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regions. The significance of these events was the start of unprecedented Japanese
involvement in the world, strongly manifested from 1895 on, up to our present age.
Negative aspects of this Japanese globalization were first felt by its Asian neighbors, not
really by the United States or Britain until World War II, and not much by Europe until
the postwar period.
Worldviews on Japan’s External Economic Relations
Fukuzawa Yukichi. The foreign books that Fukuzawa collected on his overseas
trips provided many of his ideas for Japan’s domestic and international economic
activities, as did the trips themselves. From his trip to Europe (1862), Fukuzawa
developed a deeper knowledge of Western business practices. Seeing the results of postCivil War hyperinflation on his second trip to the United States (1867), Fukuzawa
understood the causes of inflation. This helped motivate him to later start the Yokohama
Specie Bank, which became Japan’s first international bank.1108
Ito Hirobumi. Ito understood the importance of foreign economic institutions.
In 1870, he studied American financial institutions in the United States, later applying
similar knowledge to Japan’s Far Eastern empire. In the mid-1870s, he helped negotiate
a commercial treaty between Japan and Korea, a first for modern Korea.1109 After Japan
gleaned political and economic lessons from the West, in the early 1900s, and after he
became Japan’s resident- (governor-) general in Korea, Ito supported the importation of
Japan’s political and economic lessons into Korea, which he saw as inferior to Japan in
1108
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its development. This is a clear, early example of Japan projecting itself and its own
development experience on another country, soon to be a colony.
Kato Hiroyuki. In late nineteenth century Social Darwinism, and to Kato,
Caucasians were seen as racially superior to non-Caucasians. Kato would have been
shocked to see the global economic successes of Japan in the late twentieth century, when
some experts declared, “Japan is number one.”1110 Kato also had a somewhat racist view
of economic competition between nations. It seems he attributed the superior economic
performance of the West and Europeans, in part, to their “superior” race and civilization.
As noted above in Chapter 4, he worried that the superior economic abilities of
Caucasians might overwhelm Japanese in economic competition within Japan, and that
the racially inferior Chinese might do the same, through their presumed willingness to
work for lower wages.1111 If this was true for Japan’s domestic marketplace, it seems
Kato would apply the same thought to competition in global markets.
Comparison of Worldviews on Japan’s External Economic Relations (1850-1895)
Both Fukuzawa and Ito traveled to the West to observe Western economics in
action, and had early exposure to the power and presence of Western trade in their
childhoods in southwest Japan. Both observed the practical operation of Western
economics in childhood, and overseas, especially Fukuzawa. Fukuzawa was highly
effected by what he observed long-term, both by the impressive knowledge of Western
trading and Dutch studies when he was young, and then by the powerful effects of
Western economics when he traveled overseas (he was especially impressed by the

1110
1111

Unoura, “Samurai Darwinism,” 249.
Ibid., 244.
365

latter). He was moved to write about these in his many popular books, several devoted to
economics and business. Fukuzawa applied what he wrote in his private life and career,
and in the many financial and business institutions he helped found. Ito also very
impressed by what he observed in Western economics when he traveled overseas. He also
applied these lessons to another country: Korea.1112 Fukuzawa founded the highly
influential Yokohama Specie Bank, Japan’s first international bank. Thus he also had a
large influence on Japan’s international financial dealings with the world. Ito was directly
involved in international economic negotiations, though his greatest impacts were on
international politics, not international economics. This was not the case for Fukuzawa
and Kato. Ito studied economic issues in his travels to the West, and later applied them to
one of Japan’s greatest colonies, Korea. This is a clear example of Japan “learning” from
the West, and then projecting that onto its own empire. It is an example of Japan
projecting the West’s mistakes onto others, of repeating the West’s “mistakes.” It is also
an example of Japan projecting itself, its own development experience, on another
country. In general, we see suggestions of evolutionistic thought in the thought of
Fukuzawa, regarding intense economic competition between nations, but it is strongest in
Kato.1113 In Kato’s racist views and explanations of economic competition, of winners
and losers, among the races and nations, it is assumed Westerners/Caucasians are
economically superior, next Japan, and last, other Asians.
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Conceptual Analysis of Worldviews on Japan’s External Economic Relations (18501895)
Development Issues. Is it more relevant to use internationalization,
“modernization,” or both concepts here? Internationalization seems more relevant, since
it considers external, international processes involving the global economic system,
including colonialism and imperialism, of how peripheral, non-Western countries are
absorbed into the global economy, and the cultural effects of that process on the
international level, not the domestic one. This chapter does not really consider domestic
issues, so internationalization is more relevant here than “modernization,” which
considers the global economy and its effects on the internal cultural features of peripheral
countries, as they are absorbed into the world market.
In terms of internationalization, as we examine these worldviews of Japan’s
external economic relations (1850-1895), the key question is what do we learn about
Japan’s economy and its culture on the international level as it began to be absorbed into
the global economic system? As Japan was about to be drawn, or “forced,” into the world
economy, by both external and internal pressures, of necessity its cultural interaction with
the outside world increased. With pressures to trade came the signing of the unequal trade
treaties with several Western nations in the late 1850s, which in turn brought pressures
for more negotiations from the Japanese side, in order to replace the treaties and their
unfair requirements. Increased economic interaction brought foreign teachers of
economics and business to Japan, as well as some foreign businessmen and migrant
workers from China. Japanese government officials and young scholars were also sent
abroad to master the fields of economics, business, accounting, and related fields. These
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interactions greatly updated and transformed the technical practice of business in early
Meiji Japan, even if many of the ideologies guiding Japanese management continued to
be influenced by neo-Confucian values that prevailed in the late Tokugawa period.1114
Additional social changes hit Japan that were brought through increased economic
interaction with the outside world, including rapid industrialization, increased
urbanization, women entering the workforce, and so forth. These economic changes also
enabled Japan to begin to build its huge export businesses, build up its military, and to
“export” its own culture to neighboring regions, in a manner of speaking, with the SinoJapanese War.1115 In coming decades, Japan’s economic relations with the world would
have increasingly large economic and social effects on Japan, its Asian neighbors
(especially its colonies), and other nations.
Technology Issues. What are the most important technology-related ideas and
phenomena associated with these worldviews of external economic relations? Among the
major technological issues connected with these worldviews of external economic
relations are that these actors received direct exposure to the power and “wonder” of
Western technological and economic “marvels.” As youths in southwestern Japan, even
under national isolation (sakoku), Fukuzawa and Ito were exposed to the influence and
powerful presence of Western trade and economies. Ito stole away on a steamship to
learn how to pilot one. Both Fukuzawa and Ito were greatly impressed with these marvels
when they traveled overseas to the West, and were also exposed to Western economic
1114
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ideas. While Fukuzawa’s knowledge tended toward the basic functions of modern
economies, banking, and daily business practices in the West, Ito’s knowledge focused
more on international economic diplomacy and treaties. Technology is also closely
connected with industrialization, which would further promote Japanese economic
growth. In Kato, we see an evolutionistic emphasis on economic competition between
nations, another key determinant to which nations become strong, influential, and
survive. Economically successful nations develop great technologies, are strong, more
admirable and receive the spoils of the international system.
What are the most significant economic factors present in the imported
technologies and related ideas in these worldviews of Japan’s external economic
relations?1116 And did the international system affect these technologies/issues positively
or negatively? Why? Many of these technologies were physically powerful. Their most
significant economic factors included the power of military technologies to conquer and
control foreign markets by force. Technologies of global transport and communication
enabled Western traders to trade globally, spread their economic influence, gain more
wealth, control more colonies, and more spheres of influence. They would do the same
for Japan. Managerial technologies of business, economics and economics education
would strengthen Japan’s economy domestically, build it up, and prepare Japan to better
function in the global economy. Mastering the know-how of international economic
diplomacy would enable Japan to function in the world economy. The technologies
connected with industrialization would greatly enlarge Japan’s production capacity,
contribute to domestic growth, and permit Japan to produce various products
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domestically, export to foreign markets, and increase its wealth. An “evolutionary”
mentality that stressed that Japan must work hard or it would not survive encouraged hard
efforts to ensure Japanese survival. The international system affected many of these
technologies very powerfully and positively. It is the international system that brought
Japan many of these technologies in the first place. While the international economic
system threatened to impoverish or control peripheral nations like Japan, Japan is one of
the very few cases that showed that if nations worked hard, smartly and in a disciplined
manner, independence from foreign economic and political control might be achieved.
What were the important ideas and technologies transferred in these worldviews
of external economics? Technologies transferred included transportation and
communication equipment (ships, trains, the telegraph), industrial technologies
(manufacturing, steel, textiles, shipbuilding), managerial and business technologies
(modern management, accounting, training), agricultural imports/exports, and military
technologies (ships, armaments, battle strategies). Among the ideas that were transferred
were Western economic theories of trade, finance, commerce, business, evolutionary
theory, management, business and accounting principles and theories, late Tokugawa
Dutch studies (which inevitably included some economic ideas), ideas, and theories of
imperialism.1117
Who were the main actors involved, whether international or domestic,
individual or state, and what impacts did they have on the transfer outcomes? Main
individual actors on the international level included Western international leaders,
traders, military officials, foreign economists, and business leaders. Japanese actors in the
1117
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international level included many of the same. There were also migrant laborers present,
especially from China, in this era. State and institutional actors on the international level
from the West included foreign governments, economic ministries, international shipping
and commercial firms, and from Japan, the Japanese government, economic and
industrial ministries, commercial and shipping firms. On the domestic level, individual
actors from Japan were mainly government leaders, economic thinkers, businessmen, and
traders. Western actors present in Japan included foreign businessmen, traders, and
teachers doing business with or living in Japan. State and institutional actors on the
domestic level included the Japanese government, ministries and agencies connected with
the economy, industry, trade or business, small or large business firms, and the zaibatsu.
What were the impacts of the transfers? They were both positive and negative.
Western government actors forced negative treaties on Japan. Western businessmen and
teachers brought a great deal of know-how and shared this with the Japanese. The
Japanese government had huge impacts on the progress of business in Japan. The
government’s hand in the market was heavy in this era, mostly leaning toward large
business. The public sector mostly took the lead in deciding trends and policy directions.
While the influence of individuals like Fukuzawa, Shibusawa Eiichi1118 and others was
very significant in Japan’s business and private sector, the lead of the public sector in this
era was stronger.
What lessons or chances for improvement do we learn in these transfer cases
related to Japan’s external economic relations? These technologies and economic systems
indeed were powerful. Hard efforts to study and master them paid off in many ways.
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Japan grew, and its efforts to grow and industrialize were highly effective. This is not to
say that there were not many difficulties or pain; there were. Japan grew to the point that
not long after this period it was able to negotiate an end to the unequal treaties with the
West, and become involved economically in the affairs of its neighbors such as Korea
and Taiwan, and beat huge countries such as China and Russia in military confrontations.
Yet even though Japan developed the capacity to do all of these actions did not mean all
of them were justified or right; many were not. The damage inflicted on neighboring
countries, especially through the wars, was huge. Yet economic infrastructure eventually
resulted in some places where there had been almost none (i.e., Taiwan).
What are the most significant cultural factors and values present in the imported
technologies and ideas in these economic worldviews?1119 The most important cultural
factors included greatly enhanced, speeded up connections in transportation and
communications with the outside world, a greatly improved ability to communicate,
travel to, and connect with it, and an enhanced capability to receive economic ideas from
overseas and discuss them. There were huge impacts from industrial technologies: the
ability to vastly increase the productivity and output of the Japanese economy and then
the huge accompanying social impacts. This inserted a greater Japanese presence into the
world marketplace. The impacts of this presence were likely the most significant in Asia
in this period. Managerial and business technologies brought new and enhanced
principles of scale, efficiency, finance, time-keeping, speed, exporting, importing, and
trading. Interacting with the outside world had huge cultural impacts on how Japanese
worked and conducted business in the early Meiji era, compared with the late Tokugawa
1119

Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52.
372

era. Agricultural production of silk and textiles enhanced employment in rural areas.
Increasing employment of rural men and women in new factories and industries affected
their lives, farms, village, and families in many ways. Military technologies brought
increasing discipline throughout society, and increased the economic scale of production
and industry. Western ideas of business greatly increased the scale of production of
Japanese business, connected it with world markets, greatly changed daily life in Japan,
and vastly increased the nation’s wealth. The culture of science and technology
associated with industrial and military technologies gradually spread throughout the
nation through the education system, improving research, health, and military
applications. The most important cultural values included the value of efficiency in time
and work, increased values of communication, travel, freedom, Western cultural values
of freedom, independence, freedom of communication, expression, values of free trade,
entrepreneurialism, experimentation, hard work, wealth, European ideas of class, wealth,
desires to increase efficiency in agriculture and industry, values associated with
mechanization in many areas, values of speed, evolutionism, survival of the
strongest/fittest, and the right of strong nations to invest in and influence other regions, to
gain wealth and help developing regions improve as well.
In these worldviews, how did the leaders concerned use these technologies/ideas
as means or agencies to cope with and transform Japan’s (material) environments on the
international level? Fukuzawa observed, studied, and read about these economic and
business technologies, wrote popular books to educate other Japanese in economic
principles, founded several businesses and educational institutes, and became very
wealthy and successful. In other words, he practiced what he preached. He believed that
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through his writings and efforts, Japan would improve economically on the grassroots
level, and that this would strengthen the nation internally, and enable it to flourish on the
international level. Fukuzawa had some direct influence through the founding of the
Yokohama Specie Bank. Ito used ideas of international economic diplomacy to negotiate
several international treaties, including Japan’s commercial treaty with Korea in the mid1870s. This helped to begin to project Japan’s influence overseas, which eventually had
huge impacts on Japan’s Asian neighbors, and on Japan as well. Economic efforts that
supported Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War also enhanced Japan’s position in the
international system through the increased prestige Japan gained in the eyes of the
Western powers after its victory over China. Subtle, evolutionistic ideas of racism and the
hierarchy of nations, peoples, and countries, like Kato’s, also helped to support Japan’s
military and economic interventions on the mainland.
How did these technological issues affect or enhance Japan’s survival in the
international system or environment? The rapid influx of various technologies
(transportation, communication, industry, management, and agriculture) greatly increased
Japan’s wealth, and its capacity to communicate with, interact with, and influence the
international environment. This interaction and influences most greatly affected Japan
itself, and its Asian neighbors. Influences on the West were more gradual and subtle, i.e.
the export of porcelains, teas, silk, and Japanese art from Japan, increasing Western
knowledge of and interest in Japan. For Japan, its increasing involvement in Asia and the
buildup of its military greatly increased the nation’s wealth, industrialization, and
economic power, and brought it out of near total isolation. It also increased its respect in
the international system and to the West. To other Asian countries (China, Korea), this
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would soon bring much pain, anger, and hatred of the Japanese that continues to manifest
itself to some degree in Japan’s contemporary international relations today.
Do the belief systems1120 of any of these leaders (on technology issues in these
economic worldviews, on the international level) blind them to certain realities? If yes,
which, and how? Do the leaders fail to adjust their decisions or viewpoints to changing
conditions and reality? If so, how do these factors affect transfer or policy outcomes?
The belief systems of the leaders here do blind them to certain realities, and likely bias
their actions and (where relevant) policy decisions in certain directs. The pro-materialistleaning, pro-scientific bent of these leaders, plus the great wealth and impressive
technologies of the West they have observed, makes them favor big-scale “scientific”
technologies and knowledge systems on economics from the West, then the world’s
dominant center of power. These leaders tend to favor heavy industrialization, rapid
adoption of modern business and accounting practices, large-scale development of
military armaments, assertive economic diplomacy and trade to end Japan’s unequal trade
treaties with the West, and aggressive Japanese involvement in the economic and
political affairs of nearby regions, wherever possible. Their economic belief systems
therefore make them favor economic practices or assertions of the West, and generally
blind them to non-material conditions in mainland Asia and nearby regions, such as
China, Korea, and Taiwan. Evolutionary thought also influences their focus on the
“strong” West, as opposed to Japan’s “weak” neighbors. Ironically, the economic and
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technological strength of the West, and the weakness of Japan’s Asian neighbors, seems
to motivate Japan to “copy” the West so Japan can grow strong, and then “share” its
knowledge and fruits with its weaker Asian brothers. Hopefully Japan would also gain
more wealth in the process too.
In these worldviews on external economic relations, is the concept of
technonationalism as ideology manifested? If so, how? The ideas of technonationalism as
ideology are implicit in these views, especially in Fukuzawa’s. Most of his writing on
economics stresses helping Japanese to understand modern economics and business
practice, so that they will be adopted, to strengthen Japan internally, so that it will grow
wealthy and strong, to defend itself against the West. The views of Ito and Kato also
suggest that a stronger Japan also has the right to help its weaker Asian neighbors grow
stronger, which theoretically also increases Japan’s wealth, and therefore its own
security.
Cognition Issues. Image. The primary images of Japan’s external economic
relations here can be organized into three main groups. In the first, images of foreign
economic relations, economic treaties are seen as both good and bad. They should be fair
to Japan, and in Japan’s national interests, but when they are not, they are bad (Ito,
implied). Yet economic treaties and stable economic relations between countries are
good, when they are fair (Ito). The superior economic performance of Westerners over
Japanese and other Asians is sometimes attributed to their “superior” race and civilization
(Kato).1121 Other Asian countries are seen as economically inferior to Japan and the West,
and less developed than Japan, so exporting Western or Japanese economic lessons to
1121
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them is good, and helpful for those countries (Ito). In the main images of Western
economies, Western economics and business are seen as superior to Japan’s (Fukuzawa
and Kato), and it is assumed that Japan can learn much from Western economies
(Fukuzawa). They are both seen as good models for the Japanese economy and business
world (Fukuzawa). Learning about Western business is good, whether in the West or in
Japan, but the former is even better (Fukuzawa). Western economic knowledge is useful
and can be applied in Japan (Fukuzawa), or soon, in Japan’s new empire (Ito). The third
group of images here are of Western economic institutions. They are seen as important,
and worthwhile for Japanese to study (Ito).
How do these images function as perceptual filters or organizing devices? The
economic images here reflect pragmatism and realism, similar to the images above on
external political relations. These images would encourage Japanese policymakers to
favor close economic relations with the West, and not as much with other Asian nations.
These images favor the West, its economic systems and knowledge. These images also
encourage Japan to intervene economically in the affairs of other Asian countries, if it is
strong enough and able to do so. These images do not encourage Japan to learn about
business or economics from other Asian countries.
Worldview. Based on the above image, in the cognitive framework that
emerges, the world is controlled by the strong, including the economically strong (the
West). Because the West is economically stronger than Japan and other Asian countries,
it is superior to them. Any country that does not want to be weak and inferior must learn
from the strong, the West. For the weak to become strong, they must learn and change.
Japan can learn and change by adopting Western economics. The world is also driven by
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the strong, especially the econ strong. That is now the West. That strength gives the
strong the right to control and exploit the economically weak. Japan does not want to
remain that way, so it must learn and grow economically, and become strong like the
West as soon as it can. The strong, even Japan, have the right to control the weak, i.e. rest
of Asia. Regarding the world’s order, an existing system of international trade and
economic treaties controls trade and financial relations between countries. Japan is shut
out of this system due to sakoku (national isolation) and because the powerful West has
both developed and now controls the global economic system. The economically
powerful West now controls this system. If Japan can gain military or economic power, it
can change the unequal treaties foisted on it by the West. In Japan’s views of the self,
Japan is rather poor and weak, but enterprising, well-disciplined and hard-working. It can
work hard, learn, and overcome its present weaknesses. Japan is in the best posit of the
Asian countries to do this. Japan can then help the other weak Asian countries fight the
West. In Japan’s views of the non-self (others), the West is economically strong,
aggressive, greedy, individualistic, selfish, ready to conquer others and the weak, and to
control them. The rest of Asia appears superstitious, weak, slow, lumbering, primitive,
isolated,1122 and incapable of defending itself without Japan’s “help.”
What are the relevant environment(s) surrounding the viewers/actors who hold
these worldviews? The relevant environments contain Western powers and other Asian
countries/regions nearby. There are also Western governments, Asian governments, trade
treaties, the diplomatic world influencing and controlling the treaties, and emerging
Japanese trading companies and entrepreneurs. How have these environments interacted
1122
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with or affected the leaders’ worldviews? Western treaties have put a “vice” around
Japan, an unfair burden that Japan seeks to overcome as rapidly as possible. Weak Asian
countries, their “offensive” behaviors, potential resources, and potential invasion by the
West tempt Japan’s business leaders and entrepreneurs.
How may these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions
have influenced the leaders’ perceptions? The unequal treaties angered and worried
Japan’s leaders. They made them more determined to modernize Japan, and help it grow
as quickly as possible, to overcome these unfair conditions. Actions of Asian countries
such as China and Korea angered some leaders (Fukuzawa, Yamagata), made them feel
pity for them (Ito), and desire to punish, discipline, guide them like children, and so forth.
Regarding their uses of information, Japan’s leaders favored Western economic
knowledge, not from Asia. Concerning the leaders’ understanding of events and their
causes, they encouraged them to explain economic events through Western scientific and
economic theories and explanations. They also applied Japanese entrepreneurial common
sense to many of these issues, and used very worldly, material points-of-view, pragmatic
explanations, according to which, the economically powerful control and drive the world.
It was the West.
How may have technological systems affected these worldviews? If so, which
aspects may have been affected? The huge evidence of power of economics was evident
in the power of industrial technology to build up the West, in its enormous wealth, and in
the amazing lifestyles in the United States and Europe that these leaders observed. These
systems also gave Japanese the power to travel the world, the British the power to
conquer the greatest known power (China), and so forth.
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Cultural Logics: The global phenomena to which these leaders responded
included the Western trading system, the global economic system dominated by the West,
the unequal treaty system, commodities traded with other countries, the global monetary
system, foreign investments in Japan, Japanese investments overseas, foreign
technologies (including industrial and manufacturing technologies), foreign governments
and the Japanese government, their economic and trade policies and economic-related
ministries, international companies and players from overseas and Japan, Western
economic knowledge, modern (Western) business practice(s), international segments of
the labor force, colonialism, and imperialism. Some of the powerful ideas behind the
Western and global economic systems included classical economics, theories of free
trade, international trade, industrialization, evolutionism and Social Darwinism,
imperialism, colonialism, governmental trade and economic policies, thought about
business, industry, production, factories, management, labor, Western theories of
economics and business, Western and international business practices, theories of
economic growth, wealth and prosperity, and values of wealth and individual
entrepreneurialism.1123
What are the leaders’ worldviews/basic beliefs about these phenomena? In their
view, the West controls the global economic system, and has forced treaties favor to itself
on Japan. All that the West wants to do in and with Japan is designed to be in its interest,
not Japan’s. Foreign technologies must be imported and mastered by Japan, and can be.
Foreign governments favor their own economic interests, are greedy, and do not care
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about Japan. Japan’s government must act in Japan’s natural interests. All governments
should fight for their national interests, as should their economic ministries. Strong state
involvement in international economic diplomacy is necessary for Japan’s economic
interests to be protected in the world market. Japanese international business should
definitely be encouraged, but in this period, the state must take the biggest lead. Strong
government in the marketplace for a country like Japan at this stage of econ development
is good, internationally or domestically. Western economic knowledge works, is
practical, has brought the West’s great wealth and power. Western business practices are
efficient; they work too. Western colonialism and imperialism are dangers for Japan, and
must be resisted. The international labor force must be carefully controlled, or it could
overwhelm Japan’s economy (Kato). All Western economic thoughts are “scientific.”
They prove that they are better because they work. The economically strong will control
and dominate those who are weak. Modern Western theories about business and
economics must be learned and well applied by Japan, because they work. If Japan does
this successfully, it will survive and flourish in the international system. Domestic wealth
in Japan will be affected by what happens internationally. Values of entrepreneurialism,
industrialization, and business in the private sector have been the true engine of growth in
such countries as the United States, Britain, and will be for Japan, as soon as its private
sector can be strengthened enough to emerge. Until then, a strong state role is okay and
necessary. Learning these international economic and business practices will make Japan
wealthy.1124
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What are the cultural logics under the worldviews about these global
phenomena? The strong control all forms of power, even economic, in the world. Brute
force and power controls and determines that happens in the world. Greed drives the
world. Economic actors, even states and their governments, act in their own, national
interests. Each country and government cares most for itself. Each country and
government, including Japan, must act in its own interests, including economic ones, and
defense. This is also true in international economic diplomacy, and in the world market.
Japan’s government must act on behalf of, and defend, Japan. Private business, including
Japan’s, cannot compete in the global market until it reaches a certain maturity or level of
quality and competitiveness. Until that time, strong state action in international economic
diplomacy to protect its own national markets and businesses is allowed. Strong state
economic action and intervention is necessary at this stage. Western and modern
economic and business knowledge work, are practical and scientific. Japan must learn
them. It will not be good for Japan to econ controlled or dominated by the West, so Japan
must build itself up so it will not be. The economically strong will survive and flourish in
the world, and control the economically weak. Learning Western economics and business
practices will make Japan successful, wealthy. Countries that are wealthy and successful
will survive. What happens internationally affects what happens domestically. The
private sector is what really brings growth, but if it is too weak, or just emerging, it must
have the help of the state. The public and private sectors must cooperate; they are not
natural enemies.
What were the leaders’ responses to these global phenomena? They studied
hard, learned about Western economic and business theories and theories of international
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trade, to answer these questions: why is the West so wealthy and strong? What made it
so? What are the basic principles behind these phenomena? What must Japan do to learn
these principles, and grow? What can Japan do to grow strong and wealthy so the West
will not control it? Japan’s leaders studied all of the economic areas listed. The specific
leaders studied here focused on the overall economy,1125 modern business and accounting
practices,1126 the meaning of modern finance,1127 Western business culture,1128
international economic diplomacy,1129 basic theories of economics,1130 understanding
entrepreneurial values and culture, and how they might be encouraged in Japan.1131
And what were the cultural logics under these responses? Japan has the capacity
to learn from other countries, and then grow. Japan has often done it before in its history.
Through hard work, a people and country will be rewarded. Japan must work hard in its
present situation. It must survive. It has no choice. If Japanese apply themselves to
learning these economic and business ideas, they can master them, and improve Japan’s
situation. Japan’s leaders need a basic understanding of overall economic and business
knowledge; certain leaders need specialized knowledge of particular areas. Economic
knowledge is the most fundamental for Japan’s national survival.1132 Japan’s leaders have
the responsibility for setting the pace for the rest of Japanese society concerning the
adoption of these modern economic business practices and culture, in helping set goals,
providing overall guidance, and encouraging everyday people throughout Japan to learn
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about them. The state especially has the responsibility to take the lead concerning Japan’s
international economic and business dealings, since it is beyond the realm of almost all
Japanese. But the effects of the international econ system and competition can determine
the fate of the whole nation, so the state must definitely be involved.
If we compare the cultural logics under the worldviews about the global
phenomena with the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to the
phenomena, we see that the former logics stress very realist, materialist forces and issues:
power, wealth, greed, and economic and political actors acting in their own, national
interests. If actors do not act in their own interest, they will lose in international economic
competition. Strong state action is assumed to be necessary until Japan’s private sector
has reached enough maturity to face international competition. Western business and
economic knowledge is admired and desired because of practicality: what it has done for
the West, and because it is “scientific.” These views are highly materialist and pragmatic.
Cooperation between the public and private sectors is presumed to be positive and
necessary. Though the private sector will ultimately determine most of Japan’s growth, it
is currently too small, and needs the protection and nurturance of the state. The cultural
logics under the leaders’ responses to the global economic phenomena stress action on
the part of Japan’s leaders, and the Japanese people themselves: hard work, study, and
more hard work. Hard work, cooperation and learning have built Japan in the past, from
the village level up. This time, the national government must take the lead in determining
the best courses of action for Japan’s overall economy. Cooperation of various domestic
and private sector actors will be strongly encouraged, and if necessary, coerced, since this
cooperation is a matter of national survival.
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Globalization Issues. How do these important worldviews on external economic
relations reflect and/or affect processes of globalization (intensified or speeded up flows
of ideas, peoples, money, media, or technology)? Even in the late Tokugawa period,
under the national isolation policy, in remote Japan,1133 these leaders experienced the
impacts of Japan’s limited economic relations with the West in southwestern Japan. Of
Fukuzawa, Ito, and Kato, Fukuzawa in particular sensed the power of economics to
greatly uplift Japan, from what he saw in the West. On a global level, Ito knew that Japan
must quickly undo the damage of the unequal trade treaties with the West, or it would be
colonized and econ-dominated by the latter.
If we consider these global economic processes as people experienced them, on
micro- (personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? Impressions
from Fukuzawa’s childhood of the power of Western economics, and what he later
observed as he traveled in the West, affected his lifelong work, in which he stressed the
import of economics as the foundation for Japan’s modern life. It is also seen in the
various economy-related institutions he helped found. Ito was the individual here who
was most directly involved in the processes of international economic diplomacy, helping
to negotiate treaties with several other countries, such as Korea.
Do these important global processes of external economic relations represent a
form of Japanese or non-Western globalization? If yes, what is their significance?
Western economic globalization and pressures on Japan to open for trade helped force
Japan to open and begin modernizing. Eventually Japan was determined to begin its own
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involvement in Asia, largely for economic reasons, partly in response to what the West
was already attempting to do there. Besides the economic damages resulting from the
Sino-Japanese War, the economic effects of this Japanese “globalization” did not really
start to emerge until slightly later, when Japanese colonization began in Taiwan in 1895,
and in Korea in 1910. The economic effects were much more fully seen in the next period
(1895-1945).
Conclusion
From our study of leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s external political and
economic relations (1850 to 1895), what can we conclude about how those views, and
Japan’s experiences with technology, development, and foreign relations at this time,
may have contributed to Japan’s current foreign aid policies? In this conclusion, I will
note general trends, but will explore more concrete linkages in the final chapters (9 and
10). On learning from foreign societies, we see that a developing nation needs strong
relations with more advanced countries so it can import practical, high level knowledge,
from many sources, to help it develop the nation. Nation-building, for the nation’s
survival, must be a top priority. Japan needed such knowledge in politics, economics,
science, technology, military affairs, and so forth. For this purpose, Japan sent bright
scholars overseas, and brought foreign experts into the country. Japan did all these things
in this period, and set a good example for LDCs today. These should also be priorities in
today’s aid programs, but I am not sure how much they currently are in Japanese ODA.
On cultural issues and development, Japan’s leaders (1850-1895) did not do very much to
protect the nation’s culture. On religion and development, coercion and mixing of
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religion and state were highly destructive in Japan. On the role of development and
security ideologies in domestic Japanese affairs, toward the end of the era 1850 to 1895,
Japan used several ideologies to encourage imperialistic control of nearby regions and
extremist nationalistic ideologies to cement its control of Japan’s domestic politics,
economy and society. In ODA and development policy, aggressive or extremist
ideologies should be discouraged.
On external political relations, from 1850 to 1895, there were many negative
events that can provide fruitful guidelines for ODA and development policies. For
example, in this period, Japan generally had hostile relations with its neighbors in Asia.
Though Japan was uncomfortable with being forced to open itself to foreign relations
with the West, a few years later, it forced Korea to do the same. Though Japan did not
like the unequal treaties that were forced on it, it forced similar treaties on Korea and
others. Though Japan did not want to be attacked or invaded by the West, it attacked
China over the issue of Korea, partly on Korean soil. Japan built up its military without
adequate controls on its power, which would have disastrous consequences for the nation
in a few decades. Sadly, in this situation, we have a developing country quickly repeating
the mistakes of the West in its relations with other developing countries. It seems that
Japan recognizes these mistakes on some levels. Its present ODA policy seeks friendly
relations with LDCs, not to attack or coerce them. Japan also limits its ODA for countries
that have excessive arms trade or build-up.
On external economic issues, Japan took various wise, pragmatic steps in its
international economic relations in this era (1850-1895). It sought to trade with a broad
range of nations on an equal basis, including bilateral trade, though unequal treaties
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hindered these goals, somewhat. The government encouraged Japan to seek independence
and strength in trade, and to identify the nation’s areas of economic strength, as quickly
as possible. Japan also sought positive economic and cultural relations to help it rapidly
gain needed technical knowledge. Since positive trade has been a key part of Japan’s
development and growth, Japan’s ODA policies have always sought to encourage LDCs
to develop strong economic infrastructure so that they can engage in their own positive
economic development and growth.
The second key question of the dissertation asks whether the ideas of
“modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation an accurate picture of
Japan’s experience with technology and development, and how much are they seen in
Japan’s current aid policies. The concept of translative adaptation does not really apply
here, since the main focus of this chapter is on international, not domestic issues. In their
worldviews of Japan’s external political relations (1850 to 1895), all five leaders studied
accept the basic assumptions of internationalization, that the West should not dominate
Japan as it is absorbed into the global economy, politically or economically. While it is
also implied that they do not want Japan to be culturally invaded, their cultural emphasis
is more on the domestic level. In their views of external economic relations (1850 to
1895), all three leaders studied (Fukuzawa, Ito, and Kato) support internationalization.
None wants Japan to be economically dominated by the West, nor its internal culture
destroyed. There are few comments about cultural issues on the international level here. I
found it challenging to apply “modernization” to the worldviews of external political
relations, but in the end, concluded that in the case of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato, they
suggest that while maintaining Japan’s internal cultural fortitude is important, placing
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priority on external defense first is more important (a matter of national survival).
External defense is also more important to Yamagata and Ito. I also concluded that the
concept of “modernization” does not apply to the worldviews of Japan’s external
economic relations (1850-1895).
What are some chief insights from Japan’s experience with technology,
development, and foreign relations during this period? Regarding technology, during the
Tokugawa period, Japan imported most of its Western technology through its trade with
the Dutch, the only Western country with which it was allowed to trade.1134 A significant
technology, a fleet of American navy ships, helped force open Japan in 1853. Japan
significantly built up its military technology and industrialization, contributing to its
victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). This led to further
industrialization in Japan after the war. Japan gained significant exposure to and training
in technology through several different sources in this period: through the various
government missions sent to the West in the 1860s and 1870s, foreign direct investment,
and from trade with and foreign instructors from the United States, Britain, Germany and
France.
Concerning development, national isolation (sakoku) from 1639 to 1854 turned
much of Japan’s development inward, though not totally. It limited, but did not totally
extinguish, foreign input entering Japan. During sakoku, the Dutch were the main source
of Western knowledge for Japan. Even though Japan was cut off from most sources of
foreign knowledge in the Tokugawa period, it had a remarkably dynamic, economically
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and culturally active society, based on its own internal dynamics, trade, hard work, high
educational levels, and large population. Though the signing of unequal trade treaties
with various Western nations in 1858 initially created various pressures for Japan, such as
higher commodity prices and internal unrest, ultimately the opening of the country
provided a huge stimulus for the nation’s development in all areas. Though Japan’s
development had historically been profoundly influenced by China and also Korea, with
China’s defeat by Britain in the Opium War (1840-1842), Western models became much
more appealing. After 1868, the Meiji government’s aggressive Westernization program
had large effects on Japan’s development. Examples of foreign stimulation of Japan’s
development included the large input by foreign scientists and instructors from leading
Western nations, especially the United States and Britain, and aggressive negotiations by
Japan with Russia in 1875, which enabled Japan to actively colonize the northern island
of Hokkaido, while Russia gained Sakhalin. Though the Meiji government supported
development efforts with loans and other subsidies, there was also heavy reliance upon
foreign investments, markets, technical assistance, and instructors.
What do we learn about Japan’s experience with foreign relations from our
survey of the contexts above? The national seclusion policy cut off almost all political
and economic relations between Japan and other countries in the Tokugawa era. Though
Japan reopened its political and economic relations starting in 1854, it was burdened with
the system of unequal treaties with major Western powers that did not end until 1911.
Early in the Meiji era, Japan quickly began assertively engaging China and Korea,
politically and economically. Through war and other actions, Japan gained several
colonies and significant economic footholds on the mainland, but the consequences for
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the other Asian powers were largely painful. Relations with the United States and Britain
were the most significant for Japan, politically, economically, and culturally. Military
knowledge imported from Prussia, in particular, would have important effects on Japan
and other Asian nations, through the Sino-Japanese War (1904-1905) and later conflicts.
Economically, Japan had relatively limited exchange with foreign powers during the
Tokugawa era, especially with Western powers. Despite the burden of the unequal
treaties from 1858-1911, Japan was able to export mainly agricultural and semi-finished
and manufactured goods in the Meiji period, though it usually had a negative trade
balance. Foreign trade, interchange, and knowledge were especially key in the Meiji era
for enhancing Japan’s economic and technical knowledge in this period.
What evidence emerges by comparing both the leaders’ worldviews and Japan’s
experiences with technology, development and foreign relations in this era? Regarding
“modernization” and internationalization, while these five leaders are not unconcerned
about the cultural impacts of Western influence, they are most concerned about Japan’s
external defense and security, since that was the most obvious, overt threat. In reviewing
the nation’s primary experiences with technology, development and foreign relations
from 1850 to 1895, what emerges is the great contrast between the late Tokugawa and the
Meiji eras. In the former, Japan had extremely limited access to Western technologies
and stimulation. It was greatly isolated, economically, politically, and culturally. After
the opening of the country, however, enormous growth in the nation’s technological
capabilities, development, industrial capacity, and foreign relations/connections occurred.
Another key difference is that in the older era, Japan gladly received influence
from other Asian nations, while now, those sources were nearly totally rejected, and
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Western sources overwhelmingly favored. The contrast between such intense isolation
followed by feverish importation of everything Western could not be starker. After
emerging from the late Tokugawa period, young Meiji leaders realized how much Japan
had missed, and wasted no time beginning to educate themselves and Japan in what they
believed they country needed to know, since its very freedom and independence
depended on it.
The intense nature of what Japan faced, and its need to progress as rapidly as
possible, tended to make these leaders neglect “softer” issues like culture, in the face of
more pressing political, economic and strategic issues. Internationalization’s emphasis on
comprehending the political and economic threats Japan faced as it was increasingly
absorbed into the world market is well reflected in both the worldviews and development
experiences seen in this chapter, and the urgent nature of reforms makes the leaders’
“neglect” of culture make sense. It has been argued by some aid critics that today’s
Japanese aid policy also tends to focus more on economic and technical issues, rather
than softer human issues such as those mentioned here.
What evidence do we have here of how views of spirituality and religion
associated with these worldviews of external political and economic relations (18501895) may have affected policies in Japan in this era? On spirituality, above I note how
three leaders in particular (Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato) support the use of spiritual values
to strengthen Japan and its cultural core so that Japan can better succeed in technological
and economic development, and enhance its chances for survival in the international
system. Several of the leaders also argue that positive values and spirituality, whether
Western or Eastern, can contribute to a society’s positive economic growth and
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development.1135 Above I also noted a significant theme that emerges on in the views of
several of the leaders on the role of technology in Japan’s external political relations: the
importance of strong spiritual values to strengthen Japan’s scientific and technological
growth, to help enhance its position in the international system.
In my above discussion of the worldviews and cultural logics of Japan’s
external political relations, I note that there is a heavy emphasis on material power,
values, and the presumed strength and benefits that science and technology may bring.
The superiority of material values and science is assumed. In my examination of leaders’
views of external economic relations in this era, I observe how their pro-materialist bent
makes them favor large-scale technologies and industrial development for Japan, and
encourages them to discount the ethical and philosophical values of Japan’s East Asian
and Confucian heritage. The cultural logics under these worldviews are highly
materialist, pragmatic, and stress the power of science, technology and economics to
control and change the world.
In my brief comments on religion in this chapter, I note how concepts of
religion and morality affect three of the leaders’ views of international relations to a
degree.1136 These three feel that morality and religion have a role in strengthening Japan.
In their worldviews of Japan’s external political relations, all five leaders studied admit
the West’s current superiority over Japan and Asia in most international issues, including
the presumed religious and moral underpinnings of international strength. In the lessons
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These leaders are Fukuzawa, Mori, Yamagata, and Kato. The first two are highly positive about the
potential role of Western values in the West’s.
1136
Here I am referring to Fukuzawa, Kato and Mori.
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offered for other developing countries here, a positive role for religion in contributing to
a nation’s economic development is acknowledged.1137
What impacts might these views on spirituality, religion, and materialism have
had on policies in this era? Views that strong, positive spiritual values can help build
Japan and its stature in its external political and economic relations would encourage
more humility in Japan’s approach toward its Asian neighbors, and more confidence and
less anxious perplexity at rash, insensitive actions of Western powers. These did not
occur. The heavy material emphasis in views of technology would tend to cause Japan to
support large-scale industrialization, and to largely reject its Confucian heritage, and
indeed occurred. It is possible that religion could contribute positively to Japan’s own
development and international stature, though the leaders had mixed feelings on whether
Western spirituality could. Finally State Shinto emerged as the Meiji government’s
response, especially for the purpose of offering the nation moral strength for
development. I found no intentional applications of State Shinto for international
relations in this era.1138
From the evidence presented here, what are the implications of possible
conflicts between views of spirituality and science and similar issues for policy in this
period? What are the possible value conflicts between spirituality and science revealed in
the views discussed in this chapter? While several of the leaders wisely observed that
positive spiritual values could likely enhance Japan’s technological and economic
1137

For example, religious values can contribute positively to the building of a society, so a society should
not neglect its religious heritage in order to develop. If it does, it may suffer.
1138
This was not the case in the next period (1895 to 1945), when Japan imposed the practice and
ideologies of State Shinto and emperor worship on its long-term colonies in Taiwan and Korea. Part of the
purpose of this was to build a sense of imperial identity, commitment and patriotism in these colonized
populations.
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development, and therefore also its international stature, the question was which values.
While some of these leaders leaned toward Western values or Christianity, others and the
Meiji state preferred Japanese values. While the state officially chose to build a new
national spiritual infrastructure in State Shinto, other individuals such as Fukuzawa did
their best to promote Western type values in their own personal spheres of influence. We
noted earlier, especially in Chapter 4, the profound though indirect influence felt through
Fukuzawa’s writings, his work at Keio College, and his other economic activities.
However, these efforts did not negate the general pressure against spiritual
values and ethical knowledge that pervaded the period, in the face of the overwhelming
power of technology, science, economics, and other material forces in this era that Japan
especially encountered from the outside world as it opened itself to increasing foreign
intercourse. Part of the pressure was caused by the “power” of science and materialism,
part of it came from the cultural conflicts that most Japanese felt as they considered
Christianity, and some came from rejecting Japan’s Confucian ethical and philosophical
heritage. So there was strong pressure against much consideration of spiritual factors as
various development and security policies were implemented by the Meiji state. Was any
of the pressure against the use of spiritual perspectives in policies due to the Flaw of the
Excluded Middle that was perhaps inherent in the scientific and technological
worldviews and ideologies that Japan absorbed from the West? Perhaps there was some
influence, though not in the case of several of the leaders we studied here.1139 The fact
that State Shinto could even emerge in the face of such pressures likely resulted from
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This was not the case for Kato, Fukuzawa, or Mori.
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Japan studying the presumed positive role of state churches and religion in the economic
development of Europe.
Where are possible future implications of these issues for Japanese foreign aid,
over the long run?1140 The theme of pressure against considering spiritual issues and
values as one approaches “real world,” materialist policies in politics, economics, and
diplomacy emerged in this chapter. In postwar Japan, Article 20 of the Japanese
Constitution of 1947, imposed on Japan by the American Occupation, prohibits the
influence of religion in the political affairs of the state, and state interference in the
religious life of the people.1141 What has been the effect of this stance on Japanese
diplomacy or foreign aid? It likely created additional pressure against any insertion or
consideration of these issues as aid is offered to developing countries. Has that likelihood
created “blindness” on the part of Japanese policymakers of this significant cultural area,
and how it might affect the acceptance, appropriateness, or delivery of aid programs,
loans and packages for countries with different religious and spiritual conditions? If such
a form of “blindness” exists, could it be attributed to some form of the Flaw of the
Excluded Middle? In contrast, from 1895 to 1945, spiritual issues had profound effects
on the course of Japan’s future, both domestic and international, as we will see in
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I must wait until the firt part of the conclusion, Chapter 9, to include definitive comments about my
working hypothesis, how Japan’s experience with technology, development, and foreign relations, and
leaders’ views of those areas, may have affected Japan’s current aid policies. Right now, I can say that
Japan’s experience in this period offers many potentially highly valuable lessons for other LDCs in the
areas of technology, development and foreign relations. Another key point here is that in this era, various
material, secularizing forces attempted to divorce the input of values and “spiritual” forces from Japanese
reforms and policies in multiple areas. Similar secularizing tendencies also seem to be present in
contemporary aid policy. What is the cause of these forces, and what are their current effects? I cannot yet
say.
1141
The Constitution of Japan (1947), “Hanover Historical Texts Project,” available from
http://history.hanover.edu/texts/1947con.html. Internet; accessed 9 August 2008.
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Chapters 7 and 8. But first we will consider the issues connected with Japan’s external
cultural relations from 1850 to 1895, in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6
Worldviews of Selected Key Leaders (1850-1895)
External Cultural Relations
Introduction
This chapter, a continuation of the discussion of Japan’s external relations (18501895), examines decision makers’ notions of how Japan interacts with international
influences on its cultural relations with the outside world. In this chapter, I primarily
consider the views of Fukuzawa, Ito, Mori and Kato. In Chapter 6, like Chapter 5, I again
use the concept of internationalization to analyze development issues in the worldviews
of Japan’s external cultural relations, six major issues to assess worldviews in the area of
technology, and the same concepts for analysis of cognitive issues: image, worldview
(my definition), and cultural logics. For globalization issues in Chapter 6, I use the same
questions that were used in Chapter 5: how some of the most important worldviews here
reflect or affect processes of globalization, how globalization affects worldviews, how
global processes affected people and these leaders on micro- (personal) and/or macro(shared, public) levels, and whether these global processes represent a form of Japanese
or non-Western globalization. In the conclusion of this chapter, I argue that it was very
hard for the Japanese government to balance the material aspects of foreign learning and
knowledge importation with the ethical/spiritual/philosophical aspects. Why was this so,
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and what implications might this have for later Japanese aid? In this chapter, I explore
partly how this issue and others related to Japan’s external cultural relations unfolded.
Contexts of Japan’s External Cultural Relations, 1850-1895: Major Trends
In the late Tokugawa period, until the 1860s, foreigners were generally viewed by
Japan according to China’s Ka-I (“Flower-Barbarian”) view. All foreigners outside the
middle kingdom were barbarians; the further away they were, the greater their barbarity
(Blacker 1964:125). Japanese study of and exposure to foreign cultures from 1850 to
1895 consisted mainly of academic study and cultural exchanges of several types.
During the Tokugawa era, Western learning in Japan included study of Western
languages, medicine, the physical sciences, the arts, and late in the period, military
science and foreign affairs. Japan’s sustained effort to acquire advanced Western
knowledge during the Tokugawa and Meiji eras was a decisive factor in its rise to great
power status in the late 1800s and early 1900s.1142 The Shogunate established the Bansho
Shirabesho (the Institute for the Investigation of Barbarian Books), a forerunner of Tokyo
University, in 1855, as Japan’s first centralized educational facility for the study,
translation, and teaching of Western languages, science and technology.1143 In the early
Meiji period, English replaced the Dutch language as the most important Western
language studied in Japan, and was considered essential for the mastery of Western
technologies important for modernization. Study of English stressed reading skills to
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For most of the Tokugawa period, Western learning was called Dutch learning, since Japan acquired
most of its knowledge from the Dutch during this period, because the Dutch were the only Europeans with
whom they were allowed to trade (Japan, “Western Learning,” 1697-1698).
1143
Ibid., “Bansho Shirabesho,” 100.
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master such knowledge, not oral skills.1144 Another area of western learning important
for Japan’s modernization was the study of foreign law, the concepts of which required
careful adaptation for the Japanese context.1145 Foreign law would have important
impacts on Japan’s constitutions (1889 and 1947), its politics, and the lives of all
Japanese persons.
Japan is famous for its important cultural exchanges and embassies sent abroad to
acquire foreign knowledge, some of which occurred in ancient times.1146 In the late
Tokugawa and early Meiji eras, the Shogunate missions to the West (1860s) and the
Iwakura mission (1871-1873) provided unexpected perspectives on Western societies for
embassy members and a systematic way for the government to learn about the West,
helping to motivate some of the travelers to question the traditional social and political
systems in Japan.1147 After Japan opened to foreign exchange in the late 1800s, its
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Ibid., “English Language Training,” 342-343. Such an approach to English instruction was highly
pragmatic and utilitarian, geared toward training all Japanese to master English for the building of the
nation. The stress on reading skills made sense, since in Meiji Japan, very few Japanese would ever meet
foreigners or travel abroad. But this choice affected generations of Japanese and their ability to relate well
to foreigners in intercultural interaction. Today Japan’s huge, national JET (Japan English Teaching)
program, where several thousand young foreigners are brought to Japan to teach English and other foreign
languages every year, is an attempt to overcome these difficulties. Anthropological explorations of the JET
program are found in David L. McConnell, Importing Diversity: Inside Japan's JET Program (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2000) and David L. McConnell, “JET Lag: Studying a Multilevel Program
Over Time,” in Doing Fieldwork in Japan, ed. T.C. Bestor et al. (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press,
2003), 124-38.
1145
Ibid., “Study of Foreign Law,” 399.
1146
From the seventh through the tenth centuries A.D., during China’s Sui and Tang dynasties, Japan sent
(or scheduled) twenty-four different diplomatic missions to China, in order to promote diplomatic relations,
trade and cultural exchanges. Several embassies from China also visited Japan, and a few of the Japanese
missions stopped in Korea on the way. Embassies often included scholars and Buddhist monks. In
addition to enhancing economic, political, and cultural relations, some of these exchanges promoted great
changes in Japanese culture and politics, based on Chinese models, such as the administrative reforms of
Japan’s Taika Reform of 645 A.D. (Ibid., “Embassies to Sui and Tang China,” 1467).
1147
Fukuzawa Yukichi accompanied the 1862 mission. His bestselling book Conditions in the West was
very influential in the bunmei kaika (civilization and enlightenment) movement in the Meiji era. Several
important national leaders in the Meiji government accompanied the Iwakura mission. Through their
observation of life in the West, some of them better understood the social conditions necessary to support a
modern economy (Ibid., “Shogunate Missions to the West,” 1406 and “Iwakura Mission,” 641).
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international cultural exchange policy stressed the importation of foreign knowledge from
abroad into Japan, rather than the promotion of Japanese culture abroad, in order that
Japan might quickly be built into a strong, modern nation based on Western models.1148
Japan was affected by its contact with ideologies and movements gleaned from
foreign cultures. Underlying this has been the Japanese concept of the West, which is
rather problematic in its imprecision, but tends to emphasize geographic aspects and
racial identity.1149 Among the important ideologies and intellectual trends in this period
was the bunmei kaika (“civilization and enlightenment”) movement, initiated by the Meiji
government to instill Western thought and cultural practices in the populace at large.1150
In the private sector, intellectuals like Fukuzawa Yukichi, Mori Arinori, Kato Hiroyuki
and their Meirokusha society attempted to introduce Western culture, social institutions,
and “enlightenment thought” across the fields of culture, economics and politics through
their writings and debates. These intellectuals greatly influenced the bunmei kaika
movement, and served as its leaders. Increased exposure to the West led to greater
acceptance of Western ideas such as political liberty, seen in the rise of democratic
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Ibid., “International Cultural Exchange,” 615. While this is basically true, as soon as Japan began the
process of colonizing outlying regions such as Hokkaido, Okinawa, and Taiwan, the attempt to
systematically transfer Japanese culture to those areas, and develop them economically, also began. For
Taiwan, the process began in 1895.
1149
The Japanese have used the word Seiyô for the West since the mid-1800s. It literally means “the
western seas” as related to China, historically viewed as the center of Japan’s known universe. The concept
of the West has changed greatly over the years, even recently (Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “The West,”
563-564).
1150
The government encouraged people to adopt Western diets, hairstyles, and clothing. It also initiated
cultural and technological innovations such as the telegraph, postal services, railroads, a national public
education system, and the West’s Gregorian calendar (Japan, “Meiji Enlightenment,” 946).
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movements.1151 Two other important Western-related intellectual influences beginning in
this period were Social Darwinism and feminism.1152
Concerning Japan’s interaction with foreign cultures in overseas locales from
1850 to 1895, the impact of many Japanese who studied abroad in the United States and
Europe and then returned home was great.1153 Japan has been aware of its cultural debt to
China throughout history, but from the late Tokugawa period, Japanese began to doubt
the Chinese tradition’s relevance for modernity for various reasons.1154 Japan’s cultural
debt to Korea is also deep, since it received many elements of its pre-modern culture
from Korea, or from China via Korea.1155 But problems from two attempted Japanese
invasions since the late 1500s, and Japanese pressures for influence in Korea in the late
1800s and early 1900s, contributed greatly to tensions between Japan and Korea from the
late 1800s to the present.1156 Japan’s cultural interaction with Southeast Asia, renewed in
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The Freedom and People’s Rights Movement was one such democratic movement. By 1880 the broad
acceptance of things Western led the Meiji government to counter the influence of Western culture by
attempting a revival of conservative Confucian thought (Ibid.; Encyclopedia of Contemporary,
“Enlightenment Intellectuals,” 124-125).
1152
For more on Social Darwinism in Japan, see my discussion of Mori Arinori and Kato Hiroyuki in
Chapter 3. For a brief overview of feminism in Japan, see Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Feminism,”
141-142.
1153
Japan, “United States and Japan,” 1656.
1154
These reasons included the weak response of China to both the West and to Japan throughout the
nineteenth century, revealed in China’s defeat in several conflicts, including the Opium War with Britain
(1840-1842), and the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). To intellectuals such as Fukuzawa Yukichi,
contemporary China seemed technologically and scientifically weak and philosophically stagnant,
compared with the West (Ibid., “China and Japan,” 188-189). See also Narsimhan, Japanese Perceptions.
1155
For example, many aspects of Japanese culture in the Jômon and Yayoi periods (10,000 B.C.-300 B.C.
and 300 B.C. -300 A.D.) are very similar to Korean culture of the same periods. Japan received Buddhism,
Confucianism and Chinese characters directly from the Korean kingdom of Paekche in the sixth century
A.D. (Ibid., “Korea and Japan,” 827).
1156
The tensions between China and Japan for influence in Korea led to the Sino-Japanese War (18941895), discussed above in this chapter. The Japanese victory in that war and the war with Russia (19041905) led to Japan’s formal colonization of Korea from 1910 to 1945 (Ibid., “Korea and Japan,” 827-828).
During the early 1900s, Japan had many inaccurate cultural images of China and Korea, reflected in
discrimination inflicted on Chinese and Korean residents in Japan. Japan devoted more cultural attention
toward learning from the West from 1868 to the 1920s. Though Japan’s cultural gaze again shifted to Asia
from the 1930s to 1945, at that time its imagery of China and Korea was clouded by militaristic and
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1868, included Japanese female prostitutes who worked chiefly on the Malay
Peninsula.1157 Immigration was never a major social trend in Japan.1158 While the
eventual impact of Japanese emigrants on the lands where they went is certainly
significant, the impact of emigration on Japan itself has been comparatively much
smaller.1159
Regarding Japanese interaction with foreign cultures within Japan (1850-1895),
relations with the United States had profound cultural influences on Japan. Foreign
teachers and visitors from the United States introduced many scientific, social, and
humanistic philosophies, as well as arts and religion, to young Japanese through schools
and universities.1160 Through foreign experts and teachers in Japan, German influence on
Japanese medicine and law and French influence on its economic thought and other areas
of culture were deep.1161 Several thousand foreign teachers and experts came to Japan to
both public and private sector education, helping Japan modernize in areas such as
engineering, agriculture, medicine, foreign affairs, and military science, where foreign

colonial ideologies. It is likely that accurate images of China and Korea have only recently emerged, in the
case of China, since the 1980s.
1157
These women were referred to as Karayuki-san (Ibid., “Southeast Asia and Japan,” 1449; Encyclopedia
of Contemporary, “Japayuki-san,” 233).
1158
Much larger percentages of the populations in nations such as Ireland, England and Italy have
emigrated overseas than from Japan. The major overseas destinations of Japanese emigrants in the early
Meiji period were Hawaii and the United States. Even if we consider the percentage of Japanese who
emigrated to Japan’s overseas colonies during Japan’s period of active overseas colonization, it still seems
small compared to Japan’s total population. (Japan, “Emigration,” 334).
1159
Ibid., 334-335. A significant example of the impact of Japanese emigrants on foreign lands is their huge
impact on agriculture in Hawaii, California, and Brazil, lands where they emigrated in fairly large numbers.
In California, the most productive agricultural state in the United States, Japanese emigrants in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries helped to pioneer the state’s enormously productive fruit and
vegetable growing industries. For more, see Ronald Takaki, A Different Mirror: A History of Multicultural
America (Boston: Little Brown Co, 1993).
1160
Japan, “United States and Japan,” 1656.
1161
Ibid., “Germany and Japan,” 452; Ibid., “France and Japan,” 407.
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knowledge was deemed useful.1162 Their impact on helping transform Japan from a
feudal society into a modern, great power in slightly more than a generation was huge.1163
Chinese immigrated to Japan after the nation opened to Western trade in 1853. Many
Westerners also brought Chinese employees, and by 1875, half of the foreign residents in
Japan (5,000) were Chinese. Most were merchants and professionals who settled in port
cities like Yokohama and Kobe.1164
Views of Japan’s External Cultural Relations, 1850-1895
Leaders’ Worldviews
Fukuzawa Yukichi. A key factor in Fukuzawa Yukichi’s view of foreign culture
is that he grew up in Kyushu near Nagasaki.1165 In the late 1850s, the thought of
traveling to a distant “barbarian” country was frightening to most Japanese. After two
hundred years of seclusion, they were “nervous,” “unadventurous,” and easily frightened
by Western things. Yet they felt (morally) “superior” to Western barbarians.1166 But
Fukuzawa was somewhat different. In San Francisco, he was impressed by various
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Most of the foreign instructors came from four countries: the United States, Great Britain, Germany,
and France (Ibid., “Foreign Employees of the Meiji Period,” 396-397).
1163
It is true that foreign instructors had a huge impact. They taught subjects requested by Japanese
authorities, and implemented policy decisions already made by Japan itself. In most cases, their salaries
were totally paid by Japan (at least for the public sector foreign employees) (Ibid.).
1164
Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Chinese in Japan,” 65-66.
1165
This exposed Fukuzawa to Western ideas flowing in via the Dutch at Deshima, an island outpost in
Nagasaki harbor. During the Tokugawa period, all trade with the Netherlands was relegated there, and the
Netherlands was the only Western nation allowed to trade with Japan. There was a tradition of Dutch
learning at Nakatsu, Fukuzawa’s home feudal domain, from the late 1700s. His love of Western
knowledge began when he was made curator of a large collection of Western books in Nagasaki at age
nineteen. A year later (1855), he was invited to attend a school of Dutch studies in Osaka. In 1858,
Fukuzawa transferred to teach Dutch studies in Edo. Soon he began to study English. By 1863 Japan’s
major diplomatic language had switched to English from Dutch, reflecting the increasing importance of
Britain in Japan’s diplomatic relations (Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 4, 14-16, 20, 22-27, 30, 33, 67).
1166
Ibid., 39. As an example of Japanese discomfort, some ignorant samurai attacked foreigners for
perceived insults. These could have caused foreign intervention. Fukuzawa believed that Chinese
ignorance of the West caused foreign intervention there (Ibid., 53-54).
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technologies, yet found Western male-female relationships shocking.1167 In Europe and
the United States, Fukuzawa treasured seeing things with his own eyes, but spent much
money on books, many for use in his school in Edo, to establish a foundation for modern
education in Japan. He believed that education through Western books was necessary for
Japan to achieve fukoku kyôhei (rich nation, strong army). He saw that in numerous
areas, Japan was weaker than the West, so fukoku kyôhei made sense.1168
Fukuzawa was very successful as a translator, but anxious to address a wider
Japanese audience.1169 Soon he began Conditions in the West (Seiyô Jijô) (first part
published in 1867). The first volume includes accounts of common western institutions,
technology, and essays on the history, politics, military, and public finance in the United
States, Britain, and Holland.1170
According to Fukuzawa, only through a spirit of freedom and independence could
people and nations improve themselves, and can Japan defend itself against the
“aggressive” West.1171 Individual duties are the foundation of Western civilized society
and the “well-being of states.”1172 Yet the key factor in whether societies succeed is
education. In the beginning, all people are created equal, but education makes the long-
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Ibid., 41. Among the technologies he found interesting were gaslights, tall stone buildings, factories and
steamships (Ibid., 41).
1168
Ibid., 49-50, 54, 56, 58. Japan’s areas of weakness included science, industry, politics, commerce, and
military strength (Ibid., 54).
1169
For this purpose, Fukuzawa privately distributed the unpublished Tojin Orai (How to Deal with
Foreigners) (1865) in simple Japanese, where he contended that the presence of foreigners in Japan and
interaction with them were unavoidable (Ibid., 70).
1170
Ibid., 69-71. The institutions treated include politics, taxes, currency, trading companies, schools, the
military, newspapers, and libraries. Areas of technology discussed include steam engines, steamships,
steam locomotives, and the telegraph. Fukuzawa argues that he has focused on the most pragmatic areas,
to help Japan decide whether each country is to be treated as friend or enemy, and the appropriate strategy,
military or other (Ibid.).
1171
Ibid., 90.
1172
Ibid., 72.
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term difference.1173 Fukuzawa founded Keio Gijuku (College), the first Japanese
institution that he opened, based on a Western model.1174 Building such institutions was
his way of helping to modernize Japan.1175 Fukuzawa also pioneered public debate in
Japan.1176
From 1866-1875, Fukuzawa published seventeen books on current global issues
such as western science, military affairs, British politics and diplomacy. During this
period, his greatest books were An Encouragement of Learning (1872/1876) and An
Outline of a Theory of Civilization (1875).1177 Both were bestsellers, and the former
became a national textbook for children.1178 By the mid-1870s, Fukuzawa no longer
viewed the West so positively. He lost patience with the pressures, “violence,” arrogance
and scandals of the Westerners in their interpersonal and international behavior, calling
them “inhumane white devils” and “aggressive foreigners.”1179 Fukuzawa’s role as a key
interpreter of Western civilization waned after this time.1180
Ito Hirobumi. Ito had mixed feelings about Western culture. As a young man,
prior to his first journey abroad, Ito harbored anger against foreign residents in Japan.1181
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Ibid., 89-90.
For the school, he adapted various Western customs, including standards of cleanliness, student
behavior, and time-keeping (Ibid., 82).
1175
Ibid., 80-82.
1176
Ibid., 139-140, 144-146. Fukuzawa built two famous debating halls in Tokyo in the 1870s and early
1880s, and started Japan’s first elite debating society, Kojunsha (Ibid., 139-141).
1177
Ibid., 87. In the second book, Fukuzawa claims he means to write an outline of western civilization for
the public, especially for older “Confucianist” readers. He begins by implying that all things, even the
West, must be seen and learned in relative terms (Ibid., 90-91).
1178
Ibid., 91.
1179
Ibid., 150-151. The terms in quotation marks here are direct quotes from Fukuzawa and from Tamaki,
Yukichi Fukuzawa.
1180
Ibid., 92-93. Fukuzawa’s role waned because he lost interest in translation work. Also the huge,
government-sponsored Iwakura mission returned to Japan in late 1873, and the large account of the mission
by Kume Kunitake (Tokumei zenkan-taishi Beiou Kairan jikki) was published in 1878 (Ibid., 92-93).
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Hamada, Prince Ito. Ito helped several others burn down the British legation house in Edo.
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In 1863, to learn how to operate a steamship, Ito and five others snuck aboard a foreign
freighter bound for Shanghai. Ito made it to London four months later, and was totally
enthralled by its technologies, wealth and power. To learn western culture, he lived in
the home of a London college professor for six months.1182 He grew to respect much of
the strength and wisdom of Western civilization. To strengthen Japan, he traveled abroad
several times throughout his life for extended research about Western societies.
Mori Arinori. After Mori’s first trip to Europe, he and five other Japanese
students traveled with an American to a Christian utopian religious colony in upstate
New York. This was Mori’s ticket to explore the United States.1183 Similar to Japan in
the late 1800s, the United States was a new kind of society that borrowed technology,
politics and culture from older societies, but was remaking itself and expanding in a
utilitarian fashion. Mori hoped that Japan would learn and borrow from the United States
as well.1184
One of the main purposes of Mori’s Life and Resources in America (1871), the
first comprehensive account of the United States written by a Japanese, was to inform the
members of the government’s Iwakura Mission about conditions in the United States.1185
Mori assumes that events in the U.S. are a foretaste of what will come to other
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Ibid., 33-34, 36-37.
Van Sant, Mori Arinori’s Life, xviii-xix. The colony was called the Brotherhood of the New Life. Mori
was impressionable, and clearly affected by the utopian view of Christianity he experienced in New York
(Ibid., xix).
1184
Ibid., xxv.
1185
Van Sant, Mori Arinori. The book is also meant to appeal to the interests of his Japanese audience. It is
one of the few works available in English on a nineteenth or twentieth century non-Westerner’s view of the
United States (Ibid., xxiii). Mori wrote the book with the assistance of others, including Charles Lanman,
his secretary. Curiously, the book was never translated into Japanese, perhaps because of sensitive political
conditions in Japan, or Mori’s own busyness (Akira Iriye in Mori Arinori’s Life and Resources in America,
ed. John E. Van Sant [Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004], x-xi. x, xxii-xxiv).
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nations.1186 The range of subjects covered in the book is quite comprehensive, covering
many areas of American life, politics, economics, infrastructure, society, and culture.1187
Mori is also struck by the difference between American ideals and actual reality, and by
the importance of religious, philanthropic and educational organizations in American
life.1188
Kato Hiroyuki. A key area of Kato Hiroyuki’s thought about intercultural
interaction concerns religion.1189 He attacks it as “the enemy of all learning,” and
mistakenly believed that all religions and related ethical systems are based upon theistic
supernaturalism.1190 He views religion through the lens of evolution. Religion has had
powerful impacts on progress, more the result of social evolution.1191 Ethical systems
evolve over time, and the struggle for power provides the basis for moral evolution.
Religious ethics provide great “motivating power,” but hinder civilization.1192 Kato asks
important questions about religion, and yet Winston Davis concludes that his attack on
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Van Sant, Mori Arinori, xxiii. This assumption is also found in similar books, such as Tocqueville’s
Democracy in America (Ibid., xxiii)
1187
Areas covered include America’s government and politics, agriculture, amusements, transportation,
commerce and trade, banking and finance, manufacturing, industries, religion, education, culture and
science, natural resources, the military, cities, and frontier life.
1188
Akira Iriye in Van Sant, Mori Arinori, x-xi. Examples of these ironic aspects of American society for
Mori include racial prejudice, political corruption, and failure of American Christians to always follow
their faith (Ibid., x-xi). Mori strongly suggests that Christianity is a “leading element” in the search for
civilization, and later argued that it should be adopted by Japan as the national religion. He seems to accept
the prevalent nineteenth century Western notion that there was a “connection to Christianity, ‘progress’ and
‘civilization’” (Ibid., xxvii).
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Here I consider Kato’s thought on Japan’s religious systems that originated outside Japan in this
section—namely Confucianism, Buddhism and Christianity. Kato’s views of Japan’s primary indigenous
religion, Shinto, are considered in Chapter 3 in the section on leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s domestic
society.
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An exception is Buddhism in its original form, which included no belief in a god or gods.
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Davis, Moral and Political, 83-85.
1192
Ibid., 122.
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religion was rather dogmatic and primitive.1193 Concerning major world religions,1194
Kato’s childhood was steeped in neo-Confucianism, the main support for the Shogunate,
and he based his personal philosophy of utilitarianism on conventional Confucian
virtues.1195 He admired the Confucian model of relationships, and condemned the ethics
of more universal religions.1196 Yet Confucianism provided an inadequate foundation for
modern ethics.1197 He was generally critical of Buddhism, an “otherworldly”1198 religion
that he charged hypnotizes people against their natural mental capacities. It adapted well
to the Japanese context, and seemed harmless, but was unscientific.1199 Kato was most
critical of Christianity, what he called a great “insult” to Japan’s national essence
(kokutai).1200
A second area of intercultural interaction in Kato’s time was the issue of Japan’s
unequal treaties with the West. Japan had to prove it was modern and civilized. The
Western nations pressured it to allow their traders, diplomats and missionaries to dwell
there. Various conservative scholars in Japan, including Kato, argued that allowing
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His questions include the relationship of the “is” of science and the “oughts” of religion and ethics, the
claims of faith versus the state, and whether gods are real (Ibid.).
1194
The various assertations here about the nature of non-Japanese religions here are Kato’s, not my own.
1195
These include filial piety, loyalty, righteousness, and benevolence (Ibid., 85).
1196
According to Kato, these religions failed to recognize the particularism in all moral relationships (how
moral obligations determine the particular relationship one has with another person) (Ibid., 86).
1197
Ibid., 85-88. For example, in China, some Confucian rituals were still observed, but often altered, and
included many lapses. Confucianism in China failed to protest against many social evils, such as the
criminal code (Ibid., 87).
1198
This is a direct quote.
1199
Ibid., 95-96.
1200
Ibid., 90-94. Kato published a series of three books attacking Christianity from 1907-1909. These were
republished in 1911 as The Perniciousness of Christianity. Like many Japanese nationalists, he resented
the criticisms of Christians of Japan’s emperor-worship, and its treatment of women. While modern
science rose in the Christian West, he condemned Christianity as unscientific. And while it claimed to be
the great faith of love, Christian nations were nationalistic and imperialistic. Yet early Christianity made
great contributions to human progress (Ibid., 90-94).
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“mixed residence” too soon would threaten the Japanese with extinction.1201 Meiji
Japanese thinkers saw Japanese as racially inferior to Caucasians.1202 Kato also saw the
West as superior in science. The main area where the Japanese could show their
superiority was in moral superiority and evolution.1203
Comparison of Worldviews on Japan’s External Cultural Relations (1850-1895)
To compare the worldviews of these leaders on Japan’s external cultural relations
(1850-1895), we can organize their views into several primary categories: views of and
attitudes toward culture, views of (foreign) religions, attitudes toward foreigners and
interactions with them, views of foreign learning and books, of foreign technology, and
of overseas travel and study. Regarding culture, Fukuzawa believes that while all peoples
are created equal, education is the key factor in determining how far different societies
progress. Books are also a key way to learn about foreign cultures. Individual duty and
responsibility are also fundamental bases for any “civilized” or highly developed country.
Yet cultures, even the West, must be judged in relative terms. On Japanese culture, only
by a spirit of independence and freedom in various cultural realms can help Japan or any
society grow. Education and educational institutions are a key way of accomplishing this.
Adopting some Western customs and styles of communication and thought may also help
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Also see the discussion on the issue of mixed residence in Chapter 3, in the section on Japan’s domestic
society.
1202
Unoura, “Samaurai Darwinism,” 243-244. Unlike the Germans, however, Unoura argues that the
Japanese did not overtly apply Social Darwinism to developing a sense of racial superiority to their Asian
neighbors, including the Chinese and the Koreans (Ibid., 248). But they did apply an evolutionisticinfluenced concept of hierarchy to their images of nations and peoples, to determine which were stronger or
weaker, more superior or inferior.
1203
Ibid., 247-248. This moral superiority was seen in bushido and the devotion of Japanese to the emperor
and the state.
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Japan to modernize.1204 Yet Japan must defend itself, culturally and otherwise, against the
West.1205 Compared with the West, Japan presently has many weaknesses,1206 and yet
Japan has moral superiority.1207 These leaders recognize many positive aspects of
Western culture. According to Ito, Western civilization has much wisdom, power, and
Western technology and wealth are amazing. Westerners are racially and scientifically
superior to Japanese,1208 and show much individual responsibility.1209 The general
progress in the United States, despite its many struggles, offers a foretaste of coming
global trends.1210 But there are negative aspects of Western culture. Westerners are
perceived as “aggressive,” violent, arrogant, and “inhumane” on multiple levels.1211 Japan
must overcome inequalities in its relations with the West.1212
Among these leaders, most of their attitudes about foreign religions, especially
Western religions, are negative.1213 While foreign religions provide great inspiration, they
limit civilization’s development. Foreign religion has affected progress only indirectly, as
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Here I am referring to Fukuzawa’s advocacy of Western-style public debate.
All of these points are Fukuzawa’s opinions.
1206
This is Fukuzawa’s point.
1207
This is Kato’s argument.
1208
Kato.
1209
Fukuzawa.
1210
Mori. He also finds that there are conflicts between American ideals and actual practice (Van Sant,
Mori Arinori).
1211
Fukuzawa. The terms in quotes are direct quotations from Fukuzawa.
1212
Kato. According to him, Japan’s unequal economic treaties with the West are one example of what
must be overcome.
1213
The strong exception to this is Mori, who takes a very positive view of Christianity (noted above,
especially in Chapter 3). Positively, Mori finds that religion and charity make many positive contributions
to American life (Van Sant, Mori Arinori). For the most part, these leaders do not consider Shinto to be a
“religion,” but more a deep, heartfelt, indigenous spiritual practice that at times is highly connected with
patriotism and a love for Japan. The term “religion” in Japanese, shukyo, literally translates into English as
“sect-teaching.” Before the Meiji era, before Buddhism and Shinto were formally and legally organized
into strict sects, in informal practice, they often intermixed, even at the same temples and shrines. This may
help explain why even today, many Japanese do not view Shinto (“the way of the gods”) as a “sectteaching,” or religion, while they more easily see Buddhism (Bukkyo, “Buddha’s teaching”) or Christianity
(Kirisutokyo, “Christ’s teaching”) as such.
411
1205

a product of social evolution. To Kato, foreign religions seem superstitious.1214 Kato
finds foreign religions contrary to learning, unscientific in general and in their ethics, as
opposed to science, which stresses actual reality.1215 Kato also faults universal ethical
systems, which fail to consider relational differences.1216 Kato reserves the most scathing
criticisms for Christianity, which he finds totally contrary to Japanese culture.1217
Regarding foreigners and interacting with them, these leaders, besides Mori, are
mostly negative. Above I noted the ethnocentric attitude held by most Japanese in the late
Tokugawa period that Japanese were morally superior to foreigners and Westerners, and
their fear about interacting with foreigners or traveling abroad. Yet interaction with the
West and with foreigners was unavoidable for Japan; Japanese must learn how.1218 Japan
must prove to the West that it was civilized and modern.1219 Despite these wise
conclusions, even these leaders struggled with these interactions, practically and
intellectually.1220
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Kato implies this. As noted above, he falsely believes that all non-Japanese religions are based on
theistic supernaturalism.
1215
Recall above where I noted that Kato argues that foreign religion focuses on “oughts” and “shoulds”
(i.e. ethical issues) while science focuses on the “is’s” or actual facts of reality. Recall the discussion in
Chapter 6, where I noted that Kato essentially argues that Confucianism, Buddhism and Christianity all fail
in their handling of ethics, in their unscientific approaches. In Chapter 5, I noted Kato’s argument that a
new scientific morality will eventually guide international relations. This new morality is largely based on
evolutionistic thinking. There are flaws in this thought. What then becomes of issues of justice involving
the weak, minorities, and the poor?
1216
Thus Kato prefers Confucian social ethics and its values such as filial piety and loyalty, although he
also finds that they fail to handle modernity adequately.
1217
Recall Kato’s arguments mentioned above, that Christianity is imperialistic, nationalistic, and intolerant
of Japanese spirituality and the kokutai. All of the negative points about foreign religions in this paragraph
are Kato’s.
1218
This is Fukuzawa’s essential argument, and partly why he devoted so much effort to writing many
books about the West for popular Japanese audiences, even though after the mid-1870s, his attitude toward
interacting with Westerners turned sour, when he called them aggressive and violent.
1219
Kato.
1220
Recall how when young, Ito was angry about the presence of foreigners in Japan, and helped to burn
down the British legation house, how Fukuzawa felt overwhelmed when he saw male-female interactions in
412

While interacting with foreigners seemed a huge challenge, these leaders show a
much more eager attitude about Japan’s need to master the “superior” fruits and
knowledge of Western civilization. Japan should learn and borrow from the West,
especially from the United States, according to Mori. Japanese must also understand
global affairs and Western civilization.1221 These leaders also supported foreign learning
in their own lives, seen in their study of foreign languages and numerous trips abroad for
observation and research.1222 If possible, it is worthwhile to travel overseas to research
the West, and to obtain foreign knowledge.1223 Observing things firsthand is valuable.1224
Yet not all can travel or go abroad. It is important for Japanese to learn about Western
culture and institutions through books or any other means possible.1225 These attitudes
about absorbing foreign knowledge through books or overseas learning are also seen in
the leaders’ attitudes about learning Western technologies.1226
Conceptual Analysis of Worldviews on Japan’s External Cultural Relations (18501895)
Development Issues. In terms of the concept of internationalization, if we
examine these worldviews on Japan’s external cultural relations, how did the absorption
of Japan into the Western-dominated global economy affect the various cultural features
identified in these worldviews? The positive attitude toward education seen in
San Francisco, and Kato worried that premature “mixed residence” of Westerners and Chinese in Japan
might damage Japan’s survival.
1221
Fukuzawa.
1222
Fukuzawa especially focused on English (after Dutch), Mori on English, and Kato on German.
Fukuzawa, Mori, and Ito often traveled and studied abroad.
1223
Fukuzawa, Ito and Mori.
1224
Fukuzawa.
1225
Fukuzawa, Ito.
1226
Ito believed that Western technology was great, and should be learned by Japanese. That is why he
stole aboard a ship (to learn to pilot it), and first traveled to London. Fukuzawa found Western technologies
in daily life in the West highly impressive.
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Fukuzawa’s view of culture was nothing new, but a reflection of the Confucian respect
for learning that was several millennia old. But his emphasis, and Mori’s, on the
importance of “individual” duty and responsibility does seem a reflection of Western
cultural influence. As leaders such as Fukuzawa and Mori reflected on the West’s
technological and economic successes, and Western culture, they could not help but
notice the strong emphasis on individual duty and morality common to Western cultures.
Education would expedite the technical transference of knowledge and expertise, but
independence, freedom, and creativity were more “spiritual,” and could not be so easily
copied. Fukuzawa thought that actually adopting Western customs to some degree would
help, but the process seems rather tricky. To what degree did Japan master the
transference of not only the technical aspects of various areas of knowledge and
technology, but also the value- and “spirit”-related components? Technically, it seems
that Japan mastered many of these technologies very impeccably, evidenced most clearly
in its rapid industrialization, economic growth, and the victory in the Sino-Japanese War.
But mastering the spirits of individual freedom, independence and creativity seemed
more much more elusive, given the conservative, authoritarian tendencies of Japanese
culture and politics in this era and after. What was the effect of the generally negative
view of Western religion and Christianity that prevailed in late Tokugawa and Meiji
Japan on Japan’s mastery of individualism and freedom? Though creativity in the arts
and literature has never been lacking in Japan, and a brief era of increased liberalism
occurred in the Taisho era (1912-1926), this influence seems rather small.1227 So while
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I say this because, although Christianity has exercised a relatively large cultural influence in Japan, in
the establishment of social institutions, hospitals, and universities, the number of Christians in the society
414

Japan’s full entry into the world economy greatly increased its economic and even
cultural interactions with the outside world, I wish to argue that key elements of Japan’s
core cultural identity did not really change as a result of this interaction.
But what did these processes mean for Japan’s external cultural relations?
Perceptive leaders and thinkers such as Fukuzawa and Mori identified important cultural
factors behind Western science and technology that they hoped Japan could absorb. It
seems that although Japan was superb at mastering the technical aspects of many
techniques, it did not master the accompanying “spirits” and values of freedom and
individualism nearly as well. Did Japan project these cultural “spirits” of freedom,
individualism and creativity abroad, in its foreign relations and interactions? This is the
key question relevant to Chapter 6 that internationalization asks. Theoretically, if these
spirits and values are key to technological success, and Japan wished to help its Asian
neighbors, it should have also desired to share these values. I must respond that no, Japan
did not project these spirits of creativity, individualism and freedom abroad in this era. If
it did not master them internally, how could they have been projected externally? Rather,
in the Sino-Japanese War and pressures projected in its relations with places such as
Korea and Taiwan, I would argue that Japan basically projected a negative “Western”
(and Eastern) value: aggression.
Technology issues. What were the most important technology-related ideas and
phenomena associated with these worldviews of external cultural relations? They
included education, education-related knowledge, methods of communication and
has never been large, never more than one percent of the total population. It does not seem that Christianity
has changed the fundamental core of Japanese culture, which tends to be highly oriented toward conformity
and harmony within groups.
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education that brought foreign cultures and technologies to Japan, including ships, the
telegraph, the modern postal system, universities, schools, Western education, educators
and styles of teaching, foreign language pedagogy and pedagogies (Western or Japanese)
for teaching of these areas of foreign cultural knowledge. Scientific and technological
areas of knowledge included science education and pedagogy, experimentation, the
culture of Western science and education transferred into the Japanese environment,
scientific and evolutionary theories.1228 Western cultural products included music,
literature, religion, and art. How did foreign religions relate to the transference of this
knowledge? Some foreign teachers who came to Japan were religious, often Christian. A
good example is William S. Clark, a professor from Massachusetts who taught
agriculture and Christianity as ethics at the forerunner of Hokkaido University. He
converted many of his students to Christ and famously urged them, “Boys, be
ambitious!” Many foreign instructors, some of whom were foreign language and English
teachers, and others who were Christian missionaries, helped establish universities,
schools and hospitals. Their general teaching had a great impact on the transference of
Western cultural knowledge into Japan, especially in the teaching of English, a primary
gateway for learning many other forms of Western knowledge. They collectively had a
huge impact, sometimes intangible, on Japan’s quest for foreign knowledge and culture,
in providing the first and only interaction of many Japanese with foreigners.
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Some of these “scientific” and evolutionary theories also offered support for a reemerging Japanese
sense of moral superiority over the West and other Asian nations, too (thanks to Peter Van Arsdale for this
insight).
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What are the most significant cultural factors present in the imported technologies
and related ideas in these worldviews of Japan’s external cultural relations?1229 While
Western education models exposed Japanese to more rhetorical styles of teaching and
examples of creativity, Japanese education tended to stress more rote learning styles.
Some universities may have been organized on Western lines, but functionally and
socially, remained very Japanese. Japanese easily mastered experimentation and
observation in Western-inspired science education. They were excellent learners of
English reading and writing, but due to differences in language study and emphasis, their
mastery of spoken English was often of a lower level.1230 The geographic isolation of
Japan did not affect their mastery of the technical aspects of this cultural knowledge, but
language challenges and cultural differences did hamper the general mastery by Japanese
of English and other languages for face-to-face interactions with foreigners. This latter
struggle reflects the general awkwardness of interaction with foreigners with which many
Japanese in this era struggled.
Did the international system affect these technologies/issues positively or
negatively? Japan was able to import virtually all the areas of foreign knowledge it
desired, and master them. The system of knowledge importation and learning mainly
emphasized technical mastery of information for contribution to the growth of Japan,
technologically and economically, not the gaining of intercultural skills for interaction
with foreigners and foreign cultures. This difference was not an effect of the international
system, but likely an after-effect of the extreme cultural isolation of Japan during the
1229

Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, 11; Hayashi, The Japanese Experience, 52.
The English language education system of Meiji Japan focused on the mastery of books and written
knowledge, not on oral English for communication.
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Tokugawa period, and continuing geographic isolation in the Meiji era. And the practical
purpose of this knowledge was to contribute to the building of the nation, usually not to
prepare Japanese for study or travel abroad.
Who were the main international actors in the external environment, or domestic
actors, individual or state, involved? On the international level, the main individual actors
who were Westerners included foreign teachers, scientists, researchers, and engineers
working in Japan. International individual actors who were Japanese included teachers,
scholars, government officials and business people who had traveled or studied abroad.
On the domestic level, individual actors who were Japanese included teachers, scholars,
scientists, and engineers who remained in Japan. State and institutional actors on the
international level included foreign governments and ministries (both of which had rather
limited influence), Western religious institutions (churches and missionary societies),
educational institutions and universities. State and institutional actors who were Japanese
on the international level included the Japanese government, the Ministry of Education,
other ministries (such as Foreign Affairs) which sent Japanese scholars abroad or brought
foreign teachers to Japan, and private educational institutions (such as Keio and Waseda
Universities) which brought foreign teachers to Japan. State or institutional actors on the
domestic level included the Japanese government, the Ministry of Education, private
educational institutions and universities, public and private schools, museums, and
religious institutions.
What was the impact of these actors on transfers of knowledge and ideas related
to external cultural relations? Western teachers, scientists, and Japanese teachers and
scholars who traveled abroad had huge impacts, in what they taught and transferred to
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Japanese students. Of the latter, one example is Fukuzawa, although most Japanese
instructors did not travel abroad. Western religious institutions, schools and universities
also had a fairly large influence on spreading knowledge of Western culture and English
language. Foreign governments had limited impact, though foreign educational
organizations also had some influence. The Japanese government, private educational
institutions, and public and private schools and universities also had a large influence in
spreading knowledge of Western culture, language, and technologies to the Japanese
mainstream population at large, and on whether they were favored or rejected by the
public.
From these cases of cultural and technological transfers, what lessons do we learn,
and how could these transfers have been improved? It seems easier to transfer the actual
technical hardware of a technology or cultural item, rather than the culture, context or
“spirit” that surrounds it, uses it, or causes it to flourish. Various individual and
institutional actors here made huge contributions to the spread of Western culture and
related technologies and ideas in this period. It is not possible to say here which actors
had the most influence.1231 The encounter with Western ideas, creativity and influence
had a huge, stimulating influence on Japanese arts, literature, and many other areas of
culture. To repeat, various surface features of Japan’s culture changed, but most of its
core cultural features did not change that much.
What are the most significant cultural factors and values present in the imported
technologies and ideas in these worldviews?1232 The most important cultural factors that
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More in-depth case studies would be necessary to answer that.
Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, 11; Hayashi, The Japanese Experience, 52.
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were present included targeted learning, debate, argument, Western logic, scientific
experimentation and rationality, foreign knowledge, diversity of opinion, new political
and cultural ideas, knowledge of the world, foreign conditions, their cultures, and
creativity. The most important cultural values included freedom, individuality,
independence, choice, and values connected with Western art, diversity, democracy,
liberalism, and several philosophies that mainstream Japanese considered highly radical,
such as anarchy and feminism.
In these worldviews, how did the leaders concerned use these technologies/ideas
as means or agencies to cope with and transform Japan’s (material) environments on the
international level? Of the individual actors we have considered, Ito negotiated with
foreign governments to improve Japan’s economic and political standing on the
international stage and helped import some important Western political concepts and
institutions into Japan, including the Diet and the Constitution. Fukuzawa had more
domestic than international cultural impact. Mori guided Japanese overseas (in
Washington DC, on the Iwakura Mission) to learn more about the West.
How did these technological issues affect or enhance Japan’s survival in the
international system or environment? Western nations were more impressed with Japan
after observing its political development (i.e. the Diet and the Constitution), and seeing
its victory in Sino-Japanese War, so they granted Japan more autonomy and diplomatic
recognition. Though their attitudes toward Japan were still highly racist, and they did not
necessarily agree with Japan’s conduct in the Sino-Japanese War, soon Western powers
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were more willing to sign treaties with Japan, for example, the Anglo-Japanese alliance
of 1902.
Did the belief systems of any of these leaders (on technology-related issues in
these cultural worldviews, on the international level) blind them to certain realities? All
these leaders prefer to absorb cultural knowledge from foreign cultures that they believe
have superior knowledge (from the West). They favor knowledge from cultures that
appear scientific, modern, more powerful, wealthy and advanced. This bias makes most
of the leaders here (except Yamagata, not considering in this chapter) favor Western
sources of knowledge over Asian and Confucian ones. But while these leaders desire
advanced Western knowledge and cultural products to help modernize Japan and defend
it against the West, they struggle with what will happen to Japanese identity and culture
as this occurs. They know that there are many positive aspects of Japanese culture that
must be preserved. While the West has superior technology, they do not believe that its
culture is superior (except perhaps Mori). Their general rejection of Western religion and
Christianity, except for Mori, suggests that they realize deep down that while Japan may
be very successful in acquiring Western technology and knowledge, it cannot and must
not jettison its core identity, its soul. The eagerness to learn and accept Western
knowledge and technology was great, but willingness to accept Western culture only
went as far as necessary to facilitate acceptance of the first two. They also expressed
extreme awkwardness expressed at having to learn to interact with Westerners. This also
reflects the great ambivalence present in Japan: a desire to accept foreign technologies
and knowledge without having to accept the presence of foreigners, or to keep their
presence as minimal as possible.
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To which realities are the leaders blinded, and how? The leaders here are biased
toward the West and against Asia. This blinds them to the fact that mainland Asian
countries and peoples did not feel the need or want much of any foreign presence in their
midst, including a Japanese one. It also temporarily blinded several of these leaders to the
wisdom of many aspects of Asian and Japanese heritage (especially Fukuzawa and Mori,
on Confucian and Chinese influences).
Do the leaders fail to adjust their decisions or viewpoints to changing conditions
and reality? These leaders adjusted their viewpoints to changing conditions very rapidly,
especially regarding both the West and events in nearby Asia. Yet I would argue that
their general pro-Western, anti-Asian bias tended to blind them toward realistic
conditions in Asia outside Japan, and the true desires of those regions’ peoples.
How do these factors affect transfer or policy outcomes? The general blindness
and bias seen in these regarding the rest of Asia definitely affected policy outcomes in
this era and shortly after. Fukuzawa, as we noted earlier in this chapter, was angry against
China, and his Jiji Shinpo newspaper reflected this. Ito took a paternalistic attitude
toward Korea, and Kato saw other Asians as racially inferior to Japanese. Did these
attitudes reflect those of more Japanese leaders? While we cannot be certain, given the
actions of Japan in the Sino-Japanese War, this seems a strong possibility.
In these worldviews on external cultural relations, is the concept of
technonationalism as ideology manifested? If so, how? Technonationalism as ideology is
manifested in a very basic way here, in the goal of several of these leaders (Fukuzawa,
Mori, Ito, and Kato) to strengthen Japan for its own security and survival, through its
mastery of Western technology and appropriate cultural products that are helpful for
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those ends. While they admire many of the advanced features of Western culture, they are
not blind to Western aggression. Their primary goal in helping Japan attain knowledge of
various areas of Western culture is not sheer intellectual fascination, but rather Japan’s
national survival. Their generally negative attitude toward Western religion reflects their
concern with protecting Japan’s cultural identity and core. Even Mori only wished to use
Christianity because he believed that it could help Japan become great. Interacting with
foreigners, Westerners or Asians, was very challenging for most Japanese, seen in the
attitudes of the leaders here. Yet despite these challenges, the great efforts of these
leaders in various cultural areas to strengthen Japan’s interactions with the outside world,
in their writings, research, work in various areas of policy advocacy, their travel abroad,
and study of Western culture, economics, politics, and science, all reflect one supreme
goal: to strengthen Japan so its own security is assured.
Cognition Issues. Image. The main images about Japan’s external cultural
relations include issues of culture, the West, social relations and intercultural interaction,
social development, and religion. Fukuzawa suggests that while all humans are created
equal, not all cultures are equal. A key factor in the different levels of cultural
development of different societies is varying levels of educational achievement. He also
suggests that all cultures, even the West’s, must be judged in relative, not absolute, terms.
On Western culture, early exposure to it created favorable impressions and lessened the
fear of it in Fukuzawa and Mori.1233 These leaders call Western culture impressive
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Remember that Fukuzawa and Mori both grew up in southwestern Japan (Kyushu), the region that had
the most contact with Western culture during national isolation in the Tokugawa period.
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(Fukuzawa, Mori), possessing much strength and wisdom (Ito), and Westerners racially
superior to Japanese (Kato).
Western books, and the knowledge that comes from them, are highly valuable for
Japanese, a potential foundation for Japanese cultural reformation, so they should be used
in education. They will help make Japan strong and wealthy.1234 Fukuzawa observes that
individual duties are the foundation of Western civilized society and the “well-being of
states.” It is worthwhile to study and learn Western culture, abroad if possible.1235
Regarding Western technology and culture, the West’s technology, wealth and power are
all impressive (Fukuzawa and Ito), and the West is superior to Japan in science (Kato), so
Japanese should learn Western technology and culture (Fukuzawa, Ito, Mori). And yet
the West is “aggressive” (Fukuzawa). There is sometimes a dissonance between Western
values and actual sociocultural conditions (Mori). So there is some ambivalence in these
images of Western culture and society.
There are extensive images on “foreign” religions, especially from Kato.1236 Kato
calls religion evil.1237 Religious ethics give great “motivating power,” but hinder
civilization (Kato). His images and thought on religion are colored by evolutionism.
Religion has strongly affected human progress, but because of social evolution, not
because of religion’s intrinsic nature. According to Kato, morality and ethics evolve over
time, and are based on the struggle for power. Kato sees conflicts between foreign
1234

All of these points about Western books and knowledge are images of Fukuzawa’s.
This is seen in the life examples of Fukuzawa, Ito and Mori, who all studied and traveled abroad at
many points in their lives.
1236
Remember that Kato does not see Shinto as a “religion.” He sees all religious and ethical systems that
did not originate in Japan as foreign, even if they have adapted to Japan and flourished there for centuries,
as in the case of Buddhism and Confucianism. All Kato’s comments here, on religion, morality, and ethics,
are generally directed at religious and ethical systems he considered foreign.
1237
Kato called religion the “enemy of all learning.”
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religions and reality, foreign religions and science, for example, between the “is” of
science and the “oughts” of religion and ethics, faith versus the state, and whether the
gods are real.1238 To Kato, neo-Confucian values and the Confucian model of social
relations are more admirable than the ethics of more universal religions. But
Confucianism provides an inadequate basis for modern ethics, since it fails to handle
many modern social evils.1239 Buddhism is negative since it hypnotizes people against
their “natural mental capacities,” and Christianity is ethnocentric, anti-Japanese,
unscientific, hypocritical, and imperialistic, although it has made many contributions to
human progress. Kato’s images of Christianity greatly contrast with Mori’s, who sees it
as very positive, and believes that it has made many contributions to America and the
West. Its spirit of independence and individualism are very important, and likely part of
the reason for the West’s success in science. So Japan needs Christianity or least
Christian-inspired scientific values.
These leaders offer extensive images about the challenge for Japanese to relate to
Westerners. While Fukuzawa soon argued, after traveling abroad, that Japanese must
learn how to interact with foreigners, and that doing so in Japan would be unavoidable,
Kato and Ito worried about the presence of Westerners in Japan and the effect it could
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It is interesting to realize that though Kato saw conflicts between “foreign” religions and
science/reality, he drew on ideologies based on Japanese spirituality, Shinto, to support Japanese
nationalism, patriotism, and evolutionary arguments for descent of the Japanese people from the divine
emperor, into one “family-state.”
1239
Neo-Confucian values reflect such qualities as filial piety, benevolence, and loyalty. In the Confucian
model of social relations, morality exercised is based on relational particulars. In Kato’s mind, universal
religions ignore these relational aspects of morality. But Confucianism, in its stress on proper ritual, fails to
address many modern social evils.
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have on Japan’s culture.1240 Fukuzawa himself struggled with these interactions.1241
Despite this, Fukuzawa argues that for Japan to improve, it desperately needs knowledge
of Western culture and the adoption of certain Western cultural practices.1242
A final type of images regarding Japan’s external cultural relations concerns how
social change and development are affected by international factors. Fukuzawa argues
that building social institutions based on Western models and incorporating Western
customs is a key way to help Japan modernize.1243 Several further factors are identified as
key: education, “spirits” of freedom and independence, and vitality in religion.1244
How do these images function as perceptual filters or organizing devices? These
images stress cultural relativism and a hierarchical view of different cultures. The culture
and knowledge of the West is seen as positive, though its behavior is not. These images
would cause policymakers to fear the West yet admire it, and to reject Asian models for
cultural change. The negative bias of Kato’s images of “foreign” religions is notable. He
finds nothing positive about Christianity, though he quietly acknowledges that science
1240

Ito worried about the presence of Westerners in Japan, and remember that Kato worried about the threat
of “mixed residence” if Westerners were allowed to live in Japan too soon. These fears reflect the
inexperience and fears of most Japanese in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods concerning
interaction with Westerners.
1241
Recall how Fukuzawa was shocked at male-female interactions when he visited San Francisco, and
how in the mid-1870s he called Westerners arrogant, scandalous, and violent in their interpersonal (and
international) behavior.
1242
Fukuzawa, Ito and Mori all contend that learning about the West will strengthen Japan. Mori believes
that Japan can learn much from America, and that it should study its conditions in depth to do so (Van Sant,
Mori Arinori). According to Fukuzawa, practical knowledge of Western culture is important for Japan to
understand how to respond to each foreign society. He further argues that Japan needs “spirits” of freedom
and independence to defend itself against the West, and that adopting Western cultural customs and habits
such as cleanliness, time-keeping, public debate, and schooling practices will help Japan to modernize.
1243
Here modernize is not given in quotes, so I mean the conventional sense of modernization, not the
specialized Japanese definition (“modernization”) that is used as an analytical concept in the development
issue sections throughout this dissertation.
1244
Fukuzawa concludes that the key factor in whether societies succeed is education. Mori notices that
religious, philanthropic and educational organizations are important contributors to American life (Van
Sant, Mori Arinori), and believes that they can be for Japan too. Also recall the stress of Fukuzawa and
Mori about the importance of freedom, independence and individual initiative.
426

emerged within Christendom. This crucial point, the power of Christianity and its
“spirits” of freedom and scientific investigation,1245 is what Mori seizes upon as key to
help Japan become scientific. The ill feelings of Kato toward Christianity reminds one of
anti-Christian bias prevalent in the Tokugawa period,1246 also present in the early Meiji
period, though the government made the religion legal, due to pressure from Western
countries. Pro-Christian leaders like Mori were influential, but small in number. Japan
eventually acquired science, despite anti-Christian feelings. National survival encouraged
Japanese to study English and Western knowledge, even if most in this era would never
interact directly with foreigners. The insight that Japan needed education and positive
values for growth and change certainly took hold, and has influenced Japan up to the
present.
Worldview. Based on those images, in the worldview/cognitive framework that
emerges, the world is divided into many cultures, many of which are unequal. Cultures
with more knowledge and education are better. In the view of these leaders, those
cultures, such as the West, have more power and control the world.1247 Countries with
poor cultural development are weak. To Kato, many peoples are “religious.” Religion is
simply a feature of social evolution, not important by itself. Western religion is negative,
greedy, nationalistic, and does not fit Japan. Foreign religion conflicts with science and
reality. To Mori, Western religion (Christianity) made the West great, partly through its
values, and also encourages science. Japan needs science, so perhaps it needs Christianity
1245

Remember that many of the great early European scientists, such as Newton, Galileo and Copernicus,
were Christians.
1246
Under the Tokugawa period’s Sakoku (national isolation) policy, the practice of Christianity was
banned in Japan.
1247
Note that the views listed here are the views of the leaders under study.
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as well. The West drives the world. Japanese must interact with both. Mori also believes
that through education, a people can improve their culture and their condition.
In this worldview/cognitive framework, countries with superior culture are
powerful and strong in other areas too, such as politics and economics. To Kato, science
drives the world; religion does not. Religion is a lie, unreal, and cannot handle modernity.
Mori believes that positive religion (i.e. Christianity) and its values can make a people
great (for example, the United States). Not just greed drives the world, also charity,
philanthropy, science, and inventions (inspired by religion and creative, inspired values).
Education enables a people to grow, improve. In this worldview, the West now culturally
dominates the world, as China once dominated Japan’s known world. Japan must
therefore learn from the West, not just from China and Asia.
In this cognitive framework, Japan is seen as presently weak, but having a great
culture, morality, and a capacity to learn, grow, work hard, and change. Views of the
non-self see the West as strong, “superior” in culture and technology to Japan, but not
necessarily in morality. To Mori, the West has superior morality, and its religion (mainly
Christianity) is superior to Japan’s. It has made the West stronger in science and
technology to Japan and Asia. Japanese must unavoidably interact with Westerners to
learn from them. Westerners are greedy. Asia is weak, culturally inferior, and stagnant.
While it was once great, it is now isolated (China, Korea), and now has trouble learning
modern knowledge, such as from the West.
The relevant environment(s) surrounding those who hold these worldviews
include Western ideas, arts, books, education, and from Asia, Confucian culture, Chinese
ideas, studies, arts, literature, and philosophy. How have these environments interacted
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with/affected these leaders’ worldviews? The effects include a view of Western learnings
as fascinating, amazing, cutting-edge, superior, and more “scientific” than Japanese and
Asian learnings. This causes most Japanese thinkers in this period to highly favor
Western knowledge and culture. Others struggle with how to merge Western culture with
Japanese culture and Asian heritage.
How have these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions
influenced the leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, and understandings of events
and their causes? In these perceptions, in the most extreme version, Western culture is far
superior to Japan’s. Japan needs it, must learn, master, and support it. Eastern culture is
stagnant, slow, and backward. Japanese feel very awkward in interacting with
Westerners. Regarding information, there is a new preference for Western art, culture,
dress, and customs. Asian and Japanese arts are briefly ignored, and deemphasized by
certain leaders. A high value is placed on Western culture and knowledge as key for
Japan’s survival. On understandings of events and their causes, Western arts,
architecture, science, and culture are great and more “modern.” Science dominates and
drives the world. Now the West and its culture are conquering the world. Therefore the
West can conquer Japan and Asia. Japan needs this culture, or at least knowledge of it, to
be more strong and modern. Change happens through learning. Through education, a
people can better themselves and their country.
How may have technological systems affected these worldviews? The West’s
superior technology makes Japanese assume that the culture and science of the former are
better. This makes most Japanese leaders in this period temporarily prefer Western
culture and learning from the West, rather than Asian culture and learning. Yet most
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Japanese know there is much honorable in Asian and Japanese cultures. Japanese and
Asian cultures cannot be totally abandoned, and certain things about the West seem
funny, strange, bizarre, and/or incomprehensible.
Cultural Logics. What are the global phenomena relevant to external cultural
relations about which these leaders hold a worldview, and to which they are reacting?
These include Western cultural influences entering Japan: ideas from politics, science,
literature, the arts, medicine, technology, food, new products, materials, clothing, books,
English, German and other foreign languages, and people (Western teachers, scholars,
traders, diplomats, missionaries, and religion coming to Japan). This includes knowledge
brought back to Japan from Japanese who have studied and traveled abroad. Asian
students, traders, and migrants who come to Japan, especially from China, also brought
their cultural artifacts and knowledge.
What are the leaders’ worldviews/basic beliefs about these phenomena? Western
culture, knowledge, and science are powerful, great, and superior to Eastern and Japanese
knowledge in a material, technical sense, but not necessarily in a moral sense (Kato,
Yamagata, and Ito). Perhaps in a moral sense, Western culture is superior to Japanese
culture.1248 The superiority of Western culture is proven in the power it manifests in
economics, politics, the military and technology.
In the cultural logics under the worldviews about these global phenomena, the
powerful and the strong are great and superior. The West is superior to Japan and Asia.
The strong are better than the weak, who are inferior. Japan and Asia are both weak and
inferior. Weak countries should copy and learn from the cultures of strong countries.
1248

This was the view of Fukuzawa earlier, not later, and of Mori.
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What were the leaders’ responses to these global phenomena? At first, there was a
mad craze to learn and copy anything Western (opera, beef, and dress) and strongly
manifested in the bunmei kaika movement. Soon after, there was anger and fear at the
West, its greed, and concern about how to protect Japanese culture and identity against
the Western onslaught. There was also a strong desire to strengthen Japan, its culture,
nationhood, and identity, and to earn a strong place for Japan on the international scene.
This would include respect for Japan’s military, and Japan’s place in international
relations. Japan should become a strong power in Asia. Japan should earn a position of
respect, while still being Japanese.
What were the cultural logics under these responses? At first there was almost
idolatrous worship of the West and its power, and then realistic appraisal and concern
over the West, its power and intentions. This was followed by much pondering and effort
to discern how to keep Japan great, protect, and maintain its culture. Some of these
leaders showed anger toward the West and/or toward Asia. Later came the desire of some
to aggressively counter the West and “help” Asia, even if war must be waged.
If we compare the cultural logics of the worldviews about the global phenomena with the
cultural logics under the responses to the phenomena, the former logics seem logical, but
also more philosophical/mental than the latter ones. The latter logics are more pragmatic
and realistic, and yet more reactive to actual conditions.
Globalization Issues. How do these important worldviews on external cultural
relations reflect and/or affect processes of globalization (intensified or speeded up flows
of ideas, peoples, money, media, or technology)? These worldviews reflect the processes
of greatly intensified cultural globalization for Japan that especially occurred in the early
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Meiji era. The increased cultural flows especially involved ideas and new technologies,
but also a relatively small number of influential people, both foreigners who came to
Japan, and Japanese who went overseas. In the arena of external cultural relations, the
influence on Japan of these leaders who went overseas, Fukuzawa, Ito and Mori, was
huge, especially from the first two. The impact of Fukuzawa on overall Japanese society,
through his translation of Western cultural ideas in ways that were comprehensible for
millions of Japanese in his popular writings, and his less acknowledged work in
economics, looms large. Ito also had indirect, but great, effects on daily Japanese life
through his translation of Western political concepts in the Constitution of 1889.
If we consider these global cultural processes as people experienced them, on
micro- (personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? Fukuzawa, Ito
and Mori experienced the effects of cultural interchange with the West in their personal
lives from their youth, due to growing up in Kyushu, the region with the most connection
with the West in the late Tokugawa period. These three also experienced these effects as
they traveled overseas on various occasions for study or work. All of these men,
including Kato, were highly impressed with the quality of knowledge they learned from
the West. But each struggled with relating to Westerners in person. Only Mori did not
seem to struggle as intensely. In spite of his intensive study of foreigners, later Fukuzawa
became bitter after the mid-1870s. Mori also noted that there were conflicts in the United
States, between its high ideals and its actual accomplishments.1249 And Kato struggled
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The specific conflict to which I refer is that between the high moral ideals of Christianity, the
predominant religion in the United States, and the nation’s struggle with slavery, which helped provoke the
Civil War. Mori arrived in the United States in the early 1870s, when he wrote his Life and Resources in
America (see Van Sant, Mori Arinori). Given this environment, shortly after the end of the Civil War, this
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with what he viewed as elements of Western culture, like religion, that seemed highly
incongruent with Japanese culture. Did everyday Japanese struggle in these ways as they
encountered Western culture and ideas? It does not seem that they did, as these deepthinking leaders especially struggled on a philosophical level. This “clash” of Japanese
and Western values was not fully manifested until the anti-Western backlash of the promilitary governments of the 1930s, when Japan’s government came under intensified
military influence. On a public level, over time, the impacts of Western cultural artifacts
and technologies would greatly transform the daily lives of most Japanese, especially
during the twentieth century.
Do these important global processes of external cultural relations represent a form
of Japanese or non-Western globalization? These relations do not represent a very strong
case of Japanese globalization in this period, since other countries did not begin to come
under much Japanese cultural influence until shortly later in the early twentieth
century.1250 This process was especially intense in Korea, which became a Japanese
colony in 1910. The cases of cultural influence were greatest in those regions that became
Japanese colonies (also including Taiwan and Okinawa).
Conclusion
From our study in Chapter 6 of leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s external cultural
relations (1850 to 1895), what can we conclude about how those views, and Japan’s

conflict could not have been more vivid for Mori. Yet despite America’s struggles, Mori was still hugely
impressed with what he observed.
1250
The chief exception to this time line was Taiwan, which became a colony of Japan’s in 1895, shortly
after the Sino-Japanese War.
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experiences with technology, development, and foreign relations at this time, may have
contributed to Japan’s current foreign aid policies? Here I will list general trends, while
more concrete linkages with the actual ideas of current Japanese ODA will be explored in
Chapters 9 and 10. First, gaining key areas of foreign knowledge is a key priority for any
developing country, and must be in ODA policies. These areas include science, foreign
languages, politics, economics, foreign law, and so forth. The government should take a
key role in encouraging policies in this area, including sponsoring study abroad,
scientific/cultural exchanges, importing foreign teachers and books, and society-wide
discussion of what values and institutions should be imported and/or rejected. Japan
excelled in much of this in the period 1850 to 1895. On cultural issues and development,
ODA policies should encourage an LDC’s government to initiate policies to protect the
nation’s positive cultural values and institutions, but the policies should not be coercive,
and must allow for freedom and opposition. Japan’s policies on culture were often
coercive and repressive.
Regarding external cultural relations, to learn from foreign countries, an LDC
must have accurate views of those cultures, and the capability of interacting effectively
with foreigners. In ODA, this issue relates to the effective transfer of technology and
knowledge, and how culture affects the process. Japan had numerous cultural barriers to
cross: the need to overcome great geographic and cultural isolation that had lasted
hundreds of years, linguistic difficulties, inaccurate views of foreigners influenced by
ancient Chinese and Confucian stereotypes, and broad inexperience in interacting with
any foreigners at all. All of these factors suggested that it would be quite challenging for
Japanese to interact with foreigners and their cultures. Indeed it was, even for bright
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young leaders who eagerly desired to do so. But Japan benefited from its long tradition of
importing, learning and improving knowledge from foreign countries, and its historic
eagerness over many centuries to do so. Perseverance and hard work in this area also paid
off, despite setbacks such as World War II. The historical legacies of Japan’s geographic
and linguistic isolation have created significant barriers that continue to somewhat
“isolate” its people from the outside world, even today. At the very least, while Japan
does an amazing job of importing and translating foreign knowledge from abroad,
knowledge from Japan is much less accessible to foreigners, because of the difficulties of
the Japanese language.
These cultural difficulties have affected Japan’s ODA and its overall
effectiveness. Japanese aid agencies have been hampered in their ability to adequately
assess ground level issues and interact with local populations because of language
challenges. Cultural barriers, to some degree, also affect the international image of
Japanese ODA, and the success of Japan’s government in communicating about it to the
world at large. Whatever cultural barriers other LDCs face in development and aid, no
doubt Japan has faced many of similar gravity.
Regarding the second key research question of the dissertation, is the idea of
internationalization an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with technology and
development?1251 In my discussion above of how internationalization meshes with the
worldviews of external cultural relations in this chapter, I argued that a chief factor in the
views of Fukuzawa and Mori, the West’s values of individual duty and responsibility,
1251

Note that the concepts of “modernization” and translative adaptation, mainly domestic focused
concepts, while featured in the second key research question, do not appear in Chapter 6, which focuses on
issues on the international level related to culture.
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seemed important for Japan to adequately master science and technology. I also noted
that while Japan was very successful in importing much hardware of Western science and
technology during this era, importing the accompanying cultural values was more
challenging. Despite the great cultural impacts and changes in Japan that resulted from
this interchange, I argued that most of the deepest parts of Japan’s culture did not change.
Also, Japan’s overseas actions in this era, primarily the Sino-Japanese War, did not
project these spirits of freedom and individualism, but rather aggression.
From the contexts examined in this chapter, what do we learn about Japan’s
experiences with technology, development, and foreign relations? Regarding technology,
various cultural institutions and policy actions were important in encouraging Japan’s
mastery of foreign technology. Three identified above included the public Bansho
Shirabesho for the study of Western languages, science and technology, the study of
English to facilitate the mastery of foreign knowledge and technology for the building of
the country, and government missions and embassies sent abroad so that leading Japanese
could learn about Western culture and technology, among other purposes. And
concerning development, above we learned that Japan’s policy on international cultural
exchange in the Meiji period emphasized the massive importation of Western knowledge
to contribute to the building of the nation, in huge contrast to the strict national isolation
policy of a few years before, under the Tokugawa Shogunate. Various intellectual trends
and ideologies, some publicly sanctioned, attempted to favorably introduce Western
culture and thought to the nation.1252 Foreign instructors from various nations, especially
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Two of these movements were the bunmei kaika (civilization and enlightenment) movement, and the
Meirokusha debating society.
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from the United States, had a huge impact on Japan through the foreign knowledge they
helped to share, greatly facilitating the rise of Japan from feudalism to a modern power in
only a few decades.
Regarding foreign (cultural) relations, before the end of the Tokugawa period,
most Japanese subscribed to the Chinese view that Westerners were highly barbaric,
given their great distance from China, though they possessed great technical knowledge.
Yet Japanese also began to doubt the modern greatness of China, after its defeats before
Western powers. After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan’s massive national campaign
to absorb international knowledge contributed greatly to building of the nation. Despite
Japanese tensions with China and Korea, Japan’s intellectual debts to those nations, and
to the United States (in the Meiji era) were huge.
What evidence emerges by comparing both the leaders’ worldviews of external
cultural relations and Japan’s experiences with technology, development and foreign
relations in this era, from the evidence presented in this chapter? From
internationalization, I concluded that while Japan did an amazing job in importing the
technical hardware of many technologies into Japan during this period (1850 to 1895), it
had a more challenging time importing some of the associated “spiritual” factors, such as
values of freedom, individualism, and creativity, believed by leaders such as Fukuzawa
and Mori to be important for Japan’s mastery of Western science and technology. In our
examination of Japan’s experience with technology, development and foreign relations,
seen in the contexts of Japan’s external cultural relations, I concluded that several social
institutions and policy efforts, such as the Bansho Shirabesho and encouragement of
English study, were important in encouraging Japan’s mastery of foreign technology. The
437

Meiji government’s policy that was extremely supportive of importing Western
knowledge contrasted sharply with that of the Tokugawa Shogunate, which sharply
limited it. The Meiji government efforts, and the contributions of many foreign
instructors, were especially key in Japan’s successful mastery of technological hardware.
A few foreign instructors also shared religion. While influential on a few individuals, it
did not take hold widely. Despite Japan’s great cultural debt to the Chinese and Korean
civilizations, they fell into some disfavor in contrast to Western civilization and
technologies as sources for Japanese learning. What again seems clear is that while Japan
was impeccable at mastering the technical aspects of these technologies, the
accompanying cultural values were much harder to absorb. In this era, in practice,
technological hardware (items of a more material nature) was more favored than the
esoteric, ethical, and spiritual values behind them.
I give a more definitive answer in Part 4 (the concluding section), but what is the
likely pattern seen in Japan’s aid policies of today, regarding the issue of
internationalization? They do not seem overtly or politically “aggressive,” as just noted. I
cannot say whether values of freedom and individualism are also transferred. Somewhat
of a degree of “dependence” on Japan may be encouraged, in that historically, much
Japanese aid has been “tied.” But its aid cannot be called aggressive, as the Sino-Japanese
War was.
Concerning the third key research question of the dissertation, to what extent has
Japanese spirituality perhaps affected Japan’s foreign aid policies? What evidence do we
see in the historical data in this chapter? In my discussion of “spirit” and spirituality in
this and several other chapters, I note how Fukuzawa and other leaders, especially Mori,
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argue that any nation wishing to develop, including Japan, must master “spirits” and
values of freedom, independence, individual duty, and creativity. In Chapter 6, I
comment that transferring intangible values like these is more challenging than
transferring technical hardware, in general and also for Japan. Hence I argue that in this
era (1850-1895), Japan did not substantively transfer “soft” spirits such as independence
and creativity in its cultural interactions with other nearby regions, but rather an
aggressive use of technology, as seen in the Sino-Japanese War. Mori also argued that
since Western Christianity seemed to encourage values of individual duty and inspired
values that encouraged science and freedom, perhaps Japan also needed Christianity. I
further identify several key lessons on spirituality and development from Japan’s
experience, including the importance of balancing material and ethical/contextual
elements of knowledge as a nation develops, the valuable contributions that religious
input from other countries can offer (though not without some cultural risk), and how
many of the leaders considered here identified both helpful values and contributions that
religion provided for the development of Western nations.
On the conflict between the material and spiritual worlds identified in previous
chapters, there are few overt references in Chapter 6. Earlier in this chapter, I commented
on how Ito is the strongest case here of a leader who took several technologies and ideas
on the international level and used them the most profoundly to transform Japan on the
domestic level.1253 I also noted how several of the leaders (Kato, Yamagata, and Ito)
found Western culture and technology superior to East Asian knowledge, though not the
1253

I am referring to his support for ideas on political issues such as a parliament/Diet, and for a
constitution. Fukuzawa also had a huge impact, though his impacts were more centered on the private
sector, not on public policy.
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West’s morality and spirituality. The only exception was Mori, who saw both Western
technology and spirituality as superior. Finally, there is the lesson here that for wise
development, a nation should seek to pursue a balance between material/scientific and
cultural/spiritual development. Perhaps this last comment is the most notable, that in
approaching development, and the technical and ethical/cultural dilemmas it presents,
Japan (and any LDC) must seek a balance. However, the overpowering “superiority” of
Western technology and culture, manifested in its military and economic strengths,
Japan’s consequent rejection of “ethical” East Asian models in this era, and perhaps an
“‘in-built’ Flaw of the Excluded Middle” weakness inherent in the Western technologies
Japan imported, may have challenged Japan’s ability to do this.
Regarding religion, the main insights that stand out in this chapter are that,
through interaction with foreign instructors, reading Western literature, and travel
overseas, several of these leaders (Fukuzawa and Mori) gained positive impressions of
what Western religion, Christianity in particular, had accomplished in the West. They
valued both its moral strengthening of individuals and the contemporary scientific and
technological advances they observed which were pioneered in the West, not in East Asia
or other regions. On the other hand, many Japanese leaders, here especially Kato, disliked
Christianity for various reasons, and felt it was highly incongruent with Japanese culture,
though it had contributed positive things to the development of the West. What
contributed to Kato’s extremely negative view of Western religion? Perhaps it was the
fact that he did not observe its accomplishments in the West firsthand,1254 and likely he
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To my knowledge, Kato Hiroyuki never had the chance to travel or study abroad. If he did, it was only
very briefly.
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was also exposed to the Protestant theological school of German rationalism in the late
nineteenth century, which caused many to question the historicity of Christianity. Perhaps
the negative attitude of these leaders reflected residue of prejudice against Christianity
left from the Tokugawa period, and their concern with protecting the identity of Japan. I
also noted above in this chapter that Western religion (thus Christianity) was one of the
most important global cultural products to be transferred to Japan at this time. Both
foreign instructors and Western religious institutions were among the main actors
facilitating this transfer. There are also very valuable lessons that Western spirituality and
religion offered for Japanese development, and for any LDC, so developing countries
should carefully reflect on what degree of openness to foreign religion they wish to
allow, and why.
What impacts may these views on spirituality have had on policies in this period?
The reflections of several of these leaders were very wise, especially their insight about
how values and “spirits” accompanying the technologies to be mastered must also be
studied and perhaps adopted to some degree. Fukuzawa and Mori both attempted to
encourage this as much as they could, Fukuzawa in the private sector, and Mori largely in
his work on education policy. Despite this wisdom, there was enormous pressure against
allowing many Western cultural values, including religion, into Japan. Part of the
pressure was based on the sakoku policy of the Tokugawa period, and part of it was
based on the prejudice against Christianity that prevailed even before the Tokugawa
period. It is also harder to transfer intangible values than technical hardware. Achieving
appropriate balance between material and ethical/spiritual/philosophical factors in
Japan’s development was thus extremely challenging. Did Japan find an appropriate
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balance in this area, or between hyper-Westernization and pro-Japanese nationalism, the
latter that especially took hold in the 1930s? Shifts between these various extremes
occurred at various times, and it seems that the ideal balance was never found in the pre1945 period.1255
The major conflicts between spirituality and science that were present in this era
include the conflict between leaders who were pro-Western religion (because they felt it
had contributed much to Western science) and leaders who were pro-Shinto (because
they thought Japan must have its own indigenous source to inspire development
efforts).1256 Could Christianity or Shinto contribute more to Japan’s development efforts?
Whatever the answer might have been, Shinto was chosen as the national spiritual
ideology to support Japanese nation-building. There was also the potential conflict
between material and spiritual values that, though mentioned infrequently in Chapter 6,
continued nevertheless.
Where are the possible future impacts of these issues for Japanese foreign and
development? As discussed above, in this era, there were great pressures against
considering the contributions of religious and other spiritual values to development, what
they might be, and pressures against Japan adopting Christianity as its official ideology
for this purpose. To achieve a balance between the extremes of considering material
issues in development, or only examining spiritual ones, I argued that in this period (1850
to 1895), Japan mainly leaned toward the material side, though it did adopt State Shinto

1255

I do not necessarily believe that the appropriate balance for post-1945 Japan has been found either,
though it is not pertinent to reflect on this issue here.
1256
There was also consideration of what Buddhism might contribute to Japanese development by various
thinkers, notably by philosopher Nishida Kitaro (1870 to 1945).
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as its official spiritual ideology for development. In subsequent periods of Japanese
history, it appears that Japan has alternately leaned toward either the material extreme or
the spiritual one on the issue of whether to acknowledge the influence of spirituality in its
development efforts (both on the domestic and international levels). In my opinion, from
1895 to 1945, Japan leaned more toward the spiritual side in its development efforts.1257
In the postwar period, I would argue that Japan has again returned to overtly pro-material
extremes in its policies for development and aid, though the Western/global aid agenda is
currently pressuring Japan to consider social and cultural issues to a greater extent.1258
This is seen in Japan’s long-running preference for economic infrastructure in both its
domestic development and foreign aid, rather than aid for social infrastructure.

1257

For more on this, see the arguments I present in Chapters 7 and 8.
Though we are not able to explore these issues in this dissertation, I surmise that partly due to the strict
legal pressures in Japan’s 1947 Constitution for the separation of religion and state, there is little or no
consideration of religion in the development ideologies currently supported by the Japanese government,
and in its aid policies. However, recent arguments about the clash of civilizations, Islamic politics, and
religious terrorism may be increasing pressure on Japan to reconsider how religion and spirituality affect its
diplomatic and aid policies. I suspect that any attention that religion is given likely fails to consider
domestic factors in Japan. There is presently much pressure for such consideration in American diplomacy.
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Part Three
1895 to 1945: The Period of Colonialism
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Chapter 7
Worldviews of Selected Key Leaders (1895-1945)
Domestic Issues
Introduction
This chapter focuses on the pre-aid period of 1895 to 1945, the age of major
overseas Japanese colonialism. Colonies included Taiwan (from 1895), Korea (from
1910) and parts of mainland China (from 1931). On domestic issues, worldviews
discussed here include views of technological development, the domestic state, market,
and society. In each case, I consider the views of Yanagita Kunio and Emperor
Hirohito.1259 What is the significance of Yanagita Kunio and Emperor Hirohito for this
project, and why did I choose each of them?
Yanagita Kunio was the founder of Japanese folklore studies, a scholar, poet,
government bureaucrat, a pioneer of ethnography in Japan, and one of the first Japanese
leaders to critically assess Japan’s mass importation of Western culture and technology,
examining this process in grassroots Japanese society.1260 The unifying theme of his
work was the search for elements of tradition that explain Japan’s distinctive national
1259

I will discuss the choice of these two leaders momentarily.
Yanagita served as a national bureaucrat, in the Diet (1914-1919), as a journalist, and at the League of
Nations (the early 1920s). After 1930, he devoted himself to ethnography across Japan (Kawada 1993).
Our consideration here is primarily of Yanagita’s thought from about 1900 to 1930. We are not able to
consider his other writings during the World War II or postwar periods, which space and time do not allow.
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character. Many of these he identified in rural society. He worried that the uncritical,
wholesale adaptation and invasion of Western technology and culture was rapidly
destroying Japan’s heart and soul. His career lasted from the early to mid- 1900s.
Japanese scholars view his work as relevant to Japan from the Meiji era onward. Some
argue that he attempted to offer Japan models for “alternative modernization.”1261
Emperor Hirohito (posthumous name, the Emperor Showa) was a pivotal figure
in the life of the nation, as a symbol and more. His thought, as an individual, was of
questionable impact. But through the symbolism of his position as emperor, the images
he projected, and his policy actions and inactions, his influence on the nation was
profound. Although the historical “height” of his reign was from the early 1920s to 1945,
his influence continued until the late 1980s. Even after his death, he continues to be
incredibly controversial, both in Japan and abroad. In his study of Hirohito, Herbert Bix
examines the contexts of his life, his interaction with politics, and how the emperor
transformed Japan’s monarchy.1262 Hirohito is the one Japanese figure, more than any
other, who reveals the nature of “…Japanese politics and government-military relations,”
and the political views of the Japanese in the twentieth century.1263 Hirohito was a
“fallible” person with common human weaknesses and desires, but at the center of
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Minoru Kawada, The Origin of Ethnography in Japan: Yanagita Kunio and His Times (London: Kegan
Paul International, 1993), 1-3, 81, 110-111. Kawada argues that while Japanese scholars acknowledge the
importance of Yanagita’s work, their overall conclusions about his work are highly varied (Ibid., 2).
1262
Hebert P. Bix’s seminal study of Hirohito’s life, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, is
groundbreaking in its analysis of Hirohito’s life, political actions, and the broader implications of these for
Japanese society and its place in the twentieth century world (Bix, Hirohito). In Japan, the book has
received both positive and negative critical response from scholarly and popular critics. For details on the
Japanese critiques of Bix’s book and his response to them, see Herbert P. Bix, “Emperor Hirohito in 20th
Century History: The Debate Rekindles,” JPRI working paper, no. 92 (Cardiff, Calif: Japan Policy
Research Institute, 2003), http://www.jpri.org, accessed 9 August 2008.
1263
Ibid., 5-7.
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power, politics, and political conflict in Japan longer than anyone else.1264 In Hirohito, we
have a strong case where images greatly affected policy outcomes. Below and in the
concluding chapter, I examine Hirohito’s worldviews and his personal and projected
images, each of which highly influenced his policies and political engagements.
Especially with Hirohito, connections between worldviews and policy actions should
become clearer.
In this chapter, for consistency and ease of analysis, where possible, I will use
the same analytic concepts that I used for domestic issues in Chapters 3 and 4. In the case
of technology issues, for worldview of technological development, I use Glick’s
anthropological definition of technology. For domestic state and domestic market
worldviews, I will again use the concepts of Glick’s definition of technology,
technonationalism as ideology, and Murakami’s concept of industrial policy. For the
domestic society worldviews, I will use the first two concepts, and not the third, in
addition to several questions about the relationship of technology and society, where
relevant.1265
An item of particular interest in this chapter is the importance that views of
spirituality exercised on policy, and the impact these policies eventually had on Japan and
its empire. A major tension arises between the views of spirituality of Yanagita, who
stressed strengthening local manifestations of spirituality to build Japan, and Hirohito,
1264

Ibid., 17-18.
The questions (from Chapter 3) to be asked here about the technology aspects of domestic society, if
relevant, are: 1) what was the effect of societal attitudes about technology upon Japan’s reception of it? 2)
What was the effect of general societal attitudes (and these leaders’ attitudes) about society, social change,
morality and religion on Japan’s views of technology and technological change? 3) Through these leaders’
views of domestic society, do we learn anything about how technology fit into Japan’s social system, daily
life and work of the era? 4) Do the worldviews of these leaders suggest that technology was a sociallyconstructed phenomenon in Japan at this time?
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who exercised great influence as the supreme spiritual and political leader of Japan, but
who focused more on the national and international levels. During this era (1895 to
1945), as time went on, spirituality exercised an increasing influence on Japanese politics
and national life. It clouded, to some degree, Hirohito’s policy actions and decisions.
Sadly, before 1945, the Japanese government largely ignored the wise observations of
Yanagita on preserving Japan’s local cultures and spirituality. The heavy mixing of
religion and politics in this era ultimately had disastrous consequences for the nation.
Based on my own reflections on these issues, later in this chapter I offer several
significant policy lessons on how religion and spirituality can positively affect a
developing country’s development processes. I also ask important questions about the
consideration of religion in Japan’s current foreign policymaking and aid policy
processes. As Japan remains the second largest economic power in the world, one of the
most significant players in the Asia and Pacific region, and one of the world’s largest
donors of foreign aid, these questions are potentially of great significance for global
development and security.
Contexts of Domestic Issues (1895-1945): Major Trends
Contexts of Technological Development
For Meiji policymakers, Western science became one of the chief means for
making Japan into a modern nation, to prevent its colonization. From the era of World
War I through World War II, while three main sectors did scientific research (the public
sector, universities, and the private sector), only the research of the national laboratories
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had much prestige.1266 During World War II, Japanese research suffered from isolation
from most foreign sources of data. The public sector, both the military and the
government at large, had used many foreign sources, but now they had to rely on
Japanese ones. Funding increased, and for the first time, Japan’s science and technology
researchers cohered their own unique identity. But as World War II worsened for Japan,
scientific research almost halted.1267
Throughout the pre-World War II era, Japan’s government played a key role in
the promotion of technological development.1268 Most engineers entered government
service, serving in public agencies, schools, laboratories, and as advisors to private
industry. The need to build both Japan’s military and industrial strengths was deemed
proper motivation for the government’s involvement in pre-war R&D. Globally, the
degree of public involvement in technological development seen in Japan’s pre-World
War II scientific research community was rare in that era. Much of Japan’s basic and
applied research in the 1930s and 1940s was done at the prestigious Institute of Physical
and Chemical Research (Rikagaku Kenkyûjo, or Riken).1269
After 1895, Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and
Japan’s economic boom during World War I were a further boon for Japan’s industrial
and technological development. Before World War II, Japan’s military escalation was
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All three of these sectors cooperated in funding pre-World War II research and development (Japan,
“Research and Development,” 1255).
1267
Ibid., “Natural Science,” 1069.
1268
Perhaps the most important public research-related effort before 1945 was the establishment of the
Gakujutsu Shinkôkai (or Gakushin), the prewar predecessor of today’s Japan Society for the Promotion of
Science. Gakushin was mainly a research funding organization, and its work provided an important
foundation for much of Japan’s postwar industrial base, including the fields of chemicals, electronics, and
medicine (Ibid., “Research and Development,” 1255).
1269
Ibid.
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the motivation for much of the nation’s industrial and technological growth, especially in
the heavy and chemical industries. Although most of Japan’s technologies in this era
were imported, Japanese researchers developed several new important technological
innovations in the pre-World War II era.1270
Domestic State Contexts
In the late 1890s, the aftermath of the war with China (1894-1895) greatly
affected Japanese politics, and the throne as a tool for authoritarian control and rule.
Ironically, the strength of political parties in the Diet also increased. Economic
development picked up speed, and Japan’s politics became increasingly competitive, as
the interests of Japan’s elites in big business, the Diet, the military and the bureaucracy
often clashed. After the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), political party activities grew,
as well as increased military spending to support Japan’s new colonies on the
continent.1271 Intense political factionalism continued until the end of the Meiji period
(1912), and slightly beyond.1272 From then until the early 1930s, political liberalism and
participation, a trend called Taisho democracy, spread as men over twenty-five received
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Ibid, “Modern Technology,” 1540. Among the notable innovations by Japanese researchers before
World War II were the development of monosodium glutamate (MSG, an important food additive) (1908),
a high performance steel alloy, KS Magnetic Steel (1917), and the Yagi Antenna, the most common
television and radio antenna configuration (1926) (Ibid.). One sector in which Japan is a pioneer is the area
of environmental technologies. Japan’s development of advanced environmental technologies has run in
tandem with its industrial development. From 1868 to 1945, mining pollution in particular stimulated
technological innovation in this sector (Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Environmental Technologies,”
129).
1271
Bix, Hirohito, 33-34.
1272
Genro (elder statesmen) from the hambastu (pre-1868 domain clique) factions, especially from the
former domains of Satsuma and Choshu, served as prime minister, influenced important government posts,
and controlled the army and navy through about 1918 (Japan, “Hambatsu,” 495, and “Political System,”
1216).
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voting rights in 1925. Yet the authoritarian tendencies of the government continued.1273
Gradually the power of the military in politics increased in the 1930s.1274 Government
and bureaucracy were very closely connected, and most bureaucrats served long-term.1275
Through 1945, the emperor had supreme authority over his ministers and the military,
creating two bureaucracies, one civil, and one military. The military exercised
extraordinary power over the political system. Laws were drafted by bureaucrats, and
approved in the Diet; the emperor also issued imperial decrees.1276 The state manipulated
both religion and images of the emperor for political purposes.1277 The power of political
parties grew after World War I, but they declined due to political pressure from the
military in the 1930s, and were absorbed into a new national body by 1940.1278
Nationalism continued as an even more powerful ideology from 1895 to 1945.
Through about 1912, Meiji leaders skillfully used the concept of kuni in the education
system to translate the people’s allegiance from their feudal domains into devotion to
1273

Many of these authoritarian tendencies resulted from the Meiji constitution, in force through 1945. The
constitution was a compromise between the two principles of imperial sovereignty and parliamentary
government, and left unclear exactly how policy was to be made. Much of Japanese political history
through 1945 was driven by the conflict between these two issues (Ibid., “Political System,” 1216;
“Constitution of the Empire of Japan,” 232).
1274
Ibid., “Political System,” 1216. Competing factions from the army and navy competed over the
government’s domestic and foreign policymaking in the 1920s and 1930s. Their power was strongest from
1937-1945, when the military dominated the entire national government (Ibid., “Gumbatsu,” 479).
1275
Most bureaucrats served long-term since they were chosen mainly by competitive examination, rather
through political appointment (Ibid., “Bureaucracy,” 147).
1276
Ibid.
1277
I explore the issue of the emperor’s image in Chapter 9. Regarding religion and politics, after Hirohito
ascended the throne in 1926, two ideological movements influenced by religion emerged. One took off
again in the late 1920s, a debate about the true nature of the national polity (kokutai), Japan’s state and
society, and how it might be renewed. It was argued that this could best be accomplished through the
emperor’s authority. The second ideology, kôdô (“the imperial way”) argued that the emperor provided the
morally superior model for all Japanese. Kôdô was influential in Japanese politics in the late 1920s and
1930s. Only morally superior Japan and its kôdô could purify Asia from corrupting Western influences,
such as liberalism, communism, and individualism. While the kokutai debate was particularly associated
with Shinto, the kôdô ideology was associated both with Shinto and several Buddhist sects, especially the
Nichiren sect (Bix, Hirohito, 10-11).
1278
Japan, “Political Parties,” 1212.
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Japan and the emperor.1279 During the period of Taisho democracy (about 1905-1932),
the nationalistic ideology of Nihonshugi (Japanism) receded, but resurfaced in the
1930s.1280 Forms of statist nationalism took hold through the education system, Shinto
festivals and rituals for the emperor, and new doctrines stressing harmony and Japanese
uniqueness.1281 In the 1930s, these forces solidified into powerful political influences.
Popular nationalists attacked the government for its “weakness” against the West, often
stressing the spiritual role of the emperor as Japan’s high priest and intercessor, and
seeking to connect all Japanese in ethno-psychic bonds. From the debate on Japan’s
national polity (kokutai),1282 the kazoku kokka (“Japan-as-a-family-state”) concept was
official dogma in Japan’s schools through 1945, with persecution of dissenters.1283
1279

Kuni is the basic Japanese word for “country,” in the sense of a national state or land. This feeling was
an example of “patriotism” (aikokushin) (Ibid., “Patriotism,” 1189).
1280
Ibid., “Nihon Shugi,” 1087. An example of a theory supportive of liberal Taisho era values, opposed to
the official interpretation of the kokutai was tennô kikan setsu (“emperor-as-organ-of-the-state” theory),
influential from 1920-1935. It argued that the emperor as mainly an organ of the state, in which primary
sovereignty was vested (Ibid., “Tennô Kikan Setsu,” 1552). Another political theory supportive of liberal
Taisho values was mimponshugi (“people-as the-basism”), developed by political scientist Yoshino Sakuzo,
which argued for government by and for the people, in the name of the emperor. The movement used
mimponshugi as the translation for democracy, since the more common term for democracy, minshushugi,
suggested popular sovereignty against the emperor, and would have drawn condemnation from the
government in the 1920s (Ibid., “Mimpon shugi,” 962).
1281
The state did not consider State Shinto to be a religion, but a government institution that fostered moral
instruction. State Shinto influenced Japan’s education system to encourage popular support for the state, by
stressing the Emperor as divine and Japan as sacred (Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “State Shinto,” 478479; Japan, “Nationalism,” 1059). The use of symbols to promote nationalism also intensified. For
example, the rising-sun flag, while a modern invention, was increasingly used in public places and schools,
although it did not legally become Japan’s national flag until 1999 (Encyclopedia of Contemporary,
“Rising-Sun Flag,” 422-423).
1282
The debate over the meaning of the kokutai goes back to the nineteenth century, and was, at its start,
heavily influenced by different schools of Shinto. Central to the concept of kokutai is the idea that the
Japanese polity is unique, since the Japanese imperial line is descended in an unbroken line from the gods,
and the concept of the family state, that all Japanese are related to the emperor as their “father.” The debate
reemerged in 1935, and the concept was important through the end of World War II as nationalist ideology
promoted by Japan’s government (Japan, “Kokutai,” “Kokutai debate,” and “Kokutai no hongi,” 819-820).
1283
Ibid., “Kokutai,” 819; Ibid., “Nationalism,” 1059. An example of official dogma related to the kokutai
issue was a two volume political tract, Kokutai no Hongi (Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of
Japan), in use from 1937 to 1945. It was intended as mass propaganda for all Japanese and school
children. It stressed the unique, divine mission of Japan, and used arguments drawn from nationalistic
treatments of Japanese culture (Ibid., “Kokutai no Hongi,” 820).
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Democratic ideals reached their zenith in the Taisho democracy movement through the
early 1930s. In 1918, the victories of democracy after the world war and Marxism in
Russia led to similar demands from students, intellectuals and workers in Japan. The
government responded by granting some demands, and repressing others. In the 1930s
and the 1940s, as the military gained more power over Japan’s politics, liberal influence
waned.1284
Political movements, acts, and incidents in Japan from 1895 to 1945 had a range
of ideological leanings. On the conservative side, notable political movements included
the Peace Preservation Law1285 and the February 26th Incident.1286 Liberal movements
included the Taisho democracy movement,1287 the Universal Manhood Suffrage
Movement,1288 the movement for women’s suffrage,1289 and the student movement.1290 A
major political scandal of this period was the Siemens affair of 1914.1291
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Ibid., “Democracy,” 278. The values of liberalism had a hard time taking hold before 1945. The Meiji
constitution gave top power and position to the emperor, assuming that the state was always more
important than the individual. Important players on both the right and the left resisted liberalism. A few
activists resisted the rise of militarism from the 1920s to the 1940s, but with little effect (Ibid.,
“Liberalism,” 889).
1285
This law (in use 1925-1945) was used to control communists, anarchists, and other political radicals,
and was the main foundation of ideological control in Japan (Ibid., “Peace Preservation Law of 1925,”
1192-1193).
1286
Ibid., “February 26th Incident,” 359-360.
1287
This movement (1905-1932) encouraged liberal values in Japanese politics, culture, education and the
media (Ibid., “Taisho Democracy,” 1500-1501).
1288
This was a movement to grant the vote to all Japanese males over the age of 25 in elections to choose
members of the House of Representatives in the Diet. It was passed in 1925 (Ibid., “Universal Suffrage
Manhood Movement,” 1662).
1289
The women’s suffrage movement in Japan began not long after 1868, as some activists in the Freedom
and People’s Rights Movement pressed for women’s rights. The women’s suffrage movement became
active in the 1920s, but was disbanded in 1940 (Ibid., “Women’s Suffrage,” 1709).
1290
The student movement in Japan was at its height from the 1920 to the 1970s. While there are student
groups of every political leaning, Marxist-leaning groups have been the most influential. In the 1920s, the
leading student group was the Marxist Gakuren, but in the 1930s, nationalistic student groups were the
most active (Ibid., “Student Movement,” 1460-1461).
1291
Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Scandals,” 439. In the Siemens affair, a German company paid
kickbacks to Japanese navy officials in exchange for contracts. Scandals have been a major feature of
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Domestic Market Contexts
Concerning Japan’s economic history, through 1919, several major industries
grew greatly, but rapid industrial growth caused problems in several sectors, including
textiles, iron and steel, shipbuilding, and banking. Agricultural growth was slow.
Alongside industrial growth, small scale and cottage industries continued, resulting in a
dual structure economy, with most people’s incomes staying low. The government and
the police largely suppressed the socialist and labor movements at this time. During the
1920s, several economic crises struck Japan, and the worldwide economic depression
(from the 1929 U.S. stock market crash) hit the nation in 1930-1931, causing the Showa
Depression (1930-1935).1292 Many small- and medium-sized firms went bankrupt. The
agricultural sector suffered, increasing poverty for tenant farmers, and exacerbating rural
social unrest. Yet in the 1920s, Japan’s productivity increased in technological growth
and industrial rationalization. Pressure for the concentration of capital enabled the
growth of older financial and industrial conglomerates (zaibatsu), and the birth of new
ones. By 1931, after the Manchurian Incident in China,1293 the government increased
military spending, prompting growth in key industries, employment, and agriculture.
This also began Japan’s ultimately disastrous march into World War II. The government
slowly increased military spending, public control over labor, the economy, and key
industries. Toward the war’s end, by 1944 and 1945, manufacturing halted with allied
modern Japan’s political landscape since the 1880s, when the government sold public-related industries to
Meiji officials’ friends at bargain prices.
1292
The financial crises that hit Japan in the 1920s included the post-World War I slump (1920), short
recovery followed by the economic crisis from the great Tokyo earthquake of 1923, and bank failures
causing the financial crisis of 1927 (Japan, “Industrial History,” 307; Ibid., “Showa Depression,” 1414).
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For more details on the Manchurian Incident, see the section on the contexts of Japan’s external
political relations, 1895-1945 in Chapter 8.
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bombing.1294 The wartime economy totally crumbled with Japan’s surrender in August
1945.1295
In government economic policy, from 1868 to 1945 there was no antimonopoly
policy in Japan, and little support for individual entrepreneurs. The chief economic goal
was to strengthen the national economy rapidly, to prevent Japan’s colonization. The rise
of large zaibatsu was encouraged, and seen as supportive of the economy’s nationalistic
goals. Many new industries and their related corporations emerged in the interwar years.
Government policies promoted the growth of specific industries.1296 Japan’s industrial
revolution continued until about 1910, with the government taking the lead in developing
certain heavy industries.1297
The private industrial sector in Japan was stimulated by Japan’s victories in the
wars with China (1895) and Russia (1905), and the opening of new colonies. Japan’s
industrial capital increased greatly during World War I, with the Far East left to mainly
Japan’s input.1298 Through 1931, the private sector endured several waves of
unemployment, bankruptcies, and increasing capital concentration by the zaibatsu. After
1931, the economy “re-inflated” through war preparations, more exports, and achieved
greater employment. A weakness of Japanese banks was the large number of small banks
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Production in late 1945 was one-sixth of prewar (1935-1937) amounts (Ibid., “Industrial History 307;
and “Showa Depression,” 1414).
1295
Ibid., “Industrial History,” 307; and “Showa Depression,” 1414.
1296
Emerging industries included aircraft, consumer electronics, and automobiles (Ibid., “Industrial
History,” 601).
1297
One of the heavy industries getting public promotion was iron and steel, from the late 1880s (Ibid.,
“Industrial Revolution,” 603). Until 1900, light industry dominated up to 85 percent of industrial
production in Japan. The textile industry was the most important light industry in Japan through World
War II, and the greatest energizing factor in Japan’s industrialization (Ibid., “Industrial Structure,” 603).
1298
During World War I, the Far East was left mainly to Japan’s input since the other major powers,
including Russia, the United States, Britain, Germany, and others in Europe, were all occupied with
hostilities in Europe.
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connected to particular firms.1299 The government strongly supported the formation of
joint-stock companies (kabushiki kaisha) from 1901, and the zaibatsu networks of
interrelated industrial and financial holding companies, which grew greatly.1300 Families
maintained intense control of the top zaibatsu until just before World War II.1301 In the
1930s, Japan’s economic activity on the Asian mainland expanded, and several new
zaibatsu emerged.1302 Through tight control, zaibatsu limited imported technology to
their related firms.1303
The first continuous labor unions began in the late 1890s, but disbanded by
1901.1304 Through the 1920s, awareness of worker’s rights increased, and labor linked up
with democracy movements. More lasting labor federations started in 1912 and 1919.1305
The productivity of industry grew in the 1920s, partly due to partial suppression of trade
unions, and the growth of managerial principles that encouraged loyal workers.1306 By
the 1930s, ideological differences split the labor movement into moderate and more
radical branches. The latter was basically eliminated by government repression before
World War II. In the late 1930s government militarists suppressed labor by starting
Sampô (Sangyô Hôkoku Kai, the Industrial Patriotic Association), which stressed loyalty
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Following numerous bank failures from 1926-1929. By 1935, the five largest private banks held 40
percent of deposits (Ibid., “Corporate History,” 250).
1300
Reasons for the growth of the zaibatsu included their large capital bases upon founding, their ready
access to funding, raw materials and lines of foreign trade through their networks, their excellent
entrepreneurial leaders, and their application of the Confucian ie (household) concept to the business
environment, which inspired consensus decision-making and intense corporate loyalty (Ibid.).
1301
From the start of World War II, outside ownership grew (Ibid., “Zaibatsu,” 1768).
1302
One of the newer zaibatsu was automobile manufacturer Nissan (Ibid.). Important, older zaibatsu in
this period included Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo (Ibid., “Mitsubishi,” 980; “Mitsui,” 982; and
“Sumitomo,” 1471).
1303
Ibid., “Zaibatsu,” 1768.
1304
Their disbanding was due to financial and police problems (Ibid., “Labor,” 869).
1305
Ibid.
1306
Ibid., “Industrial History,” 601.
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and ultranationalist values. All unions disbanded or went underground. Both Sampô and
managers’ encouragement of family-like loyalty (1890s-1930s) provided the basis for
Japan’s postwar enterprise unions.1307 Working conditions for women in industry were
poor and wages low, and first received notice in the late 1890s.1308 Women remained
concentrated in the textile industry, but with militarization in the 1930s, moved into other
sectors as men joined the military.1309
Important ideological currents about domestic economic development from
1895-1945 included the concept of fukoku kyôhei.1310 From the early 1900s, management
ideologies were affected by principles about paternalism and the uniqueness of Japanese
culture. Business faced public intervention in labor issues, so managers argued that
foreign-type labor laws would drive up costs, and that they, unlike Westerners, cared for
employees.1311 Among intellectuals, the pre-World War II Nihon shihonshugi ronsô
(debate on Japanese capitalism) was important.1312
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Ibid., “Labor,” 870; and “Labor Unions,” 873.
The first law to improve women’s working conditions passed in 1911 (Ibid., “Women in the Labor
Force,” 1707).
1309
Women outnumbered males in the total labor force through about 1930. In the 1930s, the other areas
women moved into included the chemical industry, manufacturing and skilled jobs (Ibid., “Women in the
Labor Force,” 1707).
1310
Through about 1912, fukoku kyôhei continued its influence in building up strategic, publicly supported
industries (Ibid., “Fukoku Kyôhei,” 425).
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Ibid., “Managerial Ideology,” 915. The argument about managers’ concern for workers’ welfare was
based on the Confucian ideal of ie (household) family-like relationships in the workplace. It could be
argued that this ideal had only limited effect in the prewar system, since working conditions for many
lower level laborers in the prewar system were perhaps as bad as those in any Western country undergoing
industrialization.
1312
This debate of Marxist economists, at its height from about 1927-1937, considered whether the most
important factors of Japanese capitalism were its residual “feudal” or “semi-feudal” aspects from the Meiji
area (argued by the Kôzoha “Lectures” faction, connected with the Japan Communist Party) or the aspects
it shared with other advanced capitalist countries (the position of the Rônôha “Labor-Farmer” faction).
Members of the latter faction argued that Japan’s coming revolution would be socialist (Ibid., “Nihon
shihon shugi ronsô,” 1086; “Rônôha,” 1275; “Nihon shihon shugi hattatsu shi kôza,” 1086). See also
Japan, “Kôzoha,” 836.
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Domestic Society Contexts
Regarding social and national identity (1895 to 1945), we noted in Chapter 3
how a government commonly instills a sense of national identity through symbols,
rituals, education, and ideas. Popular culture also contributes. The Meiji state also
encouraged nationalist images based partly on the Kokugaku School of learning,1313
stressing such sources as Shinto and its creation myths, and Confucian values of loyalty,
duty, and patrimonial descent. The Emperor ideology related closely to the concept that
all Japanese were divinely descended from the imperial family in a “family-state,”1314
with the emperor as father and head of the nation. The state also drew on non-Japanese
sources, including Western concepts of royalty,1315 ethics education, and heroic figures
like Benjamin Franklin. Leading public intellectuals and mass media also contributed to a
sense of national identity. In Japan, intellectuals like Watsuji Tetsuro (1889-1960),
Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945), and Yanagita Kunio (1875-1962, already mentioned)
investigated elements of Japanese identity, including connections with nature, cultural
practices, and Buddhist philosophy.1316
In this period intense debates over the racial origins of the Japanese also
emerged. While some scholars, including Kato Hiroyuki, stressed the racial purity and
homogeneity of the Japanese, descended from the imperial family, others, such as
anthropologists Torii Ryuzo (1870-1953) and Kita Sadakichi (1871-1939), emphasized
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the descent of the Japanese minzoku (ethnic group) from peoples who entered Japan from
Northeast and Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, prior to the Japanese state’s
formation in the seventh or eighth century A.D.1317 As the nation entered World War II in
the 1930s and 1940s, issues of identity and race were increasingly affected by politics.
From 1937-1940, the Kokumin Seishin Sôdôin Undô (National Spiritual Mobilization
Movement) encouraged pride in Japanese culture and values of patriotism and thrift
through radio and celebrity lecture tours.1318
Despite legal restrictions against women in the 1898 Meiji Civil Code, women
made huge contributions to the nation and its economy. In addition to their participation
in agricultural labor and cottage industries in rural areas, women contributed greatly to
the industrialization of Japan in the textile industry. Gradually women entered new jobs
in such places as telephone exchanges, department stores, and entertainment venues.
Some even entered the new occupations of journalism, secretarial work, teaching, and
medicine. At the turn of the nineteenth century, a few women became leaders in the labor
movement, and in political movements in nationalism, socialism and anarchism.1319 The
feminist group Seitôsha (Bluestocking Society) emerged in 1911, followed by politically
active groups in the 1920s and 1930s, some of which pressed for female suffrage. In the
1930s, conservative militarist forces impelled Japanese women to quiet these demands.
During World War II, women worked in government-sponsored neighborhood and
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patriotic associations, but work in industry was limited to single women during most of
the war.1320
From 1895 to 1945, important social movements, ideologies and events
included the social effects of several wars, Nihonshugi (Japanism),1321 feminism,1322
pacificism,1323 Taisho democracy,1324 the Tokyo Earthquake of 1923,1325 Yamatodamashii,1326 and the cultural effects of the Kokutai (national polity) movement from the
late 1930s through 1945. During World War I, the war, centered in Europe, meant that
Western and other foreign suppliers could not meet demand for various products in Asian
markets. This, plus the demand of Japan’s Western allies for munitions, increased the
value of Japanese exports three fold from 1913 to 1918. Japan had an industrial boom and
a rapid entry of capital, causing steep inflation for Japan’s quickly urbanizing regions,
leading to widespread rice riots in 1918. But overall, the large growth of Japanese society
during World War I, including industry, the economy, military, and empire, brought an
1320
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increased sense of pride for most Japanese.1327 For Japan, World War II, occurring at the
end of this period, represented a total national effort on the part of all citizens. The war,
commencing with Japanese military intervention in China in 1937, profoundly affected
the lives of all Japanese persons. Yet many Japanese experts have claimed that even utter
defeat in August 1945 failed to rock the basic stability supporting the Japanese social
system.1328
In this period, both local and national newspapers became very popular. By the
1920s, expanding democracy, urbanization, education, industrialization and capitalism
allowed the rise of mass magazines, including many for women. Magazines attracted an
increasingly diversified readership, and often included selections of fiction to attract
readers. In the 1920s, as radio broadcasting began to emerge, newspaper and magazine
publishers attempted to open radio stations, but the government chose to establish NHK
(Japan Broadcasting Corporation) as the national broadcasting service. Radio
broadcasting commenced in 1925.1329
Advertisements in magazines and newspapers took off by the early twentieth
century, with the rise of national mass media. As the country moved more toward
imperialism and World War II, the volume of advertising decreased, and people working
in advertising leaned more toward the national propaganda machine.1330
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Another influential force in Japanese mass culture in this period was the
Iwanami Publishing House (Iwanami Shoten), founded in 1913, which dominated prewar
Japanese academic publishing through the 1970s. Iwanami first established its reputation
by publishing the works of the famous Japanese novelist Natsume Soseki, and gained
particular strength in philosophical works. Iwanami is one example of the rise of the
Taisho democracy movement, and has contributed many influential trends to the Japanese
publishing industry.1331
In Japanese education, ideological factors were increasingly influential during
this era (1895-1945). The push for education to encourage nationalism and modernization
were powerful forces in the late nineteenth century. Nationalism reemerged as an
important influence under state militarism in the 1930s. Part of the purpose of the
comprehensive national system of schooling was to contribute to the nation’s
modernization, and to encourage the people’s “spiritual unification.” In the early
twentieth century, new, complex forces influenced Japanese education, including the
Russo-Japanese War, World I, the Russian Revolution, and global demands for
democracy. New or renewed ideologies such as democracy, liberalism, socialism and
communism entered Japan, spawning such movements in Japanese education as the New
Education Movement, child-centered teaching, student movements, and the first teacher’s
union, all in opposition to nationalistic education. By the mid-1930s, the government
reacted with repression and promotion of the Japanese spirit (Yamato-damashii), to try to
counter the effects of leftist ideologies. Schools began to emphasize ultranationalism after
the Manchurian Incident in 1931, and outright militarism with the start of the war in
1331
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China in 1937. After war with the United States began in late 1941, military education
and indoctrination in the schools increased, using such textbooks as the Kokutai no Hongi
(Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan).1332 After the Russo-Japanese War
(1904-1905), military training courses (gunji kyôren) were required for all students, male
and female, at the primary and secondary levels. The height of gunji kyôren was during
World War II, when it was required even for university students. After the war, it was
banned from education.1333 Moral training and education (shûshin) was instituted in
Japan’s public schools from 1872, and increasingly incorporated principles of
Confucianism, nationalism, and militarism, until it was ended after World War II.1334
Regarding more general trends in education, additional imperial universities
besides Tokyo Imperial University, the first, were established starting in 1897.1335 During
the two world wars, three main actors in Japan, including universities, did scientific
research.1336 During the Meiji period, although universal education was the goal,
opportunities for females after primary school were few. Therefore a large private sector
of educational providers for girls and women began opening schools for them. Christian
missionaries were prominent in helping to provide these opportunities, and several
private colleges for women were also established.1337
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In the arts in this era,1338 Western literature continued to exercise a heavy
influence on Japan, another arena where the struggle to come to terms with modernity
and Westernization occurred.1339 Novelist Shimazaki Toson published Wakanashû (1897,
a volume of free verse poetry), initiating a new style of free verse in Japanese poetry.
Additional significant influences from the West included romanticism (introduced in the
1890s), symbolism (introduced in 1905), and naturalism (highly influential from 1905 to
1910, the source of the “confessional” novel, also known as the I-novel or watakushi
shôsetsu). An additional significant trend in the early twentieth century was the
publication of coterie magazines by writers of similar mind, and the serial publication of
novels by famous writers in newspapers.1340 Many novelists such as Natsume Soseki,
Mori Ogai, Nagai Kafu and Tanizaki Junichiro struggled with integrating elements of
Western culture with Japanese literature. In the late 1920s and 1930s, Nagai and Tanizaki
managed to draw on a vague sense of Japanese “tradition,” quickly obliterated after the
war.1341 Drawing on Western concepts of literary criticism, modern Japanese literary
critics attempted to apply Western critical standards to a variety of Japanese works, with
varying success. They struggled to find a common position from which both Western and
Japanese literature could be critiqued.1342 In spite of the venerable tradition of classical
literature by Japanese women,1343 the category of “women’s literature” (joryû bungaku)
arose as a distinct genre in the early 1900s, when collections and histories of women’s
1338
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writings began to be published. This categorization has been criticized as isolating
women’s writing from the Japanese literary mainstream of “pure literature”
(junbungaku), despite saving it from being classed with popular literature (taishû
bungaku).1344
Regarding mass popular culture, in the Meiji period, younger writers attempted
to create a new form of popular literature (called taishû bungaku) that fused elements of
both Western and Japanese literature.1345 Western literary influence can also be seen in
the emergence of genuine science fiction in Japan starting in the Meiji era from 18901900, based on translations of works by Jules Verne and H.G. Wells, and reappearing in
the 1920s.1346 The state was also involved in attempting to shape national popular culture
through the imperial museums. New imperial museums in Kyoto and Nara, started in the
1890s, used displays, archives and archaeology to help inculcate the state’s concepts of
“nation” and “empire” to visitors. It was no accident that these museums were called
“imperial,” not national, museums, since even in the 1890s, the state used the imperial
throne as a symbol of nationalism. Displays also connected with Japan’s colonial
ambitions.1347 A movement of aesthetic modernism that influenced mass culture in the
1920s and 1930s was ero guro, an abbreviation of the Japanese term for “erotic-grotesque
nonsense” (ero-guro-nansensu). This movement touched such areas as magazines, horror
and detective novels, commercial design, soft-core pornography, and academic fields like
urban anthropology and psychology.1348
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Concerning philosophy, in the 1890s, the Japanese government attempted to
encourage emperor-centered nationalism through the national education system. At the
same time, certain Japanese intellectuals such as Nishimura Shigeki introduced the use of
Western philosophy to reinterpret Confucian and Buddhist thinking. In public
universities, study of British and French enlightenment thought was gradually replaced
by German-influenced idealism (i.e. Hegel) through the work of Inoue Tetsujiro. Another
scholar, Onishi Hajime, used the work of Kant to counter Inoue’s anti-Enlightenment,
pro-statist positions, combining Eastern and Western thought in the process. In the early
1900s, researchers in Japan’s state universities used German philosophy to deepen
Japan’s understanding of modern philosophy, generating a new understanding of the self
and awareness of the search for the meaning of human existence. From the late Meiji
period to the end of the Taisho era (1926), Japanese scholars focused on Neo-Kantianism,
producing work of increasing technical focus. In 1911 Nishida Kitaro published Zen no
Kenkyûjo (A Study of the Good), which was the first study by a Japanese philosopher to
try to develop a universal philosophical system by applying Western philosophy in a
logical, rational fashion to “traditional” Japanese thought. Under the influence of the
Taisho democracy movement, philosophers such as Kuwaki Gen’yoku and Watsuji
Tetsuro attempted to use intellectual rationalism, traditional Japanese and East Asian
ethics, and new liberal, democratic ideals influential in the Taisho period, to encourage a
move beyond strict state nationalism to a spirit of individualism and values supportive of
the new middle class.1349
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Marxism, first in the form of socialism, did not become influential until after the
Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and its ensuing social and political problems in Japan.
Early socialists such as Abe Iso and Katayama Sen were inspired by Christian humanism.
Another socialist, Kotoku Shusui, shifted from anarchism to support for socialism and
workers’ rights after a visit to the United States, but was executed by the Japanese
government in 1910. Though the Marxist movement revived slightly following World
War I, it did not receive much philosophical consideration until after about 1926,
encouraged by scholars such as Kawakami Hajime, Fukumoto Kazuo, and Miki Kiyoshi.
Japan became increasingly fascist and militaristic after war with China started in 1937,
and many Japanese intellectuals were increasingly influenced by nationalistic
philosophies such as Japanism. Thinkers such as Tosaka Jun and Saigusa Hirota tried to
encourage consideration by intellectuals of the accomplishments of Marxism in the
Soviet Union, but their movement was disbanded by state repression. Along with the rise
of interest in Marxism, there was growing Japanese philosophical concern with historical
and social issues, especially through the lenses of Hegelian philosophy and dialectical
thought.
The rise of militaristic nationalism in Japan in the late 1920s and 1930s
encouraged work on nationalistic ideologies such as Nihonshugi (Japanism) and
kôdôshugi (imperial supremacy) by scholars like Kihira Tadayoshi.1350 Confucian ideals
were preserved in the Imperial Rescript on Education of the late 1800s, and by the early
1930s, increasing international and domestic pressures on Japan created an atmosphere
where the fusing of Confucian values with nationalism was encouraged. Through tools
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such as the nationalistic document Kokutai no Hongi, Confucian ideals became a
powerful tool for the promotion of Japanese nationalism within Japan and throughout the
empire.1351 In the years shortly before World War II, conservative Japanese scholars also
attempted to use the ideology of Kokugaku to provide ideological backing for the
imperial state of Japan.1352 The historical tool of kôkoku shikan was also used in the late
1930s and 1940s as a primary ideological tool to encourage Japan’s wartime
activities.1353
Regarding religion, by the end of the nineteenth century, Shinto and Buddhism
had become more institutionalized and formalized, and Japanese folk religions highly
popularized.1354 State Shinto, founded in the Meiji period, exercised an even higher
degree of influence on Japanese spirituality and politics from 1895-1945. It was formed
partly to provide a clear cultural and national sense of identity for Japanese in the face of
Western religions, ideologies and influences that were rapidly entering Japan. In the
twentieth century, State Shinto exercised influence on Japanese education, encouraging
ideas of the divinity of the emperor and sacred nature of Japan. The government claimed
that State Shinto was not a religion, and organized separate branches of Shinto that were
considered religious (called Kyôha Shinto). Thus the government could attempt to coerce
all Japanese to participate in worship at State Shinto shrines without breaking the
Constitution, which guaranteed freedom of religion. Another controversial part of State
Shinto was the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, dedicated to enshrining Japan’s war dead. The
1351
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emperor performed ceremonies at the shrine that turned the war dead into kami; over one
million were so deified during World War II. The formal state functions of Yasukuni
Shrine as a primary center of State Shinto were legally prohibited in late 1945.
Nevertheless, it continues to be a source of controversy within Japan and between Japan
and its Asian neighbors, even up to the present.1355
Some folk religious groups organized around charismatic leaders or pilgrimage
groups, eventually becoming “new religions.”1356 Many new religions were founded in
the nineteenth century.1357 Many have been characterized by offering close camaraderie
and warm fellowship in small groups,1358 also true before 1945. Government control of
religion was especially intense during the years shortly before 1945.1359 Despite this,
membership in many new religions grew greatly in the twentieth century. Perhaps the
most famous new religion founded in the twentieth century is Sôka Gakkai, currently the
largest new religion in Japan. Sôka Gakkai bases its doctrines on the teachings of the
Nichiren Shôshû sect of Buddhism that focus on the Lotus Sutra. Before 1945, Sôka
Gakkai members experienced some persecution from the government for refusing to
participate in Shinto efforts in support of World War II.1360
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Views of Domestic Issues (1895-1945)
Worldviews on Japan’s Technological Development
Yanagita Kunio. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, Yanagita Kunio believed
that two forces threatened Japan’s indigenous stability—family changes, and lifestyle
alterations through the rapid influx of Western culture and technology.1361 Uncritically
received through urban gateways, they especially affected rural people’s daily lives,
worldviews, lifestyles and finances.1362 Yanagita believed that farmers must evolve
standards of acceptability for Western products and their imitations, which spread to the
remotest areas by 1912.1363 Their response to foreign technology also affected the
agricultural economy, since the class system of rural life sometimes stifled creativity,
talent, and innovation. Failure to conform to expectations could result in banishment or
ostracism.1364 Rural Japan needed a new balance of “traditional solidarity” and
individual will.1365
Hirohito, Emperor. Concerning science, from 1914, Hirohito developed a love
for marine biology. In school he learned natural history, physics, marine biology, and
Darwin’s theory of evolution. In his worldview, he reconciled modern science and
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accounts of Japan’s national polity (kokutai).1366 Science strengthened the rational side
of Hirohito’s character, making him capable of weighing arguments, reason, and
evidence. He also felt a great duty to his imperial, divine ancestry.1367
Comparison of Leaders’ Worldviews on Technological Development (1895-1945)
How do Yanagita and Hirohito’s views of Japanese technological development
and culture compare?1368 Both Yanagita and Hirohito highly valued Japanese culture and
society, desiring to preserve it. Yanagita wanted to protect the “soul” of Japan and its
cultural core from the uncritical importation of Western culture and technology.
Preserving certain elements of Japan’s true identity, seen in the religious practices of
many of Japan’s rural villages, seemed necessary. Hirohito was especially concerned
with protecting and continuing the imperial throne and his position on it, no matter the
cost. It seems that no matter the perils and destruction that Japan faced during World
War II, this was his strong desire.1369 Perhaps he believed that if the imperial throne
ceased to exist, so would Japan. While Hirohito strongly supported the official emperor
religious ideology that was imposed on Japan during his reign and before, Yanagita
rejected it as the core of Japan’s cultural identity. Rather, Yanagita argued that the
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“heartfelt” expressions of grassroots folk worship found in rural Japanese villages were
closer to the true heart of Japanese culture.1370
What about Yanagita and Hirohito’s general views of Western science,
technology and culture, and their relation to Japan? Yanagita viewed Western
technology and culture in a negative manner. He believed that Japan’s massive
importation of Western technology and culture was a threat to Japan’s survival, and its
cultural soul. To forestall this destruction, new critical standards of what to reject and
what to accept must be developed. Hirohito viewed Western science and technology
positively, with great fascination and respect. Beyond his personal avocation with
Western-derived scientific study of marine life, he supported the positive Meiji view of
Western science and technology, that it was superior to Japan’s, and a powerful tool to
help strengthen Japan militarily, economically, and politically. Through modern science
and technology and its applications, Japan could lead and protect itself, and perhaps the
rest of Asia, from Western invasion and colonialism.
What about Yanagita and Hirohito’s willingness to be exposed to Western
technology and culture, through the training they received in Japan or abroad? Both
Yanagita and Hirohito were trained in some of the most advanced Western knowledge in
their respective areas of study in their era, Yanagita at Tokyo Imperial University, and
Hirohito at the imperial schools expressly created for his training.1371 But while both men
received such exposure to Western knowledge in Japan, neither one studied or lived
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abroad for very long.1372 Like the leaders of 1850 to 1895 discussed above, both desired
to use Western science and culture to strengthen Japan.1373
Conceptual analysis of leaders’ worldviews of technological development (18951945)
Seen through the lenses of internationalization, translative adaptation, and
Glick’s anthropological definition of technology, Yanagita’s thought about technology
was mostly concerned with its effects on domestic Japanese culture and society, the
effects of the aggressive internationalization of Japan by the West that he observed. To
him, the internationalization was underway; the question was how to mitigate its impacts.
Hirohito’s worldview emphasized basic scientific principles of rationality and empirical
investigation more than technology. During World War II, his scientific worldview also
influenced his policy actions concerning the military’s use of technology, chiefly for
what he and the Japanese government saw as the defense of Japan and its Asian
neighbors against the “iron ring” of “ABCD” encirclement by other powers, especially by
the aggressive West.1374 So inspired by the West’s aggressive internationalization,
Yanagita’s technological concerns focused more on the issues of Japan’s effective,
domestically focused translative adaptation. Before 1945, Hirohito, was more externally
focused in his view of technology. At this time, he was profoundly influenced on a
1372
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personal level by Western science, seen in his usually rational policies using technology
to “defend” Japan and Asia against the West. His view of technology mostly emphasized
the external threat of Japan’s internationalization by the West. Through an
anthropological lens, Yanagita’s view of technology seems fundamentally
anthropological, especially in an applied sense, regarding his concern about the impacts
of Western technology on the daily lives of Japanese, rural society, and the cultural core
of Japan as a whole. Hirohito, however, did not seem to have any real comprehension or
concern about the impacts of science or technology on the daily lives of his subjects.1375
Worldviews on Japan’s Domestic State Contexts
Yanagita Kunio. Domestically, Yanagita Kunio supported universal male
suffrage in the 1920s, the parliamentary system, and political parties (the last two if they
truly reflected “the people’s will”). Though espousing no ideology, he supported
proletarian parties, but it was hard for them to unite against the two most powerful
conservative parties of the dominant elites, the Seiyûkai and the Minseitô. The nation’s
diverse interests were more important than those of any class or group, but even with
universal male suffrage, all of them were not represented. Yanagita’s concept of
nationalism stressed the nation’s long-term interests. Representative government should
control all aspects of national policy and the military.1376 The emperor should be the
nation’s supreme spiritual symbol, without much political power. Yanagita also cared
about regional political development, but saw little interest in it. The weakening of
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Perhaps this was related to Hirohito’s overall isolation from and lack of understanding of his subjects, a
point explored by Bix (Bix, Hirohito).
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Elements of the political system that Yanagita criticized included the House of Peers, the Privy
Council, the political power of the military, and the power of the genrô (elder statesmen) to influence
national policy. All of these forces tended to limit the “people’s will” in various ways (Kawada, Origin
Ethnography, 88-91).
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“communal consciousness” seemed a source of political problems, and national
administrative consolidation in rural Japan damaged “traditional” solidarity. Perhaps the
enduring sense of communality limited this, yet it also might stifle political freedom.1377
Yanagita gave unique importance to the role of agriculture in Japanese politics, culture,
and national life.1378 As the basis of national solidarity, it contributes to the people’s
sense of communal belonging.1379 He also emphasized Japan’s ie (extended family)
system, which connected individuals to extended family, ancestors, descendants, and the
nation.1380 Yanagita criticized many national trends in pre- World War I politics since
they ignored citizens’ everyday concerns, and long-term implications. By the late 1920s,
he took an independent stance toward many political questions.1381
Hirohito, Emperor. Hirohito’s education affected his worldviews about the
Japanese state and domestic politics. The goals of his lifelong education were to enable
him to judge policy viewpoints and options, yet stay above the process, and effectively
serve through the Meiji system of checks, balances, factions, and bureaucracies.1382 Until
nineteen, Hirohito attended his own schools, learning military and non-military affairs,
important for his future work on domestic and international affairs.1383 From 1914-1921,
Hirohito received formal military training, the daily routine of which greatly influenced
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Ibid., 86-107, 151.
Yanagita’s academic background was in the field of “agro-politics” (Ibid., 2-3).
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Yanagita saw agriculture as the key link between “… the land and its people,” the nation’s “anchor”
(Ibid., 38-39).
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Ibid., 39-40.
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Ibid., 107.
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Bix, Hirohito, 81.
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Ibid., 36-41, 43-47, 51, 57-59. These non-military subjects were called teiôgaku (“instruction for the
emperor”). They included mathematics, science, economics, foreign languages, calligraphy, ethics, and
law (Bix, Hirohito, 58-59). His instructors included top military leaders and university professors. Many
of his instructors were conservative. Because top instructors were usually chosen as his teachers, they were
not “fanatical emperor worshippers.” Later in life, Hirohito was uncomfortable with such people (Ibid.,
44).
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his whole life.1384 Hirohito’s education affected his worldview of the military and
politics in important ways.1385 A conflict emerged in Hirohito’s training, due to the image
of his autocratic grandfather, the Emperor Meiji, whom he was to emulate. The
Confucian ideal of gentle, benevolent monarch contrasted with the autocratic ruler image
imported from Europe. The last image conflicted with Hirohito’s natural personality.1386
On Japanese history, he learned the same ideology of divine descent, racial homogeneity
and superiority that all Japanese children did. These became essential elements in his
worldview.1387 Hirohito also received instruction on current Japanese theories of
constitutional law.1388 He believed in the sacred nature of his authority, and was taught to
perform Shinto rituals for the imperial ancestors, representing the ideology of kôso kôsô
1384

His military training was also affected by the military culture of the time. Japan’s military culture in
the 1910s and 1920s was influenced by the values of bushido (the samurai ethic), Yamato damashii (“Japan
spirit,” which stressed feelings of “racial superiority” and “invincibility”), and strengthening Japan’s
national polity (kokutai). The military also had the conflicting roles of protecting Japan’s colonies,
defending the nation, and maintaining internal stability in the midst of the most intense strikes and labor
unrest in Japan’s history. There were also conflicts in the military concerning general morale and support
for the monarchy (Ibid., 51-52, 152-156).
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emperor, he would exercise leadership in political and military matters. As he entered adulthood, his
interests tended toward politics, but also history and the natural sciences. How would Hirohito balance his
conflicting roles of supreme military commander and constitutional monarch? His education failed to teach
him how to handle these conflicts, but his tendencies unfolded in the crucible of policy making in the late
1920s and 1930s (Ibid., 51-56, 89-91). For example, Hirohito and his aides continued to allow the superior
power of the military over civilian forces in the “mixed” cabinets that ruled Japan from 1888-1945. And
against the opposition of educators, from 1925, Hirohito allowed the military to send officers to middle
schools and universities to provide military training for students (Ibid., 150, 156-157).
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Ibid., 133. Hirohito’s character affected him throughout his life—his reticence, high-pitched voice,
weak demeanor, and “unmartial” appearance. Hirohito came to often mask his emotions during public
appearances. The theme of masks and hiding one’s emotions is important in Japanese culture. Hidden
meanings have been highly valued. Despite appearances, Hirohito was fairly intelligent, strong-willed,
frugal, and knowledgeable about the military, though not very creative. Top experts were brought in to
help him through daily lectures, and they often succeeded (Ibid., 84, 87-91, 129-130).
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Bix, Hirohito, 70-74. His instruction also stressed that activist emperors were important throughout
Japanese history, even during periods of military domination of politics (i.e. the Kamakura period, 11931336) (Ibid., 73-74).
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One theory, advocated by Hozumi Yatsuka and Uesugi Shinkichi, advocated imperial absolutism. The
other major theory, of Minobe Tatsukichi, argued that the emperor was an organ of the state, and that his
power was therefore constrained at times. In his exposure to constitutional law, Hirohito learned that the
center of sovereignty (tôchiken) is located in both the emperor and the state, but that the emperor is the
brain (central force) of the state (Ibid., 77, 79).
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that connected the imperial family to the myth of Japan’s divine creation, forming part of
his worldview about morals and the state.1389 In the mid-late 1920s, Hirohito supported
nationalism and traditional political values over the liberalism and openness connected
with the Taisho democratic movement.1390
Comparison of Leaders’ Worldviews on the Domestic State (1895-1945)
Yanagita and Hirohito’s views of the domestic state can be broken into three
broad categories, views of politics and policymaking, of political institutions, and of
political ideologies. On politics, Yanagita worried that Japan’s political system ignored
the people’s daily concerns, that the loss of “communal consciousness” would cause
political problems. This consciousness was deeply rooted in rural agriculture. The latter
he saw of central importance in Japan’s culture of politics, and worried that national
political consolidation occurring in Japan would damage “traditional” solidarity. Hirohito
had very different concerns. In general politics, in the competition between military and
oligarchic political involvement and civilian political involvement, he definitely preferred
the former. So on politics, Yanagita manifests more concern for popular political
involvement, while Hirohito preferred elite control with limited, carefully regulated
democracy.
On political institutions, Yanagita worried that elite controlled institutions such
as the Genro1391 and the Privy Council limited popular democratic involvement. He
supported such institutions as the Diet, broadly populist political parties, universal male
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Ibid., 77-80, 38-39. Kôso kôsô means “the imperial founders of our house and our other imperial
ancestors” (Bix, Hirohito, 38).
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Ibid., 146. See the brief discussion of the Taisho democracy movement in Chapter 7.
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The Genro refers to the Elder Statesmen who advised the emperor in the pre-World War II political
system.
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suffrage, and representative and civilian control of the national government and the
military. In contrast, Hirohito disliked democracy, and believed that Japan needed a
supreme leader, the emperor. Yanagita believed that the nation’s emperor should be the
nation’s supreme spiritual leader, but not have much political power. Hirohito saw the
emperor’s authority as sacred, that the emperor must perform sacred rituals for the
imperial ancestors. In the conflict between the images of the emperor as benevolent,
Confucian ruler or as autocratic, European-style emperor, Hirohito personally preferred
the former. Yet he also desired that the emperor should have much power, as he indeed
had in the prewar political system.1392 In his actions, he shows that he desired to be able
to judge policy options, and yet stay above the complexities of national political
entanglements. In Hirohito’s prewar view, the emperor should exercise influence in the
nation’s political and military affairs. In his own training, military knowledge and
discipline were heavily stressed, so he could not help but be strongly influenced by them.
To Hirohito, the military was vital in the political life of the nation.
Regarding political ideologies, according to Kawada, Yanagita had no particular
ideology, although he leaned toward proletarian, populist political parties, against the
conservative parties of Japan’s ruling elites. As of the late 1920s, Yanagita usually took
an independent political stance. In contrast, Hirohito’s basic political ideology was very
conservative, as seen in the ideology of kôso kôsô, that Japan was divinely created and
closely related to the imperial family. Elements of this ideology included the views that
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This view was stressed in his education, which stressed the “activism” of many emperors in Japanese
history. His training also emphasized the conservative values of Japan’s military culture, including bushido,
Yamato damashii (“Japan-spirit”), and strengthening the kokutai (national polity or essence).
Understanding military issues and affairs was highly important to Hirohito in the prewar political system.
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Japanese are divinely descended from the gods, racially homogeneous, and superior to
others. On nationalism, Yanagita saw the nation’s long-term interests as more important
than short-term ones, but also believed that representing the diversity of those interests
was more important than those of any single group.1393 Regarding views of the nation and
Japanese history, Yanagita believed that the Confucian ie system connected all Japanese
to each other and the state. To him, “communal consciousness” and communality were
important in Japan’s culture of politics. Agriculture played a central role in both Japan’s
national solidarity and the sense of “communal belonging” of all Japanese. The
weakening of Japan’s communality in the 1920s seemed to be a source of political
problems, but he worried that excessive communality might stifle political freedom.
Hirohito, as just noted, viewed Japanese as divinely descended and racially superior, and
saw national sovereignty as centered in both the emperor and the state. On religion and
the state, Yanagita was not opposed to some mixing of religion and public life, in that he
believed that the emperor should be the nation’s supreme spiritual symbol. And yet, he
wanted the political power of the emperor to be limited. Though we have already noted
Hirohito’s mixing of religious and political authority (his zealous participation in Shinto
rituals), later in life, he was uncomfortable with “fanatical” emperor worshippers. So on
political ideologies, while both Yanagita and Hirohito have conservative elements,
Yanagita is much more populist in his outlook.
Conceptual Analysis of Leaders’ Worldviews of the Domestic State (1895-1945)
Development Issues. Regarding “modernization,” the basic question, from
1895-1945, is, as Japan was increasingly absorbed into the world economy, and
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In the 1920s, Yanagita believed that not all national interests were yet represented.
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interacted with it, from the evidence in the domestic state worldviews here, what
happened to Japan’s domestic culture of politics? Did its “core” become more “Western,”
or did it stay basically “non-Western” and “Japanese”? On general politics, Yanagita was
more concerned for grassroots, populist political involvement and genuine democracy
(similar to the consensus, village-level politics of traditional Japan): a focus more on the
domestic level. Hirohito was more concerned with oligarchic control of the political
process, with limited democratic input, and a focus more on national level. On the local
level, despite the heavy input and huge changes brought by Japan’s heavy involvement in
the international economy in this period, the basics of Japanese political culture in rural
areas, especially decision-making by consensus and local communalism, did not change.
At the national level, the oligarchic, authoritarian tendencies of Japanese politics, seen
since ancient and Tokugawa times, also did not change.
On political institutions, Yanagita favors strong, democratic, populist input and
institutions. Hirohito favors supreme power exercised by an all-powerful emperor, and
oligarchic- and militarily-controlled political institutions with limited popular input. He
seemed “afraid” of the people, somewhat unsure of how to personally relate to them. In
national political institutions, Hirohito’s view prevailed in the pre-war system; its core
seemed more similar to “traditional Japanese political culture. “Modernization” basically
prevailed in Japan’s general politics and political institutions in this period.
Concerning political ideologies, Yanagita supported a populist, independent
form of Japanese nationalism, but was rather conservative in his support for “traditional”
elements of Confucian social connection and rural, agriculturally based solidarity.
Hirohito was highly conservative ideologically, supporting the political aspects of
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emperor ideology, State Shinto and nationalist thought. He also had a highly conservative
view of the state and of Japanese ethnicity. Both Yanagita and Hirohito were fairly
conservative, but Yanagita, more populist. In their political ideologies, both seem
reflective of “modernization”—Yanagita in his support for Japanese communality and
Confucian values, and Hirohito, less so. Though Hirohito supported Shinto values, they
were the redefined, nationalized values of State Shinto, not necessarily those of
“traditional,” local Shinto across different regions.
On translative adaptation, the main question here is, in the evidence in the
political worldviews here, as Japan attempted to adapt to the global market, in spite of its
importation of Western political and cultural items, did the “core” of its domestic culture
of politics stay mostly “non-Western” and “Japanese”? On general politics, Yanagita was
concerned that national politics were destroying “traditional” Japanese communality. He
was also concerned for local and regional political life. Hirohito cared about oligarchic
and military control of politics, with limited democrat input. In both of these worldviews,
on general politics, translative adaptation seems validated; Japan’s basic politics stayed
mostly non-Western and Japanese. On political institutions, Yanagita favored democratic,
popular input in political institutions, and was wary of too much elite input. Hirohito
supported a strong emperor, and elite/military-controlled institutions. In these
worldviews, did the core of its domestic culture of politics stay mostly “non-Western”
and “Japanese”? Again, translative adaptation generally prevailed.
On political ideology, Yanagita was populist and proletarian leaning, without
espousing a specific ideology, but supported communality and Japan’s local culture of
politics. Hirohito was ultraconservative, supported the state’s main ideologies, including
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State Shinto, the emperor ideology, and nationalism, and had conservative views of the
nation. In these worldviews, did the core of Japan’s domestic culture of politics stay
mostly “non-Western” and “Japanese”? Yanagita’s support for communality prevailed,
but his democratic populism did not. Hirohito’s conservative political ideologies also
prevailed, although the highly state-manipulated ideologies of emperor worship and
ultranationalism were not very characteristic of the historic Japanese culture of politics.
Here, Yanagita basically supported the ideals of translative adaptation.1394 Hirohito’s
“new” ultranationalistic political values seem more like Western ideologies of
ultranationalism than “traditional” Japanese ones, and do not seem supportive of
translative adaptation.
Technology Issues. Examining these leaders’ views on general politics through
the lens of Glick’s concept of technology, Yanagita was more supportive of popular
political involvement in national politics, while Hirohito favored elite control. Yanagita
was more concerned about how politics affected peoples’ daily lives. Yanagita disliked
elite institutions that limited people’s opportunities for democratic involvement. Hirohito
was concerned about maintaining elite control of institutions. Yanagita manifested a
concern for how politics affected peoples’ daily lives much more than Hirohito did.
There was not much concern in either Yanagita or Hirohito for the issues of
technonationalism as ideology, to make Japan wealthier. Yanagita’s main concern for
economics is that the state should focus more on agriculture and the regional economy,
not heavy industrialization and exports. He believes that this is the major way to make
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Yanagita’s views here reflect the basic continuance of communality that continued in rural Japanese
politics, but here we cannot judge what happened in urban politics.
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Japan stronger and therefore wealthier. His main concern was protecting Japan’s culture
and identity, enabling Japan to survive. Making Japan abundantly wealthy was not his
major concern. Hirohito’s main concern, however, was effectively ruling Japan, and
maintaining the viability of the imperial throne, not economic, industrial or wealth issues.
Concerning Murakami’s concept of industrial policy, in their views of politics,
neither Yanagita nor Hirohito shows much concern for Japanese government intervention
in Japan’s economy. Yanagita is a strong supporter of government intervention, but not in
support of heavy industrialization. He desires that intervention be positive, especially
focused on rural, regional, and agricultural issues. His main motivation is the protection
of Japanese culture, not the promotion of (heavy) industrial growth. Hirohito shows
absolutely no concern for this issue. So while Yanagita is a mixed, perhaps moderate
example of Murakami’s concept, Hirohito shows no connection to it at all.
Cognition Issues. Image. The main images of Japan’s domestic state here
concern politics, political institutions, political ideologies, the nation and politics,
Japanese society and politics, and religion and politics. There is a large dichotomy in
many of the images because of huge differences in many of the basic views of the two
leaders studied here, Yanagita and Emperor Hirohito. Regarding basic politics, Yanagita
paints positive images of regional and local politics and takes an independent stance on
many issues. Hirohito, however, supports the conservative authoritarian apparatus of
prewar Japanese politics. On Japan’s culture of politics, Yanagita’s images stress the
importance of agriculture and local culture in Japan, while Hirohito’s stress the roles of
the nation’s elite-dominated political institutions and the military in politics, and the need
to create stability.
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Main images on political institutions from Yanagita question elite domination as
negative, while those from Hirohito imply that elite control of politics is both good and
necessary, since the people are not able to govern themselves. While Yanagita’s images
of the emperor’s role in politics stress that it should be limited, those of Hirohito
emphasize that the emperor, the “brain” of the state,1395 has a primary role in providing
leadership and guidance for the state and the military, without getting mixed up in
political complexities and factional disputes. On the role of the military in national
politics, while Yanagita’s images stress that representative government should limit the
military, Hirohito’s suggest the importance of the military in national life and politics. On
democracy, Yanagita’s images stress that all of the interests in Japan must achieve some
level of representation,1396 and that representative government should reign in political
actors such as the military. Hirohito’s images hint that democracy is dangerous, and
therefore it should be limited. Yanagita supports political parties if they support workers’
rights and broad national interests; he distrusts the elite-dominated parties in control in
the 1920s.1397
On ideologies of politics and the nation, Yanagita’s images are progressive and
liberal leaning, while Hirohito’s support imperial and nationalistic ideologies of divine
descent and Japanese heritage such as kôso kôsô. On Japanese history and national
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his conservative political beliefs and experience in working with elite political actors and bodies, it is likely
that he distrusted and disliked them.
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origins, there is slight similarity in their images. In the imagery of Hirohito’s beliefs, we
see strong connection between the imperial family and the history and creation of Japan.
Yanagita also sees Japan and its people as founded on the imperial family, but, in
addition, closely connected to the land and heartfelt worship of local spirits.
In imagery on Japanese society and politics, we see strong support in Yanagita
for democratic politics and populist movements, while Hirohito’s suggest fear of
democracy and too much popular involvement. Yanagita supports more such
involvement, while Hirohito’s images suggest a preference for elite control. Yanagita’s
images also reveal a strong concern for the daily concerns of peoples’ lives, and a stress
on the importance of protecting indigenous solidarity and communality. If this
communality is damaged, politics will suffer. We also find strong images supporting
religion, spirituality and politics, from both Hirohito and Yanagita. Though Hirohito
supports a stronger, more active role for the emperor than Yanagita does, the latter still
sees the emperor as the nation’s greatest spiritual symbol. Both Hirohito and Yanagita
suggest images which draw on Japanese spirituality and ethics very strongly, including
Hirohito’s fervent, faithful performance of Shinto rituals, and Yanagita’s conviction that
the Confucian-based ie1398 system connects people to their ancestors and the nation.
How did the above images function as possible perceptual filters or as cognitive
organizing devices? In the images of general politics, Yanagita shows preferences for
local and regional politics, agriculture, and local culture. Hirohito’s images stress strong
roles for elites, the emperor and the military in politics, and limited democratic input.
These could result in Yanagita failing to deal realistically with national or international
1398

Ie means household.
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level forces, interests or groups. Hirohito shows almost a total lack of touch with his
subjects and their desires, and no comprehension of grassroots and local issues. On
ideologies, Yanagita is basically independent, but shows a preference for liberalism,
while Hirohito prefers nationalistic and imperialistic thought, and both see the nation’s
founding through the lenses of imperialist ideology.1399 In these ideological biases,
Yanagita shows potential anger or a lack of in-depth understanding of the intricacies of
elite ideologies and forces, and their powerful lock on national politics from the late
1920s through 1945. Again, Hirohito shows little knowledge of, and no experience with,
local beliefs and issues, though he was trained in the same nationalist ideologies as other
Japanese. On society and politics, in his images, Yanagita shows a strong concern for
rural areas, solidarity, communality, and support for populist, democratic movements.
Hirohito suggests a fear of democratic political involvement from his subjects. Yanagita’s
images suggest few blind spots on society and politics issues, though his rural preference
may have biased him slightly against urban needs and issues. Again, Hirohito has almost
no connection with average Japanese or awareness of their true needs and issues. Finally,
on religion and politics, in their images, while both leaders support Shinto-related beliefs,
Hirohito’s have more connection with State Shinto and state-defined spirituality in
service of politics, and Yanagita’s have more connection with grassroots society and
popular belief and spiritual practice. Here Yanagita’s bias suggests a potential lack of
relevance to the reality of State Shinto, what it is doing to the country, and an inability to
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486

resist or change it. Hirohito failed to see the devastating impacts of State Shinto and
emperor ideology near the end of Word War II, which nearly destroyed Japan.
Worldview. In these worldviews about the nature of the domestic state, about
the nature of the world, Yanagita is concerned about micro-level political matters, not
just the macro-level. In his views, the most fundamental things that happen in Japan
occur at the local level, related to agriculture and rural areas; the local drives the most
basic things that happen in a society. Yanagita believes that progressive political thought
will do more for the world. On the other hand, in Hirohito’s view, elites and leaders run
the politics in all normal countries and in Japan. Without them, politics cannot function.
To Yanagita, the world is driven by politics on both the macro- and micro-levels. To
really understand it, we need to study both levels. He believes that the people have a right
to be involved in politics; their voice must be heard. For politics to work effectively, the
people’s interests must be heard, and their voices known. Hirohito, however, believes that
leaders who are conservative, experienced and wise must lead politics. Leadership by
those who are too young, inexperienced or radical will fail. Hirohito believes that the
world needs stability and leadership by experienced leaders in order to function well.
Regarding the world’s forms of political organization, for Yanagita, political order on the
local and regional levels is important, not just the national or international levels. While
Hirohito believes that elite-dominated political institutions run the nations of the world,
Yanagita sees elite domination of politics as negative. To Hirohito, elite control of
politics and leadership is both needed and good. Yanagita believes that to prevent abuses,
leaders must be account to the people. Hirohito believes that democracy is dangerous,
and should be limited, while Yanagita views populist, democratic political parties as
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positive, and dislikes elitist political parties. He supports the representation of workers’
and peoples’ rights.
Regarding their views of the self (Japanese politics), to Yanagita, local and
regional politics are more important in Japan than national politics. He sees the heart of
politics in Japan as located in agriculture and local communality. Agriculture is a basic
part of Japan’s political culture and how it works. On the other hand, to Hirohito, elites
and the military must lead Japanese politics, and the emperor has a key role in Japan’s
politics. Above all, stability is needed in Japan’s politics, and the people cannot govern
themselves.1400 Yanagita believes that the emperor’s role in Japan should be limited,
while in Hirohito’s view, the emperor has a primary role in guiding the Japanese state and
military. To him, the emperor should not get mixed up in ground-level political
complexities. Yanagita argues that all political interests in Japan should be represent at
the national level, and that Japan needs democratic and representative government to
control potential abuses by its leaders. In Hirohito’s view, democracy is dangerous for
Japan, and should be limited. Again, Yanagita supports populist politics, and the rights of
the workers and the people. To both Hirohito and Yanagita, Japan must be ruled by
divine forces, the imperial family and order. Japanese are descended from the imperial
family. To Yanagita, Japan and its people are closely related to the land and local
spirituality. The needs of the people matter, and Japan’s indigenous solidarity and
communality must be protected. If Japan’s communality is damaged, its politics will
suffer. He views the emperor is Japan’s greatest spirit symbol. To Hirohito, Shinto
rituals, honoring the kami, and ancestors are important for the success and functioning of
1400
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the nation. For Yanagita, the Confucian-based ie system connect all Japanese to their
ancestors and to the nation.
What are the relevant environment(s) surrounding the viewers/actors who held
these worldviews? How have these environments interacted with/affected the
viewers’/actors’ worldviews? Yanagita’s views were shaped by his experiences in urban
Japan, in rural Japan-regions and small villages, towns across the nation, by his own
education in agro-politics at Tokyo Imperial University, and by his own experiences as a
politician in the Diet and as a diplomat in the League of Nations. These experiences and
environments have given Yanagita views that are quite broad and practical, but biased
toward the rural, populist sector. Hirohito’s elite, isolated environment stressed
militaristic training and the best learning and knowledge available at the time. He was
isolated in the imperial court and in his interactions with only the highest leaders and
aristocrats of the nation. This environment totally oriented Hirohito toward elitist views
of the world, and the nationalist ideologies he was taught as a child. It totally isolated him
from a capacity to relate to his subjects. How these worldviews and their associated
environmental interactions influence the viewers’/actors’ perceptions, uses of
information, and their understanding of events? Yanagita’s education in agro-politics and
his own personal interests heavily biased him in the direction of focusing his own
research on rural and agricultural Japan, also influenced his findings. These also strongly
affected his interpretations of rural and indigenous spirituality. Hirohito’s isolated,
heavily guarded, regulated upbringing and environment isolated him from understanding
the concerns of average Japanese, to a large extent, and biased him exclusively toward
elitist politics and conservative views of the military, what their roles in politics should
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be, and against popular, democratic input. These also strongly biased his spiritual
interpretations toward State Shinto and its ideologies and practices/rituals. In uses of
information here, Yanagita was biased toward rural, popular, ethnographic, local level,
bottom up sources, and Hirohito was biased toward top down, elitist, state/official views
and sources of information regarding politics. Regarding their understanding of political
events and their causes, Yanagita interprets events as influenced by organic causes, and
by Japan’s indigenous spirituality and culture, to a large extent. Neglect of these, and
over-reliance on foreign or urban sources and models will likely cause problems in Japan.
Hirohito interprets the causes of political events through the evolutionary and also
spiritual training he has received. Underneath all his education is the influence of
evolutionary views on the behavior of foreign actors and of Japan in the international
system (the strongest will survive). Regarding the blessing and survival of Japan, it seems
his spiritual training (and his performance of proper Shinto rituals and prayers) is the
most important part. Here we see the conflict between science and religion, “material
reality” and spirituality, at a very basic level in the life of Japan’s most important
Japanese political leader of recent times. What were the implications of this conflict for
policy outcomes related to Hirohito’s life and actions? I will discuss this more in Chapter
10.
How did technological systems affect these worldviews? Because Yanagita
preferred local level processes in nearly everything, he also preferred technology on a
smaller scale, and other solutions on a smaller, more humane scale. He preferred
localized politics and solutions better than national scale politics. Hirohito was oriented
toward an elitist, large scale, national/international, militarist, and conservative
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orientation in almost everything. Clearly he believed that solutions to political and
military problems must come from strong, powerful, and technologically great solutions.
In sum, if we compare these worldviews, regarding the nature of the world,
Yanagita focuses on the micro-, local level, rural areas, and progressive politics. Hirohito
focuses on an elitist, narrow, statist view of politics and the world. On how the world
functions, Yanagita sees the world operating on the micro- and macro-levels, and on
additional levels too: local, national, international, and so forth. In his mind, we need an
appropriate balance between these for effective politics and economics. Hirohito believes
that experienced, elite leaders must lead the world. Concerning the world’s political
order, order, to Yanagita, agriculture is a basic part of Japan’s culture. Democratic
accountability and involvement are essential for effective politics. For Hirohito, elite
control of politics is basic to the world and Japan;1401 democracy is dangerous. To
Yanagita, local and regional politics are more import than national level politics.
Democracy and representative politics are important for Japan, which needs limits on
possible abuses by elites and leaders. Popular needs must be recognized. Japan’s
indigenous solidarity and communality are essential. Spirituality and the imperial
tradition are important parts of Japan’s identity, but the state must respect local
differences. In Hirohito’s view, elites, the military and the imperial throne have key roles
in Japan’s politics. The people cannot govern themselves; democracy is negative for
Japan. The emperor should have strong role. Finally, he sees the Japanese as descended
from the imperial family. On these two leaders’ views of Japanese politics, Yanagita sees
local and national politics as more import than national level politics. Democracy and
1401

This point is implied.
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representative politics are import for Japan, which needs limits on possible abuses of
power by elites and leaders. Popular needs must be recognized. Japan’s indigenous
solidarity and communality are essential. Spirituality and the imperial tradition are
important parts of Japan’s identity, but the state must respect local differences. For
Hirohito, elites, the military, and the imperial throne have a key role in Japan’s politics.
People cannot govern themselves; democracy is negative for Japan. The emperor should
have a strong role, and all Japanese are descended from the imperial family. All of the
people must be committed to the national honor and honoring the ancient (spiritual) ways
of the ancestors and the imperial line.
Cultural Logics. The global phenomena to which these leaders responded
included international ideas and ideologies about politics, such as democracy, political
liberalism, Marxism, autocratic theories of European politics, monarchism, theories on
warfare and the military, ideas about political institutions, such as a national parliament,
role of a king or monarch, theories of nationalism, principles of absolute leadership, and
East Asian-derived theories of politics (such as Confucianism). What are the leaders’
worldviews and basic beliefs about these phenomena? Yanagita leaned toward
democratic and liberal-leaning beliefs, including support for voting and democratic
institutions. He believed that politics must be based on the needs, convictions, and daily
lives of the people and the indigenous ways of life of Japan, best seen in rural areas.
Democratic ideas from the West would support the effective representation of these ideas
in the Japanese political system, so that is why Yanagita supported them to a degree. The
new social science methods of ethnography, also gleaned from abroad, would enable
Japan to study and know its own self, its own culture. Hirohito embraced ideas of nearly
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absolute rule by the monarchy, little democratic representation, and authoritarian
government with a strong military influence. While some of his political ideology drew
on symbols and ideas from Japanese or East Asian origin, many of them also drew on
ideas from other nations, especially Germany and other authoritarian systems in
Europe.1402 Both Yanagita and Hirohito have a strong Confucian and imperial (family
and throne) ideological foundation to their political views. Their beliefs are in many ways
the of opposite each other.
The cultural logics emerging under Yanagita’s views are that the job of
government is to create better conditions for the people, the average citizens, people and
workers who make up the heart of society. This is a populist orientation; he really loved
the average people and ways of Japan, and the country. He wants Japan to survive.
Though he generally feels that Western ideologies and culture are totally unsuited for
Japan, he is willing to draw on ideas and techniques from the West (certain political ideas
and ideologies) when he feels they can be used to help Japan survive culturally and
politically. The assumptions here are that the heart of the nation are the people, and rural
people/farmers. These elements must be preserved and adapted by reasonable means for
the people to survive. If they are not, the country will be destroyed. Additional
assumptions are that it is worthwhile for Japan to survive, and that if intentional steps are
not taken, Western culture will destroy Japan. Western culture is not compatible with
Japanese culture. By flexibly adapting certain (political) ideas or research methods
(ethnography) from abroad, Japan can survive. Hirohito’s cultural logics include the basic
cultural logics under the Meiji political system, since his education stressed them. The
1402

Bix, Hirohito.
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basic logics under the Meiji system were that political ideas from countries with politics
and culture most like Japan’s were the countries that were the best from which could
Japan learn. In politics in Meiji Japan, that country was mostly Germany/Prussia, which
had an authoritarian system. His logics also emphasized tradition, honor, state-defined
rituals and spirituality. They also stressed that Japan would not survive if it did not have a
strong military, that the country must be defended, and strong. There are many
evolutionistic assumptions here also. The common people are like “children,” and cannot
be trusted to handle complex political decisions. Those who are wealthy, wise, proven,
well educated, and the elite members of society must provide guidance. There is the
assumption that for Japan to be strong and survive, it needs to draw on the best ideas in
the world, from the most powerful countries. Through World War I, the best, most
appropriate political ideas were believed to come from Europe. After the failure of many
states in Europe in World War I, and their authoritarian, monarchist systems, Japan lost
some of its most admired models. Hirohito and his conservative court did not like the
liberal leanings of Taisho democracy. They were happy that the military was rising (it
was conservative, and it supported the throne). Hirohito did not like Marxism, and greatly
feared the Soviet Union, remembering what they did to their monarchy.
What were the leaders’ responses to these global phenomena? Yanagita disliked
and philosophically resisted all of the conservative, authoritarian political movements.1403
His main response was do research and much writing, to try to intellectually devise
solutions to the problems Japan faced. Hirohito disliked and feared democratic and liberal
movements, and wanted them to be as limited and impotent as possible. He got involved
1403

In my research, I uncovered no evidence that Yanagita actively resisted conservative politics in Japan.
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extensively in Japan’s politics at the top level, though “behind the scenes,” usually,
especially its international political issues. He also prayed often for the nation through
Shinto rituals, especially during World War II.
What were the cultural logics under these responses to these global phenomena?
Yanagita’s views were deeply rooted in an emphasis on grassroots level society, people,
and populist viewpoints, based on his ethnographic studies of Japanese society. Therefore
he resisted conservative, elitist ideas. Hirohito was steeped in and trained in political
ideas that emphasized the importance of authority, ritual, power, and tradition.
Democratic, liberal ideas were not in his political vocabulary, training very much, nor in
his worldviews and experience. What if we compare the cultural logics of these
worldviews about the global phenomena, and the cultural logics of the worldviews under
the responses to the phenomena? On the cultural logics of the global phenomena,
Yanagita’s are that Japan’s survival depends on knowing and protecting the true,
indigenous culture and “traditions” of Japan. To do that, he is willing to use tools from
the West (some democratic ideas and institutions, and ethnography). He feels that elitist
politics do not listen to or comprehend Japan’s grassroots level needs and politics, and
therefore cannot help the country. Hirohito’s cultural logics here are based on
assumptions that emphasize leadership and control of politics by elites and prominent,
educated, wealthy members and forces of society, such as wealthy aristocrats, landowners
and the military, not the masses. He is also willing to borrow or support political ideas
from abroad that seem suitable for Japan. What he is willing to use is not democratic, but
authoritarian or monarchical in nature. The cultural logics under the responses to the
global phenomena are also extremely similar to the first cultural logics I identified.
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Again, Yanagita shows a preference for grassroots, populist, democratic and liberalleaning ideas, and Hirohito prefers elite, authoritarian ones. There is no basic change in
the logics here.
Worldviews on Japan’s Domestic Market Contexts
Yanagita Kunio. Yanagita Kunio opposed the Japanese government’s
economic policies of the early 1900s and its plans for Japan’s development on largely
Western lines.1404 His criticisms were based partly on his thoughts about cultural effects
on the process. He saw weaknesses in Western patterns of modernization, and had
serious concerns about whether Japan should follow them.1405 Yanagita concluded that
Japan should take its own path to development, based on its own conditions.1406 He
supported a re-orientation of the government’s plan by developing and improving Japan’s
domestic economy, without totally altering its structure. He developed his theories of
agro-politics and regional development during a period that helped set the course for
Japanese capitalism. He believed that capital should be broadly distributed throughout
Japan. National domestic economic policy must involve a balance among agriculture,
industry, and commerce, with the first two sectors as pillars, and the third a bridge
between them. Yanagita opposed protectionist policies in these sectors. He wished to
lessen conflict among various sectors, partly by strengthening the communal solidarity
1404

The government’s plans stressed increasing industrialization and concentration of capital to finance
Japan’s economic expansion overseas (Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 32).
1405
Some of these weaknesses were revealed in the massive self-destruction of Europe in World War I
(Ibid., 79).
1406
Yanagita questioned whether there was only one path to modernization, and argued that there would
likely be multiple paths for the varied cultures of the world to follow, based on the pattern of cultural
variation in global cultures which he saw present in the early 1900s (Ibid., 79-80). This thinking is similar
to the recent thought of Japanese anthropologist Maegawa Keiji and Japanese development economists
Hara Yonosuke and Ohno Kenichi. For more, see the definition of translative adaptation in the Glossary
section (Maegawa, “Continuity of Cultures,” and K. Ohno, “Overview”).
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that he believed had pervaded rural Japan. Yanagita saw the importance of heavy
industries for Japan’s international trade, but over-reliance on them could cause
problems. Instead, he supported the development of regional industries. While
Yanagita’s economic vision differed from that of national policymakers, Kawada
concludes that it could have contributed to long-term economic stability.1407
Second, the nation’s agriculture must gradually change to small-scale
independent farming. Yanagita opposed the “semi-feudal” landowners’ dominance of
agriculture.1408 Tenant farmers must change to small-scale, independent status.
Yanagita’s objectives differed from those of leading Japanese agricultural theorists.1409
In the 1920s, he believed Japan’s agricultural population suffered from the extreme
attention given to military and industrial buildup after the wars with China and Russia.
To help, he wished to increase the productivity of agricultural labor, and offered many
practical suggestions.1410 Also, industrial unions, legalized in 1901, should reflect the
interests of small-scale farmers and the “traditional” rural sense of communality.1411 But
Yanagita believed what unions could accomplish in rural regions was limited.1412
1407

Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 3-4, 11, 32-33, 40-42, 77-79, 141. Yet his economic thought had several
weaknesses, including vagueness on how small- and medium-sized enterprises and traditional communal
values could strengthen regional development, and the plausibility of his theories in the international
context of the era. (For more details, see Ibid., 78-79).
1408
Yanagita wished to aid independent and tenant farmers, not the landowners. He rejected the idea of
land expropriation. It would be interesting to compare Yanagita’s prewar proposals for agricultural and
land reform with those of the postwar American occupation of Japan, which were quite radical. This is
beyond the scope of this chapter.
1409
Ibid., 19, 22-25.
1410
Ibid., 10-11, 13-23. Among his suggestions were the improvement of agricultural production and
technology, encouraging farmers to focus on agriculture, and decreasing the number of farmers to
standardize landholdings (Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 10-11, 13-23).
1411
For more on Yanagita’s concept of communality in rural Japan, see the section on domestic Japanese
society.
1412
Ibid., 34-38, 143-144, 149-150. In his earlier writings, Yanagita was hopeful that unions in rural areas
could help bring regional unity among farmers and landowners, but later he grew pessimistic (Ibid., 76).
And he came to believe that labor unions could not successfully help to establish a renewed rural spirit of
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From the early 1900s,Yanagita offered detailed plans for regional
development.1413 He was especially concerned about increasing economic divisions
between urban and rural areas.1414 During and after World I, Yanagita attributed Japan’s
weakening economic condition to domestic factors.1415 To Yanagita, the central purpose
of industrial policy was to improve people’s daily lives. This influenced his theory of
regional development.1416
Hirohito, Emperor. In the late 1910s and early 1920s, Prime Minister Hara Kei
faced pressure over the huge wealth of the monarchy becoming a source of conflict for
the people.1417 As Japan’s largest landowner, the imperial house had to be careful not to
engage in economic activities that might cause hardship or raise resentment. For this
purpose, Hara and other leaders, including Yamagata Aritomo, understood that the
monarchy must use its wealth to “purchase” the people’s goodwill, such as selling some

communality (Ibid., 149-151). Yanagita also supported unions in urban areas and unionization for all
workers, including women. Without more cooperation and help for workers, he feared that the urban-rural
divide would increase (Ibid., 158-159).
1413
Yanagita’s plan was to handle surplus agricultural labor, promote regional stability, communality and
growth (Ibid., 27-33, 61).
1414
Ibid., 27-33, 61. For example, his vision for the domestic economy included a large industrial urban
sector, and smaller regional industries, and the creation of regional small- and medium-sized markets. The
purpose of small and medium markets was to help eliminate intermediary exploitation, or urban industries
would devastate local areas (for details, see Ibid., 29-30). For local markets, many new administrative
arrangements should be eliminated, and traditional political subdivisions renewed (Ibid., 30). Within
regions, he hoped to divide labor between industrial and agricultural sectors, including semi-independent
units in each area (Ibid., 32). Yanagita was also concerned about the increasing centralization of the
economy into urban industries. This centralization also occurred through zaibatsu, large industrial
combines of interlocking companies in various industries. These included such famous groupings as the
Houses of Sumitomo, Mitsui and Mitsubishi. They especially increased in strength in the period from 1905
to the late 1910s, following the Russo-Japanese War and during World War I (Ibid., 70-71).
1415
During this period, urban products continued to flood rural areas, and capital increasingly returned to
cities. According to Kawada, government promotion of urban versus rural growth caused general
economic decline. Earlier, Meiji rural industry policy on caused the decline of rural industries, lifestyles,
and economy, increasing dependence on urban products. Government policy favored rice, decreasing
agricultural diversity, and affecting rural stability (Ibid., 64-65, 67-69).
1416
Ibid., 64-65, 67-71, 74.
1417
For example, I have noted elsewhere the rice riots over food prices that occurred in many towns, cities
and rural areas across Japan, involving over 1 million protesters (Bix, Hirohito, 94).
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stocks and land holdings. The imperial family’s wealth was as great as that of Japan’s
largest zaibatsu, and it increased the ability of the imperial house to relate to and
influence the nation.1418 Although Hirohito received lectures on economics in his
education, evidence suggests that neither he nor his court group understood economics
very well. By the late 1920s, it seems his interest in economics arose mainly from a
concern for domestic and international order, stability, and peace, perhaps for the wellbeing of the throne itself.1419
Comparison of Leaders’ Worldviews on the Domestic Market (1895-1945)
Yanagita Kunio’s and Emperor Hirohito’s views of Japan’s domestic market
can be organized into three primary groups: general views of the economy and
economics, views of economic development, and views of the rural and urban
economies.1420 I found very little about Hirohito’s views, so I will explore Yanagita’s
views in more depth. In Yanagita, we see a strong desire to promote balanced
development that does not squelch Japan’s indigenous culture. He disliked development
that was too large-scale, which he saw as inhumane. He was especially concerned about
economic development across Japan’s various regions, and in its rural areas, which he
saw as the heart of Japan’s culture and identity. A significant insight here is that Yanagita
supports the recent argument of some of Japan’s leading development economists that
there are multiple paths to development, to the market. Like them, he also supports
1418

Ibid., 94-95. For example, among the monarchy’s land holdings were “… palaces, mansions, schools,
mausoleums and museums in Kyoto, Nara and Tokyo,” income from investment in corporate stocks and
bonds, profits from stocks in colonial banks and enterprises, including the Bank of Korea and the South
Manchurian Railway, an annual government allotment of 3 million yen, and income from domestic mines
and other enterprises. In 1919 the imperial house had an income of 6-8 million yen from forest
management activities alone (Ibid., 95).
1419
Ibid., 130-131.
1420
I will not repeat all of these ideas here, however, since they are found above.
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capitalism, but insists it be humane. In contrast to Hirohito’s economic views (which, as
with political views, also seem conservative), Yanagita’s views are economically
progressive. He desires to modernize Japanese agriculture, support farmers’ and workers’
rights, and he opposes large-scale, centralizing economic forces such as the overconcentration of heavy industry in urban areas and of financial power in the zaibatsu.
Yanagita’s significant reflections on economic issues flow out of his concern to protect
Japanese culture and identity from the onslaught of Western technology and cultural
influence coming into Japan. Yet it seems his overall impact on economics in this era was
small, given the generally conservative political atmosphere in Japan from the late 1920s
through 1945.
Conceptual Analysis of Leaders’ Domestic Market Worldviews (1895-1945)
Development Issues. The main question here (on “modernization” from 18951945) is: as Japan was absorbed more and more into the world economy, and interacted
with it, from the evidence in the domestic market worldviews here, what happened to
Japan’s domestic economy and its effects on Japan’s “core” culture? Did its “core”
become more “Western,” or did it stay basically “non-Western” and “Japanese”? On their
general views of the economy and economics, Yanagita opposed the Japanese
government policy for the domestic economy. His plan stressed regional development
throughout Japan and communalism, not just large-scale industrial development in urban
areas. He also supported balanced development among major sectors, labor unions, and
workers’ rights. Hirohito had a poor understand of economics, was mainly concerned for
the maintenance of peace and survival of the throne. Regarding the main question, the
government did not really follow Yanagita’s recommends on regional development until
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after 1945. It followed its goal of large-scale industrial development. It also supported the
basic conservative political and emperor ideologies that Hirohito did. It does not seem
that these things made the Japanese culture’s core less western. ”Modernization”
prevailed, though it was not intentional.
On their views of economic development, to Yanagita, there are multiple paths
to development. Japan must follow its own path, based on its own conditions, and the
basic structure of the existing economy should not be altered. There are weaknesses in
Western development models that will have negative effects on Japanese culture.
Yanagita supports the broad application of capitalism across Japan’s regions, and the
importance of smaller, regional industries, not just large scale ones.1421 On the main
question, the pattern of Japan’s economic development did not follow the pattern of
small-scale, regional and localized development that was recommended by Yanagita.
Rather, it followed the large- scale, heavy industry preferences of the national state. What
were the cultural effects of this process before 1945? Even though the country did not
follow Yanagita’s economic dev goals, the agricultural roots of Japan’s culture remained
very strong and abiding through 1945. Again, Japan’s cultural core, especially in rural
areas, stayed basically Japanese, though this was not intentional. Japan’s development
followed its own path, however. For the most part, its path was not the same as that trod
by the economies of the United States and Great Britain. Japan did not have totally free
trade, but much heavier state involvement and guidance.
On the rural and urban economy, Yanagita’s vision was to help independent and
tenant farmers, to encourage small-scale independent farming, to support land reforms,
1421

I had no data on Hirohito’s views of economic development.
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and improve agricultural production and technologies. He was concerned about the
increasing economic divide between urban and rural Japan, and the rising centralization
of the economy. Yanagita supported urban unions and urban industries balanced with
regional industries throughout Japan.1422 On the main question of “modernization,”
Yanagita’s overall concern here, and especially his vision for rural Japan’s economy,
became concerns of the postwar Japanese government, an era of rapid urban growth and
population decline in rural areas. The problems that Yanagita predicted, such as overconcentration of population and industries in urban conurbations, came to pass. In the
prewar period, the process had of rapid urbanization had not yet accelerated too much.
Japan’s population was still predominantly rural through 1945 [is this true? Try to
confirm]. It seems likely that Japan’s cultural core in rural areas, Yanagita’s key concern,
remained essentially “Japanese.” My data here does not concern what happened in the
urban areas, so I cannot judge that. So it seems that on this level again, “modernization”
prevailed, though it was not intentional.
Concerning domestic market worldviews and translative adaptation, in
Yanagita’s vision for economic development, the core of Japan’s culture would definitely
have been respected and likely protected, assuming that Japan could have developed
effectively under this vision, enough to compete successfully in the global market.
Economic success would buy the right to more cultural autonomy. But the government
did not have this vision, and did not follow this scheme. Under the government’s existing
scheme, a pattern of massive industrialization and militarization was followed in the pre-
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I also had no data on Hirohito’s views of the rural and urban economies.
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1945 period. Even so, the core of Japan’s rural culture was not destroyed before 1945, but
this was not because of public intentionality.
Also regarding translative adaptation, Yanagita’s vision for the rural and urban
economy was not shared or followed by the Japanese government. In this period, their
main concern was dealing effectively with the numerous international challenges and
wars that Japan faced, through good and bad economic times. The heavy emphasis of the
government in the 1930s and early 1940s was on militarization and maintaining domestic
political stability. Their concern was not Japan’s internal cultural preservation, though
domestic order was. But the social, indigenous glue that held rural Japan together was
centuries old. Through 1945, it basically held. But again, on the urban scene, I cannot
judge. After the war, with the nearly total destruction of cities, and rapid migration to
urban areas, there was great change in both rural and urban areas.1423 So translative
adaptation, at least in rural areas, seemed to hold through 1945, though it was not the
government’s intentional policy.
Technology Issues. Assessing these domestic market worldviews through
Glick’s concept of technology, Yanagita had a very holistic view of economics, and
concerned about how they affected peoples’ daily lives and work. Hirohito had no
concern for how the economy affects peoples’ daily lives and work. Here, Yanagita’s
views fit Glick’s concept well, but Hirohito’s do not. Concerning technonationalism as
ideology and the domestic market worldviews (1895 to 1945), Yanagita was not opposed
to the idea that Japan needed to be wealthy to protect its security, but this is not his main
concern. Rather, he would argue that Japan must be aware of, and protect, its own
1423

However, investigating this is beyond the scope of the present research.
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identity, or it will lose its heart, its culture. The real danger was that as Japan became
rich, this might happen. Hirohito would also, in theory, support this concept, but he
expressed no interest or awareness of this idea. Neither Yanagita nor Hirohito is a good
exponent of technonationalism as ideology. On Murakami’s concept of industrial policy,
Yanagita’s views were already explored under the worldviews of the domestic state.
Yanagita did value government intervention in the economy, but not very much in favor
of heavy industry, more in support of rural and agricultural industries. He desired some
industrial input in urban areas, but insisted it be balanced with regional and rural efforts.
To a limited degree, Yanagita supported Murakami’s concept of industrial policy.
Hirohito had no concern for this.
Cognition Issues.1424 Image. Yanagita’s and Hirohito’s images on the domestic
market fall into about four main categories, images on: 1) the economy, economics, and
the Japanese economy, 2) economic development, 3) industry and industrialization, and
4) the rural and urban economies. On the general economy, Hirohito’s likely images
imply that it is good to be concerned about economics, to encourage international and
domestic peace and stability.1425 Yanagita’s images condemn almost all aspects of the
government’s current economic policies for Japan, including its plans to encourage a
strong emphasis on heavy industry, trade, and concentration of capital, to develop Japan
on mostly Western lines, and its strong promotion of protectionism and urban growth. To
Yanagita, all of these damage the rural heart of Japan’s culture. Behind all of his images
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Remember that on cognitive issues of Japan’s domestic market, almost all of the views I study are
Yanagita’s.
1425
See my comment on this point above at the end of my discussion of Hirohito’s worldview of Japan’s
domestic market, based on Bix, Hirohito, 130-131.
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on economics is the conviction that economics strongly affects culture, and that the
cultural effects of the government’s current economic plans are negative. In his images of
several economic sectors, Yanagita urges a balance and lessening of tension among them,
with human-scale agriculture and industry of primary importance. His images of labor
and labor unions are highly positive. Yanagita’s imagery portrays government policies as
the source for many potential problems in Japan’s economy. To improve the economy,
both greater sensitivity to Japan’s cultural realities and broader distribution of capital and
industries throughout Japan are needed.1426
On economic development, Yanagita’s images focus on issues of culture, scale
and distribution. Development will be good if it is based on Japan’s own culture, and
follows models appropriate to it. Western models are not. Economic development should
be of a smaller scale, suitable for the rural heartland of Japan’s culture, and it should be
broadly distributed, not overly centralized. Yanagita’s images of Japanese development
stress domestic development before external activities, and following paths suitable to
Japan’s own conditions. His images of Western development find it inappropriate for
Japan.
A large group of images concern industry and industrialization. In his basic
images of industrialization, while Yanagita calls heavy industries beneficial for Japan’s
trade, most of the images are negative. He finds that heavy industrialization for several
wars has damaged Japan’s agriculture. Over-reliance on or over-concentration of heavy
industry is bad for Japan’s economy. Rather, Yanagita prefers industrialization of a much
1426

Looking back, we can see the wisdom of many of Yanagita’s insights. Over-concentration of industries
and population has long been recognized as a major problem in postwar Japan. The government has
attempted to encourage broader regional development for the last few decades.
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more human scale. Development of a broad range of regional industries is good, and it is
good for the government to place more emphasis on balanced, smaller scale rural
development. Industrial policies should improve people’s daily lives.
The final group of images covers the rural and industrial economies and their
relationship. These images reveal Yanagita’s concern over increasing gaps between rural
and urban Japan, and over government policies for urban growth he finds inappropriate
for rural areas. In his images of farming, Yanagita’s concern for human scale again
emerges, as it does in his interest in improving the conditions for rural labor. Yanagita’s
foundational concern for maintaining and restoring Japan’s commonality underlies many
of these images.
How did these images possibly function as perceptual filters or organizing
devices for Yanagita? Yanagita disliked many current Japanese government economic
policies, felt that economic development must fit Japan’s conditions, and that Western
economic schemes did not. In his images, he also shows a general dislike for heavy
industry and feels it is often too over-concentrated and large scale for Japan. He also was
concerned about economic policies more oriented for urban needs than for rural ones.
Possibly these biases may have blinded Yanagita to the good that government economic
policies did, to the possible benefits of Western development models, of large scale
development, or of heavy industry. He also may have been lacking awareness concerning
urban economic conditions and needs.
Worldview. The nature of the world revealed in these worldviews (mostly
Yanagita’s) stresses the need for balance, between culture and the economy, rural and
urban regions, various sectors, and so forth. Development at the expense of a country’s
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culture, people, ways of life would not work. Balanced, human scale economic
development was needed for economic success. To be effective, farming must be done at
a scale appropriate for farmers. Regarding the world’s order, Hirohito believed that
economics was vital for peace and order in the world. In Yanagita’s view, the Western
economies were encroaching on Japan and other developing economies. Regarding
Japan’s economy, Yanagita saw the Japanese government’s economic policies as
negative and causing many problems. The heavy policy emphasis on industrialization,
trade, over-concentration of heavy industry1427 and urban growth, excessive
protectionism and capitalism would all damage Japan’s agriculture. Developing Japan on
Western lines was negative as well. Yanagita was concerned about the cultural effects of
the government’s economic plans. Development with appropriate balance among Japan’s
various sectors was needed. To improve the economy, greater sensitivity to Japan’s
cultural realities and broader distribution of capital and industries throughout Japan were
needed. A more human-scale economy, suitable for Japan’s present agriculture and labor
conditions, was as well. Economic development and growth must enhance Japan’s
solidarity and communality. Regarding the economies of the West, Yanagita saw the
West’s development model as not useful for Japan.
What were the relevant environment(s) surrounding the viewers/actors who held
these worldviews? How did these environments interact with or affect their worldviews?
Yanagita had some exposure to urban areas and the wider world, but much study and
focus on rural Japan: its society, economy, politics, and ways of life. His long-term
exposure to rural Japan and his study in college (on agro-politics) influenced these
1427
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perspectives. How did these worldviews and their environmental interactions influence
these actors’ perceptions, uses of information, and understanding of events and their
causes? On perception, Yanagita’s in-depth exposure to rural Japan and its needs caused
him to focus mostly on the economic needs of rural areas. He believed they were the
center of Japan’s culture, so it made sense to center his analysis of Japan’s economy
there. On uses of information, Yanagita made primary use of ethnographic data. He also
made general observations and reflections about economic phenomena and processes. A
focus on the local level influenced his conclusions and explains his emphasis on the local,
rural economy, the main site of his research. Concerning events and their causes,
Yanagita’s use of ethnography, his study of Western anthropology and its attempts at
holistic methods, and his emphasis on rural areas as his primary study site(s) all
influenced his view that culture and the economy were vitally interconnected in rural
Japan. He saw culture as both fundamentally underlying the economy and affected by it.
How may have technological systems affected these worldviews? To Yanagita,
Western technologies and cultural products were in the process of invading Japan.
Western technology brought these cultural products and influences to Japan in the first
place; in part, that was what had enabled the West to “open” and culturally invade Japan.
In Yanagita’s mind, Western technology was massive scale and inappropriate for Japan,
its land, and culture. It must be adjusted and adapted to Japanese conditions.
In sum, Yanagita’s views of Japan’s domestic market (1895 to 1945) stress the
need for balance and appropriate scale in many areas of Japan’s economy and its
economic development. Though Yanagita had international experience of the wider
world and traveled abroad for short periods, he chose to focus on rural Japan, what he
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saw as the heart of Japan’s culture. As his academic training and research emphasized
rural Japan, so did his views of economics. In Yanagita’s worldview of Japan’s domestic
market, culture and economy were vitally connected. Technology provided both the
means for Western culture to enter Japan, and was itself part of the cultural threat Japan
faced.
Cultural Logics. The global phenomena to which these leaders responded
included Western products, imports, economic and trade theories, heavy industry,
Japanese government economic, trade and agricultural policies, private sector forces,
zaibatsu, smaller and medium sized businesses, economic and trade policies of Western
countries, forces, actors, and items from the urban Japanese economy such as products,
firms, and local and regional economic policies. What were the leaders’ worldviews/basic
beliefs about these phenomena? Yanagita believed that these forces were destructive and
insensitive to the needs of base Japanese society and heartland: rural Japan and its social
solidarity. Western prods and imports did not fit Japanese culture and society; Japanese
government trade policies focused on large-scale, heavy industries, the urban economy,
and producing for export. They ignored Japan’s rural heartland, its needs, and the impacts
of economic policies on the heart of Japan and its culture. Of course the Western
technologies and forces gave no thought to or knowledge of Japanese conditions.
What are the cultural logics under the worldviews about these global
phenomena? Modern economics clashes Western culture. It has little consideration of
scale or humanity. The modern economy places more emphasis on the material, wealth
and getting money. It ignores Japanese needs, culture and issues of the soul heart, and
spirit. Of course Western economics clashes with Japanese culture. Sadly, most Japanese
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economic efforts do too. What were the leaders’ responses to these global phenomena?
Yanagita responded with intense study, writing, research of local and rural Japanese
conditions, and various ideas and proposals about how to solve the problems he saw.
What were the cultural logics under these responses? Yanagita felt that Japan
must know its true self. Knowing itself, it must enact wise policies in various areas,
including economy, to protect itself. If not, its heart and who it truly was would be lost,
and Japan destroyed, at least in its identity. If we compare the cultural logics of the
worldviews about the global phenomena with the cultural logics of the worldviews under
the responses to the phenomena, what do we learn? For Yanagita, the former logics
focused on the problems of modern economics, both Western and Japanese, and how they
both ignored the heart of cult, especially Japanese culture. The latter logics focused more
on what Japan must do to protect its culture, and what might happen if it did not.
Worldviews on Japan’s Domestic Society Contexts
Yanagita Kunio. In the 1910s, Yanagita Kunio began developing his
understanding of Japan’s domestic social development. To reform Japan’s economic,
agro-political and cultural systems (all intertwined), it was necessary to understand their
contexts, all of Japanese life and worldviews, more holistically. Yanagita was concerned
with increasing gaps in the economic, social and psychological worldviews of urban and
rural Japan, and the unmitigated penetration and export of urban products and culture into
rural areas. These heightened people’s thirst for luxury, without improving their lives.1428
A new rural consciousness of culture was needed, new standards, self-awareness, and
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Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 61-63, 68-69, 108, 110-111.
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renewed identities, to strengthen “regional cultural autonomy.”1429 So Yanagita
developed his ethnographic approach in the 1920s, stating, “we must endeavor to know
ourselves.”1430
To help Japan endure the rapid changes of modernization, in writings from 1900
to 1930, Yanagita stresses restoring “communality” to rural areas. To develop
successfully, Japan’s values, worldviews and indigenous ways of life must be seriously
considered. Japan needs a new communality to help it function in the contemporary
world,1431 based on the past “traditional” communal spirit of generosity and cooperation,
the most important, unifying rural feature relevant to successful modernization.1432 The
rapid social changes hitting Japan required that the people adopt greatly refined
worldviews. Customized, local education was important for renewing communality.1433
Yanagita identifies three different levels of communality: national, family, and village
levels. Confusion over national identity clouds modernization. The breakdown in family
communality threatens connections of family, land and nation, including the spiritual
thread behind family unity. The Meiji rise of nuclear families threatened traditional
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Yanagita defines culture as everything from everyday life, including “social systems, manners and
customs, everyday consciousness and life patterns,” and “high culture” (fine arts, academic fields, ethics
and religion). On the national level, culture includes all lifestyles with elements new and old, internal and
external to a nation, during a particular time period (Ibid., 66-67).
1430
Ibid., 65-66, 74-75. Yanagita was the pioneer of the ethnographic method in Japan, where his approach
came to be called “Yanagita Ethnography” (Ibid., 108). For more on his approach to ethnography and how
it developed, see Kawada, Origin Ethnography, Chapter 5.
1431
Nevertheless, according to Yanagita, certain “age-old traditions” of rural villages must be preserved
and other elements of their worldviews acknowledged. Unless the people understood the foundations of
their worldviews driving their behaviors and thoughts, they faced social destruction (Ibid., 151).
1432
Some of examples of this “traditional communality” Yanagita includes are yui, a system of labor
exchange, and two systems related to spirituality and village leadership, kô and moyai (Ibid., 152).
1433
Ibid., 141, 145, 151-153, 155-156. Examples of localized education included “local community
education” for children and youths, preserving local knowledge, common sense, and new “cultural
standards.” Yanagita preferred this education model to the Meiji national educational system (Ibid., 155156).
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village communality. They isolated their members from extended families and support
networks, leaving them lonely, suicidal, and often poor.1434 Problems with traditional
communality included the “closed nature” of rural society, its class-based social
structure, and pressures for social conformity.1435 Problems in renewing communality in
rural and urban Japan included morality.1436 The government’s national education
campaign weakened the spontaneous evolution of popular language and worldviews in
villages, threatening communality.1437 “Traditional” values were destroyed by
bureaucratic rationalization and modern capitalism. Only ethnography could uncover the
indigenous “glue” of values to strengthen Japan in the modern world.1438
Using ethnography, Yanagita studied Japanese folk religion.1439 He argues that
there is a common faith for each people and nation, and in Japan throughout history. This
ujigami tradition, connected to Japanese “blood,” helps give Japan its identity.1440
Ujigami, present throughout Japan, are the spirits protecting a locality, above the kami
(ancestors or deities) protecting one’s family. How ujigami are worshipped varies; most
Japanese feel a deep affection for them. Yanagita believed they could provide a
foundation for national spiritual unity and modernization.1441 Rather than constructing a
national, hierarchical pattern of worship for Japan’s “family-state,” or a national “mish1434

Ibid., 141-143, 145-146.
Ibid., 153.
1436
Ibid., 159-162. Yanagita was optimistic that ethnography could help to resolve the moral crisis
affecting Japan’s urban and rural areas, through identifying the spiritual elements that sustained “Japanese
morality” “from the inside” (Ibid., 162).
1437
Ibid., 157-158.
1438
Ibid.
1439
The primary periods of Yanagita’s work on folk religion were 1905 to the 1910s and the late 1920s to
the early 1930s. Kawada Minoru investigates the importance of this research within Yanagita’s overall
scholarship (Ibid., 43).
1440
Ibid., 43-44.
1441
The ujigami system was community-centered, and included a strong emphasis on cooperation (Ibid.,
56-57).
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mash” of customs, Yanagita supported a national, horizontal network of ujigami
awareness, to respect the spontaneous, heartfelt practices of each region.1442 He also
argues that the imperial family and its worship of the sun goddess Amaterasu Ômikami
are at the center of ujigami worship, but he opposed the system of State Shinto
established by the government from the Meiji period through 1945.1443 Only ujigami
worship could play a crucial role in guarding the nation’s social morals, as opposed to
other religious or philosophical systems present in Japan.1444 From 1914, Yanagita
promoted kyôdo kenkyû (local community studies), to better understand ujigami worship.
He believed that traditional belief in the kakureyo (the unseen spiritual world of the kami)
influenced and constrained human behavior in the utsushiyo (the physical world of living
humans). Under modernization, without state support, ujigami worship could disappear
as the nation’s best anchor of communality.1445
Hirohito, Emperor. The Meiji state developed a new spiritual ideology to unify
the nation under the emperor, drawing on ancient Shinto, arguing that the Japanese are
descended from the gods. Under State Shinto, a national hierarchy of Shinto shrines was
1442

Ibid., 45-46, 49.
Ibid., 46-52. Yanagita views the imperial family as the nation’s spiritual symbol, not a “source” of
political power. His views differ from the Japanese government’s from the Meiji period onward. It sought
to develop a new national faith for Japan, State Shinto, to spiritually unify all citizens for modernization.
Under State Shinto, the emperor was the supreme symbol of national unity. Shinto shrines across the
nation were forced under state control and rankings. Yanagita condemned State Shinto as “fabricated,”
disconnected with the “people’s faith” of ujigami worship. It showed no concern for preserving ujigami,
crucial for uniting the nation during rapid social change, and could destroy all Japanese cultural traditions
(Ibid., 46-52).
1444
Among the problems with others systems were Confucianism’s stress on hierarchical relationships,
Buddhism’s focus on individual level spirituality, and the neglect of the Imperial Rescript on Education
(1889) to consider the people’s love of village or region (Ibid., 56-57).
1445
Ibid., 52-59. Yanagita worried about the increasing alienation and materialism caused by the rapid rise
of urbanization and capitalism in Japan from the Meiji period onward, threatening to destroy the indigenous
and cultural values of ujigami worship. But he fails to prove whether rural villages were still the
foundation of Japanese life, and if ujigami worship could also function as a spiritual anchor for urban areas,
in a time of great urban growth and social change (Ibid., 57-60).
513
1443

established. All families in Japan had to join a shrine. The Imperial Rescript on
Education (1890) taught generations of Japanese about their supreme duty to the state and
the emperor, the source of all morality. By about 1910, the Rescript instilled intense
paternalism, with all Japanese seen as descended from the imperial family, in the
“family-state” of Japan.1446 Hirohito was affected by this ideology. As emperor, he was
Japan’s highest religious authority, and one of its top military, educational and political
leaders.1447 He faithfully performed complex Shinto rituals, accepting the notions of
State Shinto.1448 Hirohito’s early education included several paradoxes. He was trained
in the national myths and versions of Japanese history and supporting State Shinto,
expected to honor Confucian ideals of benevolent rule, and the samurai bushido code of
honor. He was also exposed to the worldview of modern science. Bix argues that the
conflict between these worldviews formed an important basis for all of Hirohito’s
actions.1449
Comparison of Leaders’ Worldviews on Domestic Society (1895-1945)
As with the domestic market, most of my data here concern the worldviews of
Yanagita, not Hirohito. Their views fall into about three main categories: views of social
development, of rural and urban social development, and of spirituality, religion and the
state. For effective social development, in Yanagita, there is a great concern for
understanding the various elements of society and social change, such as the economy,
politics, agriculture, and culture, in a holistic manner, contextually, since he sees all parts
1446

Bix, Hirohito, 30-32.
According to Bix, this multiple identity complicates the study of Hirohito (Ibid., 16, 31).
1448
Ibid. During World War II, Hirohito performed his required religious ceremonies with zealousness,
since routine and fixed order suited his personality, and provided relief for his frustrations (Ibid., 442-443).
1449
Ibid., 49, 59. For details on Hirohito’s training in science, see my discussion on his views of science in
the section on technology development.
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of life as interconnected. He also stresses worldview’s crucial role in social development,
that Japan’s indigenous worldviews, values and ways of life must be considered. To
handle rapid social change, Japanese must adopt greatly refined worldviews. These views
together suggest the need for worldview flexibility coupled with durability. In addition to
the threats posed by Western culture and technology, Yanagita is concerned about
increasing gaps in the economic, social and psychological worldviews of rural and urban
Japan, and the cultural effects of the government’s national education campaign, which
he sees as stifling the spontaneous development of popular culture, language and
worldviews in rural villages, thus threatening communality, the heart of Japanese culture.
To Yanagita, culture has a key role in social and economic development. He believes the
core of Japanese culture is found in rural areas, so these areas need a new critical cultural
consciousness of standards, identity, and awareness, to protect each region’s “cultural
autonomy.” Yanagita’s view of culture is holistic and comprehensive, integrating daily
life and the arts on the local, national, and international levels.1450
Another major theme in Yanagita’s thought on social development is the need to
protect Japanese social identity during the economic development process, for which he
stresses renewing “communality” across Japan, starting with rural areas. Threats to
communality included the rise of the urban nuclear family and the destruction of
“traditional” values by increasing bureaucratization and capitalism, thus threatening
family and village communalities, their extended social support networks, rural and urban
morality, social, spiritual and national unity, development itself, and Japan’s capacity to
function in the modern world. To protect its communality, Yanagita argues that it must be
1450

See earlier in this chapter where I discuss Yanagita’s conceptions of culture.
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renewed through ethnographic research (so the Japanese become aware of their true
identities and values), customized, local education, “traditional” spirits of generosity and
cooperation (common in rural areas), and invigorated ujigami worship. To Yanagita, the
renewal and strengthening of local, indigenous forms of education, social cooperation,
communality, and spirituality were particularly key in assuring Japan’s cultural survival
during development.
On rural and urban social development, Yanagita is concerned about the
corruption of rural values through the increasing materialism and uncritical import of
urban products and culture into rural regions across Japan. Shoring up rural communality,
cooperation, critical judgment and consensus regarding rural cultural standards is needed.
Yanagita also cares about rural-urban social relations, including increasing gaps in basic
outlook, the squelching of rural culture by new products, and the collapse of morality.
Regarding religion, spirituality, and social development, Yanagita believes that
each country or people have had a common faith; Japan has had one throughout its
history. He views the breakdown in communality as threatening the spiritual unity of
families, which in turn threatens unity at every level across the country. In his general
view of spirituality, there is a strong stress on the local. Ujigami are worshipped and
loved on the local level, and Yanagita studied them on the local, community level.
Another theme is the issue of how the spiritual world intersects with the material one. We
noted above how Yanagita accepted the notion that the unseen spiritual world affects the
seen, physical world on earth. His view that the collapse of communality threatens both
spiritual and national unity reflects this viewpoint. So a breakdown in spirituality and
communality may also threaten social development. How spirituality intersects with
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physical reality also played out in Hirohito’s worldviews. The conflict between his
spiritual training in State Shinto, Confucian ethics and bushido-type values and his
training in scientific rationality and observation influenced many of his actions. We will
explore this more shortly.
Concerning spirituality, the state, and the Japanese nation, Yanagita sees
ujigami worship as connected to Japanese “blood,” something that gives Japanese their
basic identity. He believed that effective ujigami worship could provide a basis for
national spiritual unity and development, but he opposed the strict, standardizing effect of
hierarchical State Shinto upon spontaneous, heart-felt ujigami worship, which varied
slightly in different locales. Rather he preferred regional, localized forms of worship,
connected in a loose, horizontal, national network. Because he believed that ujigami
worship played an essential role in protecting social morality, he saw it as the most
essential part of guarding Japan’s communality. So he was willing to allow state
involvement in protecting ujigami, though he generally opposed State Shinto. In contrast,
Hirohito supported the basic ideals of State Shinto, that all Japanese were descended from
the gods, and that both the people’s and his supreme duty was to the state and to
maintaining the throne. While Yanagita accepted some Shinto-esque notions, that the
imperial family and Amaterasu Ômikami were the center of ujigami worship, he did not
to the degree Hirohito did. Hirohito believed that he had a great duty to perform sacred
rituals for the imperial ancestors and for the country, and he did so zealously, especially
during World War II.
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Conceptual Analysis of Leaders’ Domestic Society Worldviews (1895-1945)
Development Issues. On “modernization,” the key question here is: from 18951945, as Japan was absorbed more and more into the world economy, and interacted with
it, from the evidence in the domestic society worldviews here, what happened to Japan’s
domestic society and to Japan’s “core” culture? Did the “core” become more “Western,”
or did it stay basically “non-Western” and “Japanese”? On views of social development,
Yanagita saw the need to understand Japanese society, indigenous culture and
worldviews holistically (the need for Japanese to understand themselves), plus the need
for worldview flexibility and durability. Yanagita was concerned about threats of
increasing cultural standardization brought by Western culture and technology, urbanrural gaps and the national education system. To him, culture had a key role in social and
economic development; its core was found in rural areas. To protect Japan, critical
awareness and standards for rural culture were needed. Yanagita also recognized the need
to protect Japanese communality however possible. In his view, attacks on communality
were occurring through increasing urbanization, bureaucratic complexities, changes in
family structures, and politics. Yanagita desired to protect it through localized, accurate
knowledge of the Japanese self/identity, indigenous social values and spirituality. These
very wise insights by Yanagita, widely known in Japan today, were not applied until the
postwar period, for the most part. It does not seem that these wise insights had any impact
on policies in the prewar period. Rather, the state attempted spiritual mobilization and
motivation for the citizens during World War II through ideologies connected with
Japanese nationalism and State Shinto. These were standardizing forces with which even
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Christians were forced to comply.1451 They were not respectful of local differences as
Yanagita’s insights were. “Modernization” was not respected in these worldviews;
indigenous rural spirituality was negatively affected.
In his views of rural and urban social development, Yanagita was concerned
about increasing rural-urban gaps and the destruction of rural culture through increasing
materialism and penetration of urban, Western products into rural areas. He believed that
strengthening traditional Japanese values of communality and new critical standards for
cultural awareness would help protect the rural heart of Japanese culture. Surely
Yanagita’s observations on rural social change processes here transpired. The prewar
Japanese government did not really apply any of these insights to protecting Japan’s
“indigenous” cult before the war’s end, but only in the postwar period.
Regarding views of religion, spirituality and social development, Yanagita
believed that all Japanese have a common spiritual faith. Japan’s national and spiritual
unity and communality are based in that. This faith was first experienced, and must be
renewed, on the local level. He believed that the spiritual world influences the physical
one; a breakdown in spirituality and communality may harm social development. In
Hirohito’s worldviews, there was seemingly a conflict between his spiritual values (of
State Shinto, Japanese nationalism and emperor ideology) and of scientific observation
and rationality. Did these actually conflict? If so, how? They especially conflicted in his
policy decisions during World War II. While he was most often a highly shrewd, rational
political actor in daily decisions, details and interactions, when it came to his decisions on
1451

I say “even Christians” since Christians were a very tiny percentage of Japan’s total population during
World War II. That even Christians were expected to comply indicates the wide reach that State Shinto and
similar nationalistic propaganda had on Japanese society.
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really major issues, such as whether to go to war with the United States and Britain, or
how soon to declare Japan’s surrender, Hirohito’s spirituality and devotion to religious
ritual seem to have clouded his rational capacity and judgment. He made several unwise
decisions that cost many thousands of lives. In Hirohito’s case, spirituality definitely
influenced the physical world reality of his policy decisions and actions.
In Yanagita’s case, the implementation of his insights would have, in theory,
protected or enhanced local spirituality, but it was not applied in the pre-1945 period by
the state. If so, would this strengthening of Japanese spirituality also have inoculated
Japanese culture against excessive Western influences? Likely it would not have. The
notion that the spiritual world has connections with and influences the physical one is
very interesting, and a very common notion in the worldviews of many non-Western
peoples throughout the world.1452 Regarding Hirohito’s worldviews, it does seem that his
spirituality somewhat clouded his policy judgments, especially on really major issues.1453
His embrace of State Shinto, and the standardizing effect it likely had on Shinto worship
across Japan was likely great.1454 As a result of their views, in Yanagita’s case, it seems
that on this issue, before 1945 his views had very little impact on the protection of
Japan’s core culture. In Hirohito’s case, his embrace of State Shinto likely had a
standardizing effect on Shinto worship across Japan, but it is hard to say exactly how
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Note the arguments of anthropologists Charles Kraft and Paul Hiebert that are cited in Chapter 1.
Perhaps another case of this is Tsar Nicholas II, his wife the Empress Alexandra of Russia, and their
interactions with the monk Rasputin. See Robert K. Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra (New York:
Atheneum, 1967).
1454
More concrete study of this issue would be needed to confirm the exact effects of State Shinto on local
worship practices in Japan from the 1930s to 1945.
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much. Despite the devastation of World War II, I wish to argue that the core of rural
Japanese culture and society survived basically intact.1455
On their views of spirituality, the state and the Japanese nation, Yanagita
stressed the central role of local, ujigami worship in Japanese identity, communality, and
national unity. The standardizing effect of State Shinto destroyed this. Yanagita was
willing to allow some state involvement in religion, though, to protect ujigami worship,
what he saw as the heart of Japanese culture. Hirohito accepted the basic notions of State
Shinto more than Yanagita did. As noted in just above, Yanagita’s views had little or no
impact before World War II, perhaps they did after (on Japanese cultural preservation).
Hirohito survived the war. I cannot judge the impact of his support of State Shinto on
Japanese culture in rural areas (protecting it from Western influence). But on a basic
level, the whole State Shinto system, including emperor ideology, proved disastrous for
Japan in how it encouraged the Japanese to devote themselves to destructive actions in
the war that finally nearly destroyed the nation, at least physically. But this was not the
result of Shinto itself, but rather of its nationalistic perversion as State Shinto. Japan’s
defeat subjected it to an unprecedented onslaught of American cultural and political
influence after the war. At this level, ironically Hirohito’s embrace of State Shinto
indirectly contributed to the postwar deluge of Western and American cultural influences
into Japan in the postwar period. In this sense, Hirohito’s support of State Shinto had
huge political and cultural impacts on Japan, especially after the war. Yet it does not
seem that the core of Japanese culture or spirituality was destroyed before the war.
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I cannot say anything about urban issues, since they are beyond this present data.
521

On translative adaptation, in the evidence in the domestic society worldviews
seen here, as Japan attempted to adapt to the global market, in spite of its importation of
Western social and cultural items, did the “core” of its domestic society and culture stay
mostly “non-Western” and “Japanese?” On views of social development, despite
Yanagita’s wise conclusions, I have seen no evidence that Japanese policy makers
intentionally heeded his sage advice. Nevertheless, it seems that in the pre-1945 period,
rural Japanese culture (its core) remained durable, despite the huge changes brought
during the war, and the damage in urban areas.1456
On rural and urban social development, Yanagita expressed wise concerns about
increasing gaps between rural and urban areas and the destruction of rural culture. There
is no evidence that his concerns were listened to in the prewar era. Yet it again appears
that the core elements of rural Japanese culture, especially values, continued, though
likely somewhat altered.
Concerning translative adaptation and these leaders’ views of religion,
spirituality and soc development, again, I do not believe that Yanagita’s very wise
conclusions had significant impacts on policies in Japan before 1945. Hirohito had
gigantic impacts. Changes surely did result in rural Japan’s spirituality through the
creation of State Shinto and its elaborate hierarchy of Shinto shrines—perhaps there was
a standardizing and squelching of heart-felt regional worship, as Yanagita had feared.
And the impacts on Japan at large because of Hirohito’s delay in ending the war were
even larger. Did essential values continue, though? In rural Japan I wish to say yes.
Though I am not sure for urban Japan, I postulate that changes were even greater there.
1456

Again, I cannot comment on what happened in urban areas.
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So translative adaptation seems basically valid in rural Japan on the issue of spirituality
and society development.
On translative adaptation and leaders’ views of spirituality, the state and the
Japanese nation, the state did not intervene as Yanagita wished in order to protect ujigami
worship. But it did create various patriotic and neighborhood associations across Japan to
mobilize all Japanese into sacrifice and hard work on behalf of the war effort. The
ideologies that Hirohito supported (of nationalism, emperor worship, and State Shinto)
were part of this mobilization. Despite the massive invasion of American presence into
Japan that the failure of these ideologies permitted, Japanese culture’s “core” stayed
durable, certainly through 1945. The process of translative adaptation seems affirmed
here.
Technology Issues. If we view these leaders’ domestic society worldviews
through Glick’s concept of technology, Yanagita’s basic view of culture and society is
very holistic, multi-level, and includes concern for the effect of larger events on daily life
and work. His view of social and economic development also manifests this; the idea that
without careful judgment and standards, the very processes connected with development
and commodities pouring into rural Japan will destroy its identity and soul (the global
destroying the local). Yanagita fits Glick’s concept of technology very well here.
Hirohito shows no concern for this, other than that both he and the Japanese people
should faithfully worship and follow the dictates of Japan’s (imperial) ancestors, the
kami, and State Shinto ideology and practices. If either they or he did not, in theory the
nation would not be protected and blessed.
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In his views of domestic society, Yanagita supports the ideas of
technonationalism as ideology, but only indirectly. Through his holistic concept of
culture, where society and economy are closely connected, we see the view that if the
nation wisely protects its communality, the unity and spiritual center of indigenous
worship, the anchor of its identity, it will also be blessed economically, as a by-product.
Hirohito is an even less a direct proponent of technonationalism as ideology. Similarly,
he also seems to express the conviction that if both he and the Japanese people are
faithful in their moral and ritual duties (i.e. faithful worship of the nation’s ancestors and
the kami through State Shinto worship), then the nation will be protected and blessed
economically and militarily. Although both Hirohito and many Japanese faithfully
worshipped as they were taught, in World War II, this view proved false.
Cognition Issues. Image. Images on Japan’s domestic society (1895 to 1945)
cover those on 1) society, culture, social change and development; 2) rural and urban
societies; and 3) religion and spirituality. Most of these images are Yanagita’s; only a few
are from Hirohito. Yanagita’s images of culture portray it as holistic. In his images of
Japanese society and its problems, a lack of self-knowledge and the breakdown of
indigenous Japanese communality, partly driven by national, standardizing forces of
bureaucracy, education, and similar phenomena, threaten Japanese society and culture.
Yanagita’s images of how to protect Japanese culture stress the issues of how to guard
communality, and increase cultural awareness. On social change and development,
Yanagita stresses worldview issues. Increasing worldview gaps between rural and urban
Japan threaten society. Without increased, balanced flexibility in their worldviews and
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consideration of indigenous factors, Japanese cannot develop their nation
successfully.1457
Concerning Yanagita’s images of rural and urban societies,1458 those on rural
social development emphasize the danger of increasing materialism, and Western and
urban cultures destroying Japan’s indigenous, rural culture. Images on social solidarity
and communality stress the challenges of renewing communality. One of the challenges
is morality. Another is the multiple levels on which communality increasingly occurs,
including family, village/local, and national levels.
There are many images on religion and spirituality. Yanagita’s images on
religion and spirituality in general stress local spirits (ujigami or kami) protecting local
areas or families. Though styles of worship vary across regions, Yanagita sees the
imperial family and the sun goddess as their foundation. If family and other levels of
communality are nurtured and renewed, the communality of the whole nation will be
also. The spiritual world affects the physically visible world. Regarding spirituality and
the nation, Yanagita’s images stress the common bonds of faith, blood, descent and
history that all Japanese possess through ujigami worship and the imperial family.
Hirohito’s images also stress the imperial family as the foundation of the people’s lineage
and identity, and the importance of Shinto rituals for the life of the nation. In his images
on State Shinto, Yanagita opposes its imposition of a strict hierarchy on the nation’s
localized patterns of worship, though he personally does not disagree with many of State
Shinto’s doctrines. Yanagita’s images of rural and local spirituality stress the localized,
1457

Yanagita would define successful development as that which both encourages economic growth and
respect for Japan’s indigenous culture and identity.
1458
All of these images are Yanagita’s.
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regional nature of Japanese (ujigami) spirituality, the necessity to understand it on the
local level, and how ujigami worship can provide a basis for renewing national
communality, which in turn can renew the whole nation’s social development.
How did these images possibly function as perceptual filters or organizing
devices? While the images on society of Yanagita show that he was an astute, brilliant
observer, there are various potential weaknesses in his findings. His bias toward rural
society shows he had a potential ignorance of both urban and international issues, needs,
and realities. He also ignores potential positive contributions from Western culture that
may strengthen Japan: improvements in education, technology, health, and human rights,
among other areas. In his views of religion and spirituality, Yanagita fails to recognize
the values of Japanese nationalism, of uniting the nation for more effective defense, trade,
and survival in the modern world. He has not fully proven that the “heart” of Japanese
culture is indeed in rural Japan. Though he accurately describes rural worship and
spirituality, and criticizes negative aspects of State Shinto, he fails to offer practical
alternatives to counter its influence. Regarding Hirohito’s images and potential blind
spots, they are many. He failed to recognize that State Shinto and his embrace of it failed
the nation. The distorted views that resulted helped contribute to Japan’s near destruction.
Hirohito also failed to see his own personal responsibility in this and, according to Bix,
seemed more interested in his and the throne’s survival after the war (Bix 2000). This
perpetuated his lack of accountability, and perhaps the nation’s.
Worldview. The main views about the nature of the world that emerges from the
worldviews constructed from the above images about domestic society, especially from
Yanagita, are that human life and culture are holistic, and that we need to understand the
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world, including society and spirituality, on the local level as well. Regarding how the
world functions, to handle social change, flexibility to change and awareness of one’s
own self (culture, worldviews) are needed. On the world’s order, Yanagita saw
worldview issues as an important part of social change and development. Regarding
Japan, Yanagita believed that standardizing forces, such as bureaucratization and national
education, were destroying Japanese culture and societal features like social solidarity
and communality. The lack of self-knowledge of the Japanese threatened their culture.
New awareness and cultural standards could help protect Japanese culture and
communality. Yanagita believed that flexible but durable worldviews were necessary for
Japan to successfully adjust to rapid social change. Increasing worldview gaps between
rural and urban Japan, materialism and Western and urban cultures were destroying
Japan’s indigenous, rural culture and threatening society. Yanagita saw Japan’s
communality occurring on multiple levels, including the local; local spirits protect areas
and families in Japan. To both Yanagita and Hirohito, a foundation for all Japanese was
their spirituality and the imperial family. Yanagita believed it was bad to standardize
much of Japanese worship into standardized forms (State Shinto), as that destroyed
Japanese spirituality and culture, but renewing local indigenous worship could help
renew national communality and social development. Regarding the West, both Yanagita
and Hirohito believed that Western culture was ill-suited for Japan, especially its
traditional culture.
What were the relevant environment(s) surrounding the viewers/actors who hold
these worldviews, and how did the environments interacted with or affected these
leaders’ worldviews? Immersion in rural Japanese society through research and
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university studies greatly affected Yanagita. Although he had exposure to urban Japanese
and international environments as well, the rural focus affected Yanagita’s findings,
images and worldviews on domestic society. Hirohito was immersed in elite, imperial,
state, and militarist subcultures. These biased him toward elite responses, and he seems to
have had almost zero comprehension of local Japanese culture.1459
How did these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions
influence the leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, and understandings of events and
their causes? On perception, Yanagita’s immersion in rural areas strongly affected his
findings and conclusions. Hirohito’s isolation and exposure to nationalist ideologies
greatly shaped his views and beliefs. Concerning uses of information, Yanagita relied on
ethnographic research, local observations, personal study, and new theories of
ethnographic research from leading scholars in the West. Hirohito relied on his own
education, isolated upbringing, advice from court officials and other leading aristocrats in
Japan. He had no exposure to local Japanese and their lives. Regarding events and their
causes, Yanagita had a holistic view of Japanese society and life. He saw nothing seen in
isolation, but assumed that all Japanese social life flowed out of what he determined to be
“indigenous”—the heartfelt worship and communality in rural areas. Hirohito accepted
all his training and ideological notions of emperor and imperial ideologies, nationalistic
ideologies, and State Shinto.
How have technological systems affected these worldviews? If so, which
aspects? The main effect of technology on Yanagita’s worldviews of society was his
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The same basic environmental effects on Hirohito’s domestic society worldviews were also noted
earlier under my findings for the environmental effects on his domestic state and market worldviews.
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concern over whether the flood of Western products and culture into rural Japan would
destroy rural culture. Hirohito’s chief concern was that the technological power and
military successes of Japan in various wars, including World War II at certain points,
seemed to confirm to conservative Japanese and others, including himself, the rightness
of their worldview and system. This also reinforced his belief in Shinto and nationalist
ideologies through the war’s end.
In comparing the domestic society worldviews of these two leaders, I am struck
by Yanagita’s in-depth observations of rural society, and Hirohito’s few observations and
images of society, due to his lack of exposure to it. The two leaders are similar in a few
of their convictions of spirituality (on imperial origins and the descent of the nation).
Yanagita supports spontaneous rural worship; Hirohito supports State Shinto as the true
practice of the land.
Cultural Logics. The global phenomena behind domestic society worldviews to
which these leaders responded included Western theories about society and culture, ideas
from politics and economics that affected society, evolutionistic thought, thought about
social institutions, health and education, overseas wars in Asia and elsewhere and their
effects on Japanese society, new ideas about social change, morality, workers’ and
human rights, freedom, democracy and how those affected Japanese society, Western
cultural and social influences on literature, music and the arts, new media influences
(radio, broader circulation of newspapers), and technological innovations (i.e. telephones
and increased mobility through the spread of railroads). As Japanese society turned more
inward in the 1930s and 1940, several domestic features became increasingly influential
on Japanese society, including State Shinto, nationalistic and militaristic ideologies.
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What were the leaders’ worldviews/basic beliefs about these phenomena?
While Yanagita felt that Western culture in general was incompatible with Japanese
culture and society, and was somewhat wary of Western culture and science, he accepted
that some Western theories about society might be used to protect Japanese culture from
the onslaught of Western influences, his first concern, and give voice to the Japanese
people. In Yanagita’s mind, the people were wise; they had more common sense than
foolish, selfish leaders. The people should be heard, not crushed.1460 He also believed that
the heart of Japanese culture was in the lives and beliefs of people in “traditional,” rural,
agricultural Japan. Yanagita supported several progressive ideas about democracy,
workers’ and farmers’ rights. He worried about the influences of elites, the military,
Western culture and technology, and thought they should be controlled by careful
judgment, increased awareness and self-knowledge by all Japanese. Hirohito saw
Western culture as relatively unfamiliar, strange, foreign, and generally not compatible
with Japanese culture. He believed that the heart of Japan, the deepest part of its identity,
was found in the Meiji state-manufactured State Shinto. Though I have not read exactly
what he believed about Japanese society, Hirohito’s actions suggest that he deeply
honored and valued Japan’s “traditions” as he learned them, and was concerned that they
be preserved against corrupting Western influences. Some of what Hirohito learned about
State Shinto was corrupted and a distorted version of Japanese spirituality, as Yanagita
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This reminds one of Lawrence F. Salmen’s Listen to the People: Participant-Observer Observation of
Development Projects (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), which stresses the wisdom of learning
from local people in development projects through the ethnographic research method of participant
observation.
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argued. Hirohito was not seem opposed to technology, per se, but did not like democratic
movements.
What were the cultural logics under the worldviews about these global
phenomena, and what were the leaders’ responses to the phenomena? To both Yanagita
and Hirohito, Western culture was generally not seen as compatible with ideologies of
State Shinto, the emperor and imperial throne ideologies. What were their responses to
these phenomena? Yanagita used Western theories about society and culture to study
Japan and its culture, so it might be protected. He attempted in his writings to inform and
train other Japanese about who they were (identity) and to get them to incorporate new
critical standards for judging culture, so they could protect themselves. Hirohito was
informed about various Western phenomena and ideas, including politics, science,
economics and culture, though his education was highly oriented toward conservative,
militaristic and nationalist ideologies. His unique, isolated environment meant that he
could not respond very flexibly to these issues. His responses were cautious, guarded, and
ideologically conservative. Though he loved pure scientific investigation, he did not
concern himself very much with direct Western cultural and social influences, but more
with Western political issues and threats.
What were the cultural logics under these responses? To Yanagita, Western
culture was basically incompatible with Japanese culture, though it did have some useful
ideas and methods that were practical and ironically could help Japan strengthen itself
against the West. To Hirohito, Japan was a divine and unique nation, unlike all others.
The West did not understand Japan, and never could. The emperor’s sacred,
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unchangeable duty was to guard, protect and lead the nation, the people and their sacred
heritage.
In comparing the cultural logics of the worldviews about the global phenomena
with the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to the phenomena, it
emerges that Yanagita’s logics in both cases stress that Western culture was incompatible
with Japan, though it could provide tools to help protect Japanese culture. The former
logics stressed the inherent wisdom of the Japanese people more than the latter ones,
which focused more on the West. Hirohito’s first logics accepted the common Japanese
view that Western culture is highly different from Japanese culture. He also accepted the
general, official ideological views of the state; there is no indication he did not.
Hirohito’s latter cultural logics were basically the same as the first in their assumptions.
Conclusion
First, I will offer some preliminary reflections from this chapter on the first key
research question of the dissertation, how Japan’s experiences with technology,
development and foreign relations from 1850 to 1945 (here, focusing on 1895 to 1945),
and key leaders’ worldviews of those issues, may have affected its current foreign aid
policies. General trends will be noted here, while more concrete linkages between ideas
and experiences in this era and Japan’s current ODA policies will be noted in Chapters 9
and 10, the concluding chapters. On sociocultural issues (technological development and
domestic society), both the Japanese military and state played a huge role in Japan’s
R&D from 1895-1945. There was also a repressive environment toward the end of the
era. Today, while the government plays a large role in encouraging Japanese R&D, the
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private sector also has a huge role. In its aid, Japan most certainly does not encourage
heavy development of military R&D for the growth of LDCs. It also heavily involves the
private sector. Developing a high quality education system was a top priority for Japan,
with a proper balance of foreign and imported elements. It should be one of the top
priorities for successful development. For that, education must be free from ideological or
propagandistic influences. It was not in Japan before 1945. Related to social change and
economic development, there are other issues in this period (1895 to 1945) that were
decisive, including women’s participation in the economy, development’s effects on
them, media freedoms, social and worldview flexibility/durability, and the need for
policies to encourage social solidarity through localized approaches to education, social
cooperation, and morality.1461 Japan’s policies in these areas fell far short. They focused
on national goals, to the detriment of local identities, and generally ignored women’s
needs (actually seeking to discourage the participation of most women in the economy
during World War II). They also limited media freedoms from the 1930s to 1945, and
sought to impose ultra-conservative worldviews from the top down. Today’s Japanese
ODA seeks to be increasingly sensitive to these social goals and needs, and to incorporate
them into its agenda.1462
On cultural issues and development, in Japan in this period, there was a varied,
vibrant response to economic development and international forces, especially seen in
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Remember that the policies to encourage social solidarity and communality were the recommendation
of Yanagita Kunio.
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Evidence of this is seen on JICA’s website (Japan International Cooperation Agency,
www.jica.go.jp/english, accessed September 26, 2008). Several global issues of priority for JICA listed on
the website, and involving social change and development, include education, health, governance, peacebuilding, gender and development, and poverty reduction. But how effectively is consideration of these
issues actually being incorporated?
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Japan’s popular culture, and in its intellectual life. The focus of many of Japan’s top
political leaders at this time, such as Hirohito, was external, not very internal. A balance
between internal and external focus is needed for successful development. A government
should initiate policies to protect social solidarity and identity at all levels, not just the
national, including encouraging critical cultural standards, but not censorship. Japan
failed in many of these areas; today’s LDCs might learn from its mistakes. A key
question is: what is Japan’s aid doing now?
On religion and development, for effective development, separation of religion
and state are paramount. The state should not endorse any religion or (indigenous)
ideology, even for development. In Japan, the state endorsed Shinto, and reformulated it.
This negatively affected other religious groups, and deceived Japanese into waging a
disastrous war that nearly destroyed the country. It has continued to sour Japan’s relations
with nearby countries over controversies such as the Yasukuni Shrine. How can a
developing nation’s government help religion can to encourage development, even
indirectly, without coercion or endorsement of one faith over another?
A concept that prevailed in Japan at this time, still influential, is that Japanese
identity, even kinship, is strongly connected to particular forms of religion and
spirituality. In a sense, a conviction of the strong connections between the spiritual and
physical worlds seems predominant throughout much of the developing world, unlike in
the West and its Flaw of the Excluded Middle. For development and aid plans to succeed,
they need to consider the religion and spirituality factor among others, since it is such an
important part of a people’s core identity and worldviews. The strong connection
between presumed identity and spirituality in so much of the non-Western world may
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make separation of religion and state a very difficult thing to achieve in policy. Yet if this
is not respectfully achieved, the state may coercively endorse one religion over another,
and the nation risks some of the mistakes Japan and other authoritarian societies have
made on the issue of religion.
On domestic political economy issues, in prewar Japanese politics, there was a
continuing battle between those who supported more liberal, democratic politics, and the
repressive, oligarchic tendencies of the state. The repressive side won. In Japan, from the
1920s to 1945, authoritarianism and the military grew too strong, and nearly destroyed
Japan as a result. Conversely, Japan has prospered much more greatly under a democratic
type system than was ever imaginable under the repressive system. Ideologically, two key
leaders we studied in this period (Yanagita and Hirohito) had rather conservative political
ideologies, though Yanagita preferred more populist, democratic political approaches. In
several postwar developing countries in East Asia, conservative politics have often
guided economic development (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore). Though
authoritarianism is not desirable, conservative political approaches may be best, at first.
For general ODA policy and Japan’s, it seems that aid for LDC should encourage the
development of democracy, while allowing for the presence of more conservative
ideologies, since these have worked so well in many East Asian LDCs. A strong state is
also a common factor in all of these cases.
On domestic economic policy and development, one of the most important
economic issues in Japan (1895-1945) was the issue of balance. While Japan experienced
great growth until the 1920s, and later decline the Showa depression and World II, it
struggled to balance large-scale industrialization with small-scale industries, urban with
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rural growth, and military domination of the economy and economic growth in the 1930s
and early 1940s. Two additional significant points here include the strong state presence
in Japan’s economy, and Yanagita’s idea that there are multiple paths to development,
and that they must be customized by each nation’s conditions. Yanagita’s idea of
customized development also seems evident in current Japanese development scholars’
support for translative adaptation. Ironically, in much its current aid, and throughout the
postwar period, Japan has argued for a rather universalizing approach to aid that
emphasizes economic infrastructure. And ironically, the Western/global development
agenda now argues that more ground-level, customized approaches. Concerning the
impact of Japan’s military on its domestic economy, while several military conflicts in
this era built up Japan’s economy (i.e. the Russo-Japanese War and World War I), World
War II totally destroyed it. Given the destructive impacts of warfare on society, ODA
policies must encourage limits on conflict, military force and its growth. Japan’s aid
policies now do.
On the role of development and security ideologies in Japan’s domestic issues,
in the era 1895 to 1945, the Japanese state did not hesitate to draw on propagandistic
ideologies incorporating race and religion to promote to promote development and war.
ODA policy should never promote such ideas for the pursuit of development, and Japan’s
ODA policy does not. These ideologies violate the idea of separation of religion and
state, among many other problems, and caused many difficulties for Japan before World
War II.
On culture and the arts, the arts in Japan were largely unfettered before the late
1920s. Especially from the 1930s to 1945, more government control and censorship
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occurred. ODA policies from Japan and other nations should seek to enhance cultural
freedom where they can.
On the second key research question of the dissertation, are the ideas of
“modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation, as reflected in the
domestic worldviews studied here, an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with
technology and development in this period? Concerning views of Japan’s technological
development, Yanagita was concerned about the effects of aggressive internationalization
of Japan by the West, seen in the affects of Western technology and cultural products on
Japanese society. Hirohito’s views focused on the external challenges brought by Japan’s
internationalization. On technology and translative adaptation, Yanagita focuses most on
how Japan’s domestic core culture could remain intact during the flood of Western input
entering Japan. Hirohito’s views do not show concern for translative adaptation.
In views of the domestic state, on “modernization,” as the domestic state was
increasingly absorbed into the global economy, did its “core” culture of politics become
more Western, or stay “Japanese”? I conclude that the core of Japan’s politics in this era
did not change much. Popular input remained limited, and authoritarianism on the
national level and decision-making by consensus in rural areas both continued. In
domestic politics worldviews of Yanagita and Hirohito, “modernization” basically
prevails. Yanagita is more concerned for local, grassroots politics, and is democratic
populist in orientation. Hirohito more focused on oligarchic control of the political
system, and on national and international issues. In their support for varying degrees of
emperor-centered Shinto nationalism, both leaders again support “modernization.” I also
argued above that in Japan’s core culture of politics, the worldviews of Yanagita also
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support the concept of translative adaptation, though Hirohito’s did not. Yanagita in
particular was concerned for the preservation of Japan’s local political life.
On worldviews of the domestic market, in Japan’s general economy, I
concluded above that “modernization” basically prevailed, though this was not
intentional. In views of Japan’s economic development, I also argue that Japan’s core
culture, especially in rural areas, stayed basically Japanese. I argued this also seemed true
on the issues of the rural and urban economy. In the prewar period, Japan’s cultural core,
Yanagita’s main concern, essentially stayed the same. Regarding translative adaptation,
before 1945, though the government did not follow Yanagita’s vision for localized and
regional economic development on the rural level, Japan’s rural social structure and
stability remained basically intact, so the concept seems validated here, though I cannot
comment on urban culture. On economic development, though the government followed
policies supporting massive industrialization and militarization, it seems Japan’s rural
cultural core remained stable, so again, translative adaptation seems validated. The
government’s focus during this period was not on the rural and urban divide, or on
protecting Japan’s indigenous culture, but on strengthening Japan against external threats
and maintaining internal stability and security. Through the evidence studied here, it
seems that translative adaptation held true through 1945, at least for rural areas.
On views of domestic society, despite Yanagita’s wise insights about how to
better protect Japan’s cultural heritage and its rural spirituality in the midst of rapid
changes in Japan’s rural and urban social development, the government paid no attention.
Hirohito supported the ideologies of nationalistic State Shinto, and his views had
somewhat of a standardizing effect on Shinto worship across the nation, since they
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concurred with official government policies. Despite the damage of World War II, I
concluded above that the core of rural Japanese culture remained basically stable through
1945, and that Hirohito’s support of State Shinto before the war contributed somewhat to
the defeat of Japan,1463 and so ironically opened the door to massive American cultural
penetration into Japan after 1945. In all of these processes, it seems that the ideals of
“modernization” were not really respected by Hirohito or by the government, though they
were by Yanagita. Yet in practice, since the “core” of rural Japan stayed basically stable
through 1945, the ideals of “modernization” prevailed here. Concerning translative
adaptation, in various areas of the worldviews of the domestic society studied here,
including views of social development, rural and urban society, religion, spirituality and
social development, and spirituality and the state, although Yanagita offered advice that
seemed very wise, few of his policy suggestions were adopted by the state before 1945.
On spirituality and social development, Hirohito had a large policy impact, through his
support for the emperor ideology and the standardizing effect of State Shinto. In all of
these areas, in rural Japan, the ideals of translative adaptation were affirmed through
1945.
From the domestic contexts presented in Chapter 7, what lessons emerge about
Japan’s experiences with technology and development?1464 As noted above, enhancing
Japan’s capacity in science and technology was perceived by Meiji policymakers as one
of the key ways to strengthen the nation against Western invasion. The state had a degree
1463

I make this argument since Hirohito supported State Shinto and its nationalistic efforts that encouraged
large popular support for Japan’s war efforts, which nearly destroyed the nation.
1464
Here I will not consider contextual aspects related to foreign relations, since this chapter is mainly
focused on domestic issues. I did the same in two previous chapters, 3 and 4, which were similarly mainly
focused on domestic issues.
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of involvement in research and development that was, for the time, high by global
standards. Industrial and research activities generally received a boon during periods of
military escalation, although they were isolated from key foreign sources during World
War II. Though Japan pioneered several significant developments before the war, most of
its technological achievements in that era were based on technological imports from
abroad.
Development contexts fall into three main areas, political, economic and social.
From 1895 to 1945, authoritarianism dominated the Japanese political landscape, except
for brief cultural trends (called Taisho democracy) supporting democratic tendencies
from about 1912 to the early 1930s. Meiji politicians purposely limited democratic input,
since they felt Japan was not yet prepared for it. Militarism was ascendant in political
influence from the late 1920s through 1945. Political and religious nationalism were
heavily promoted by the state during the 1930s through 1945, to enhance patriotism and
the national war effort. State involvement in the Japanese economy was heavy throughout
this period, and promoted heavy industry, large-scale business, including zaibatsu, and
national security through economic and technological strength.1465 Though an economic
boom occurred in Japan due to several wars from 1894 through World War I and new
colonization, Japan was hit by several economic depressions and slowdowns during the
1920s and 1930s. From 1931, the government increased military spending, which helped
prompt some growth in key industries. On social development, we noted how statepromoted nationalism, begun in the early Meiji period, accelerated through 1945, through
the promotion of religious nationalism, neo-Confucian values, emperor ideology, the
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In other words, this last point refers to the ideology of fukoku kyôhei.
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national education system, and various rituals. Other significant social trends included
increased involvement by women in the economy, the expansion of national media, and
continuing vitality in Japanese religion, despite government manipulation of spirituality
through State Shinto.
How did the worldviews of Yanagita and Hirohito compare with Japan’s
experiences in this period? Though Yanagita showed more concern for maintaining the
cultural identity and integrity of the rural Japanese heartland, both Hirohito and the
Japanese state placed more priority on Japan’s international security, especially economic
and political.1466 Japan’s basic culture of politics, emphasizing oligarchic control of
political institutions and decision-making at the national level, and consensual decisionmaking at the local level, remained fairly stable in overall tendencies, so the concepts of
“modernization” and translative adaptation were generally affirmed. In Yanagita’s views
of the domestic market, concern for preservation of local rural cultural integrity also
seemed affirmed, though this was not government policy. Hence, “modernization” and
translative adaptation were again supported. On social development, though Yanagita
offered many wise observations about how to preserve rural Japan’s cultural integrity, the
government did not pay attention. Hirohito was not explicitly concerned about the
cultural integrity of rural Japan (though no doubt he would have desired it). Rather, his
concern was mainly for Japan’s international security and the stability of the throne. The
government also ignored Yanagita’s many suggestions about protecting Japan’s rural
spirituality. Hirohito’s support for State Shinto likely had a standardizing effect on
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elements of Japanese spirituality. I concluded that through 1945, in social development,
the goals of “modernization” and translative adaptation were basically supported.
Japan’s general experience with technological development (1895-1945)
essentially agrees with the external security focus of Hirohito and the Japanese
government, not the internal concerns of Yanagita. The focus of technological
development was mainly external, on building up Japan’s technological capabilities
internally so they could contribute to Japan’s national security, and on what foreign
technological innovations needed to be copied and mastered. The contexts of Japan’s
domestic politics also leaned more in the direction of Hirohito’s and the Japanese
government’s authoritarian tendencies, not toward Yanagita’s democratic populism. In
the economy, as with technological development, the emphasis tended toward
strengthening Japan’s internal infrastructure for the purpose of national (external)
security, again, more in line with Hirohito’s and the state’s concerns, not Yanagita’s. On
the social front, the state exercised increasingly nationalistic manipulation of education,
spirituality and education, in support of national security, especially from the 1930s to
1945. This was the general policy tendency from 1895 to 1945, increasingly so as time
went on. Yanagita’s domestic cultural concerns do not seem to have become a major
policy concern until Japan became more affluent in the postwar period. In all of these
policy areas, both the prevalent worldviews and contexts emphasize domestic strength
and stability in support of Japan’s national security, or technonationalism as ideology.
Regarding the third key question of the dissertation, how Japanese spirituality
has perhaps affected Japan’s foreign aid policies, what evidence do we see in the
historical data in Chapter 7 of how views of spirituality and religion may have affected
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policies in this period? Yanagita’s views stress spirituality in the local level, and its role
in protecting communality and social solidarity. Hirohito’s emphasize his role on the
national level. Each leader’s view of the role of spirituality in the life of the nation was
influenced by each one’s respective upbringing and professional experience. While
Yanagita emphasized spirituality as a vital part of Japanese identity, and the role of the
state in protecting Japan’s culture, Hirohito saw it as an important pillar of the nationstate, its politics, and the throne. Hirohito accepted the notions of State Shinto more than
Yanagita. Hirohito also wished to use spirituality (State Shinto) to promote the nation.
Both share a view of the importance of spirituality in promoting the health and life of the
nation, though differ in how that will happen. In a few of their observations of
spirituality, of the imperial origins and descent of the nation, there are also similarities.
There are weaknesses in their views. Yanagita is not able to offer a counter to the
influences of State Shinto. Hirohito is blind to the damage done to Japan by the same, and
his participation in that process.
On religion in Chapter 7, it is clear that Yanagita is especially concerned about
the preservation of Japan’s identity by preserving local religious and spiritual practices
throughout rural Japan. He believes that the government, including elements of State
Shinto, does not respect them. Though both Hirohito and Yanagita support elements of
Shinto ideology, such as the emperor as the supreme spiritual authority, Hirohito does
more so. Hirohito desires to use religion more as a tool to promote the state and throne on
the national level, while Yanagita’s primary concern is the survival of rural Japanese
spirituality, culture and identity, on the local level.
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What impacts might these views of spirituality and religion have had on policy
issues in this era? The further into the period (1895 to 1945) we proceed, the more
advanced becomes the role of spirituality in promoting state aims. Spirituality had a big
role in Japanese nationalism, seen in such images and phenomena as the emperor as the
nation’s intercessor and high priest, the use of State Shinto to encourage nationalism, and
the presence of spiritual symbols in the national education system for the same purpose.
State Shinto was also a prime government tool to influence patriotism and support for the
state, the emperor system, and World War II, through education. Both Yanagita and
Hirohito have images and beliefs supporting the important role of the emperor as the
nation’s spiritual leader, Hirohito to a more extreme degree. Both use images suggesting
the strong connections among Japanese religion, spirituality, and politics. Hirohito’s
views on spirituality had a much greater policy impact than Yanagita’s did, especially
before 1945. Both Yanagita and Hirohito suggest the attitude that if the people practice
proper Shinto rituals and spirituality, that the nation will be protected from aggressive
foreign invasion, either politically or culturally. Though Hirohito was very faithful to his
spiritual duties, this was not the case. Despite Yanagita’s wise recommendations for what
Japan should do to protect its local and indigenous cultures and spirituality, the
government ignored his advice. The State Shinto supported by the government and
Hirohito ultimately seemed to have a rather negative standardizing effect on indigenous
spirituality, and almost destroyed the nation.
At the beginning of this conclusion of this chapter I offer policy lessons on the
issues of economic development, religion, spirituality, politics, and religious freedom.
One is that leaders of LDCs should be aware of the positive roles that spirituality and
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religion can possibly play in economic development. Religion, if properly free and
encouraged, yet kept separate from the state, can be an extremely vital encourager of
development. An LDC’s state should not trample on religious freedom, a vital sector of
civil society. Freedom of religion must be guaranteed. Religious leaders should not seek
to invade the domain of the state and politics, though their limited ethical input should be
allowed. In the challenging area of religion and politics, careful balance and wisdom
should be sought. LDC leaders must also receive broad training in the diverse social and
ethnic issues they will confront, including religion and spirituality, to positively engage
them for the nation’s benefit, in development and security. An LDC’s leaders must learn
how to include religion as a positive part of their development and security tool kit.
Another major policy lesson here is that an LDC’s government should seek to protect
itself from the impact of negative cultural values of forces such as hyper-materialism (or
hyper-secularism), which ignores the important contributions of religion and spirituality,
by enacting proactive policies. It should seek to encourage opportunities to enhance the
nation’s both material and cultural/spiritual lives, without overt interference in the
religious sphere.
In pre-1945 Japan (since 1868), the state drew heavily on religious and spiritual
ideologies and images to support patriotism, nationalism, and national development. It
did not hesitate to mix these images and symbols with the political system. In the 1930s
and 1940s, it was also happy to attempt to control, suppress or marshal religious bodies
such as Shinto, Buddhist and Christian groups, and new religions such as Sôka Gakkai, in
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service of the national interest.1467 In spite of these efforts by the state, religion and
spirituality remained very active and vital in Japan, even more so after the war. The
state’s strict withdrawal from active involvement in religion, prompted by the separation
of religion and the state as mandated in the American-imposed Constitution of 1947,
contrasts sharply with the state’s gradual increasing use of spirituality as a pragmatic
policy tool from 1868 to 1945. If anything, this modern behavior seems more in line with
much of Japanese history, where political officials have often been wary of overinvolvement by different sects in the affairs of the state.1468 So the willingness of the state
to create State Shinto seems almost a reflection of attitudes toward spirituality in popular
Japanese culture, namely a rejection of the Flaw of the Excluded Middle, and a pragmatic
willingness to draw on any form of spirituality that meets one’s current particular
need.1469
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We noted above how Sôka Gakkai resisted the government’s attempts at state control. During World
War II, the government forced Protestant churches into one grouping, and encouraged both Protestants and
Catholics to include honoring the emperor as part of their worship services. Marshalling religion in the
service of the state is also a feature of several postwar Communist systems in East Asia. In China, the
government organized all legal Protestant churches into the Three-Self Patriotic Movement, and Catholics
into the Catholic Patriotic Association. Unregistered groups are illegal, but currently tolerated. After the
enormous earthquake near Chengdu, Sichuan, China in May 2008, the Chinese government showed more
willingness to allow volunteer groups from outside China, even religious ones, to assist with relief efforts.
In North Korea, religion has been strictly banned and controlled for state purposes.
1468
I noted an example of this wariness in an earlier chapter, when the Japanese state relocated the capital
to Kyoto to avoid excessive influence of Buddhist clergy in state affairs.
1469
The attitudes toward spirituality and religion mentioned in this paragraph and in the footnote
immediately preceding show a pragmatic attitude toward religion that is common throughout East Asia,
including in China, Japan, and Korea. This is a willingness to participate in any spiritual activity or site that
will aid one’s current needs. In the examples just cited, the governments of China, North Korea and Japan
have been happy to either ban religion, restrict it, or promote it, depending on what would serve state
purposes. The Tokugawa government in Japan did the same thing when it banned Christianity in the
seventeenth century. Despite the normally highly secularized nature of the states of China and Japan since
ancient times (mentioned earlier in this research), this attitude shows a rejection of the Flaw of the
Excluded Middle. Most of the time, rather than totally ignoring or banning spiritual reality, these East
Asian states, like their citizens, are happy to acknowledge religion and utilize it when it serves their
material, pragmatic purposes.
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What are the implications of possible conflicts between views of spirituality and
science and similar issues for policy issues in this period? There is a strong connection
between the spiritual and material worlds in the views of both Yanagita and Hirohito; in
neither one is a conflict between these two realms seen to be inherent. In Chapter 6, there
are not as many mentions and occurrences of materialism as there are of spirituality and
religion. The most prominent occur in the views of Yanagita. For example, he is
concerned that modern economics places too much emphasis on the material world and
on wealth, and ignores the needs of the heart and soul. He also cares about the corrupting
influence on rural life by increasing materialism and the penetration of urban and
Western products. The “conflict” in Hirohito’s views between scientific rationality and
spiritual rituality/practice does not seem to be as present in the views of Yanagita. He
used a Western scientific methodology, ethnography, to uncover the nature of rural
Japanese spirituality, so the cultural life of the nation might be protected.
Where were the possible future impacts of these issues for Japanese foreign aid?
Here we observed Yanagita’s stress on local level impacts, and Hirohito’s stress on the
national level. In contemporary Japanese aid, there is likely little consideration of
spiritual issues and impacts of aid on any level. Yanagita stressed how protecting and
respecting the indigenous spirituality of local and rural regions across Japan in must be
the foundation of all policies to guard Japan’s essential culture and identity. Hirohito
offered no consideration of these issues at all; he only desired to help impose a national
level spirituality to strengthen the overall state. Contemporary Japanese aid has a basic
attitude not to intervene in the religious and internal political/cultural matters of aid
recipients. This ignores issues of how spirituality/religion in a given aid recipient affects
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its receipt of aid, and the effectiveness of the recipient’s development programs. How
could such a consideration enhance aid’s effectiveness?1470
Some states desire to use religion to help promote the state’s development, or at
least they do not want development to conflict with the state’s national religious
ideology.1471 Could the failure of an aid donor to consider how religion affects the
delivery or receipt of aid have a “secularizing” effect on the society of the aid recipient
that might negatively affect its social stability or durability? This would be interesting to
consider.
I noted above the very heavy role of spirituality in some areas of Japanese
policy from 1868 to 1945, contrasted with its intentional absence in the postwar period,
due to legal restrictions. But is there some sort of subtle influence anyway, even in aid?
In some of my policy lessons, I argue that religion, in its proper sphere (separate from the
state) can possibly enhance or complement economic development efforts, even those
promoted by the state. Is contemporary Japanese aid cognizant of this fact? If so, is the
Japanese government’s avoidance of the spiritual implications of its aid hampering, rather
than enhancing, Japan’s aid efforts? If so, how could this situation be improved?
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Recall the observation of many foreign observers that Japan’s aid agencies have historically been weak
in their skills in analyzing the “soft,” social aspects of aid (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid). Religion and
spirituality are two of those components. Yet since JICA and the OECO division of JBIC have just
completed their new merger (on October 1, 2008) as I write this on October 11, 2008, things may slowly
change. In a luncheon speech in Tokyo on October 1, 2008, New JICA president Ogata Sadako reported
that the New JICA intends to establish a new research institute that will conduct research by first rate
researchers on various soft components of aid, including economic, political and social issues, both in
Japan and abroad. Reportedly, a big area of focus in the research will be aid to Africa, to which Japan has
recently given increased priority (“Luncheon Speech at FCCJ,” http://glocom.blog59.fc2.com/blog-entry832.html; accessed 11 October 2008). Hopefully consideration of religion and spirituality factors in Japan’s
ODA by Japanese aid agencies may gradually improve. To comment definitively on this issue,
ethnographic research would be necessary.
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Two such states are contemporary Saudi Arabia and Iran.
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Increasing numbers of foreign policy policymakers acknowledge the importance
of the “religion” factor in foreign policy and international politics, and the need of
foreign policymakers and diplomats to understand it.1472 Given the most obvious example
of this issue since the 9-11 terrorist attack, Islamic terrorism, what is the Japanese state
doing to better prepare its future diplomats and aid workers to better understand and
handle the “religion” factor? What about in the issue of aid? Though Japan is not paying
much attention to religion questions in its aid policies, is there a way that they might
bring the religion factor into consideration? Despite the “messiness” of religious and
similar cultural issues, if Japanese policymakers can be shown that such integration
would be in their pragmatic interest, would they not be willing to embrace it?1473 I will
explore some of these questions further in Chapter 9.
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See Albright and Woodward, Mighty and Almighty.
If they can be shown that doing so is in the best interests of Japan, its ODA programs, and aid
recipients, given the pragmatic attitudes in Japan toward policy, foreign aid, and spirituality, I believe
agencies like the New JICA will research these issues, especially if they can be practically shown how to
do so without violating legal restrictions or interfering in an aid recipient’s internal affairs.
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Chapter 8
Worldviews of Selected Key Leaders (1895-1945)
International Issues
Introduction
In Chapter 8, regarding international issues (1895-1945), on external political
relations, I examine the worldviews of Ito Hirobumi, Yamagata Aritomo, Yanagita
Kunio, and Emperor Hirohito, on external economic relations, those of Yanagita, on
external cultural relations, Yanagita and Hirohito, and on imperialism, the views of Ito,
Yamagata, Kato Hiroyuki, Yanagita, and Hirohito.
Chapter 8, like Chapters 5 and 6, considers primarily international issues, not
domestic ones. Therefore here, as in Chapters 5 and 6, for the conceptual analysis of the
technology aspects of the various worldviews about external matters, I will again ask
questions on these six major themes related to technological issues on the international
level, but not the domestic one: 1) general concepts of technology, 2) technology in the
international system, 1474 3) technology transfer, 4) technology, culture, and the
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See the insights about technology as a system offered by Szyliowicz in Politics, Technology,
Development, 8 and mentioned in this dissertation.
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international system, 5) technology, cognition, and international relations,1475 and 6)
technonationalism as ideology.
Contexts of Japan’s Foreign Relations (1895-1945): Major Trends
Contexts: Japan’s External Political Relations
Regarding Japan’s general international relations, earlier in this period, major
themes included Japan’s attempt to renegotiate the unequal treaties imposed on it by the
West (not achieved until 1911), increasing Japanese expansion on the mainland, conflicts
with China, Korea, and Russia, increasing Japanese influence in Southern Manchuria and
Inner Mongolia in the 1900s and 1910s, and several conflicts with the United States.1476
During and shortly after World War I, Japan moved to consolidate its hold over territories
in China and the South Pacific, including several formerly held by Germany.1477 Japan
put increasing pressure on China to allow more Japanese input into Chinese government
affairs. From 1917 to 1922, Japan, along with several other allied nations, stationed up to
70,000 troops in eastern Siberia during the Russian Revolution. The Washington
Conference of 1921 resulted in the “Washington System,” to encourage more cooperation
in East Asia. Japan began to come under pressure to curb some of its actions in China,
Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia.1478
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Note the discussion on technology and cognitive factors above in Chapter 5, based on Ibid., 8, 212,
223.
1476
Conflicts with the United States included disputes over trade and railway issues in China, U.S.
restrictions over Japanese immigration in the United States, and increasing rivalry between the U.S. and
Japanese navies in the Pacific (Japan, “History of International Relations,” 618).
1477
The territories over which Japan moved to strengthen its control included southern Manchuria, eastern
Inner Mongolia, the Shandong peninsula in Shandong province, China, and Pacific islands formerly
controlled by Germany (Ibid.).
1478
Ibid.
551

Further Japanese incursions on the mainland in the 1930s, including the
Manchurian Incident in 1931 and the founding of the Manchukuo puppet state in 1932,
increased tensions between the United States and Japan. Both the United States and the
League of Nations responded negatively. By early 1933, Japan withdrew from the
League. Facing less trade with the United States and Britain, Japan turned to more
intervention in Manchuria and northern China, which increased tension with the Soviet
Union. Japan’s second war with China broke out in mid-1937. In 1938 and 1940 Japan
issued two declarations of intention to create a new Pan-Asian, non-Western political
order throughout Asia.1479 After rapid German victories in Europe with the start of World
War II there in September 1939, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy
in September 1940.1480 By April 1941, Japan invaded all of French Indochina, and the
United States stiffened economic sanctions against Japan by declaring an oil embargo and
freezing Japanese assets. After Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, war with the United States
began in late 1941. Early, sweeping victories across the Pacific enabled Japan to occupy
all of Southeast Asia, including French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, Malaya,
and the Philippines. A turning point in the war was Japan’s defeat in the Battle of
Midway in June 1942, and from that incident, Japan grew steadily weaker. The empire
became more challenging to maintain.1481
On late July 1945, the United States, China and Britain issued the Potsdam
Declaration, informing Japan that it must immediately surrender or face “prompt and
1479

Ibid., 618-619. These were the Tôa Shinchitsujo (New Order in East Asia, declared in 1938), and the
Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, announced in 1940.
1480
Japan, “Tripartite Pact,” 1626.
1481
Japan, “History of International Relations,” 619. For more details on World War II, see my discussion
below on Hirohito’s views of Japan’s external political relations, later in this chapter, and in Chapter 9, in
the section on the policy implications of external political relations worldviews.
552

utter destruction.” The Japanese government was divided on the issue. Delay resulted in
the dropping of two atomic bombs and Soviet invasion of territories held on the
mainland.1482 Hirohito announced Japan’s surrender by radio on August 15, 1945, and the
Instrument of Surrender was signed on September 2, 1945.1483
Regarding Japan’s foreign relations (1895 to 1945), throughout this era, the
military increasingly challenged MOFA’s monopoly on the conduct of Japan’s foreign
affairs, especially during conflicts such as the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese
War, and World War I. From 1931, MOFA was increasingly forced to share foreign
policy functions with various military representatives.1484
In Northeast Asia, Japan’s victory against China in the Sino-Japanese War
(1895) forced China to recognize Korea’s independence, cede Taiwan and the Liaodong
peninsula, pay a large indemnity, and grant Japan broad trading privileges. Tumultuous
events in China in the early 1900s included the Chinese Revolution of 1911 and its
aftermath. Japan gave sanctuary to Sun Yat-sen’s political party and movement when
they fled there. After World War I began, European powers fled Asia, and Japan rushed
into China, claiming formerly German-held concessions. In 1915, Japan forced China to
accept various demands.1485 Affronts such as these to China’s integrity led to the eruption
of the May Fourth Movement, in which 4,000 Beijing university students protested in
May 1919, causing widespread protests and strikes in China throughout the 1920s against
foreign imperialist actions. After Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1905),
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Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Potsdam Declaration,” 404-405.
Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Surrender,” 487. For more details on Japan’s surrender, see my
discussion in Chapter 9.
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Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” 317.
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These are known as the Twenty One Demands, which Japan made to China at this time.
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Japan again won the right to the Liaodong peninsula, and extended its influence in
Manchuria through the South Manchuria Railway. In the early 1930s, China’s Nationalist
government and the Soviet Union increasingly threatened Japan’s interests in Manchuria.
To solidify their hold on Manchuria, Japan’s Guandong Army blew up a section of the
South Manchuria Railway north of Shenyang, and blamed the Chinese.1486 After setting
up the puppet state of Manchukuo in Manchuria in early 1932, Japan invaded Hebei
province, near Beijing, in 1933. The second Sino-Japanese War began in late 1937 over
fire exchanged near Beijing in July. Japanese hostilities in China continued through 1945,
killing many millions.1487 Concerning Korea, after victory in the Russo-Japanese War
(1905), Japan gained the legal right to exercise increasing influence in Korea. In 1910
Japan annexed Korea as a colony, controlling it through 1945.1488
Japan established consulates in Southeast Asia from the 1880s. During World
War I, Japan occupied several South Pacific islands previously controlled by Germany,
(considered by Japan to be in Southeast Asia). By 1936, Nanshinron (the “Southern
Expansion Doctrine”) became official policy, implemented in 1940 in the Greater East
Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.1489 By late 1941, Japan occupied many areas in the region,
including French Indochina, New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, the Philippines, the
Dutch East Indies, and Burma. In late 1942 Japan formed the Greater East Asia Ministry,
1486

This is known as the Manchurian Incident.
Japan, “China and Japan,” 189-190.
1488
Japan, “Korea and Japan,” 828.
1489
The Greater East Co-prosperity Sphere was a slogan used by the Japanese government (1940 to 1945)
to represent the idea of an economically and politically united Asia, led by Japan, to successfully resist
Western imperialism and hegemony. The government also used the slogan to justify its imperialist plans for
expansion on the mainland and elsewhere. The sphere included Japan, Manchukuo (Japan’s puppet state in
Manchuria), additional areas of China under Japan’s control, the Dutch East Indies, and French Indochina.
Before long, all of Southeast Asia and Japanese-controlled Pacific islands were added (Japan, “Greater
East Asia Coprosperity Sphere,” 475).
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which did not exercise much decisive control. During World War II, most of Japan’s
diplomatic efforts focused on Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, not China.1490
Russia aided China during the first Sino-Japanese War (1894 to 1895),
obtaining a leasehold in the Liaodong peninsula. After 1900, as Russia constructed the
China Eastern Railway, it sent troops into Manchuria. Japan was increasingly nervous,
and attacked the Russian military at Port Arthur (Lüshun), Manchuria in early 1904.
After a war fought mainly in Korea and Manchuria, Japan received the Liaodong
peninsula, the South Manchuria Railway, south Sakhalin, and recognition of its interests
in Korea. Shortly after, Russia and Japan signed various agreements that were rejected by
the Soviet Union after 1917.1491 Through 1945, Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union
were affected by Soviet ideologies, various foreign policies, and colonial competition in
north Asia. Japan’s dispatch of troops to Siberia from 1917 to 1922 to fight against the
Bolsheviks raised tensions. Yet the two nations shared mutual economic interests and
needs. Japan recognized the Soviet Union in exchange for economic and trading rights,
but the rise of militarism in Japan from the late 1920s increased chances for hostility. The
Soviets allowed Japan to take the China Eastern Railway, but grew nervous in the late
1930s over Japanese actions in China. In April 1941 the Soviets and Japan signed a treaty
of neutrality, but in early August 1945, the Soviet Union initiated huge attacks on
Japanese forces in Manchuria, the Kuriles, south Sakhalin, and Korea. Japan effectively
surrendered by August 14.1492
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Though the United States and Japan had stable relations in the early Meiji era,
after Japan’s victory over China in 1895 and U.S. victory over Spain in 1898, both
nations emerged as “great powers.” They then had to deal with each other on military,
balance of power and colonial issues, not simply trade and education. After Japan’s
victory over Russia in 1905, both Japan and the United States drew up hypothetical war
plans concerning each other. Tensions increased over American restrictions on Japanese
immigration. Japanese and Americans competed economically in China. Though some
leaders attempted to strengthen mutual ties and understanding between the U.S. and
Japan, the rise of militarism in Japan in the 1930s hampered this. The United States
reacted negatively to Japanese actions in East and Southeast Asia, and Japan increasingly
saw the United States as the chief obstacle to its Asian goals. After Japan joined the Axis
and the United States increased economic sanctions, to many in Japan, conflict was
inevitable.1493
In Europe, Japan had close relations with Great Britain through the early 1900s.
Britain was a model for Japan on modernization, Western culture, and a key contributor
of technology and foreign knowledge.1494 The Anglo-Japanese military alliance, Japan’s
first military treaty with a foreign nation (1902 to 1923),1495 was one sign of Japan’s
emergence as a major power. Both Britain and Japan were concerned with protecting
their Asian interests in the face of an increasing Russian presence. One faction led by Ito
Hirobumi favored accommodation with Russia, while another led by Yamagata favored
Britain. The second prevailed. In the 1930s, Japanese interventions in China increasingly
1493
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strained relations with Britain, including their economic competition in third countries.
After Japan signed the Tripartite Pact in the late 1930s and moved to attack Indochina
and Southeast Asia, tensions boiled over. Japan declared war on the U.S. and Britain after
Pearl Harbor, and seized British possessions in Asia. Britain participated in the American
occupation of Japan after World War II.1496 Though Germany influenced Japanese
politics through advising Ito as he wrote the Constitution of 1889, and Yamagata
modeled the Japanese army after Prussia’s, World War I interrupted German-Japanese
relations, and Japan seized German possessions in China and the South Pacific. In the late
1930s, both countries had fascist systems, and signed treaties to increase cooperation
against the Soviet Union and the West, but with little effect.1497 France assisted the Meiji
government as it sought to modernize Japan. After Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese
War, France and Japan signed a treaty in 1907, agreeing to recognize their respective
Asian possessions. Diplomatic and economic cooperation followed. But in the 1920s and
1930s, both nations experienced tension over events in Asia. In the early 1940s, Japan
invaded French Indochina, and the Free French government declared war in late 1941.
Japan formally annexed Indochina in 1945.1498 Japan’s relations with other world regions
such as Latin America and the Middle East increased in significance after 1945.1499
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Of several intellectual currents affecting Japan’s international relations (1895 to
1945), one of the most important was Pan-Asianism (Han-Ajia-shugi). This intellectual
movement stressed the uniqueness of Asia contrasted with the West. Pan-Asianists in
Japan argued that Japan should pay more attention to commonalities that Japan had with
Asia, that Japan’s future lay in Asia. Other proponents stressed that Japan’s future lay
with China,1500 while in the early 1900s, Okakura Kakuzo stressed that “Asia is one,” and
East-West distinctions. Pan-Asianism was revived in the 1930s to justify Japan’s actions
in Asia, arguing that wars in China and the Pacific were basically cultural warfare, the
East versus the West, necessary to awaken Asia to its true destiny.1501
On military and defense issues, as the leaders of Meiji Japan created Japan’s
modern military, modeled on leading Western examples, they instituted special privileges
for them that would decisively influence the course of the nation. After the Sino-Japanese
and Russo-Japanese Wars (1894-1895 and 1904-1905), the military’s “right of supreme
command” was increasingly applied over the civil authority in the national government.
After war with Russia, a debate between the Nanshinron and Hokushinron doctrines
erupted among Japan’s military leaders.1502 Ultimately, a compromise was reached,
where the army focused on preparing for a Russian threat, and the Navy a U.S. one. After
World War I, there was international pressure against militarism. But with the onset of
the Great Depression in the late 1920s and 1930s, militarism rose in Japan, increasingly
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See my discussion of the Nanshinron and Hokushinron doctrines in Chapter 5, in the section on the
contexts of imperialism.
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influencing society. Militarism’s grip on Japanese society was not broken until Japan’s
defeat in 1945.1503
Significant conflicts during this era included the Russo-Japanese War (19041904), World War I (1914-1918), the war in China (1937-1945), and the Pacific War
(World War II) with the United States (1941-1945). In the Russo-Japanese conflict, Japan
attacked Russia in southern Manchuria over Russia’s increasing presence in Korea, to
firmly establish Japan’s interests there. The war was costly, especially for Japan, but
afterward, Japan won the right to exercise exclusive influence over Korea, control of
south Sakhalin and the Liaodong peninsula. Significantly, Japan achieved the status of an
imperialist state in the Far East, in direct competition with the West, and in the minds of
many Meiji Japanese, finally achieved its independence and security against the West.1504
In World War I, after conflict began in Europe, Japan declared war against
Germany in support of Britain, Japan’s ally. Japan quickly took control of German
possessions in China and several German–controlled islands in the South Pacific. Soon
after, Japan pressured China to accept its “Twenty-One Demands.” In the face of British
and American protests, Japan dropped several of the demands while forcing China to
accept the remainder, which granted Japan greater influence in China. In 1917 and 1918
Japan attempted to consolidate its gains in China, somewhat in competition with the
United States, though the U.S. finally agreed to respect Japan’s interests, in exchange for
equal opportunities in commerce and recognition of China’s integrity. By the end of the
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war, Japan held former German territories in Shandong province and the South Pacific,
more sections of mainland China, northern Manchuria, and some of eastern Siberia.1505
In the Sino-Japanese War of 1937 to 1945, the Japanese military fought against
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Army and the Communist Army led by Mao Zedong. The
conflict included numerous battles, war atrocities, and cost millions of lives. Japan’s
attack on China essentially enabled the rise of peasant nationalism by the
Communists,1506 eventually leading to the rise of communist China a few years after
1945.1507 Starting in the 1930s through 1945, an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 women
(comfort women—jûgun ianfu) were forced to serve in military brothels in areas such as
China, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific and New Guinea.1508
World War II was complex for Japan, on multiple levels. From 1930 to 1936, an
increasing number of political assassinations in Japan slowly increased the political
power of the military. Both the Imperial Army and Navy competed for attention for their
respective agendas, military adventurism in China and Northeast Asia, and invasion of
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific islands. Later in the decade, as Japan’s military
increased its power in the nation’s politics, there was more emphasis on heavy
industrialization, militarization, and mobilizing the people for war. The role of the Diet
and the political parties slowly decreased, and the nation plunged haphazardly toward
possible conflict with the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia, and Western powers in
Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Though the war in China from 1937 may be viewed as
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part of World War II, many Japanese see it as a separate but related conflict. The China
war drained Japan’s resources and risked war with the West, not to mention the damage
inflicted on China. Though Japan and Germany shared several possible enemies (the
Soviet Union, Britain and the United States), they lacked a common strategy. As
Germany attacked various nations in Europe, it became more tempting for Japan to attack
their possessions in Southeast Asia. That angered the United States, and risked war with
the Americans and European powers. The nation pursued a desperate, risky gamble by
attacking the United States at Pearl Harbor, hoping that along with immobilizing
American naval power, it could quickly establish a wide network of naval and air bases to
discourage American response. Japanese progress for the first months of the war was
rapid, but Japan met increasingly decisive resistance from the United States, including the
Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway (in May and June 1942). From then on, Japan was
on the defensive. In additional, costly battles across the South and Central Pacific and
Southeast Asia, Japan’s resources gradually waned, though its determination to fiercely
resist American victory did not. In the final stages of the war, the devastating costs to
both the U.S. and Japan included painful, bloody battles in locations such as Iwo Jima
and Okinawa, costing hundreds of thousands of lives. There were also devastating fire
bombings of most major Japanese cities, and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, killing many more hundreds of thousands, and leaving over 13 million or more
homeless. After the atomic bombings, Japan finally surrendered.1509
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Contexts: Japan’s External Economic Relations
In policies for foreign trade from 1895 to 1945, Japan’s government traded with
foreign nations to help Japan achieve economic parity with the West. Until the end of the
unequal treaties with the West (1911), Japan paid for needed imports (things it did not
produce itself, such as ships, steel, and equipment) with exports. To promote
industrialization and development through technical assistance, subsidies and loans,
Japan also imported needed items. Exporting to import has remained a basic part of
Japan’s trade policy for decades. From 1899, tariff protection was granted to particular
industries. Tariffs on raw materials were kept low, to help stimulate manufacturing.
Policies for the protection of Japan’s domestic market were also extended to Japan’s
colonies and occupied territories.1510 During World War I, Japan experienced a large
economic boom as its exports to the rest of Asia greatly increased in the European
absence during the war, leading to great inflation in Japan.1511 In the 1920s and 1930s,
Japan exported heavy industrial products to the colonies, and imported mostly raw
materials and food. Japan’s need to import and export in such a manner in the hostile
international environment of the 1930s was one factor contributing to efforts to establish
something akin to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.1512
Concerning Japan’s foreign economic relations with Asia (1895 to 1945), a
large motivator of Japanese colonial and military intervention in China was economic in
nature. From the late nineteenth century through 1945, Japan viewed various markets and
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resources in China as vital for Japan’s survival. Japan’s intervention in China in various
regions, was motivated, in large part, by economic factors, and Japan’s desire for survival
in the harsh international system.1513 After gaining Taiwan as a colony in 1895, Japan
developed the island’s economy mainly for Japan’s economic benefit. The same policy
was followed in Korea. In the Korean case, resentment against the Japanese presence and
economic policies was more overt than in Taiwan, but in both, resistance was often
harshly suppressed.1514 Around 1900, Japanese shipping companies opened trade routes
between Japan and major ports in Southeast Asia. Communities of Japanese traders
opened in all parts of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific (the latter also considered by
Japan to be a part of Southeast Asia). From 1914 to 1920, Japanese trade with the region
increased dramatically, especially in cotton textiles, and Japanese investment in rubber
and coconut plantations. Expanded trade brought an increased Japanese presence in the
region.1515
Japan’s foreign economic relations with Europe (1895 to 1945) included
significant connections with Great Britain, Germany and France. Great Britain had a
great impact on Japan’s development, providing the model for its railway system, and
many foreign instructors who helped teach subjects related to economic and
technological growth. Japan and Britain signed the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty
in 1894, partly ending their unequal trade relations and Britain’s extraterritoriality. But by
the 1930s, trade friction over British and Japanese competition in third markets such as
1513
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China, and Britain granting its own colonies preferential trading status from 1932,
contributed to tension between the two nations.1516 From the Meiji period forward,
German and Japanese economic relations also quickly increased through growing
trade.1517 France provided crucial assistance to the Meiji government as it began Japan’s
efforts to industrialize, helping with advice and technical assistance. After the FrancoJapanese Agreement of 1907 was signed, both nations agreed to respect each other’s
possessions in Asia. Economic and diplomatic cooperation followed. Economic and
financial cooperation continued after World War I. In the 1920s and 1930s, increasing
tension during negotiations over economic issues between French Indochina and Japan
was further heightened during aggressive Japanese actions in Indochina in the early
1940s.1518
Japan also had significant economic relations with the United States from 1895
to 1945. American teachers had significant impact on Meiji Japan’s mastery of various
forms of economic and technical knowledge. By 1907, more than 125,000 Japanese had
settled on the U.S. West Coast in addition to Hawaii.1519 Japanese laborers made
important contributions to the economies of Hawaii and California, especially to
agriculture.1520 In the early 1900s, there were various military, economic and cultural
tensions brewing in the U.S.-Japan relationship, however indirect. The U.S. passage of
the 1924 immigration law excluding Japanese immigration was a serious blow to the
countries’ relations. Increased Japanese intervention in Southeast Asia, China and other
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parts of Asia, in the name of Japan’s economic survival, caused relations to further
decline.1521
Concerning foreign trade, around 1900, Japan’s primary imports shifted to raw
cotton from cotton thread, to iron, and to machinery instead of ships. From 1868 to 1915,
Japan had a positive balance of trade in only twelve years. From the late 1800s, there was
a boom in the construction of large textile mills. During World War I, Japan replaced
European and American exports to many Asian nations, especially to Southeast Asia and
Russia. The percentage of finished goods in Japan’s total exports increased. By 1918, the
last year of the war, the volume of exports was three times the prewar level. After World
War I, although conditions were again favorable for exports to Europe and the U.S.,
domestic demand in Japan created a foreign trade deficit. In the 1920 and 1930s, general
trading companies, especially those connected with the zaibatsu, played a large role in
increasing Japan’s foreign trade. Large shipyards produced heavy machinery, railway
equipment, and other heavy steel and iron products. Several major shipping firms
emerged. From 1929, the Great Depression had a drastic effect on Japan’s economy. The
volume of imports, exports, and Japan’s currency fell dramatically. After 1931, Japan
adopted controls over foreign exchange and trade to organize a war type economy.
During the 1930s, global trading blocs and Japan’s trade with its colonies both increased
in importance. After the start of the war with China in 1937, Japan’s trade became more
war-oriented, focusing on imports of war-related materials, items for basic living, and
exports devoted to earning foreign currency for needed imports. Trade controls were
imposed in 1937, and from 1941, general mobilization for war began. Trade became
1521
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heavily focused on Japan’s “yen bloc,” especially its colonies, and trade outside the yen
bloc was reduced. Japan had a trade surplus with the yen bloc, but deficit with countries
outside the bloc.1522 Before 1930, Japan had no widespread foreign exchange controls,
but during the 1930s, an extensive system of production, distribution, and foreign trade
ensued, characteristic of an economy on wartime footing.1523
Regarding foreign investments (1895 to 1945), after the Sino-Japanese War
(1894 to 1895) to World War I, Japanese firms in the chemical and heavy manufacturing
sectors sought connections with Western firms in the U.S. and Europe for access to
proprietary knowledge and technologies, sometimes through technical licensing
agreements. Several leading American firms such as General Electric and International
Telephone and Telegraph played a significant role in Japanese firms.1524 In the 1890s,
after trade-related companies, including insurance and trading firms and banks,
established overseas offices, several major spinning firms established branches in Tianjin
and Shanghai. In the 1930s, Japan’s heavy industries actively invested in Manchuria, but
Japan lost all of these in World War II.1525 Two of the major assets that aided Japan’s
control of Manchuria were the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria
Railway, both of which Japan obtained from Russia and the Soviet Union by 1935.1526
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Contexts: Japan’s External Cultural Relations
Regarding international cultural exchange and the study of foreign cultures in
Japan from 1895 to 1945, in the Meiji and Taisho periods (1868 to 1926), English
language training focused on the mastery of written English for learning Western
knowledge and technology, though there were unsuccessful efforts to introduce the oral
method of language teaching.1527 From the 1880s to 1945, the study of German law was
especially important, forming the major influence on Japan’s first Constitution (of 1889),
which in turn affected all of Japanese society throughout this period. In the Meiji era,
prominent foreign legal scholars from countries such as France and Germany advised
Japan on many legal reforms, and outstanding Japanese experts in the fields of English,
German and French law emerged.1528 From the late nineteenth century through World
War I, Japan’s external cultural relations focused on the introduction of Western culture
in Japan, rather than the promotion of Japanese culture abroad, which was motivated by
the national goal to build Japan into a modern state based on Western models. After
World War 1, the importance of promoting international understanding was more widely
recognized. In 1934, Japan’s Society for International Cultural Relations (KBS, Kokusai
Bunka Shinkokai) was formed.1529 From the late 1890s to the 1920s, principles of
progressive Western education influenced a movement in Japanese education called the
New Education Movement. It encouraged initiative and individuality in children, but its
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influence decreased with the rise of Japanese militarism in the 1930s.1530 The first foreign
students came from China after the Sino-Japanese War (1894 to 1895).1531
In this period, there were many Japanese intellectual trends influenced by
foreign cultural influences, including Marxism, liberalism and democracy, but I will limit
my comments to two fields. The Meiji enlightenment intellectuals such as Fukuzawa
Yukichi and Mori Arinori, explored in earlier chapters, worked broadly at introducing
Western social institutions, customs, and thought into Meiji Japan, and served as leaders
in the movement. They helped to introduce Western ideals of reason and enlightenment,
and other important principles to be followed for Japan’s modernization.1532 Feminist
thought and movements, inevitably influenced by their Western counterparts, began in
the late nineteenth century. They included arguments in favor of women’s rights (joken)
(1880s), the emergence of women’s literary journals (1910s), socialist debates over the
“woman question” (fujin mondai) (early 1900s), and unsuccessful campaigns for
women’s suffrage (1920s and 1930s). The militarist governments of the 1930s suppressed
autonomous women’s movements through 1945.1533
Concerning Japanese interaction with foreign cultures overseas, Japan had
major interactions with China in this period, through the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese
War (1894 to 1895), continuing disputes over the right to influence and control Korea,
Japanese investments in Manchuria and other parts of China, Japan’s demands for more
influence in China in the 1920s, Japanese incursions and attacks on China in the 1930s,
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and the war with China from 1937 to 1945.1534 These interactions were highly painful and
costly for both Japan and China, and have had long-term effects on Asia and the world,
up to the present. Japan also had extensive interactions with Korea, which it absorbed as
a major colony in 1910. This included Japanese intervention in Korea during the wars
with China and Russia (1894 to 1895 and 1904 to 1905), and major influence in Korea
after 1905. Japan’s rule and exploitation of Korea was harsh and painful on multiple
levels, economically, politically, and culturally.1535 Up to the early twenty-first century,
these interactions have also had major influences on other world powers, including on
China, Russia, and the United States. In this period, the United States continued to have
major cultural impacts on Japan through sending many instructors, experts and
missionaries, and some prominent young Japanese also studied in the U.S. Yet cultural
misunderstandings between the two nations increased in the early twentieth century
through the 1930s as the United States moved to limit Japanese emigration through
several laws, through racist fears of a “Yellow Peril.” The two nations also felt tension
due to their economic competition in China, and Japan’s increasing sense that the United
States stood in the path of its pursuit of “Asia for Asians.”1536
On Japanese interaction with foreign cultures in Japan (1895 to 1945), earlier in
the period, Western nations including the United States, Britain and others had a major
cultural influence on Japan through foreign instructors at Japanese universities. The two
other major groups of foreigners present in Japan at this time were Chinese and Koreans.
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In the Meiji era, many Japanese accepted Western notions that Chinese were unhygienic.
Though foreign concessions were abolished in Japan in 1899, Japan passed laws that
forced Chinese to continue to live in those areas. The two major Chinese areas in Japan
slowly emerged as “Chinatowns” in Yokohama and Kobe, composed of mostly
professionals and merchants. By 1930 the number of Chinese in Japan had decreased to
30,000, but the number from Taiwan increased greatly. By 1943 150,000 Taiwanese were
in Japan, mostly conscripted soldiers.1537 While Korea was a Japanese colony (1910 to
1945), some Koreans migrated to Japan, looking for jobs and better economic welfare.
After the Pacific War started in 1941, hundreds of thousands were brought to Japan as
wartime laborers, many by force. In 1945, over 2 million Koreans were present in
Japan.1538
Contexts: Japan’s External Relations-Imperialism
About ten years after deciding to compete with the West for Asian colonies,
Japan declared war on China in 1894 to gain control of Korea, but instead gained Taiwan,
the Liaodong peninsula of southern Manchuria, the Pescadore islands, and trade benefits
in China. Japan’s victory over China in 1895 stirred “xenophobic nationalism” and a
sense of racial superiority over the Koreans and the Chinese in many Japanese. From the
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), Japan gained influence in Korea, control of the South
Manchurian Railway, southern Sakhalin, and the Liaodong peninsula (this last location,
for a second time), but at great financial and human cost.1539 The empire eventually
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occupied all or portions of Korea, Taiwan, China, the Soviet Union, Southeast Asia,
islands in the North and South Pacific, and threatened additional regions such as India
and Australia. Ultimately Japan’s imperial expansion cost about 23 million lives in World
War II alone.1540
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, a new mood emerged in Japan, in praise of
imperialism. During the Taisho period (1912-1926) and Taisho democracy, there was
little praise of Japan’s victories in the late Meiji wars in China and Russia. But in the
1930s, the Japanese army celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of the victory in the RussoJapanese War, and there was a large literary, artistic and dramatic output of books and
plays lauding the victory, in patriotic, jingoistic, emotional terms. Through this, Japan
experienced a large cultural affirmation of the glories of empire, its “war god” military
heroes, and its “virtuous” young emperor, Hirohito.1541
New colonial ideologies arose in connection with the formation of Japan’s
colonial puppet state of Manchukuo (1932). Japan crossed a threshold in “self-defense,”
gaining new victories over “Western decadence” and Chinese “warlordism” on the path
to modernity. For Japan’s politically active military leaders, the tropes of “crisis” and
“Anglo-Saxon encirclement” became useful political tools to strengthen the army’s
involvement in politics and Emperor Hirohito’s image. As “virtuous” Japan fought
morally inferior foreign “devilish” states, people were encouraged to support the “holy
mission” to spread “the emperor’s benevolence” to other regions, and to overtake the
1540
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West in every field. During the Meiji era Japan adopted the concept of “Datsu-A,” the
sense of escaping from inferior Asia, to assimilate the superior cultural features and
technologies of the West. Now an independent Japan emerged as the rightful leader of
Asia, to resist Western aggression, and spread morally superior, harmonious living to the
continent. Though Japan never developed the systematic racism of Nazi Germany, from
the start of Japanese colonialism in 1895, many Japanese manifested a strong racism
toward other Asians.1542 These new ideologies were supported by Japanese views of
Manchuria and its potential. In the early 1930s, speeches by military officials
emphasized Japan’s need for raw materials, national security, land, increasing population,
racial competition for empire, and the coming necessity for war. Manchuria would help
Japan through its vast resources, and as a buffer between the latter, Russia and China.
Japanese diplomat Matsuoka Yosuke called Manchuria-Mongolia Japan’s “economic,
strategic, and moral ‘lifeline,’” stirring patriotic feelings in Japan.1543 In 1938, the
Japanese government introduced the slogan Tôa Shinchitsujo (New Order in East Asia) in
justification of its China policy. It supported the expansion of Japan’s presence in China
as a stepping-stone to build increased economic, cultural and political ties among Japan,
China, and Manchukuo (Japan’s Manchurian puppet state).1544 Additional ideologies that
provided support for Japan’s imperialistic expansion in this period included hakkô ichiu
(“eight corners of the world under one roof”), Nanshinron (“advanced to the south”),
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Hokushinron (“advance to the north”), and Hokushu nanshin (hold the north, advance to
the south).1545
The most important colony for Japan was Korea, in terms of size, nearness to
Japan, and historical connections. Korean resistance became fierce. Taiwan served as a
training ground for Japanese colonial officials, and economically, was the most profitable
colony in the empire. The southern half of Sakhalin, known as Karafuto, was occupied in
Japanese in a manner similar to Hokkaido, and became a genuine “settlement colony.”
Japan’s Pacific Island colonies stretched across Micronesia, and included 84,000
Japanese settlers by 1942. Japan also received the southern tip of Manchuria, the
Guandong territory, from Russia in 1905, and used the South Manchuria Railway to
eventually influence the rest of Manchuria. Though Japan hoped to use the colonies to
absorb excess population from Japan, this had only mixed success, since several areas
were highly populated, and generous subsidies for settlers had limited impact. Japan also
desired to use the colonies to create an integrated economy in which it exported
technology and capital in exchange for raw materials, foodstuffs, and investment
opportunities. Though it did largely integrate its economy with the five colonies (Korea,
Taiwan, Karafuto, Guandong Territory and the Pacific Islands), it did so mainly for its
own benefit, not theirs. Japan also used these colonies and territories as a springboard to
expand into China, the Pacific and Southeast Asia.1546
What were the effects of Japanese national identity on the colonies? From 1895,
the Japanese state also imposed the Tokyo dialect of educated Japanese beyond Japan
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proper, on newly acquired territories of Hokkaido, Okinawa, colonies in Taiwan, in
Korea from 1910, and beyond. Debates on race and Japanese identity affected colonial
policies, in that while Koreans and Taiwanese came to be called “Japanese subjects,”
they were not given the same political rights as other Japanese. Policymakers argued over
whether there should be strict separation between Japanese colonizers and the colonized,
or whether the colonized should be fully absorbed.1547
After Japan annexed Korea as a colony in late 1910, it took control of the
government, military, education system, major enterprises, ended the Joseon dynasty, and
suppressed all political parties, meetings, and the press. Since Koreans were subjected to
harsher punishment than Japanese in Korea, and forced to use Japanese in schools,
resentment increased, leading to the Samil Independence Movement that began with a
declaration of independence read in Seoul in March 1919, resulting in widespread riots
that were violently suppressed by Japan. In the 1920s economic conditions became
harder in Korea as the nation was forced to produce increasing amounts of rice for Japan.
The number of tenant farmers increased, and by the early 1930s, hundreds of thousands
sought better employment conditions in Manchuria or Japan. Feeling in Japan against
Korean immigrants was high; more than 6,000 Koreans were killed in anti-Korean
violence following the massive 1923 Tokyo earthquake. Conditions in Korea became
more repressive as State Shinto, emperor worship, and Japanese names were forced on all
Koreans after the war in China started in 1937. From 1939 to 1945, about 1.2 million
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Koreans were forcibly transported to Japan as laborers, and drafted into the military near
the end of World War II.1548
Taiwan was a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945. Taiwanese resistance to
Japan’s takeover was suppressed. Japan’s colonial control of the island was modeled after
Western imperialism. A Japanese governor-general controlled Taiwan’s government, and
its economy was developed for the benefit of Japan. Japan introduced modern economic
infrastructure and technology to the island, primarily benefiting resident Japanese. These
actions stimulated agricultural and commercial development, and the island became a
major supplier to Japan of sugar, rice, and other agricultural products and raw materials.
In the 1920s, light industry began to develop. Despite occasional resistance from the
indigenous and educated Taiwanese, general peace, stability and economic growth
prevailed. From 1937 to 1945, Japan used the island as a base from which to conduct war
operations in China and Southeast Asia. Taiwan contributed heavily to the war effort,
both economically and in terms of military recruits. Taiwan was attacked in 1944, and
severe economic shortages and inflation soon followed.1549
Views About Japan’s Foreign Relations (1895-1945)
Worldviews on Japan’s External Political Relations
Ito Hirobumi. In the late 1890s, Ito declared that the real object of the Japanese
government was friendship, assistance, and ultimate independence for Korea, since the
two countries’ interests were so close. By the early 1900s, Ito feared that conflict with
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Russia in Korea was inevitable. In the new century, Japan felt threatened by Russia’s
increasing influence in Manchuria and Korea. In response, Prime Minister Katsura’s
government favored signing an Anglo-Japanese alliance (done in 1902). Ito agreed, but
feared it could lead to war with Russia. Japan sent Ito to Russia to informally negotiate
over Korea and Manchuria. 1550 When Russia moved too slowly, in Japan’s eyes, the
latter attacked Russian forces in Port Arthur, Manchuria in February 1904. Ito went to
Korea as an envoy. Hayashi asserts that his intention was never the absorption of Korea,
but to offer Japan’s aid and protection, until Korea could stand independently. After the
Russo-Japanese War, Japan’s interests in Korea were internationally recognized in 1905.
While the Katsura government sought to tighten its control over Korea, Ito’s goal was to
slowly strengthen Korea’s capacity for self-government and development. In late 1905,
under duress, the Korean king agreed to Japan’s control of Korea’s foreign affairs. Next,
Ito was appointed resident-general of Korea. By mid-1907, the King abdicated.1551 In
1906, Ito called the Japanese military government on the Liaodong peninsula in
Manchuria a great insult to Imperial China. By 1909, he stressed the promotion of peace
and cooperation among the Far Eastern powers (China, Japan, and Russia) without
interference from outside powers, and equal opportunity for commerce for all nations in
the region.1552
Hamada calls Ito a realist and moderate on foreign policy issues.1553 As a young
man, Ito recognized the West’s power, and the threat it presented to Japan’s security and
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independence. He wanted to quickly strengthen Japan’s global standing by ending
unequal treaties, and responding to security threats. Was he an imperialist?1554 We will
consider this further. Ito believed that Japan needed to stand up to other regional powers
to protect its own interests. Hamada also calls Ito a man of peace.1555
Yamagata Aritomo. After 1914, Yamagata’s fear of worldwide racial war of
whites against non-whites made him support closer ties with China.1556 In 1916 he
supported an agreement with Russia to counter a possible “all-white alliance.”1557 After
1905, to counter increasing American interest in South Manchuria, he supported stronger
ties with Russia. From 1907-1912, Japan and Russia signed three conventions.1558
Through World War I, Yamagata increasingly saw improved Russo-Japanese relations as
key to countering an increasing American presence in East Asia.1559 By 1914, many other
members of the military-bureaucratic elite shared Yamagata’s view about the low value
of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Japanese imperial expansion to counter the coming race
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war, and the United States as the biggest threat to Japanese power in Asia.1560 Concerning
the United States, as early as 1916, prominent publications and top intellectuals began
pondering how Japan should with deal with rising American power in East Asia.1561
Hirohito, Emperor. Here we will consider Hirohito’s prewar views of Japan’s
foreign relations at some length, given his huge importance in twentieth century Japanese
politics. Concerning Japan’s foreign relations, Hirohito was taught a rather social
Darwinian and racialist philosophy, stressing competition between races for global
dominance, Japan’s superiority and a disdain for democratic principles. The only
absolute was the state.1562 On international history, he learned that during the wars with
China and Russia, Japan always acted justly, for “peace.”1563 He devoured books about
Western history that saw revolution and war as monarchy’s greatest threats. His
instruction in history was at times rational and rich in examples, yet reflected official
ideologies of Japan’s racial origins and the emperor as the center of its power and
empire.1564 When young, he viewed modern history in terms of Emperor Meiji and his
court, and the world in light of the Meiji empire. The Meiji wars with China and Russia
reshaped the situation of Japan’s national life, and its international environment.1565

1560

Ibid., 48.
Ibid., 155. Yamagata and other members of his faction grew increasingly worried about the threat of
“radical” ideas of representative government and Wilsonian international egalitarianism presented at the
postwar Versailles peace conference, both emanating from the United States (Ibid., 227, 234-237).
1562
Bix, Hirohito, 66-69.
1563
Though his history instructor acknowledged Chinese resistance to Japan’s colonization of Taiwan after
the Sino-Japanese war, he was silent about Japanese injustices committed against Korea (Ibid., 74).
1564
Ibid., 74-76.
1565
Ibid., 33. Related to Hirohito’s views, during World War I, Japan’s leaders supported a foreign policy
of “Asian Monroeism,” the right of Japan to protect Asia from the West, and to use war to oust Western
powers from China. Japan’s leaders viewed the world as locked in endless racial conflict. Hinting at
Japanese military goals in the 1930s, they secretly formulated plans to make China a Japanese protectorate,
dominate Manchuria and Mongolia, control resource-rich Indonesia, and declare Asia for Asian (Japanese)
control (Ibid., 146-148, 264).
578
1561

During Hirohito’s regency (1921-1926), Japan signed several treaties that
changed its foreign relations, shifting the emphasis on multilateral treaties, the League of
Nations and its “peace code.” Hirohito and the court supported this reorientation.1566
The new order recognized Japan as a great power, but had weaknesses, not allowing
racial equality. Japan’s leaders and Hirohito continued to view international relations as
competition between the races, and that each nation must have adequate arms. Treaties
signed by Japan in 1921-19221567 limited its naval power, and committed it to “open
door” and “equal opportunity” policies for China’s development. Realizing that the new
system would not support Japan’s true goals, Hirohito and the court finally withdrew
their support, supporting actions in violation of the League of Nations.1568
In the early-mid 1920s, Hirohito was proud of Japan’s victories in World War I
and its wars with China and Russia, yet he was somewhat open to the international peace
perspectives, given the dangers of rapid military buildup and engagement in China.1569 In
1921, court officials urged Hirohito to go to Europe and see the world and its leaders, to
prepare Japan for its new international relations. They wanted to project an image of
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Hirohito as Japan’s worldly-wise, confident, great regent, to strengthen the monarchy’s
“declining” image.1570
In the late 1920s, Hirohito evolved a view of diplomacy and international law
stressing that leaders must sometimes use force in support of their national interests.1571
In August 1928, Japan signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which stressed pacifist
principles.1572 The Pact enjoyed broad support in the United States, but not in Japan,
where leading scholars denounced it.1573 Hirohito and his court group never encouraged
it. The signing of the Pact occurred amidst a developing crisis over Japan’s presence in
Manchuria, and new efforts of the government and court to unite the Japanese with their
emperor, and to renew national spirit.1574 Hirohito and the court group decided to pump
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in other important locations, such as the Soviet Union and Japan’s colonies (Ibid., 133-135).
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In Japan, the Kellogg-Briand Pact is referred to as the No-War Treaty. According to the Pact,
signatories agreed to recognize aggressive war as an international crime, condemn war as a solution for
international disputes, and seek to use “pacific means” for such conflicts (Ibid., 220-221).
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Among those who denounced it were Tachi Sakutaro, Japan’s top international law expert and
Hirohito’s personal lecturer on the subject. In the minds of Japan’s intellectuals, the No-War Treaty was
another example of the Western liberal democracies, such as Britain and the United States, forcing their
pacifist interpretations of international law on the post-World War I world order, for their own advantage
(Ibid., 222-223).
1574
Hirohito did not see the Pact as a barrier to resolving any potential crisis over Japan’s presence in
Manchuria through force. Japan’s leasehold, centered on Dalian, southern Manchuria, had been acquired
580

up nationalist spirit through the enthronement events.1575 Like many Japanese bureaucrats
of the late 1930s, he likely viewed international law as a Western invention, useful for
Western, but not Japanese, interests.1576
In the early 1930s, the worldview of the Japanese of themselves and the world
changed. The military, not the elites, seemed to have more awareness of the people’s
suffering in the depression, so the people supported the former. Overall, Japan accepted
“anti-Chinese, anti-Western xenophobia,” supporting the Manchurian incident in
1931.1577 Hirohito and the court could have reversed this, but they saw international
relations in racial terms, disagreed over the proper path, and allowed the military’s view
to prevail.1578 In the predominant Japanese worldview of international relations, the
United States and Britain seemed very hypocritical for proclaiming democracy at home
while supporting imperialism abroad.1579 The Soviet Union seemed a huge threat, with
its potential might and communist ideology. The breakdown of global capitalism,

during the Qing dynasty. Hirohito viewed it as part of the “sacred” legacy he inherited from the Emperor
Meiji. Prof. Tachi looked for loopholes in the Pact that might allow Japan to protect its rights and interests
there (Ibid., 222-223).
1575
Ibid., 221-224.
1576
Ibid., 359-360. In the late 1930s, Hirohito did not support complying with international laws governing
the treatment of prisoners of war. He could have issued orders to prevent the mass murder and torture of
numerous Chinese prisoners, but did not (Ibid., 360).
1577
The Manchurian Incident refers to the situation where Japan’s Guandong Army faked an explosion on a
railway bridge near Shenyang, Manchuria in order to falsely blame China and provoke an excuse to further
invade Manchuria.
1578
Ibid., 263-264.
1579
Many Japanese became willing to confront Britain and the United States for Japan’s honor. Prince and
multi-term Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe argued that the white race had violated international law by
dominating the yellow race. Konoe’s views were highly influential for the emperor and the court (Ibid.,
265-269).
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emerging monetary and trade blocs, and domestic disagreement over politics and
ideology were used to justify Japan’s actions in Manchuria.1580
Also in the early 1930s, Hirohito knew that only superior arms would permit
Japan to achieve victory in war with the United States or Britain, and hesitated to break
relations with them.1581 Rapid mobilization would threaten the stability of the throne.1582
In July 1940, Japan contemplated invading Southeast Asia, and strengthening its axis ties.
Hirohito worried about the response of Britain and the United States, but hoped for their
continued cooperation, and that invading would help end the China war. The Americans
saw it as a direct provocation.1583 Japan signed the axis Tripartite Pact in September
1940, which the Japanese government contemplated for three years. Hirohito could have
halted it, but did not.1584 He broke with Meiji Japan’s heritage of friendship with Britain
and the United States. He hesitated, knowing it might cause war.1585
Hirohito did nothing to counter the views of military officers suggesting that
China was merely a geographical designation, not a distinct people or nation, and that
Japan should be allowed to seize all desired regions.1586 Many university professors
supported official, ideological defense of the attack on China—Japan offered China the
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Ibid., 265-269. For the specifics on the views of many Japanese, Hirohito, the court and other leading
officials on Manchuria and empire in the 1930s, see my discussion later in this chapter in the section on
Japanese views of imperialism in the 1930s.
1581
For example, Hirohito did not accept all of the nationalist propaganda put forth by the government in
some well-known patriotic films released in 1933 to 1934 that portrayed the West as Japan’s insidious
enemy. I discuss a couple of these films later in this chapter in the section on Hirohito’s view of outside
cultural influences on Japan (1895-1945).
1582
Ibid., 278.
1583
Ibid., 375-379.
1584
The axis states Japan eventually allied with were Germany, Italy, Romania, and Hungary (Ibid., 380).
1585
Ibid., 380-382.
1586
For example, he allowed the military to increase the size of its China garrison in 1936, and approved
the construction of a new military base at Fengtai outside Beijing. He also believed that resource-rich
provinces in North China should be available for seizure (Ibid., 306-307).
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emperor’s benevolent “imperial way” (kôdô).1587 Hirohito supported the war. Behind
Japanese support was the throne, and his powerful image as benevolent emperor, the
virtuous embodiment of morality, aristocratic and national values. Hirohito symbolically
clouded “principles of peace” that later emerged as “policies of violence,” serving as
supreme war commander, and shaping policy and strategy. By the late 1930s, he did not
view China as a modern state, likely viewed the invasion as correct, and supported a
policy of undeclared war.
Policy documents from July 1941 mention the possibility of wars with the
Soviet Union, the United States and Britain.1588 Hirohito most feared war with the Soviet
Union. Soon he believed that war with the latter two must be risked but avoided if
possible. When Japan’s military hastened their advance into Southeast Asia, the United
States responded with harsh economic sanctions, but only light military reaction. The
sanctions greatly shocked Hirohito and Japan’s top leaders. Different factions in the
court group debated whether or how soon to declare war on the United States and
Britain.1589 Hirohito and many leaders assumed that the axis would be victorious over
Britain and the Soviet Union, so they plunged ahead. Indecision risked internal stability
and the throne’s strength. Hirohito had several options, to favor diplomacy, focus on
China, or keep Japan neutral. In fall 1941, he assented to war.1590
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This is related to the ideology of hakkô ichiu (Ibid., 326-327).
One document called for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, ending the
war in China, and invading southward, to ensure Japan’s “self-existence and self-defense” (Ibid., 397).
1589
Hirohito worried about the possibility of Japan’s “ABCD encirclement,” Japan being surrounded by
America, Britain, China, and the Dutch (Ibid., 559). He also blamed Japan’s situation on the U.S. oil
embargo on Japan, and stalemated U.S.-Japan negotiations. He had no realization that Japan’s situation
was due to the cabinet’s aggressive policies against China and Southeast Asia (Ibid., 407).
1590
Ibid., 397-405, 408-410, 419, 426-427, 429-439. While preparations for war with the U.S., Britain, and
Holland continued in fall 1941, Hirohito stalled and quietly urged officials to seek other options. He was
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Yanagita Kunio. Yanagita’s thought on Japan’s social and economic policies
of the early 1900s suggests that he supported a non-assertive, non-expansionary pattern
for Japan’s international relations.1591 His primary political writings from 1924 to 1930
show important clues about his overall political thought.1592 He laments the deterioration
of Sino-Japanese relations, and Japan’s imposition of the Twenty-One Demands on China
during World War I. Although he felt Japan had no alternative but war in the SinoJapanese War, he was uncertain if it was justified. His comments about the Japanese
immigration exclusion law passed in the United States in 1924 reveal his general attitude
about international relations. He felt the law was symptomatic of Japan’s general
international isolation since the late 1800s. Overall, national interests were still more
primary in the international system than the cooperative spirit of international
humanitarianism. But power imbalances and conflicts between nations are likely
temporary phenomena in world history. Yanagita also distrusted oligarchic dominance of
politics and international relations.1593

hesitant concerning possible invasions and war with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Southeast
Asia. Some reports likely convinced him that a prolonged war with the United States could be sustainable,
and so he finally assented. In the days leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 8, as Hirohito
reviewed numerous details about the attack and other aspects of the coming war, he was amazingly calm
and optimistic. On the eve of the Pearl Harbor, in late 1941, faced with the possibilities of an oil embargo
that strangled the military, defeat in China and loss of most of the empire, and endangering the throne,
Hirohito chose war with the United States and Britain. He believed that the axis would defeat Britain, and
hoped that quick action by Japan could lead to a standoff with the more powerful United States (Ibid., 414415, 433, 437, 439, 441).
1591
Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 77-78.
1592
Kawada Minoru studied Yanagita’s political writings from this period that appeared as political
editorials in the Tokyo Asahi Shinbun (Ibid., 81).
1593
Ibid., 81-82, 84-87. For example, Yanagita doubted if Japan could learn anything from fascist Italy, and
he thoroughly opposed elite dominance of decision-making in Japan’s international relations, such as going
to war. Such important matters should be decided with input from the people (Ibid., 86-87).
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Comparison of Leaders’ Worldviews About Japan’s External Political Relations
(1895-1945)
These leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s external relations can be classified in
three main groups: their general views of foreign relations and the world, their views of
relations with specific regions (Asia and the West), and their views of international
conflicts, peace and diplomacy. On foreign relations and the world, Hamada concludes
that Ito was a moderate on foreign policy, a realist, and a general supporter of peace.1594
Yanagita supported a populist, more democratic approach to international relations,
similar to his approach to domestic politics. He opposed elite domination of foreign
policy decision-making, and instead advocated a non-aggressive, non-imperialist
approach to Japan’s foreign relations. Temporarily, he believed that realist, national
interests and power struggles dominated foreign policy, but that international cooperation
would eventually prevail. Perhaps we could call Yanagita a progressive idealist.
Hirohito’s views of international relations stress social Darwinism, competition between
the races for global domination, Japanese superiority, a disdain for democracy, and
preference for absolute state power. In the late 1930s, he viewed international law as
useful for Western, but not Japanese, interests. The ideological tendencies of Ito and
Hirohito were more conservative, while Yanagita’s were more liberal. Concerning their
views of the world and world history, Hirohito was an avid reader of world and Western
history who received (in his education) fairly accurate yet racialist views that supported
state ideologies, empire (via the lens of the Meiji era, the Emperor Meiji and the Meiji
empire), and the empire as absolute. After 1914, Yamagata was preoccupied with fear of
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Hamada, Prince Ito. Ito negotiated with foreign powers for peace on several occasions.
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an impending race war the West, centered in Asia, which he believed the United States
and Britain would wage.
Regarding relations with other Asian powers, by 1909, Ito stressed peace and
cooperation among major East Asia powers, non-interference from outsiders, and fair
trade. Similarly, it is likely that Hirohito supported the doctrine of “Asian Monroeism,”
that Asia should be free from intervention from outsiders, but open to Japanese input.
Views of China varied, from Ito and Yamagata who desired cooperation with China
against Western encroachment, to Hirohito, who, in addition to that view, was proud of
Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War, and who supported, by his actions, the right of
Japan to invade, exploit, and control China as a protectorate in the 1930s. In contrast,
Yanagita was ashamed of the Sino-Japanese War. Views of Manchuria also varied. Ito
was nervous about both Russia’s and Japan’s presence there in the early twentieth
century, and negotiated with Russia over its future. But in the 1930s, Hirohito saw
Manchuria as part of a “sacred legacy” inherited from the Emperor Meiji, and did not
oppose Japanese intervention in Manchuria in 1931. Ito desired close relations and
friendship with Korea in the late 1890s, feared conflict with Russia over it, and wanted to
help Korea maintain its independence. Ironically he became the first Japanese governorgeneral there, and demonstrated a patronizing attitude that the Koreans resented; it
resulted in Ito’s death. Tensions over Korea and Manchuria led him to negotiate with
Russia before the Russo-Japanese War, with whom he desired peace. Somewhat
similarly, in the early 1900s and 1910s, Yamagata sought stronger ties with Russia to
counter increasing American influence and an impending “race war.” In contrast, though
Hirohito seemed proud of Japan’s victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, he
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feared the Soviet Union as Japan’s greatest potential enemy. Hirohito supported invasion
of Southeast Asia in 1940, and hoped it would not provoke a harsh Western response, but
it resulted in sharp U.S. economic sanctions. Hirohito was shocked, worried about
Japan’s need for resources from the region, and the possibility of Japan’s “ABCD”
encirclement. He hoped that conflict with the U.S., partly over Southeast Asia, could be
avoided, but finally consented to it with the attack on Pearl Harbor. Some common
themes that emerge here among these leaders are a common desire for Japan to help its
Asian neighbors defend themselves against the West. However, later in the period, by the
1920s and 1930s, more than two decades into the era of overseas Japanese imperialism,
Hirohito shows more support for Japanese intervention in Asia, China, Manchuria,
Taiwan1595 and Southeast Asia than other leader we have studied.
In their views of relations with the West, commonly there was caution and fear.
When young, Ito was worried about the West’s power. During and after World War I,
Yamagata saw increasing American interest in China, Manchuria, spreading democracy
and international Wilsonian egalitarianism, along with Britain, as Japan’s greatest
security threats, and sought Russian help to counter them. By the early 1930s, it seems
likely that Hirohito and his court group supported the main view of the military elite, that
the United States and Britain were very hypocritical for supporting democracy at home
and imperialism abroad. Japanese leaders slowly became willing to confront the U.S. on
its racism, but Hirohito knew the danger of conflict with the Americans, and hesitated to
cut ties. By 1940, despite hoping for cooperation, he finally, hesitatingly broke Japan’s
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See comments on Hirohito’s tour of Taiwan below in the section on leaders’ views of imperialism, later
in this chapter.
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long Meiji tradition of friendship with the U.S. and Britain. In 1941, frustrated over U.S.
economic sanctions because of Japan’s invasion of Southeast Asia, Hirohito proceeded to
war, without realizing that the U.S. reaction was mainly due to Japan’s aggressive
military actions in China and Southeast Asia. Regarding Britain, Ito disliked it as a
youth,1596 and was wary of signing a treaty with it in the early 1900s, for fear of angering
Russia. Similarly, Yamagata’s racist view of coming conflicts caused him to value peace
with Russia more than with Britain, and since he saw the United States and Britain as the
chief threats to Japan’s interests in East Asia, he preferred relations with Russia more
than with Britain. Despite Hirohito’s highly positive impressions of Britain garnered
during his imperial tour there in the early 1920s, he also noticed the hypocrisy of British
imperialism. As with the United States, he also desired peace with Britain, and worried
about Britain’s response to Japanese intervention in Southeast Asia. But by the time he
signed the Tripartite treaty with the Axis in September 1940, he was willing to bet on
Britain’s losing the war, and to risk it. Britain was also the “B” in the “ABCD” threat of
Japan’s encirclement. At the beginning of this period (1895 to 1945), these leaders
generally viewed both the United States and Britain as threats, and feared them. Leaders
throughout the period expressed frustration over the hypocrisy and racist nature of AngloAmerican imperialism. These events resulted in Japanese war with both of these powers
by the end of this era. At the beginning of the period, these leaders seemed more willing,
at times, to cooperate with Russia, but Hirohito greatly feared the Soviet Union, and
seemed generally more pro-Asian than pro-Western in his view of international relations
before 1945.
1596

Remember that as a youth, Ito participated in the burning of the British legation house.
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In their views of international conflict, peace and diplomacy, three of these
leaders saw international conflicts in racial terms, to a large extent. In the early 1900s,
Yamagata feared worldwide racial wars, and sought ties with both China and Russia to
counter the possibility. In the early 1930s, Hirohito largely envisioned international
relations in racial terms, though he saw revolution and war as the monarchy’s greatest
threats, and was proud of Japan’s victories in wars with China, Russia, and in World War
I. While he hoped to avoid war with the United States and Britain, he was willing to risk
it for Japan’s national interests. While he supported Japan’s invasions of China and
Southeast Asia, and finally assented to war with the United States, as we noted above, he
most feared war with the Soviet Union. Yanagita’s view of international relations was
seemingly partly colored by the issue of race. He saw Japan’s international relations as
characterized by the twin issues of isolation and exclusion on the basis of race.1597
Regarding specific conflicts, while two of the leaders regretted some of them, Hirohito
took a more positive view before 1945.1598
The power of Hirohito’s supreme authority and position meant that his actions,
inactions, and decisions gave extremely influential input into the events in China and
World War II in the 1930s and 1940s. For example, in the late 1930s, in the military’s
“Imperial Headquarters” and the “imperial conferences” (gozen kaigi), Hirohito
influenced and approved major decisions affecting Japan, its colonies, and other
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I say this based on Yanagita’s view of the 1924 Japanese immigration exclusion act in the United States
that we noted earlier in this chapter.
1598
Yanagita regretted Japan’s actions in the Sino-Japanese War, and Ito tried to discourage war with
Russia. In the 1920s, Hirohito felt that each nation had a right to adequate arms, and that war was
sometimes necessary, for a nation to pursue its national interests. We already noted his pride in Japan’s
victories in earlier modern wars.
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nations.1599 These basic facts, argued at length by Herbert Bix (Bix 2000), stand in stark
contrast to Hirohito’s postwar image long cultivated by the Japanese government, that of
Hirohito as a passive, pacifist ruler controlled and manipulated by aggressive militarists
and ultraconservative bureaucrats he was powerless to stop. Hirohito was highly
concerned about his image,1600 an effort he continued after the war, and which, with
American cooperation, enabled his survival. Bix charges that Hirohito’s concern for the
image of the emperor, the throne and their survival even delayed the surrender of Japan at
the war’s end.1601
Ito and Yanagita stand out as the strongest supporters of peace here.1602
Interestingly, Hirohito believed that Japan waged the earlier wars with China and Russia
for the sake of peace. In the early 1920s, at first Hirohito and his court somewhat
supported the prevailing international atmosphere of peace-building, multilateral treaties,
and the activation of the League of Nations. But shortly later they dropped their support,
since these various instruments seemed to limit what Hirohito and other conservative
political and military leaders viewed as Japan’s legitimate interests in Asia. These leaders
also displayed mixed attitudes concerning various treaties.1603
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Bix, Hirohito, 327-332.
Starting in the 1920s, the Japanese government used, created, and projected many select images of
Hirohito and the imperial throne to encourage Japanese nationalism, patriotism, and support for the throne,
stressed at various places in Bix, Hirohito. This concern for image is also seen in Hirohito’s imperial tours
of colonies as regent (Ibid., 137-139, 156), and in the Imperial Household Ministry’s excessive attention to
detail in promoting and maintaining Hirohito’s image in such events as his enthronement ceremony (Bix,
Hirohito).
1601
For more on Bix’s discussion of how Hirohito hesitated to end the war, see Ibid., 16-17, 487-493, 499505, 519-521, 523-524.
1602
We noted above how Hamada called Ito a “man of peace,” given his opposition to the Russo-Japanese
War, support for and negotiations for peace with various powers.
1603
For example, Ito desired to quickly end the unequal trade treaties that the West had forced on Japan in
the late nineteenth century. He also reluctantly agreed to the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1902, fearing it
would provoke war with Russia. In the early 1920s, Hirohito and his court briefly expressed support for
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Conceptual Analysis of Leaders’ Worldviews About Japan’s External Political
Relations (1895-1945)
Development Issues. Internationalization asks, as Japan engaged in increasing
trade in the global economy from 1895 to 1945, what happened culturally on the
international level? What, if any evidence, do we see from these worldviews of Japan’s
external political relations? Most of the leaders here, except for Yanagita, were
conservative in their politics, and expected Japan to soon get sucked into various race
wars. Most of these leaders have very realist views of international relations, somewhat
affected by evolutionistic thought. All of this is especially true for Hirohito. All these
leaders support Japan’s leadership of the Asian region against Western imperialism.
During World War II, Hirohito expressed increasing support for Japanese imperialism in
several regions. He was fearful of the West, but finally willing to sacrifice war with the
United States and Britain for the pursuit of Japan’s interests. He showed a more favorable
attitude toward conflict than any other leader here. While the leaders had varied attitudes
toward treaties, Hirohito only supported them when, again, they were judged to be in
Japan’s interests. The generally conservative, assertive attitudes toward external political
relations and conflict seen in these leaders tended to encourage assertive Japanese
political and diplomatic action as Japan’s domestic politics became increasingly
conservative and militaristic in the 1930s. The assertion of Japanese power in the East
Asian region could not help but affect the cultures of other countries there as Japan
exercised increasing political and economic influence. Whether through trade during

various multilateral treaties, but soon opposed most of them. They also never supported the Kellogg-Briand
Pact of the late 1920s, since its pacifist nature seemed contrary to Japan’s overseas interests.
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World War I, later conflict, or direct imperialism, the projection of these attitudes on
other nations in the region surely had profound effects.
Technology Issues. On general concepts of technology, what are the most
important technology-related ideas associated with these worldviews of external political
relations? The main technological phenomena connected with these worldviews were the
technologies of heavy industrialization, militarism, and military arms. While Japan
imported some of the weapons it used in its various conflicts, without this
industrialization, Japan could not have mastered or built the military arms it needed to
support the military actions in which it engaged in this period, from the Russo-Japanese
War through World War II. If Japan had not produced and used these technologies in all
of these conflicts, perhaps the future of East Asia would have been very different.
What are some the most significant political factors present in the imported
technologies and related ideas in the worldviews of external political relations studied
here?1604 Some of the main imported technologies related to these worldviews were
industrial and military technologies, military arms, and political ideas of authoritarian
government, monarchy, military theories, and theories of evolutionistic political
development.1605 Did the international system affect these technologies/issues positively
or negatively? Why? Though more liberal thought from Great Britain and the United
States was influential in Japan during the Taisho democracy movement (about 1905 to
1932), especially in academic circles and popular culture, conservative thought from
1604

Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52.
For a more detailed list of the types of ideas and technologies that were imported, see the discussion
later in this chapter, under cognition issues, on the cultural logics of these worldviews of external political
relations, specifically on the global phenomena to which these leaders reacted. Evolutionistic ideas seemed
more relevant earlier in the period (seen here especially in the thought of Kato), but touched even the
thinking of Hirohito, due to his education early in the twentieth century.
592
1605

Europe was more predominant in the government, the military and the imperial court.
This conservative influence constrained the actions of the Japanese government and its
top decision makers. It also had a decisive impact on the overall direction Japan’s
politics, international and military relations took.
What were the important ideas and technologies transferred in these worldviews
of external political relations? These ideas and technologies were mentioned in the
immediately preceding paragraph. Who were the main international actors in the external
environment, or domestic actors, individual or state, involved, and what impacts did they
have on the transfer outcomes? Some of the main international actors included foreign
governments and leaders, foreign diplomatic bodies and actors, such as the League of
Nations, and foreign military bodies who advised Japan. Important domestic actors
included ministries and agencies of the Japanese government related to heavy industry,
foreign affairs and relations, the various emperors and their courts, branches of the
Japanese armed forces, and military leaders. The main impacts of the foreign actors on
these transfers included allowing the Japanese government, military, and heavy
industries, both public and private, to import these technologies and develop them
further. The primary impacts of the domestic actors, beyond importing and further
developing the technologies and ideas, included deploying and spreading them
throughout areas under Japanese influence in East Asia and the South Pacific.
What are the significant lessons here, or could these outcomes have been
improved? A possible lesson is that Western exporters should perhaps have been more
selective in what they allowed Japan to import, by asking for what purposes the imported
items would be used. This was perhaps too advanced a concept for the time. Did the
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international system affect the technologies and ideas Japan imported positively or
negatively? Japan imported some ideas and technologies that became very destructive to
the peoples of East Asia in the 1930s and 1940s. Most of the time, foreign governments
did not consider very much what Japan was importing, or what the effects might be.
When Japan attacked Southeast Asia in 1941, the United States enacted strict economic
sanctions. This was one case of a foreign government reflecting seriously on what Japan
was doing, and taking action as a result.
What are the most significant cultural factors and values present in the imported
technologies and ideas in these worldviews?1606 Some of the most important cultural
factors were conservative political ideologies that stressed the virtue of power and
military victory, that the strong would be victorious and rule the weak. The state,
military, and imperial court especially embraced ideas that were conservative, as Japan’s
own predominant culture of politics was. Some of these ideas partly had their basis in
evolutionistic thought, while some were accentuated by the nationalist, imperialist
propaganda that became influential in Japan in the late 1920s through the 1930s. This
combination of ideas helped Japan’s conservative political and military leaders come to
the conclusion that Japan had a duty, or right, to help defend both itself and other Asian
nations against the West. Astute Japanese leaders quickly observed the hypocrisy of how
the West handled the issue of race. There was no strong culture of peace in Japan at this
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Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52.
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time, neither in the main political ideas the state imported, nor in Japan’s own
“traditions.”1607
In these worldviews, how did the leaders concerned use these technologies and
ideas as means or agencies to cope with and transform Japan’s (material) environments
on the international level?1608 Japan’s leaders often used ideas of strong military action,
aggression, and military intervention in the affairs of other nations to pursue Japan’s
national interests, and what they interpreted to be the interests of neighboring regions,
including Korea, Taiwan and others. Japan used the most advanced military technologies
it could obtain to seek to obtain access to or control territories and resources that they
believed were necessary to defend Japan and the rest of Asia against the West.
How did these technological issues affect or enhance Japan’s survival in the
international system or environment? These technologies, especially military ones,
enabled Japan to invade and attack Russia, Korea, Taiwan, China, the United States
(Hawaii), and other areas. Earlier attacks brought wealth and honor to the nation’s
military, and new areas came under Japan’s predominant influence for the first time. But
the long-term costs were devastating; ultimately Japan was virtually destroyed at the end
of World War II, and damage to other areas was also huge, in many cases.
Do the belief systems of any of these leaders (on technology issues on the
international level) blind them to certain realities? If yes, which, and how? Yamagata,
Hirohito and Kato were more conservative and militarist leaning, Ito was conservative
1607

Note my previous comments on pacifism in Japan. When pacifist ideologies were first imported from
the West in the 1800s, Japan had no recent, significant experience of war, so many Japanese had a hard
connecting with these ideas.
1608
Again, this is what I call the “international cultural ecology approach” to technology, drawn from
anthropology, based on Clemmer, Myers, and Rudden, Julian Steward, and Glick, “Technology,” 464.
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but less militarist, and Yanagita was more of a progressive pacifist. Several of the
leaders’ belief systems definitely blinded them to certain realities. The clearest example
here is Hirohito. His unusual, tightly controlled environment, steeped in imperialist,
nationalist, and spiritual ideologies, could not help but constrain his viewpoints and
actions. Did the leaders fail to adjust their decisions or viewpoints to changing conditions
and reality? If so, how did these factors affect transfer or policy outcomes? In Hirohito
we have a very strong case of a leader who failed to adequately adjust his decisions to
rapidly changing conditions, especially during World War II.1609 The results for Japan
and East Asia were devastating. Through the war, Japan experienced the ultimate
technological nightmare to date: two atomic bombings. And ironically, this supreme loss
eventually resulted in Japan’s postwar technological renaissance with open export access
to the world’s largest consumer market, the United States.
Finally, in these worldviews on external relations, is the concept of
technonationalism as ideology manifested? If so, how? Views of technonationalism were
very strongly present in the views of Yamagata and Hirohito. Yamagata strongly relied
on military power and technology to create the strong military forces needed to defend
Japan and allow it to pursue its national interests in Asia. Though his overt use of military
technologies for this purpose was more evident in the previous period (1850 to 1895),
these factors were still present in his thought early in this period (1895 to 1945). In his
thought on international relations in this era, Hirohito shows implicit support for the ideas
of technonationalism as ideology. Though his thinking and actions were more driven by
1609

I will mention only two examples discussed in Bix, Hirohito. One example was Hirohito’s minute
attention to detail in many policy areas, which caused him on occasion to lose sight of the “big picture,”
and also his hesitancy to allow Japan to surrender until the last possible moment (Bix, Hirohito).
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ideas of power politics and evolutionistic images of survival of the strongest nations, and
less by overt economics, he surely realized that economics and resources had connection
to political power.1610
Cognition Issues. Image. The basic images in these leaders’ minds (1895 to
1945) about Japan’s international relations may be organized into about four major
groups. In the first group, images of international relations and general foreign policy,
concerning their primary images of foreign policy and international relations, most of the
images lean toward realism and competition between nation states for power.1611 Images
of intense competition between nations, based on their own interests,1612 battles for
power, and competition between the races1613 suggest the influence of evolutionary
thought.1614 Of the leaders who commented on external political relations in this period
(Ito, Hirohito, Yanagita, and Yamagata), only Yanagita’s images suggest non-aggression
or distrust of oligarchic dominance of leadership in diplomacy. Some of Hirohito’s
images reveal the opposite: a dislike for democratic input in international relations. In all
of the images on basic international relations, there is a desire for equality between Japan
and other nations.1615 Images of the place of Japan in international relations mention
competing images: Japan’s superiority to other nations,1616 the danger of its encirclement
by other powers,1617 and its general isolation.1618 The images of several leaders include
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references to competition between races and impending race-based conflict between
Japan and Western powers.1619 In these leaders’ images of Western and international
history, we see a stress on conflict, power, and competition between nations.1620 In
Hirohito’s images of international law, the stress is on nations acting in their own
interests, and the assumption is that through international law, Western nations do just
that.
A second major group of international relations images are those of Japan’s
relations with Asian powers. In his images of general relations with Far Eastern
countries, Ito expresses support for peace, cooperation, commerce, and for Japan
defending its interests against other regional powers if necessary. He also offers images
of friendly relations with Korea. On images of China and Manchuria, in the 1930s,
Hirohito is supportive of invasion and inferior status for both regions, and earlier, fearful
of China helping to “encircle” Japan. In contrast, Yanagita regrets Japanese aggressive
action in China. Images on relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, from Ito,
Yamagata, and Hirohito, are contrasting. While Hirohito and Ito greatly fear conflict with
Russia or the Soviet Union, Yamagata is eager for treaties with Russia to counter threats
he sees from the United States. Finally, in his images of relations with Southeast Asia,
Hirohito reveals he is willing to go to war with the United States and Britain in order to
gain the resources of Southeast Asia for Japan.
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The third group of images concerns Japan’s relations with Western powers. In
their images of relations with the West and Europe at large, while Ito recognizes the
West’s power, and the potential of conflict with it, Hirohito was highly impressed with
Europe, especially Britain, when he traveled there as regent. In the images of U.S.Japanese relations, we see negative images. While Yamagata viewed the United States as
Japan’s greatest threat in East Asia, in Hirohito’s images, we see caution and fear about
possible ruptures in the relationship. On relations with Britain, there are similar images—
fears about conflict with Britain, or that signing a treaty could bring conflict.1621
The final group features images of war, peace and diplomacy. In his images of
many conflicts, Hirohito reveals a belief that Japan acted justly, for peace, or that he was
proud of what was accomplished.1622 He also voices support for each nation possessing
adequate arms. In contrast, Ito and Yanagita both express doubts about several wars. On
peace and diplomacy, several images from Ito show that he was often supportive of peace
and ending unequal relationships in international relations. In Hirohito’s images on peace
and diplomacy, we see a mixed record, of support for peace early in the 1920s, and later,
general opposition.
How may these images functioned as perceptual filters or organizing devices?
On international relations and foreign policy, several blind spots existed in the views of
these leaders, including blindness on paths to peace, non-aggression, idealism,
cooperation, the dangers of Japan toward other regions, and what Japan could learn from
Asia. Yanagita was less blind in these areas. Perhaps a balance of influence in foreign
1621
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policy, both democratic and elite, would have been best for Japan at this time. On
relations with Asia, the leaders’ blindspots included a general ignorance of the
possibilities of peace through trade and cooperation, not aggression. In their minds, how
could cooperation with Asia be possible if not through colonialism and imperialism? On
relations with the West, these leaders seemed blind to the benefits and possibilities of
cooperation with the West, the United States, and Britain. What might have been gained?
Ito and Yanagita often supported peace and diplomacy, but Hirohito had a mixed record
and generally did not, except when it seemed they would benefit Japan. On war, if
Japan’s leaders, in practice, had been more cautious about war, perhaps the government
and Hirohito would have been less aggressive toward Asia, and Japan’s postwar relations
with the continent smoother.
Worldview. From the above images, the predominant worldview that emerges
sees the world as made up of power hungry groups and actors, competing for position and
strength in the international system. These groups and actors include different countries
and races. Western nations are seen as more of a threat to Japan than Asian nations, and
the latter seem weaker than Japan. The international system is mostly driven by
competition for power, and nations, by their own interests. Powerful countries control the
world, and want to dominate weaker ones. The West wants to dominate the countries of
Asia and other non-Western regions, and usually does. Non-Asians want to dominate
Asians. In the world’s political order, stronger countries dominate weaker ones. The West
dominates the non-West. Elites and powerful groups in different countries dominate the
leadership of their nations’ diplomacy. Japan should be equal with the nations of the
West.
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In this worldview, Japan should be equal with Western nations, but is not. Japan
must grow stronger to fight for its interests in the international system. It is in danger of
being invaded, controlled or encircled by aggressive foreign (especially Western) nations.
In Hirohito’s mind, Japan has acted justly in its wars with other countries (Hirohito).
Regarding views of peace, to Yanagita and Ito, conflict is negative, and should be
avoided whenever possible. Yanagita alone felt Japan should not compete with other
nations, but should seek cooperative non-aggression.
Regarding the non-self, on Asia, these leaders express a desire for Japan to
cooperate with them. There is a common belief that Japan is superior to other Asian
nations, and that Japan is best able to lead them against the West. Later, in Hirohito, we
see the view that Japan has the right to dominate other countries. Yanagita believed that
Japan should seek to set an example for other Asian countries, try to lead them toward
development, and cooperate with them against the West. On the West, images show fear
in the minds of other leaders, that the West threatens Japan, wants to control and encircle
it. In general, most of these leaders desired, if possible, to avoid conflict with major
Western powers. Among the most threatening Western states were the United States,
Russia/the Soviet Union, and Britain. Hirohito is the leader who finally took Japan to war
against all three.
What were the relevant environment(s) surrounding the viewers/actors who hold
these worldviews? How did these environments interact with or affect the leaders’
worldviews? The environment was the system of international relations in Asia, largely
dominated or influenced by major Western powers: the United States, Britain, Russia,
and several lesser Western powers, including France, Germany, and Holland (the latter,
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through World War II). Earlier in this period, there were several non-Western powers
who are important actors in connection with Japan, especially China and Korea. There
was also the system of international diplomacy and international bodies such as the
League of Nations. This system and bodies were absolutely dominated by the West, and
not open to much input from those outside the West. The international diplomatic system
and the Western powers did not respect Japan or non-Western powers, expect or want
them to have a voice in the international system. But Japan’s military victories in the
Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars won it a small amount of respect. In the
international system, Japan had almost no voice. The Western nations assumed that they
knew best, had the right to dominate international diplomacy, and expected Japan to
cooperate. When Japan did not, the West found it incomprehensible, and was willing to
resort to force in the Russo-Japanese war or World War II if Japan actually attacked
Western interests, especially in Asia. Otherwise, the West was not interested in listening
to Japan or other non-Western powers and their interests.
How these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions may
have influenced the leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, and understanding of
events and their causes? The perception that strong, aggressive countries dominate
international diplomacy made Japanese leaders very open to realist, military-oriented
interpretations of international relations. They generally were not open to perceptions that
hinted at cooperation. These power-oriented views also encouraged Japan to take a more
aggressive stance toward its Asian neighbors. On uses of information, the power-oriented
views of international relations likely encouraged Japan’s leaders to read views of
international relations and military theory that stressed realist views and building Japan’s
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defenses. These views downplayed and persecuted individuals, groups and scholars who
hinted at pacifist views. The leaders’ understanding of events and their causes made most
of these actors view international events as reflective of the power-hungry drive of
nations for survival. These events were caused by countries’ pursuit of their national
interests and the desire to survive. How did technological systems affect these
worldviews? The stress on power and the military throughout this period made Japanese
leaders prefer powerful, technological solutions to the problems of international relations.
These solutions had to be supported by the industrial, military complex in Japan. These
worldviews leaned overwhelmingly in the direction of realism, conservatism, and
militarism. The only exceptions were the views of Ito and Yanagita on peace and
cooperation.
Cultural Logics. The global phenomena to which these leaders responded
included foreign governments (Western and Asian), Western ideas and theories about
politics and international relations, military forces, theories and technologies, Asian
military forces (China and Korea), international conflicts such as the Russo-Japanese War
and World War II, Western powers, East Asian powers, Western diplomatic institutions
and structures, Western writings on politics, diplomacy and military affairs, international
treaties, and international bodies such as the League of Nations. What were the leaders’
worldviews and basic beliefs about these phenomena? Of the leaders here (Ito, Yamagata,
Hirohito, Yanagita), most saw international relations as competition between different
nations and/or races.1623 Regarding conflict, while all of the leaders were fearful of war to
varying degrees, some saw the use of arms as acceptable to defend Japan’s national
1623
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interests, worth risking if it would strengthen Japan.1624 Others saw it as dangerous, to be
avoided if possible.1625 Regarding Japan and international relations, Yamagata was
determined to defend Japan through foreign alliances and a strong military, and Ito
desired to strengthen Japan so it could stand independently on the international stage. On
Asia, all of these leaders saw other Asian countries besides Japan as weaker and more
inferior, and believed that Japan could help lead and strengthen them to successfully
resist the West. They seemed to accept the view of some Japanese leaders during World
War I, “Asian Monroeism”—that Asia should be for Asians, not just for the West’s
domination. Some of these leaders thought it was acceptable for Japan to invade or
control other Asian countries,1626 while others implied that Japan should help them, but
not invade.1627 On the West, all of the leaders were cautious about or fearful of the power
and potential actions of such nations as the United States, Britain and Russia/the Soviet
Union. On peace and diplomacy, some of the leaders supported treaties and diplomacy as
long as Japan’s national interests were furthered,1628 while others were more generally
supportive.1629
The cultural logics under these worldviews saw international relations as driven
by power and competition between different nations and groups. Nations that are stronger
militarily will have more power, and be able to conquer and lead other nations. If Japan
became strong, it would have the right to lead other Asian countries, and to guide them in
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resisting the West. It was not merely Japan’s power that gave it the right to lead other
Asians, but also its superior character.
The response of these leaders to these global phenomena was to personally be
involved however each one was able in areas of action or reflection relevant to these
issues. Ito was personally involved in diplomacy and in becoming the first Japanese
resident governor-general in Korea. Yamagata founded and led one of the most powerful
political factions in early twentieth century Japan, advocating for policies that would
maintain Japan’s modern military. Later, Hirohito was personally involved as the leader
and emperor of Japan. He continued his policy efforts behind the scenes at the imperial
court. Yanagita most actively opposed the various wars and elitist tendencies of Japanese
diplomacy in his writings in Japan’s press, and in personal reflections.
The cultural logics under these responses are that as the West overtly threatened
Japan up through the period of 1850 to 1895, it continues to threaten the rest of Asia in a
somewhat similar manner in the current period (1895 to 1945). Japan needs to help these
other countries strengthen themselves, unite and rise up against Western domination. In
all of these leaders, except Yanagita, there is also the assumption that if Japan is strong, it
has the right to use some of the other countries’ resources. We see the assumption that the
strong will rule those who are weaker. It is ironic that most of these leaders assume that
other Asian nations will welcome Japanese leadership, just because Japan is also Asian,
and stronger. They fail to realize that most other Asians do not want any foreign
domination or influence, even from a fellow Asian country, especially one that invades.
-Compare the cultural logics of the worldviews about the global phenomena, and then
compare the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to the phenomena.
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In both of these sets of cultural logics, there is the assumption that the strong have the
right to rule the weak. The first set assumes simply that those who have the most power
have the right to, and will, rule the weak. In the second case, the cultural logics under the
responses, Japan also has the right. There is little realization, except by Yanagita, that
Japan’s Asian neighbors do not want its intervention, leadership, or control.
Globalization Issues. To consider globalization issues, as in Chapters 5 and 6,
the first question I ask here is, how do some of the most important worldviews here
reflect and/or affect processes of globalization (intensified or speeded up flows of ideas,
peoples, money, media, or technology)? In the momentous events that take place in
Japan’s external political relations during this period, ranging from Japan’s surprise
attack on Port Arthur in China in 1904 to its large-scale production supporting the allies
in World War I to the events in World War II, this period represents greatly intensified
processes of globalization in external political relations. For these various conflicts, Japan
produced an impressive range of technologies and armaments. Each successive conflict
represents an increased degree of technological sophistication and global connection. By
the time of World War II, Japan launched transpacific attacks on Hawaii and Alaska,
controlled a vast area of the South Pacific, and soon faced massive bombing from
American planes and the atomic bomb before the end of the war. Not only in these
technologies, but also in the thinking of the leaders on Japan’s external political relations,
we see intensified consideration of global issues, including concerns over the actions of
various Western powers, and important Asian powers such as China and Russia. As the
single most influential leader in Japan in this period, Hirohito had access to frequent
reports and briefings of the best available information about various political and military
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issues and events. His reactions had global and regional consequences for thousands,
indeed millions of lives.
And how does globalization affect the worldviews? The intensification of
political and military information and technologies helped Japan to continue modernizing
its military forces during this period, enabling it to attack such major powers as Russia,
China, the United States, and Britain, either directly and/or their colonies. Japan’s access
to excellent military know-how and technologies greatly complicated its political,
diplomatic, and military interactions during this period, across an increasingly broad
geographic range. While these actors often showed great skill and astuteness in these
interactions, the broadened scope necessitated an increasingly larger range of experience
and skills. Some mistakes were inevitable.
If we consider these global processes as people experienced them, on micro(personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? As these leaders
interacted with important political and military forces and ideas, they worked very hard,
and were often very deeply affected. For example, Ito was assassinated in Korea in 1909.
Hirohito nearly lost the imperial throne at the end of World War II, and contributed to
greater destruction in the nation by surrendering so late. On a macro-level, many
Japanese were affected by the various wars and changes in Japanese society that took
place as millions of lives were lost, as the nation increasingly industrialized and
transformed itself to supply the conflicts, and as it suffered terrible attacks and
deprivation during the war. The scale of shared suffering increased exponentially by the
end of World War II. These processes of global politics and conflicts affected millions of
Japanese, and millions more in foreign lands and Japan’s colonies.
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Do these important global processes represent a form of Japanese or nonWestern globalization? If yes, what is their significance? Based on the above definition of
globalization, the events from 1895 to 1945 do represent a new form of globalization, of
intensified, regional connections, unprecedented in their intensity, coming from Japan.
As Japan drew in other regions and nations into its colonial orbit, its political, economic,
and cultural influence on them grew. Regarding politics, colonial areas were forced to
come under Japanese administration and submit to Japan’s political and nationalistic
ideologies, including State Shinto and emperor worship.1630 This was the first period of
global Japanese influence in history, but it was relatively short-lived. The region with the
most extended influence was Taiwan, where it lasted from 1895 to 1945 (fifty years).
Japan’s influence on certain regions, such as Taiwan and Korea, was great, and minimal
on others, such as the Philippines and Burma. The prewar case of Japanese globalization
in some ways prepared the way for vastly increased, new forms of global influence after
1945, when Japanese globalization truly became global in its scope, through trade,
exported economic and cultural products, aid, and other means.1631
Worldviews on Japan’s External Economic Relations
Yanagita Kunio. In 1925, Yanagita Kunio wrote that national-focused
economics had ended, that the age of international economics had begun. Yet countries
still regarded their national interests as primary. Because of social evolution, the stronger
nations would devour the weaker ones.1632 Japan still needed a system of national
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economic planning, and excessive economic liberalism was not advisable. The Meiji’s
government’s basic economic policy favored development of commerce and industry
focused on exports, and top-down capitalism. The contributions of agriculture were seen
as secondary.1633 The government and some other scholars advocated protectionism in the
early 1900s. Yanagita, aware that Japan was a developing nation, disagreed with some of
their ideas, but agreed that Japan needed limited protectionism. Some officials and
scholars like Ito Hirobumi supported primary protection of commerce and industry, and
agriculture as secondary. Yanagita felt that over-dependence on manufactured exports
would place Japan at the mercy of international economics. Less-developed nations that
received Japan’s products would build up their own industries, reject imports, and
attempt to export their own products.1634 In the late 1920s, the government’s economic
policies focused on exports and the rationalization of industry. Yanagita disagreed,
arguing that the economy should focus on reforming agriculture, and domestic-oriented
production.1635
Conceptual Analysis of Yanagita’s Worldviews About Japan’s External Economic
Relations (1895-1945)
General Issues. Yanagita’s views about the structure of Japan’s external
economic relations differed greatly from official Japanese government policy from the
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early 1900s through the 1920s. While the government placed emphasis on heavy and
large-scale industries geared for exports, Yanagita favored smaller-scale production,
regional industries, a focus on agriculture and the domestic market. In the mid-1920s,
though he felt the age of international economics had truly arrived, he still felt that most
nations focused on their own economic interests, with the strong devouring the weak.
Since Japan was still a developing country, he favored national economic planning, and
distrusted too much economic liberalism. Overall, Yanagita’s international economic
views seem somewhat progressive, supportive of heavy state involvement in promotion
of human scale industries, and cautious about economic plans that turned Japan’s
productivity away from basic commodities like agricultural products and increased its
dependence on the uncertainties of international markets through over-reliance on
industrial products. There is also a slight influence of evolutionary views here.
Development Issues. If we examine Yanagita’s views of Japan’s external
economic relations in the 1920s through the lens of internationalization, we see that his
entire concern was the protection of Japan’s domestic culture from the ravages of the
impacts of international economic and cultural forces on Japan as it engaged the global
marketplace. He favored the revitalization of regional industry and agriculture so that
Japan could be strengthened internally on both the economic and cultural levels, and so
be able to better withstand the impacts of foreign influences. However,
internationalization considers the economic and cultural impacts of a developing
country’s absorption into the global market on the international, not domestic level. But
Yanagita does not consider the issue of the impacts of Japan’s external economic
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relations on the international level, so the concept of internationalization is not very
relevant here.
Technology Issues. What are the most important technology-related ideas and
phenomena associated with Yanagita’s worldview of external economic relations? The
most notable concept related to technology here is Yanagita, in general, opposes a heavy
emphasis on large-scale industries and technologies mainly geared for generating exports.
He acknowledges that some large-scale industries should be present, but for Japan, he
favors industries and technologies that are more human scale, suited for broad
distribution across the nation.
What are the most significant economic factors present in the imported
technologies and related ideas in the worldview studied here?1636 In his emphasis on
regional, human scale industries, Yanagita also places more emphasis on Japan’s
domestic market, rather than on international trade. While Japanese government policy in
the early twentieth century favored heavy industries geared for exports, Yanagita takes
the opposite track. If Japan does care for its own house first, the house may collapse. Yet
the government’s policy on heavy promotion of exports, coupled with fierce competition
within Japan’s domestic market, is the basic policy that finally prevailed through the
postwar period. Did the international system affect these technologies/issues positively or
negatively? Why? There is no evidence here that international forces influenced
Yanagita’s views of external economic relations, though he was surely aware of the
major economic theories through his training in agro-politics in college.
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What were the important ideas/technologies transferred in this worldview?
Among the most important ideas in Yanagita’s worldview are that economic activities
should fit the scale of life and level of the people whom it affects, and that they should be
broadly distributed (geographically) across a society, not just centered in one or a few
locales. He also believed that though international trade had reached unprecedented
levels, that the national interests of various nation-states still drove the system, and that
production, in Japan’s case, should focus on primary products, such as agricultural ones. I
have no idea what the sources for these economic ideas are, whether they are Japanese or
foreign. The main international actors in the external environment, and domestic actors,
individual or state, involved here included foreign governments and their trade and
economics-related ministries, trading companies, international firms, zaibatsu, the
Japanese government and its economic ministries. Their impacts on the transfer outcomes
here were important, especially in the case of the Japanese government. The
government’s policies on economics and trade directly affected what Japan’s economy
did on the international level. It is interesting that the Japanese government’s concerns for
protecting regional and rural economies took off in the 1960s and 1970s, in an era of
extremely rapid urbanization. It seems that Yanagita’s economic vision, while not
embraced in the prewar period, may have been somewhat prophetic.
What are the most significant cultural factors and values present in the imported
technologies and ideas in this worldview?1637 The most significant cultural idea here,
imported or not, is that economics must be human scale, and sensitive to human needs. It
must not engulf ways of life in local areas, but strengthen and complement them. Another
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cultural value is that it is moral for the state to intervene in the economy for the common
good. Yanagita does not trust in the automatic good or morality of the marketplace. There
is no evidence here that Yanagita used these technologies/ideas as means or agencies to
cope with and transform Japan’s (material) environments on the international level.
Rather, his concern was for Japan’s survival on the domestic level. He assumes that if
Japan prospers on the domestic level, that its international prosperity, or survival at a
minimum, will follow. His first concern is for Japan’s mere cultural survival (economic
survival is seen as a means for achieving that end). Did these technology-related ideas
affect or enhance Japan’s survival in the international system or environment? Since
Yanagita’s cultural ideas here found no application in the prewar system, they had no
opportunity to enhance its survival on the international level. It is interesting to
contemplate what they might have done if they had had the chance.
Does Yanagita’s belief system here, on technology issues on the international
level, blind him to certain realities? Yanagita seems convinced that Japan’s priorities
must be on building its economy and technologies for the human scale. What did he
believe about technology on the international level? He likely would have argued that
although the economy (and presumably technologies, too) is now internationally driven,
individual developing nations, such as Japan, must not allow themselves to be engulfed
or coerced by international forces to determine what their economies and technologies
do. Rather, these decisions and policies should be determined by each nation, by each
one’s own peoples and government, according to the unique conditions and situation of
each. If this was Yanagita’s conviction, did it blind him to certain realities? Yanagita was
certainly aware of international realities, but he was biased toward the domestic level.
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Does Yanagita fail to adjust his viewpoints to changing conditions and reality? Perhaps
he does. While he argued against the Japanese government’s policies, that it was too
biased toward heavy industry and exports, he was biased toward the domestic side. It
seems that a balanced policy, integrating both extremes, might have been more advisable.
In this worldview of external economic relations, is the concept of
technonationalism as ideology manifested? Technonationalism as ideology is not central
to Yanagita’s thought. Rather, the idea of “cultural nationalism as ideology” can be called
one of its central emphases. Yanagita is not concerned about economics as the most
important aspect of Japan’s survival. Japanese must not lose their sense of self, who they
are. If they do, all the money in the world will not matter. To Yanagita, economics is a
by-product of culture, but not the item of most fundamental concern.
Cognition Issues. Image. Most of the images of Japan’s external economic
relations are Yanagita’s, and fall into three groups: images of international economics, of
Japan’s economy within the international economic system, and of Japan’s trade and
international economic policies. In Yanagita’s images of international economics, we see
a stress on the irony that although the age of international economics has truly begun as
of the late 1920s, nations will still act primarily in their own national economic selfinterests. Perhaps because of this, stronger nations will continue to devour weaker ones in
the global marketplace. Regarding images of Japan’s place in the international economy,
Yanagita sees Japan as a developing country, and expresses concern that overdependence on exporting manufactured goods, rather than primary products such as
agriculture, will make Japan vulnerable. Yanagita’s images of Japan’s trade and
international economic policies show disagreement with most Japanese government
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policies. Yanagita disagrees with the emphases of these policies on heavy industries,
commerce, and exports of manufactured goods, and argues that there should be more
emphasis on agriculture. His images also reveal his support for national economic
planning, some protection of the Japanese market, emphasis on domestic reforms and
issues first, and opposition to unfettered economic liberalism [by implication, free trade].
How might these images have served as perceptual filters or organizing
devices? On the international economy, these leaders failed to see where there were any
opportunities for economic cooperation, or cases where positive trade with other nations
would result in greater growth and prosperity for Japan and others. On the Japanese
economy in the international economic system, perhaps it would have been best to
include a balance of industry, commerce and agriculture, not one more than the other.
Both Yanagita and the government had differing views of this subject. Regarding Japan’s
trade and international economic policies, Yanagita’s emphasis on mainly agriculture
might have depleted Japan’s food resources, and left it vulnerable to boycotts from other
nations such as the United States. What difference would seeking a policy of balanced
trade, with some free trade and some sectors with limits have made? What if the
government had been encouraged to consider trade’s impacts on local areas?
Worldview. In the worldview framework that emerges from the above images,
concerning the nature of the world, the world is affected by fierce econ competition. A
developing country like Japan would do better to depend more on primary products, not
manufactured ones. Concerning how the world works, though the world is now an
international economic system, nations still act in their own international economic
interests. The economically stronger nations devour weaker ones. Free trade is not good;
615

LDCs need more protectionism, not less. More state intervention in the economies of
LDCs would probably be positive. On the world’s order, in these worldviews, the world
is truly an international economic system for the first time, but in practicality, national
economic interests still largely drive the system.
Concerning views of the self (Japan and the self’s actions, beliefs, and roles),
Japan is still seen as an LDC. If it depends on exporting manufactured goods too much, it
will be vulnerable to what other nations want to do. The Japanese government’s
economic policies are wrong. They overemphasize heavy industries, exports, and
commerce. There should more emphasis on exporting agriculture. More state intervention
in Japan’s economy would also be good. On views of the non-self (non-Japanese
nations), nations that are stronger than Japan or other Asian nations (namely, the West)
will devour Japan and Asia economically if given the chance. Therefore they cannot and
should not be totally trusted in the economic system. Japan and similar nations need some
level of protectionism and strong state economic intervention to prevent being devoured.
What were the relevant environment(s) surrounding these leaders and these
worldviews? How have these environments interacted with and/or affected the leaders’
worldviews? The international trading system, dominated by Western countries, was also
a highly aggressive environment. Countries, even large ones, that could not organize
themselves would be invaded, economically dominated and perhaps colonized by the
West.
How did these worldviews and their associated environmental interaction
influence the leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, and understanding of events and
their causes? Regarding perception, harsh economic environment and evolution616

influenced economic views made Yanagita oppose free trade and liberal economic
policies. If “weak” Japan was too open, it would simply be devoured. Yanagita preferred
more state intervention to protect Japan’s agriculture and domestic economy, since he
generally was more concerned about domestic issues, and feared that too open an
economic environment would destroy the heart of Japan, the rural economy, agriculture
and its culture. Foreign nations did not care about rural Japan’s culture, and nor did
Japan’s government. On information use, Yanagita’s views on international economics
were limited, since he was greatly concerned about there domestic economy. Therefore
my data on this section, based on only Yanagita, is short. On understanding of events and
their causes Yanagita believed that the unlimited international market was driven by
greed and lack of concern for an individual country’s needs or cultures. Therefore these
countries must protect themselves. It also seems that evolutionary thought affected his
basic thoughts on the international economy.
How did technological systems affect these worldviews on the international
economy? Yanagita saw large, heavy industries, a major emphasis of Japan’s trade
policies, as totally disconnected with the cultural realities of Japan, and what needed to be
done to protect it. Therefore he opposed many basic aspects of Japan’s trade and
economic policies.
Cultural Logics. In their worldviews, the global phenomena to which these
leaders responded the Western trading system, the global economic system dominated by
the West, commodities traded with other countries, the global monetary system, foreign
investments in Japan, Japanese investments overseas and in the colonies, foreign
technologies, foreign governments and the Japanese government, their economic and
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trade policies and economic-related ministries, international companies and players from
overseas and Japan, Western economic knowledge, modern business practices and
technologies, theories of international trade, industrialization, evolutionism, imperialism,
colonialism, governmental trade and economic policies, thought about business, industry,
production, factories, management, labor, Western theories of economics and business,
theories of economic growth, wealth and prosperity, commodities traded with Japan’s
colonies.
What were the leaders’ worldviews and basic beliefs about these phenomena?
Yanagita believed that the Japanese economy should be domestically focused, especially
on agriculture and the production of primary products. The export of mainly
manufactured goods was unhealthy. Strong state intervention in the market and in trade
was needed by the state in the face of intense economic competition between nations still
acting in their self-interests. Some protectionism was needed; totally free trade was ill
advised for a developing country like Japan. If free trade prevailed, Japan would be
devoured.
What were the cultural logics under the worldviews about these global
phenomena? They see economics as one of the most powerful forces in the world. It
could destroy vulnerable countries. A state must intervene in the affairs of a country and
their people, to protect them from economic or cultural exploitation from other countries.
If Japan’s government did not take decisive action to protect Japan, Japan could be
controlled or destroyed by other countries’ economies.
What were Yanagita’s responses to these global phenomena? He reflected
deeply about a broad range of issues that he observed affecting Japan, one of which was
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its economic interactions and trade with foreign countries. His main area of concern was
protecting the heart of Japan’s indigenous culture and identity, found in rural Japan. He
saw that Japan’s trade with foreign countries could overwhelm the country economically,
and that unguided importation of too many products would damage Japan’s culture. He
desires that Japan’s government consider and take decisive action regarding its foreign
trade, as he argues in the writings studied here.
What were the cultural logics under these responses? An uncontrolled flood of
foreign money and influence could overwhelm the culture of a weaker nation. Japan’s
culture and economy were in a weaker state than those of the Western countries. Japan
had a valuable culture and country, and they had the right to exist. A weaker country and
its government must take defensive steps to protect the country. If they did not, they
might lose.
What do we learn by comparing the cultural logics of the worldviews about the
global phenomena with the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to the
phenomena? In both cases the logics stressed the weaker state of Japan’s economy and
culture. Without intervention by the state, either one or both might be destroyed or
controlled by foreign forces.
Globalization Issues. Again, to assess globalization issues connected with
Yanagita’s worldviews of Japan’s external economic relations (1895-1945), the first
question I will ask is, how do these worldviews reflect and/or affect processes of
globalization (intensified or speeded up flows of ideas, peoples, money, media, or
technology)? And how does globalization affect the worldviews? Yanagita’s views here
focus on the effects of Western economic globalization on Japan’s indigenous culture.
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Large-scale industries and the massive import of Western products into rural Japan
threatened to engulf local ways of life.
Regarding how globalization affected Yanagita’s worldviews here, while he
saw Western globalization, in the form of the cultural effects of the reach of Western
trade and its economic products, as a huge threat to Japan’s indigenous culture and
identity, he expresses no direct concern about how Japanese global influences would
affect the cultures of other regions in Asia. Given his sensitivities, while he expressed a
desire for Japan to offer positive guidance for other Asian countries, likely he would not
have wanted Japan to impose its ways on them. I do not see evidence that Yanagita’s
culturally sensitive insights had much impact on the actions of the Japanese government
toward other Asian regions.
If we consider these economic processes as people experienced them, on micro(personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? As Yanagita observed
and studied the impacts of Western economic globalization on rural Japan, he became
concerned about the disappearance of its culture. His ethnographic observations were
made on the local, micro level, though over the years, he studied several locations across
Japan. His conclusions are made on the basis of observations and interviews with
multiple actors in several locations across several regions in Japan. So these are microlevel observations of the local impacts of macro-level, global, economic phenomena.
Do these important global processes represent a form of Japanese or nonWestern globalization? If yes, what is their significance? Yanagita’s observations here
focus on the impacts of Western globalization on a non-Western region (Japan). They do
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not examine Japanese or another form of non-Western globalization affecting another
region.
Worldviews on Japan’s External Cultural Relations
Hirohito, Emperor. In Hirohito’s youth and early adulthood, the Taisho
democracy movement (influential from about 1905 to 1932) heavily influenced Japan’s
political life and culture.1638 Regarding culture, according to Bix, Taisho democracy
includes “…the transmission to Japan of American [and other Western] cultural and
political products, lifestyles, and such ideologies as individualism.” It also challenged
the assumption of Meiji Japan that the government, rather than the individual, should be
the main factor in regulating correct morality.1639 As noted above, the values of Meiji
Japan heavily influenced the education and worldviews of Hirohito in many areas, likely
contributing to his resistance to Western democratic values before World War II.
In 1928, connected with enthronement events, a theme emerged in the Japanese
press that Japan was about to begin a new global mission as the center of world culture,
sharing superior values of peace, filial piety and loyalty with the world. This thought
emerged as a variant of the ideology of hakkô ichiu.1640 Hakkô ichiu revived about 1928
in support of Hirohito’s reign, contributing new energy to Japanese nationalism.1641
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Taisho democracy movement refers to public efforts, often by politicians, journalists, and leading
thinkers, to press for a more democratic political system, based on political party action in the Diet, rather
than political cliques outside it, universal male suffrage, and cabinet governments led by the strongest
political party’s chief (Bix, Hirohito). See Japan, “Taisho Democracy Movement,” 1500-1501).
1639
Bix, Hirohito, 41.
1640
This 1928 version of hakkô ichiu, “eight corners of the world under one roof,” was related to the
concept of hakkô ichiu in Tokugawa era writings that eventually each nation would recognize its proper
place in the world hierarchy of nations, and follow the leadership of Japan in bringing world peace. In the
1850s and 1860s the concept re-emerged with the argument that Japan’s emperor should always be a
dynamic leader who furthers the cause of enlightenment and civilization (Bix, Hirohito).
1641
Ibid., 200-201.
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In 1933 and 1934, the military began producing propaganda films and books to
mobilize the public for war. Some of them attempted to make the Japanese reject
decadent Western culture, evoking images of the honor of sacrifice, Shinto worship,
patriotic images of emperor and shrine worship, and village life. These films connected
emperor and military ideologies by suggesting that through imperialism, the military
embodied “national virtue” and the “sacred spirit” of Hirohito. “Spiritual mobilization”
would allow Japan to break the “iron ring” of foreign powers starting to surround it.1642
Yanagita Kunio. Yanagita Kunio argued that only by helping the peoples of
Japan’s different regions to strengthen their cultural identities and autonomy would they
be able to pick what was beneficial from the onslaught of Western culture. Unless they
understood their own indigenous cultures at the grassroots, they could not defend
them.1643 Without understanding how modernization1644 interacted with Japan’s existing
cultural values, its imposition on top of Japanese culture would be disastrous.1645 The
source of confusion in Japan, seen in crises in the rural economy and urban morality, was
the failure of the government to examine the effects of imported Western culture on
indigenous lifestyles. This blindness of policymakers resulted from policies focused on
short-term economic gains and losses.1646 Unless the Japanese re-examined their lives
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Ibid., 273-278. One book issued by the army, Hijôji kokumin zenshû (Essays on the Time of Emergency
confronting the Nation) (1934), argued for government control and mobilization of all areas of the
economy, politics, and society for war (Ibid., 277).
1643
Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 66. Yanagita felt this understanding was necessary at several levels,
including those of the government and of the citizens themselves (Ibid., 76).
1644
Note that this is the conventional, Western meaning of modernization, not the Japanese version that I
list in quotation marks.
1645
Ibid., 77.
1646
Ibid., 75.
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and indigenous values, adequate policies for international politics and economics would
be impossible.1647
Comparison of Leaders’ Worldviews About Japan’s External Cultural Relations
(1895-1945)
In brief, there are four main themes that emerge here regarding Japan’s external
cultural relations in this period: 1) views of the clash of Japanese culture with Western
culture, and how to protect the former, 2) views of Western cultural influences in Japan,
3) views of the place of Japan in international culture, and 4) images of Western culture
in comparison with Japanese culture. Regarding the clash of Japanese and Western
cultures, Yanagita stressed these major factors: 1) Japanese must understand their own
cultures and ways of life at the public, private and personal levels in order to effectively
protect them during the onslaught of Western culture and values. 2) This cultural
understanding must be encouraged in local and regional areas across Japan, to protect
each area’s cultural autonomy and identity. 3) The Japanese government needed to be
involved in the process of studying and protecting Japanese culture, but unfortunately its
policy emphases on short-term economic gain blinded it to this reality.1648 4) Without
effective cultural self-awareness, not only will Japanese not be able to protect their own
culture, their policies in international politics and economics will be handicapped.
Concerning views of Western cultural influence, we noted above how Hirohito
was heavily influenced in his personal values by the cultural values of Meiji Japan and
1647

Ibid., 107. The use of ethnography to develop this sense of self-understanding is implied here, as well
as the need for long-term historical perspective and reflection (Ibid., 77).
1648
Eventually the Japanese government seemed to catch on to Yanagita’s point here. The government has
had, for some decades in the postwar period, extensive programs to recognize, protect and nurture rare
cultural treasures and knowledge in danger of disappearing. One example is the government’s policy of
recognizing “living national treasures,” people who have knowledge of rare and unique cultural practices
and arts that few others possess.
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the Emperor Meiji, which were heavily stressed in his education. His highly conservative
education discouraged the liberal type of Western democratic values that the Taisho
democracy movement promoted: individualism, personal choice in morality, democracy,
and Western, particularly American, cultural products and values. Hirohito was generally
very conservative in both his political and cultural values. It is likely that in the pre-1945
period, he also distrusted the kinds of liberal values that the Taisho democracy movement
promoted.
On views regarding the place of Japan’s culture in international culture, in the
late 1920s, Hirohito supported, to some degree, the thinking of the hakkô ichiu ideology,
that Japan would now help bring world peace, culture, and virtuous Confucian values to
the world, especially to Asia. His strict thought about the proper place of Japanese
colonies in the hierarchy of nations also shows he supported hakkô ichiu.1649
On images of Western culture compared with Japanese culture, in the late
1930s, how much did Hirohito support government propaganda showing Japanese
virtuous images of Shinto, farm life, emperor worship, and the decadence of Western
culture? Remember that as a child, he was trained in the same basic ideas of nationalism,
State Shinto and emperor ideology as his subjects. This propaganda also showed the
virtuous Japanese spirit breaking the “iron ring” of foreign nations trying to surround and
strangle Japan. While we cannot be absolutely certain of Hirohito’s beliefs about
Western culture, he zealously participated in Shinto rituals, and accepted the ideas of the
“iron ring” and Western threats against Japan in his foreign policy decisions and actions
through 1945. He was also likely wary of Western culture to some degree.
1649

On this point, see my discussion later in this chapter on Hirohito’s views of Japanese imperialism.
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Yanagita was more progressive in his beliefs, especially on politics, while
Hirohito was highly conservative. Like Yanagita, Hirohito also disliked Western cultural
values, but for different reasons. Yanagita was concerned about Japan’s cultural integrity
from the bottom up. Hirohito was most concerned about protecting Japan from the top
down, i.e. from potential military invaders. In the ideology of hakkô ichiu, Hirohito also
displays a top down view of the place of Japanese culture in the world. Yanagita is most
concerned about protecting the integrity of Japan’s own culture and identity amidst the
cultural onslaught of Western values flooding into Japan: Japanese culture must hold its
own in the midst of world cultures. Like Yanagita, Hirohito seems wary of Western
cultural influences in Japan, and also accepted that the government had a role in
protecting Japan’s culture. In sum, Yanagita had a much more populist, grassroots
concern for Japanese culture, while Hirohito had more top-down, elitist perspectives.
Both felt the government had a role in protecting Japan’s cultural and political integrity
against the West.
Conceptual Analysis of Leaders’ Worldviews About Japan’s External Cultural
Relations (1895-1945)
Development Issues. In applying the concept of internationalization to these
worldviews of Japan’s external cultural relations (1895-1945), we see that Yanagita and
Hirohito mainly had a concern for what international forces might do to Japan’s domestic
culture, which is not the concern of internationalization, which mainly focuses on what
happens to developing countries on the international level. Internationalization is relevant
if we note the ideology of hakkô ichiu, the idea that Japan would become a beacon of
peace and Confucian civilization for the world, including East Asia. In the pre-World
625

War II international community, Japan never had such an influence in East Asia or
globally. It is beyond the scope of this brief section to investigate the impacts of Japan’s
external cultural relations with other nations in this period, but it is safe to say that its
deepest impacts were likely upon the regions it ruled as colonies, especially Korea and
Taiwan. Were these impacts those symbolized by the hakkô ichiu ideology? While Japan
laid very valuable economic and infrastructural foundations in Korea and Taiwan, its
cultural exports were deeply resented and resisted, especially in Korea.1650 From this brief
examination, it seems the ideals of hakkô ichiu were not effectively shared during
Japanese colonialism in this period. The concept of internationalization applies in only a
limited fashion for these worldviews of Japan’s external cultural relations.
Technology Issues. What are the most important technology-related ideas and
phenomena associated with the worldviews of Japan’s external cultural relations studied
here? As noted in the discussion of technology and culture in the Glossary, technology
includes cultural values, even intrinsically.1651 Technology is influenced by the social
structures and cultural values of the societies where it is created, by the structures and
values of the societies that export it, and those of the societies that receive it. Technology
also affects the structures and values of receiving societies.1652 In addition, technology
that is transferred across cultural or international boundaries is deeply affected by the
structures and cultures of both the sending and receiving organizations.1653 Obviously,
cross-cultural technology transfer is a very complex process.
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For example, in Korea, children were required to learn Japanese in school.
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Yanagita reflected deeply on the effects of the transfer of Western technology
and cultural products, mediated by urban Japanese environments, where they were
usually first received, on the life and social structures of rural Japan. He was disturbed by
what he observed through his ethnographic research, and spent much effort trying to
devise practical solutions to relieve what he believed were very devastating impacts.
Hirohito and the Japanese government observed what the impacts of Western culture and
technology on Japan were at a much more general, less grounded level. As reflected in
propaganda films of the late 1930s (already noted), the government argued that Western
values were corrupting the discipline and sincere cultural/spiritual purity of Japanese.
Through these propaganda tools, they hoped to alert Japanese to this danger, and
encourage them to return to “purer” “Japanese” ways, such as filial piety and emperor
worship. These films were also designed to raise patriotic, nationalistic pride.
What are the most significant social factors present in the imported technologies
and related ideas in the worldviews studied here?1654 The imported cultural and
technological items and ideas in this period included a huge range of things, such as new
inventions (the radio, the automobile, telephones), consumer products and gadgets, art,
Western novels, films, and the “Western” values of individualism, personal freedoms,
and broader morality connected with the Taisho democracy movement. These inevitably
had massive effects across Japanese society. It is impossible to say in this brief
consideration whether the international system affected these technologies and issues
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positively or negatively.1655 But Yanagita, the conservative Japanese government of this
era, and likely Hirohito all viewed and interpreted these effects negatively, as they
surveyed their impacts on Japan’s domestic scene. They did not consider what effects
Japanese imperialism or cultural influences might be having on the rest of East Asia and
the Pacific. As reflected in the hakkô ichiu ideology, it seems that the government and
Hirohito wanted to believe that Japan’s cultural influence across the region was positive.
What were the important ideas/technologies transferred here, in the worldviews
under consideration? We noted in them in the paragraph immediately preceding this one.
They include various items drawn from international science, business, the arts, and
cultural ideas and values. Who were the main international actors in the external
environment, or domestic actors, individual or state, involved, and hat impacts did they
have on the transfer outcomes? Individual entrepreneurs, world travelers, artists, writers,
intellectuals, teachers, and scholars, some foreign and many Japanese, and international
firms and trading companies were among the chief actors driving these exchanges, but
the Japanese government and its relevant ministries and agencies also played a role.
While it is impossible for governments in relatively open societies to dictate or control
the cultural directions its citizens take, certainly government policies have some effect.
The more open atmosphere in the Taisho period (1912-1926) generally allowed a more
open embrace of foreign and Western influences. The restrictive, ultraconservative
policies of Japan’s militaristic government in the 1930s and 1940s also narrowed the
flow. What lessons or chances for improvement do we learn here? It would have been
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good if the governments of the late 1920s through 1945 had been more constructive,
intentional, and intentionally listened to the critiques of leaders like Yanagita, without the
outright censorship and propaganda it did, but this was not the case.
What are the most significant cultural factors and values present in the imported
technologies and ideas in these worldviews?1656 The most important cultural items and
values in these worldviews included more cosmopolitan, international values connected
to science, communication, increased mobility, comfort, convenience, and individual
tastes, preferences, and freedoms. In these worldviews, how did the leaders concerned
use these technologies/ideas as means or agencies to cope with and transform Japan’s
(material) environments on the international level, if at all? While Yanagita was not
involved in seeking to transform Japan’s international environment in the cultural sense,
the Japanese government used Hirohito and his carefully cultivated image to shore up
support for the Japanese state, both in Japan and in the overseas colonies. Ironically, in
the 1930s and 1940s, the state attempted to use fear of these Western values to encourage
support for “Japanese” values, as evidenced in the propaganda films already noted. How
did these technological issues affect or enhance Japan’s survival in the international
system or environment? I see very little connection between what the Japanese militarist
state and Hirohito did here, and what happened on the international level. The military
actions of Japan in World War II cost it whatever goodwill and cultural capital it
possessed before the war.
Do the belief systems of these leaders (on technology issues on the international
level) blind them to certain realities? If yes, which, and how? Yanagita’s beliefs about
1656
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Western culture and technology were highly oriented toward “traditional” and
“indigenous” items in Japanese culture on the domestic, rural level from what he believed
were the highly negative effects of the former on the latter. But there is no evidence in his
beliefs of what positive effects of Western culture and technology might be. I will
mention just two from the postwar period: increased mechanization of Japanese
agriculture in the postwar period greatly raised its productivity, and land reforms induced
by the American occupation also aided the numerous tenant farmers for whom Yanagita
expressed much concern. Hirohito encouraged the use of military technologies (many
originally imported) for use in spreading Japanese influence, trade and imperialism in the
1930s and 1940s. His own nationalistic and spiritual biases blinded him to the negative
impacts of these efforts and the terrible damage inflicted on China and additional regions.
The costs for Japanese international relations and foreign policy are still felt today. Did
the leaders fail to adjust their viewpoints to changing conditions and reality? As noted
earlier, the biases and blindness of Hirohito on the effects of various technological
phenomena on the world around him (i.e. Japanese attacks on millions of civilians in
China, and American bombing of cities across Japan) led to very costly suffering and the
difficult surrender of Japan at the end of World War II. On a sixth issue,
technonationalism as ideology, neither Yanagita nor Hirohito manifested a strong
concern or awareness for the ideology in their worldviews of external cultural relations
here.
Cognition Issues. Image. There are six main groups into which we can organize
these leaders’ images of Japan’s external cultural relations (1895 to 1945). In the first,
images of Japanese culture compared with other cultures, Hirohito implicitly stresses the
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honor of Japanese culture, its values of sacrifice and others, seen in the ideas and
practices found in emperor worship, State Shinto, nationalist and imperialist ideologies.
In his images, Yanagita stresses that Western culture will destroy Japanese culture unless
Japanese know themselves, their culture, and strengthen their own cultural autonomy. In
the second group of images, on Western culture, both Yanagita and Hirohito show fear
and concern over the impacts of Western culture as it enters Japan. It is likely that
Hirohito viewed Western culture as decadent and that he resisted American cultural
values such as individualism.1657 Yanagita fears that Western culture flooding into Japan
may destroy Japan’s culture if Japanese do not grow in cultural self-awareness and
independence. A third group of images concern cultural values associated with
democratic ideas (the Taisho democracy movement in particular).1658 It seems likely that
Hirohito personally resisted these and similar values. In the fourth group of images, those
of Japanese cultural interaction with other cultures, we have already noted Yanagita’s
concern about the impacts of Western culture flooding into Japan. His images also reflect
awareness of the need for careful reflection, study and understanding of these issues, by
Japanese and the government.1659 Without these efforts, their culture will be destroyed.
The fifth group of images focuses on images of the Japanese government’s policies on
cultural issues. Yanagita laments the government’s general lack of input on a coherent
1657

I say that it is likely because many of Hirohito’s views must be determined indirectly by contextual
clues, diaries by court officials, and from reports of his actual behavior, the general methods Bix used in
Bix, Hirohito. This is because the Imperial Household Agency in Japan maintains a very tight grip on the
image, writings and possessions of Hirohito and of other members of the imperial family.
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cultural values associated with American culture, in particular.
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Yanagita’s images suggest that understanding is needed of the effect of modernization on Japanese
culture, and understanding of Japanese culture and identity themselves. Yanagita is further concerned that
Japan’s government is not studying these issues, which he sees as a major source of social and moral
confusion.
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policy or study of the effect of imported Western cultural products on indigenous
Japanese culture and values. In Yanagita’s images, ignorance on these issues, partly due
to a focus on short-term economic gain by policymakers, and lack of reflection and
knowledge by Japanese themselves, threatens all of Japan’s other international policies.
And sixth, on images of the place of Japan in world culture, evidence suggests that
Hirohito supported the images of the hakkô ichiu ideology, that Japan would become a
center of world culture, and share noble values of loyalty, peace, and devotion to family
and parents with the world. His enthronement in 1928 was steeped in these images.
According to Yanagita’s images, unless Japanese understood their own culture at the
grassroots, they could not protect it in its relations with other world societies.
How did these images serve as perceptual organizing devices or filters?
Regarding Japan compared with other cultures, Hirohito was blind to Japan’s weaknesses
of culture and character, and about what Japan could continue to learn from overseas.
Yanagita failed to see good aspects of Western culture, and presumed that Japan must
totally be on the cultural defensive. He also seemed blind to external issues, with his
nearly total focus on the domestic level. For example, he failed to consider what was
valuable for Japan to import from the West. What cultural products should Japan export,
and what might it gain? On Western culture, both Yanagita and Hirohito missed the good
things that Western culture had done and was doing in Japan. What positive Western
values fit Japan well? How could Japan build on and improve those (i.e. Western
education, technologies, hospitals, health care, democracy, and human rights), as it had
“improved” Chinese culture over the centuries? On culture and democracy, Hirohito
failed to see how empowering the people could empower both the nation and its cultures.
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Postwar Japan has learned this. Yanagita did not have this problem, but supported
popular democratic and workers’ rights. On Japan’s interaction with other cultures, these
images show that these leaders misunderstood, on some levels, the benefit of interaction
with Western culture, how Japan could grow, improve, and improve Western cultural
items. This was seen very clearly in the postwar Japanese experience. I agree with
Yanagita’s basic argument on Japan’s policy on culture, but I believe that the main thing
that destroyed Japanese culture at this time was not ignorance of Western culture’s
effects on Japan, but the government’s twisted policies of manipulating State Shinto,
patriotism and other nationalistic values. This caused Japan to invade other countries, and
destroy most of its infrastructure in World War II. That literally nearly destroyed the
country, and subjected it to defeat and foreign invasion. How fortunate Japan was that the
United States invaded it, and not the Soviet Union.1660 On Japan’s place in world
cultures, consider briefly the place of Japan in Asia during this era. Did other East Asian
countries, including Japan’s colonies and the territories it invaded, desire the values that
Japan offered? In general, they did not, since imperialist invaders forced these values on
them. Japan, in reality, did not offer the noble values of hakkô ichiu in the various wars
and its imperialism. Rather it offered the foreign values1661 of State Shinto, the emperor
ideology, and other nationalistic ideologies, in a largely brutal and coercive manner. Yet
Yanagita’s basic viewpoint about the place of Japan in world culture was true. Without
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the Japanese achieving a better understanding of their self-identity, Japan’s culture faced
potential destruction.
Worldview. In the cognitive framework of worldviews that emerges from the
above, what is the view of the nature of the world? In this view, different countries have
different cultures. The cultures of stronger societies threaten those of weaker societies.
Though some societies like Japan are currently weaker, their cultures still have honor and
positive points. It is good if weaker countries with honorable cultures can protect and
preserve the good parts of their cultures. They should make efforts to do so. They can do
so by knowing and studying themselves, and taking time to honor their “traditions.” In
this cognitive framework, how does the world work? Implicit in even these worldviews is
a degree of evolutionary thought, in which the cultures of dominant, stronger societies
will flood and wipe out those of weaker societies. Here we also see a stress on economics
driving the world. The drive to survive, economically and otherwise, will make a country
or government forget what really matters, its heart, its deeply latent culture. If weaker
countries are not more careful and self-aware, they will lose the core of who they are. In
Hirohito and the state’s hakkô ichiu ideology, we see the wish that Japan will become a
virtuous center for world culture and peace. In the world’s order in this cognitive
framework, the economies and cultures of stronger nations control the world, and
dominate those of weaker countries. The economies and cultures of the West now
dominate those of Japan and other non-Western cultures.
Regarding views of the self (Japan and its actions, beliefs, and roles in the
world’s culture), even though is presently a weaker country economically, its culture has
huge importance and honor in its values of sacrifice, duty, and love of nature and family.
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Its culture is worth saving and protecting from the onslaught of Western values. Japanese
must know themselves, and the government must make efforts to help save Japan’s
culture.
On the views of non-self (others) in this cognitive framework, Western
countries are stronger than Japan. Their cultural values are flooding into Japan and other
non-Western countries. Western culture and values do not fit them. Western culture
seems decadent, individualistic, selfish, and inferior to Japan’s.
What were the relevant environment(s) surrounding the leaders who held these
worldviews? How did these environments interact with or affect the leaders’ worldviews?
These views arose in a hostile international environment of harsh political and economic
international competition and trade. Accompanying these interactions was intense
cultural interchange of the cultural products and ideas of stronger societies flooding into
weaker societies like Japan. The West might engulf or greatly weaken Japan politically,
economically and culturally unless Japan was active and defended itself. In addition, we
must not forget the rural environment that surrounded Yanagita in his research, and the
isolated imperial environment in which Hirohito was immersed. These colored each
man’s views. Regarding environmental interactions, the “hostile” international
environment gave Yanagita and Hirohito’s views here a negative tone regarding potential
cultural impacts of the West on Japan. Part of this was due to the negative effects of
economic shocks in Japan in the 1920s and the 1930s, from the worldwide depression.
Each actor’s predominant environment in this era (Yanagita in rural Japan, and Hirohito
in the imperial court and government) influenced each one’s emphasis here (Yanagita on
the value of rural Japanese culture, and Hirohito on the virtue of “traditional” Japanese
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values, due to its unique nature and divine descent). Each actor here seems blind to
potential positive aspects of Japan’s interaction with the world, to provide much greater
wealth and comfort for more Japanese, which happened during the 1910s and the 1960s
to the 1990s.
How did these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions
influence these leaders’ perceptions, utilization of information and interpretation of
events and their causes? On perception, each actor had a mainly negative worldview
regarding the interaction of Western culture with Japanese culture in Japan, and wished to
defend the latter. They were concerned about Japan’s political and cultural survival.
Yanagita seemed more concerned than Hirohito. What Yanagita observed happening to
the cultures of rural Japan, as more Western and urban Japanese cultural influence came
in, greatly colored his thinking. Hirohito’s isolated imperial environment and his lack of
practical exposure to the West also colored his views and reactions. But in the postwar
period, in his interactions with General Douglas MacArthur and other important
American actors, with the aid of many of his top officials, he proved very adept at
surviving and transforming his image in the greatly transformed postwar cultural universe
(Bix 2000). In his uses of information, Yanagita used ethnographic information from his
personal research, and reflection based on his own research and readings, to form his
opinions. Hirohito received daily in-depth briefings of the best available information.
Each man’s environment (Yanagita, rural Japan and Hirohito, the imperial court) colored
sources of information and final interpretations of each. It seems it was more difficult for
Hirohito, because he could not humanly break out of his imperial cocoon. On events and
their causes, Yanagita was rather biased toward his views of rural Japan as the foundation
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of all Japanese culture and identity. Despite his perceptivity, he largely ignored the many
important events and influences in urban Japan. It seems impossible for Hirohito to have
escaped the intense training and cultural universe in which he lived, which was steeped in
imperial and nationalistic influences in the prewar period. If he had been of exceptional
intelligence or leadership ability, like Peter the Great or Abraham Lincoln, perhaps he
could have, but he was not.
How did technological systems affect these worldviews? The technological
major factors here were the increased manufacture and transport of urban and foreign
products into rural regions across the nation in the case of Yanagita). For Hirohito, it was
the increasing rise of heavy industry partly related to Japan’s military in the 1920s and
1930s, and partly connected to Japan’s imperialism.
What do we learn by comparing these worldviews? Yanagita emphasized
protecting rural Japanese culture from the flood of Western and urban cultural influences.
In contrast, Hirohito seemed to show concern about protecting his image of traditional
Japanese culture embodied in imperial and nationalistic ideologies of what Japan
supposedly was.
Cultural Logics. Under these worldviews on Japan’s external cultural relations
(1895 to 1945), the global phenomena to which these leaders responded included
Western cultural influences entering Japan, such as ideas from politics, science, literature,
and the arts, including movies, science, technology, new products, materials, books,
information, and from people, including Western diplomats, teachers, and others coming
to Japan. What are these leaders’ worldviews and basic beliefs about these phenomena?
In their mind, Western culture and values were not suitable for Japan, and did not fit its
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culture and identity. Western culture was highly individualistic and selfish. Japanese
culture, as defined by the state, or as indigenously practiced by the people, was worth
saving. Japanese moral character was superior to Western values, which were decadent
and selfish. Japanese must critically assess their indigenous culture and identity, and the
government had the duty to help them in this. If Japanese did not know who they were,
they could not protect themselves from the flood of Western culture, and their culture
would be lost.
What were the cultural logics under the worldviews about these global
phenomena? Western culture did not fit Japan. Japan’s culture and identity should be
saved, since they had value. The state was a strong actor, and could help in this task. It
seemed that Western culture might overwhelm Japanese culture. There is no assumption
that the two cultures could mix, and a new one result, only that the old Japanese culture
might be destroyed.
What were the leaders’ responses to these global phenomena? Hirohito
supported the state’s cultural campaign of nationalistic and spiritual ideologies, such as
State Shinto and hakkô ichiu, from the late 1920s to 1945. To warn Japan about the
dangers of losing its identity and heritage it faced if it did not take careful, critical action,
Yanagita researched rural Japanese culture extensively and wrote much about it.
What were the cultural logics under these responses? For Hirohito, the
assumptions were likely that the state-defined culture of Japanese identity and spirituality
was who Japanese really were. For Yanagita, Western values were not true Japanese
identity. Western values were often negative, and did not fit Japan. Western values and
culture were aggressive, appealing, and might seductively destroy Japan’s real culture
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and identity if allowed to enter unchecked. Japan’s state was strong, and positive action
by the state in the affairs of the nation, such as culture, would normally help the situation.
In comparing the cultural logics of the worldviews about the global phenomena,
and the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to the phenomena, in the
former logics, there is an emphasis on what will happen to Japanese culture as it and
Western culture interact. In the second set of logics, there is more of an emphasis on what
both Japanese and Western culture and values actually were. In both cases, strong action
by the state was desired, to prevent a negative outcome.
Globalization Issues. How do the most important worldviews here reflect
and/or affect processes of cultural globalization (intensified or speeded up flows of ideas,
peoples, money, media, or technology)? How does globalization affect these worldviews?
Western globalization affected Yanagita’s worldviews to a great degree. His worldviews
here reflect concerns over the long-term impact of Western culture on Japan’s regional,
indigenous cultures. His perception of the intensification of Western globalization’s
impacts, and their long-term effects, based on his own ethnographic research in rural
Japan, is what has spurred his concerns. His concern also reflects the impacts of Western
culture mediated through the urban gateways of Japan, where usually the Western
cultural products first enter Japan and are then distributed across the nation. The spread
of newspapers and radio also contributes to these effects. Hirohito also mediated certain
cultural values, of official nationalism, State Shinto, and the imperial throne, to the
nation. His actions show support for these official ideologies that opposed Western
cultural influences and values, sought to minimize their influence, and to maximize the
impact of official ideologies. What was the actual impact of these ideologies on the daily
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lives of persons in rural Japan? Perhaps it was not that much.1662 But the overall costs,
revealed in the loss of lives and Japan’s defeat in the war, were huge.
If we consider these global processes as people experienced them, on micro(personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? Yanagita’s
ethnographic study of the effects of Western globalization on rural Japanese culture
spurred many of his writings, and they are well known and respected in Japan, even
today. What kind of policy impacts did they have? Their policy impact through 1945
seems to have been minimal. On the other hand, the macro-level impact of Hirohito’s
worldviews here was much larger, since his views reflected the official policies of the
state, and he was the most influential political actor in the nation in prewar twentieth
century Japan. The social costs of the state’s nationalistic policies during World War II,
reflected in millions of deaths and the defeat of the nation, were tremendous.
Do these important global processes represent a form of Japanese or nonWestern globalization? If yes, what is their significance? Over the fifty years of this
period, the impact of Western cultural forces on Japan was certainly great. Huge changes
in Japan’s economy, industrialization and urban-rural balance could not help but result
from its increasing engagement in the global economy, in several wars, and greater
connections with the outside world. The whole period seems, overall, to represent a
conservative counter-reaction to Western cultural influences, contrary to their generally
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John Dower notes this in his Embracing Defeat, which investigates the overall cultural conditions of
Japan during its early postwar recovery in the American occupation period, 1945 to 1952. He mentions the
research of a social scientist who found that in prewar Japan, few villagers studied manifested much impact
from emperor ideology in their daily lives (John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of
World War II (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1999).
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enthusiastic reception from 1850 to 1895.1663 Also in this period, we see the initial spread
of Japanese cultural globalization through its empire and increased global connections.
Worldviews on Japan’s External Relations: Imperialism
Kato Hiroyuki. According to Kato Hiroyuki, imperialism and colonialism are
related to evolutionary progress. If the imperialist European powers had not ventured
overseas, they would have progressed less, and colonial regions benefited less. Even
slavery is a form of progress.1664 International law is unsuccessful since the Europeans
use their power to exploit, destroy and colonize weaker peoples.1665 Yet while Kato
observed the nationalism and imperialism of the western “Christian” nations, because of
progress, he could not totally condemn them. As the strongest, they had a right to control
the world. But he found Western imperialism to be hypocritical, against Christianity.
Yet Kato remained almost silent about Japanese imperialism, arguing that parts of the
empire, such as Korea, Taiwan and Mongolia, were merely satellites of Japan.
“Patriarchal sovereignty”1666 and Japan would always remain the center of the empire,
and the imperial family would always be the “quintessence” of the race. According to
evolution, the ruler will always be the Denkcentrum (thought-center) or tôchi kikan
(Denkorgan—controlling organ) of the state [and empire].1667

1663

This is despite the brief period of Western influence in the Taisho democracy movement from about
1912 through the late 1920s.
1664
Davis, Moral and Political, 103-106. In Kato’s view, without slavery, the achievements of ancient
civilizations such as Egypt would have been impossible. Africans enslaved in America escaped the
barbarism of Africa, and some even received education and enlightenment (Ibid., 105-106).
1665
Ibid., 76.
1666
This is the concept that all Japanese are ultimately descended from and connected to the imperial
family, the foundation of the kokka, the “family-state” (Ibid., 71-72).
1667
Ibid., 37, 71-72, 91-92, 113, 124-125.
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Ito Hirobumi. Ito supported large colonization schemes for Taiwan and
Hokkaido.1668 Before 1895, Ito showed a somewhat paternalistic attitude toward
Korea.1669 Later, in the early 1900s, in his role as governor-general for Korea, this
attitude about Korean development surely had a major impact, encouraging the eventual
transfer of technologies and other areas of know-how to the peninsula. He had extensive
plans for Korea’s development.1670 Hamada argues that in the face of a second conflict
over the Korea issue, Ito stood as a force of moderation, against pressures for war from
Russian and Japanese militarists.1671 After Japan won that war, Ito brought in Japanese
experts to improve Korea’s infrastructure in transportation, health, education, economy,
and government.1672 After the Korean king abdicated in 1907, Ito issued a plan for the
resident general’s control of Korea’s internal and foreign affairs, resisting pressure from
Tokyo to annex Korea.1673 In August 1907 he returned pessimistically to Japan to secure
loans and experts for Korea’s development.1674 To improve relations, Ito and the new
king went on a failed national tour. Ito resigned, returning to Japan.1675 In some ways,
perhaps Ito was attempting to steer Korea’s reforms in the image of Japan’s. There was
much similarity between his vision for Korea’s development and the Meiji approach to
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Hamada, Prince Ito, 113-114, 116-118, 120. After the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), Japan claimed
China’s Liaodong peninsula. Under pressure from Russia, France and Germany, Japan renounced it, but
won Taiwan (Ibid., 113-114, 116-118, 120).
1669
See discussion of this in Chapter 5, where I discuss Ito’s worldviews of external political relations from
1850 to 1895 (Ibid., 87-90, 110-111).
1670
The Japanese annexation of Korea did not occur until 1910. Ito declared his plan about 1907.
1671
Ibid., 168-169. The first conflict was the Sino-Japanese War, and the second potential conflict was
between Japan and Russia.
1672
Ibid., 188-191. Ito planned to reform Korea’s bureaucratic structure and government ministries. The
ministries would be subject to the advice of the resident-general (Ibid.).
1673
Ibid., 199-201. In announcing his plan, Ito declared that Korea had finally been freed from China, and
that Japan had merely suspended Korea’s independence, not violated it (Ibid.).
1674
Ibid., 202-203. Ito was pessimistic since he felt that Koreans could not initiate reforms, that they
resisted his own, and that they might rebel (Ibid., 202-203).
1675
Ibid., 205-206, 208.
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Japan’s development. His desire was to strengthen the Korean nation and render
constructive advice, yet most Koreans resented against his efforts.1676 It is tempting to
call Ito an imperialist, since he felt that Japan must be the power to restore Korea’s
strength and independence.1677
Yanagita Kunio. According to Kawada Minoru, in the early 1900s, as Western
nations sought more colonies, a shift occurred in the world economy, from capitalism to
imperialistic militarism. As Japan’s economy developed, it laid the groundwork for
imperialism through wars with China and Russia. Japan evolved into a “semi-feudal,”
militaristic, capitalistic state in the first half of the twentieth century. Yanagita wished to
strengthen Japan so it could stand independently and in prosperity against possible
Western imperialism.1678 He strongly opposed nationalist forces that favored use of the
military for overseas imperialism.1679 He believed that Japan must not blindly copy
Western imperialism, but seek to lead other Asian nations by example, encouraging their
development and unity against the West.1680 Yet Yanagita does not explain how to do
this. How realistic was his theory of agro-politics in the context of expanding
imperialism in the early 1900s?1681 And how would increasing the sense of national unity
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Ibid., 192-193.
It is hard to imagine any contemporary scholar today who would not call Ito an imperialist. In spite of
his doubts about Korea and China, both have become global economic powers, although it has taken them
longer than Japan.
1678
Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 3.
1679
Ibid., 107.
1680
Ibid., 82-86. Yanagita especially was concerned with Sino-Japanese relations and regretted Japan’s
copying of Western imperialism and racism toward its Asian neighbors (Ibid.).
1681
Ibid., 27, 32. On a related issue, Yanagita later criticized the government’s policy of diverting rural
capital for investment in overseas colonies, although he thought that colonization might reduce the surplus
of agricultural labor (Ibid.).
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and communality in Japan affect its expansive tendencies?1682 Yanagita was much more
concerned with Japan’s internal development, and very little with its overseas expansion.
Yamagata Aritomo. In 1918, in the face of Russia’s Bolshevik revolution in
Russia, Yamagata enthusiastically supported dispatching Japanese troops to Siberia, a
wonderful opportunity for Japan to expand from “small house” to “grand master” status,
and for his faction to strengthen its position at home. Official approval followed, but
soon huge riots over rice price increases broke out across Japan. The Siberian
Intervention failed to arouse nationalistic sentiment as the wars with China and Russia
had.1683
Hirohito, Emperor. As one of the most complex political figures in twentieth
century Japanese life, from 1926 to 1945 Hirohito had a huge influence over Japan and its
short-lived empire, exercising authority in a manner that was ultimately calamitous.
Under Hirohito, the empire occupied various parts of Northeast and Southeast Asia, the
Soviet Union, and the North and South Pacific.1684 He inherited the origins of this empire
from Emperor Meiji.1685 Even before becoming emperor, Hirohito exercised influence
over the empire. As regent, in April 1923, he traveled to Japan’s Taiwan colony.1686
Hirohito especially wanted to visit schools, to impress Taiwan’s youth. His tour had
many purposes, in terms of the imperial image, to remind all Japanese that the throne was
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Ibid., 42. Kawada poses these significant questions, but fails to answer them.
Dickinson, War and National, 188-190, 200-203. Similarly, Dickinson argues that Japanese
imperialism in the late 1800s was driven not so much by fear of Western invasion as by incredible euphoria
at Japan’s unprecedented “opportunities” (i.e., Japanese victories in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese
Wars, 1894-1895 and 1904-1905) (Ibid., 256-257).
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Bix, Hirohito, 3-4.
1685
Ibid., 9.
1686
The Taiwan colony’s people, weather and culture were distinct from Japan, although a small number of
Japanese had settled there. About four years before, control of Taiwan’s government passed from Japan’s
military to a civilian governor-general, though in reality, the military continued to rule (Bix, Hirohito).
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the moral source of their wealth, affirm Japan’s possession of Taiwan, and strengthen the
peoples’ belief in the monarchy as the source of all morality. Hirohito’s official visits
always had a great deal of pomp and formality, extensive press coverage, and the Taiwan
tour was no different. In 1925, he took a similar tour of the southern Sakhalin colony.1687
Military considerations made Hirohito support the military in its invasion of
Manchuria in 1931. After the invasion, he felt the most important issue was to stabilize
Japan’s internal politics, which he thought the invasion would aid.1688 In the late 1930s,
as Hirohito pressed for more “unity” among his perpetually divided government and high
command, these differences were wallpapered over in policy statements bringing
increasing pressure for imperialist expansion. Both Japan’s aggressive military and its
“religiously charged” throne impelled expansion in China in the mid- to late 1930s.
While a few military leaders argued for “rationality” in Japan’s imperialist policies, soon
the nation was carried away, and conflicts with China, the United States, and Britain were
unavoidable.1689
In 1942, Hirohito and Prime Minister Tojo planned to establish a new Greater
East Asia Ministry to control the conquered territories in mainland China and Southeast
Asia.1690 In late 1943 and early 1944, they encouraged a new approach to China, treating
it as a co-equal, which they hoped would allow a reduction in Japanese forces there.1691
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Ibid., 137-139, 156. There are further comments about how in the late 1920s and 1930s the Japanese
government manipulated images of imperialism to encourage support of the emperor and the throne above
in the contexts of imperialism section.
1688
Ibid., 265-269.
1689
Ibid., 310-312.
1690
Ibid., 457. The ministry was not going to control colonies in Korea, Taiwan, and Sakhalin (Ibid.).
1691
In January 1944, Japan and the puppet regime of Wang Ching-wei in Nanjing signed a treaty in which
Japan agreed to end its treaty-port settlements and extraterritorial rights in China, treat Wang’s regime as a
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But Hirohito did not support the concept of “national self-determination,” nor any change
in the relationships of Korea and Taiwan with Japan. Rather, he supported a hierarchical
notion of each “race” in the empire assuming its proper place, with Japan guaranteed its
proper lead-position and privileges.1692
Comparison of Leaders’ Worldviews About Japanese Imperialism (1895-1945)
Here I will evaluate four categories of these leaders’ views: 1) their general
views of imperialism and colonialism, 2) views of Western imperialism, 3) views of
Japanese imperialism, and 4) views of Japanese colonies and colonialism. On the general
nature of colonialism and imperialism, Kato Hiroyuki had mixed views. While he sees
them as positive signs of evolutionary progress, he laments the exploitation and damage
that European colonialism has wreaked on weaker peoples. Nevertheless, the strong have
that right. Yamagata and Hirohito see imperialism by Japan as positive; Yanagita does
not. In 1918, Yamagata believed that successful Japanese colonization in Siberia would
enhance Japan’s international status, and his faction’s own domestic political power.
Similarly, in the 1930s, Hirohito hoped that Japanese achievements in Manchuria and the
colonies would calm the domestic political scene. This suggests an attitude that external
adventures will alleviate challenging domestic situations. Yanagita had a more domestic
focus, preferring Japan’s internal development more than overseas expansion. Bix
charges that domestic forces, including religion, created additional pressure on the throne
to increase imperial expansion in China in the mid- to late 1930s.1693 Similar to Kato, we
co-equal, and no longer supervise Chinese administration in occupied regions. Wang Ching-wei, a member
of China’s Nationalist Party, established his regime in Nanjing in March 1940 (Bix, Hirohito).
1692
Ibid., 473-474.
1693
Ibid., 310-312. What were these religious pressures? Perhaps they came from the nationalistic pressures
inherent in the emperor ideology and State Shinto, both taken to extremes.
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see evolutionistic influence in Hirohito’s preference for each “race” in the empire to take
its proper place in the hierarchy, with Japan in the lead. In their views of colonialism and
imperialism, these leaders have both negative and positive impressions.
On Western imperialism, Kato argues that although Western imperialism has
done damage, it has also benefited European powers and their colonies. To Kato, this
“progress” means that Western colonialists cannot be totally condemned; they have the
right to rule the world, and eventually will. But the damage they have done is at odds
with the values of Christianity, and Kato finds this troubling. Yanagita felt that imitating
Western imperialism would be negative for Japan. Yamagata believed that weakness in a
Western power, i.e. Russia, could create positive opportunities for Japan overseas. These
leaders (Kato, Ito, Yamagata, Hirohito, and Yanagita) universally condemn the idea that
Japan should be subject to the West. All of them want Japan to repel Western
imperialism, and to remain free.
On Japanese imperialism, Kato saw the emperor, imperial descent and the
throne as the center of Japan, the “satellite” colonies, the “race,” and the empire. So
biological, evolutionary thought, mixed with Confucian and Shinto influences, also
colors his thought on Japanese imperialism. While Yanagita hoped that Japan would
develop and lead other Asian nations against Western exploitation, he strongly opposed
use of the military for Japanese imperialism. The evidence from Kato, Yamagata and
Hirohito suggests that they viewed Japanese imperialism as positive. Kato and Hirohito
also believed that the emperor had a central role in Japan’s imperialism.1694 In Hirohito
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Kato saw him as the “brain” of the nation and empire, and Hirohito was delighted to use his early
colonial tours of places like Taiwan and south Sakhalin to strengthen the imperial image.
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we see tacit or direct approval of various imperialistic ventures in areas such as China,
Manchuria, and Southeast Asia. Despite rhetoric suggesting equality, colonial selfdetermination, and the proposed creation of the Greater East Asia Ministry in 1942, in
reality, Hirohito seemed to most highly value imperialism for how it might help domestic
concerns, including empowering the throne.
Concerning their views of Japanese colonies and colonialism, though Kato
called Taiwan and Korea mere “satellites” of Japan, Ito and Hirohito both felt highly
supportive of the colony in Taiwan, Hirohito for propaganda purposes.1695 Ito had
particularly strong, paternalistic feelings for Korea, and tried to offer it guidance for its
internal and external affairs without making it a colony, as most in Tokyo desired. But
near the end of World War II, Hirohito failed to support much self-determination for
either Taiwan or Korea, or any change in their current status. Rather, he supported a rigid
international, racist hierarchy of regions, with Japan at the front.1696 Regarding
development, Ito’s vision for Korea here was the most significant. As governor-general
of Korea, he requested that Tokyo dispatch experts in numerous fields to Korea to help it
begin to modernize, even before it became a colony. But he was shot before much
happened.
In sum, all of these leaders saw Western imperialism and colonialism as
negative, and most of them regarded Japanese imperialism as positive, protecting
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I am referring to his tour of Taiwan as the imperial regent in the early 1920s.
This reminds one of the famous Japanese vision of economic development for Asia, the flying geese
pattern, where Japan supposedly takes the lead for all of the nations in Asia, in its position as first
developer.
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Asia.1697 Most see negative effects of Western imperialism, and all universally want
Japan to stay free. Most focus most on what colonialism and imperialism will do for
Japan’s domestic affairs. We noted biological, evolutionistic, Shinto, and Confucian
influences in the thought of Kato and Hirohito here, where there is also a strong
connection of imperialism with the emperor ideology. Ito and Yanagita have the most
sincere vision, genuinely desiring to help colonial regions grow, and defend themselves
against the West. Hirohito had the greatest influence here; most of it was negative.
Conceptual Analysis of Leaders’ Worldviews About Japanese Imperialism
(1895-1945)
Development Issues. The concept of internationalization is highly relevant to
the issue of imperialism. What do we learn from these leaders’ worldviews on
imperialism if we examine them through the lens of the concept of internationalization?
Again, the key question of internationalization is, what happened on the international
level, especially culturally, as Japan was drawn into the global trading system? It is
especially relevant to consider this in terms of Japanese colonialism and Japan’s actions
across Asia during World War II. Three of the leaders here1698 paint a positive picture of
the impacts of Japanese imperialism, while Ito and Yanagita are somewhat doubtful.
Several of the leaders1699 think about Japan’s imperialism in terms of the benefits it may
bring Japan’s domestic situation or picture it as something that Japan inherently deserves,
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While Yanagita condemned Japanese imperialism, he supported Japanese strengthening and defense of
Asia against the West.
1698
Kato, Yamagata, and Hirohito.
1699
Yamagata and Hirohito.
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if it becomes strong.1700 They also imagine the benefits colonies or areas under Japanese
influence will gain.1701
While each of the leaders acknowledged negative things that Western
imperialism did to peripheral countries, only Yanagita expressed active concern about
what aggressive Japanese imperialism might do. Yet even he was hopeful Japan could
exercise positive leadership to help East Asia and the Pacific resist the West. Ito hoped
Japanese intervention might aid Korea and Taiwan. While it is beyond the scope of this
research to examine what Japan’s impacts on the colonies actually were, it seems in the
short term that they brought some economic benefit to the regions under colonial rule.
Examples include the development of railroads and transportation networks in
Manchuria, Korea, and Taiwan, heavy industries in Manchuria, and the expansion of
education in Taiwan and Korea. But it was at a heavy toll. As I noted earlier, resistance,
especially in Korea, was fierce. If we consider the impacts and destruction on other
nearby regions during the war, such as China proper, they were devastating.1702 Of these
leaders, only Yanagita hints at a slightly realistic appraisal of what Japanese imperialism
actually did.
Technology Issues. What are the most important technology-related ideas and
phenomena associated with these worldviews of imperialism? Military technologies and
power are partly what enabled Japan to fight and achieve victory in the conflicts that won
it its colonies and empire. Additional technologies of communication and transportation
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Kato.
Hirohito, Ito, Yamagata, and Kato.
1702
It is also fascinating to think about what the legacy of Japan’s prewar cultural impact has been in the
postwar period and even today, but beyond our present study.
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also provided Japan with the technical means to develop and exploit various resources in
areas such as Manchuria, Korea, and Taiwan. And technology provided much of the
sheer power helped allow Japan to maintain control of these areas for as long as it did.
The pro-imperialism viewpoints of all these leaders, except Yanagita, no doubt approved
of these coercive and exploitive uses of technology.
What are the most significant factors related to imperialism present in the
imported technologies and related ideas in the worldviews of imperialism studied here?
The main imported technologies and related ideas connected with these worldviews
included military technologies, heavy industrial, mining and agricultural technologies,
new transportation and communication technologies, management principles, certain
political ideas and theories, and evolutionistic ideas, to a degree. The key imperialism
related factors included the ideas that strong nations had a right to have colonies, that the
strong rule the weak, that Japan and the rest of Asia must not be colonies of the West,
that Japan was weaker than some of the Western countries, but stronger and more
disciplined than the other Asian countries, and therefore entitled to colonies itself. The
international system affected these issues both positively and negatively, at multiple
levels. Japan imported Western military technologies and products to enable it to attack
China (1894-1895), and Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Technological
expertise, imported and enhanced in Japan, allowed Japan to provide commodities for
many Asian markets and its allies during World War I. Relevant technologies helped
enable Japan to maintain control of its colonies through 1945, to attack and wage warfare
against the United States, and then suffer huge defeat in the war, which also meant the
loss of its colonies.
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What were the important ideas/technologies transferred here, in these
worldviews of imperialism? Who were the main international actors in the external
environment, or domestic actors, individual or state, involved, and what impacts did they
have on the transfer outcomes? What lessons or chances for improvement do we learn?
The main ideas and technologies related to imperialism here, revolving around military
strength, technological power, and the right of the strong to exploit the weak, were
mentioned in the previous paragraph. The chief international and domestic actors
included the foreign governments of the countries and regions Japan attacked and/or
gained as colonies or areas of influence, the Japanese government and its relevant
ministries related to the military, colonies, and international economic issues, Japan’s
military and the military forces of the foreign countries concerned, new governments
installed in colonial or occupied territories, multinational and trading companies, and
various leaders and important individual actors involved in the above groups. The
impacts of these various groups and actors on the transfer of empire-related technologies
and ideas were complex, and many. Japan’s industrial actors imported and then produced
the military technologies that enabled Japan’s military to attack, influence, and/or control
other regions. The Japanese government set major policies influencing what technologies
were produced, and how they were used, whether for military or industrial purposes in
the colonies. Some of the main lessons from this complex situation we learn are that the
predominant beliefs of many of the top leaders in the country (in this case, on
imperialism) eventually prevailed, resulting in horrific consequences for Japan and other
nations. This argues in favor of the perspectives of Yanagita, for more popular and
democratic oversight of governing and military elites, to help prevent abuses of power.
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What are the most significant factors and values present in the imported
technologies and ideas in these worldviews of imperialism?1703 There is a mixture of
many contrasting values. In addition to the images and ideas connected with military
power, here we see ideas of evolutionistic influence, that the strong have the right to rule
and exploit the weak, and yet discomfort with the hypocrisy of that, with the realization
that no weaker nation, including Japan, wishes to be exploited. There are racial values,
and a Confucian influenced sense of the hierarchy of nations in East Asia, with Japan in
the lead. This is related to ethnocentric values of Japanese superiority. There is
admiration for Western power and “progress,” coupled with resentment of Western
racism, cruelty, and bigotry toward non-Westerners. There are values of greed and power
contrasted with altruistic desires to liberate, protect, and defend neighboring Asian
regions from Western influence or control. There is also the desire to strengthen Japan
domestically (politically and economically) through the colonies.
In their worldviews, most of these leaders, except Yanagita, used these
technologies and ideas as means or agencies to cope with and transform Japan’s
(material) environments on the international level by justifying Japan’s intervention in
neighboring countries in terms of the overall benefit that both Japan and the colonies
would gain if the West were repelled, and the colonies were given the benefits of
Japanese protection and development expertise. The supposed economic benefits for
Japan were also added bonuses. The outcome of these technological issues finally
threatened Japan’s survival in the international system, since it bankrupted and nearly
destroyed Japan by the end of World War II.
1703
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The belief systems of many of these leaders, on technology issues on the
international level, blinded them to the reality that Japan’s neighboring regions did not
want to be colonies of Japan just as Japan did not wish to be a colony of the West.
Though Japan was, in many ways, more developed than the others, and almost the lone
Asian actor to not become a Western colony, did not mean that Japan should control its
neighbors. But an alternative view was almost unknown. In the mind of most of Japan’s
leaders, Japan had no choice but to engage in assertive interventions in its neighbors,
because if Japan did not, the Western countries would, to the peril of all East Asia.
Toward the end of this era, even though it became impossible for Japan to maintain
control of its colonies, Hirohito in particular stubbornly refused to admit the need for
flexibility in colonial policies, and to surrender as soon as was needed. It is hard to
believe that the nationalistic ideologies of hakkô ichiu, imperial descent and Japanese
superiority did not cloud his actions on the empire at least a little.
In these worldviews on imperialism, technonationalism as ideology is strongly
manifested. Kato, Yamagata and Hirohito all implicitly, yet definitely, support the idea
that Japan’s colonies and imperial ventures must benefit Japan, economically and
politically, to enable it to resist Western encroachment. Only Yanagita resists this ideal.
His view, like Fukuzawa’s in an earlier era, was that Japan’s internal development must
precede foreign adventures. But Yanagita’s vision did not prevail; that of the other
leaders did. Ultimately aggressive intervention in other nations nearly destroyed Japan
and its neighbors in World War II.
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Cognition Issues. Image. These leaders’ images of imperialism may be
organized into four groups. In the first group, basic images of colonialism and
imperialism, the images are generally positive. Kato calls imperialism and colonialism
evidence of evolutionary progress, and argues that the strongest have the right to rule the
world. Yamagata hints that imperialism can enhance a nation’s power and prestige in the
international system. The images of European and Western imperialism are mixed.
European and Western colonialism are called positive in that they have contributed to
global progress. In Kato’s eyes early in the twentieth century, as the strongest nations,
they have a right to power and control of the world.1704 Negatively, Western colonialism
has exploited weaker peoples and destroyed many of their cultures, is hypocritical, and
contrary to Christianity.1705 Western imperialism can be positive for Japan if it serves as a
motivator for the nation to grow to resist the West.1706 Images of Japanese imperialism,
offered by Kato, Yamagata, Yanagita, and Hirohito, are generally supportive and
positive. Hirohito offers the most positive images,1707 while Yamagata strongly supported
the unsuccessful Siberian Intervention in 1918. Other images, of Kato and Yanagita,
suggest that Japan is superior, more powerful, central, and important than its colonial
satellites.1708 Yanagita offers the only negative images of Japanese imperialism here.1709
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Yanagita.
1707
In his images, Hirohito shows support for the general idea of Japanese imperialism in his imperial tours
and elsewhere, for the invasion of Manchuria in the 1930s, and for Japan’s additional imperial expansion in
the late 1930s. He also believed that Japanese imperialism could aid politics and the throne at home.
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For example, Kato declared that “patriarchal sovereignty” and Japan would always be the center of the
empire, that the emperor was the “brain” of the empire, and that the imperial family would be the
“quintessence” of the Japanese race at the empire’s center. Even Yanagita, who opposed Japanese
imperialism, suggested that Japan must lead other Asian nations by example, and that Japan must
encourage the development and unity of other Asian nations against the West.
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Regarding images of Japanese colonies, although Ito opposed colonialism in Korea, he
calls colonialism in Taiwan and Hokkaido good. Hirohito’s images suggest that each
colony should take its proper place in the imperial hierarchy, and that each is naturally
inferior to Japan. Images of how Japan should relate to the colonies stress that Japan
should take the lead position in the empire,1710 and that some colonies need Japan’s
guidance, protection, and help with development.1711 Rhetoric near the end of World War
II, suggesting that certain regions in the empire should have some autonomy or equality
with Japan, proved not to be genuine.1712
How may these images have served as perceptual filters or organizing devices?
On colonialism and imperialism, these images ignore the negative impacts of
colonialism, including exploitation, moral and human rights problems, economic
injustices, oppression, and so forth. On European and Western colonialism, Kato’s
images were overly positive. Negative aspects of Western colonialism were true. Western
colonialism was really a mixed case. It would have been good if Japan had not copied so
much Western colonialism. From the social and political points of view, there seemed to
be many negative impacts on other Asian countries from Western imperialism. From the
standpoint of technology and economics, in the long run there were some positive
impacts. In images on Japanese imperialism, there were several blind spots. Hirohito in
particular failed to recognize that Japanese imperialism was often brutal, despite
economic benefits and infrastructural development it brought some areas, including
1709

For example, Yanagita argued that Japan’s internal development was more important than its
colonialism or imperialism, that using Japan’s military for overseas imperialism was bad, and that Japan
must not blindly copy Western imperialism.
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These are suggested by Ito’s images of Korea.
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These were some of Hirohito’s statements about China, Taiwan and Korea, noted earlier in the chapter.
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Korea, Manchuria and Taiwan. Since it was forced on these areas, it was often resented.
This has caused many foreign policy headaches for Japan that often continue until now.
The images on Japanese colonies included false ideas that Japan was inherently better
than all of its colonies. It is true that the colonies benefited somewhat from Japan’s input
and its higher level of development. This help should have been given without force, not
as a result of invasion. Perhaps some nations would have welcomed Japanese help that
was not forced, perhaps not.1713 There was a failure to recognize the ultimate failure this
forced policy would have, and the baggage it would create for Japan’s future international
relations.
Worldview. What worldviews of Japan’s imperialism emerge from the above
images? In the nature of the world, the strong have the right to rule the world.
Imperialism is good if it contributes to progress, though weak nations may suffer.
Imperialism can be hypocritical, and this also is not good. The strongest nations will rule
and control the weak ones. If Japan or any other nation does not want to be ruled or
controlled by others, it must become strong. If Japan becomes strong, it has the right to
have an empire too. On views of the world’s order, the strong rule the weak. If a nation
has an empire or colonies, it can build its power and prestige. It is good for nations to
submit themselves to the proper international hierarchy of nations. Hirohito believed that
those in Asia should willingly let Japan lead, since it was the most advanced nation in the
region.
In views of Japan, imperialism could help Japan grow, domestic politics and
other domestic issues. Japan was superior and therefore fit to lead other Asian countries.
1713
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Japan could help these other countries with development, and to resist the West. In the
views of non-self (non-Japanese) here, Western countries were seen as superior to Japan.
Their imperialism had helped bring progress to Asia and elsewhere, but they exploited
and harmed the cultures of weaker countries, which was not good. Weaker peoples,
namely other Asian countries, were not as strong as Japan or the West. Japan should help
lead them. Colonialism in Taiwan and Korea and similar regions was good. Hirohito
especially believed that each Asian country should take its proper position in the empire
so Japan could lead.
What were the relevant environment(s) surrounding the leaders who held these
worldviews? How did these environments interact with or affect the leaders’ worldviews?
The environment included Western imperialism and colonialism threatening other Asian
countries. Though not a current threat to Japan, it was in the recent past. Several of the
leaders, including Hirohito, were afraid of the threat of war with or invasion (of Japan) by
the Soviet Union. There was great competition between Japan and the Western powers on
the Asian mainland for resources and influence. Concerning environmental interactions,
to many except Yanagita, Japan’s rapid military victories in the late 1800s and early
1900s, its gain of colonies in Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria, and rapid economic growth
through the mid-1920s, seemed to confirm Japanese power and the rightness of Japanese
imperialism and its cause. However, the collapse of Japan’s empire in World War II, the
huge suffering and defeat of the nation caused many to feel betrayed after the war. How
did these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions influence the
leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, and understanding of events and their causes?
On the issue of perception, for Hirohito, Japan’s victories in the earlier wars since 1895,
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and tours to several colonies, seemed outstanding proof of the rightness of Japanese
militarism and imperialism. Others, such as Kato and Yamagata, were generally
supportive of Japanese imperialism. But Ito and Yanagita expressed doubts. On uses of
information, information for several of these leaders was limited, due to various
circumstances. Difficulties in travel and tight control on information later in the period
meant that they sometimes had a hard time having an accurate picture of what was really
happening abroad. This was not the case for Hirohito, who usually had access to the best
possible information.1714 Power politics, realism, and evolutionary thinking, to some
degree, influence many of these views of imperialism and colonialism. Imperialist and
nationalist ideologies, some from Meiji Japan, influenced the thought of Hirohito, Kato
and others. The main exception was Yanagita.
How may have technological systems affected these worldviews? Heavy
industry, powerful military technologies, and successful industrialization and trade all
enabled Japan to buy or produce the technologies it used in its warfare and imperialism.
Railroad, port and mining technologies allowed economic exploitation in several
colonies, such as Manchuria. To these leaders, except Yanagita, these successes,
especially before the full breakout of World War II, suggested that imperialism was the
right path for Japan.
Cultural Logics. Under their worldviews of imperialism, what were the global
phenomena to which these leaders responded? These included Western imperialism,
colonialism, theories and ideas about colonialism, evolutionistic theories, economic
pressures for colonies and more wealth, the idea that Japan was threatened with invasion
1714
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or foreign control if it did not obtain more wealth, colonies, and pressure for natural
resources. What were the leaders’ worldviews and basic beliefs about these phenomena?
Some believed that Western imperialism had contributed much to evolutionary progress.
The strong have the right to rule the weak.1715 All believed that Western imperialism
should be repelled, Japan should not be a colony of the West; it must remain free. Kato
and Hirohito believed that superior races have the right to control weaker countries and
races. Some saw Japanese imperialism as positive.1716 They believed it could strengthen
Japanese politics and economics, and help various domestic issues. 1717 Japanese
imperialism could help Asia defend itself against the West.1718 Kato saw Japan as
superior to its colonies, as the necessary the center of the empire. Colonies were mere
“satellites” of Japan.1719 Japan should help the colonies to develop and be
strengthened.1720 Only Yanagita believed that Japan should be more focused on home, not
overseas adventures.
What were the cultural logics under the worldviews about these global
phenomena? These included evolutionary assumptions that the strong and superior races
usually win, seen as positive. Because the West had many colonies, it had contributed to
“progress.” There were assumptions that progress and imperialism were good, because
they would strengthen the controlling country, and often the colonies. Japan should not
become a colony; it should stay free. Freedom for one’s self was seen as good. It was
permissible for Japan to have colonies although Japan did not want to be controlled by
1715
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others. That was a right of stronger countries, and Japan was such a country. Japan was
superior to other Asian countries, so it could and should help them.
What were these responses to these global phenomena? They responded with
hard work, study, writing, and much effort in policymaking (in some cases) to help build
up Japan and help it grow so it could resist the West. Ito was personally involved in
helping to administer a region under Japanese control (Korea). Hirohito had the biggest
impacts on imperialism, due to his position as emperor, and the huge macro-level policies
during World War II that he either allowed or did not stop.
What were the cultural logics under these responses? They included hard work
to help Japan fend off Western imperialism. This was seen as a matter of survival.
Actions regarding Japanese imperialism, colonies were seen as contributing to Japanese
survival. They were also as a means of helping Japan’s Asian neighbors to develop,
grow, progress and resist the West.
What do we learn if we compare the cultural logics of the worldviews about the
global phenomena with the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to the
phenomena? The former logics were more basic, such as what the meaning and
motivations for imperialism were, and whether imperialism was good. The latter logics
examined more specialized issues, such as the value of Japanese imperialism and
colonialism.
Globalization Issues. How do the most important worldviews of imperialism
and colonialism here reflect and/or affect processes of globalization (intensified or
speeded up flows of ideas, peoples, money, media, or technology)? How does
globalization affect these worldviews? Intensified global connections of technology and
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communication enabled Japan to be both threatened by Western imperialism, and then to
threaten its Asian neighbors. The spread of political ideas and military technology from
the West enabled Japan to study and make sense of the actions of the West, and the new
threats that Japan and other Asian nations faced. The chief understanding that emerged is
that the world is now driven by wealth and power, and that if Japan is to repel the West
and become strong itself, it must grow strong enough to resist the West, but then
influence other Asian countries near it so it too can become great. The worldviews of
these leaders reflect their own understanding of, and reactions to, the Western
imperialism that had threatened Japan, and then their interpretations of how the enterprise
and concept of imperialism should be acted upon by Japan and nearby regions. In this
sense, these leaders received the concept of Western imperialism and mediated it in
somewhat different forms to the rest of East and Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.
While all these leaders condemned Western imperialism, not all supported the Japanese
form. Yanagita is the exception.
If we consider these global processes as people experienced them, on micro(personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? Ito, Hirohito1721 and
Yamagata had limited experiences of living in and/or traveling to nearby regions.
Yanagita served briefly in Europe in the League of Nations.1722 The thought of all of
these leaders on imperialism and colonialism is fundamentally based on what they read
and were taught in their conservative educations, public service, and limited travel
overseas. Their conservative training colored and influenced their reactions, especially in
1721
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the case of Hirohito. The exception is Yanagita. Why was Yanagita different? How were
his progressive-leaning political beliefs acquired, and why did they make him oppose
harsh, militaristic Japanese imperialism?1723 This is beyond the present project’s scope to
answer, but perhaps because he so opposed the destructive effects of Western
globalization on Japan, he did not want Japan repeating similar mistakes on its neighbors.
Do these important global processes represent a form of Japanese or nonWestern globalization? If yes, what is their significance? These processes are an example
of a non-Western power, Japan, receiving the impacts of Western globalization, in the
form of imperialism, and then mediating them in similar, though altered forms, as
Japanese forms of global impact (Japanese imperialism and colonialism). They are
significant as the first forms of non-Western globalization in the modern world, though
certainly earlier forms of non-Western globalization, such as China’s, were highly
significant.
Conclusion
From the above study of several key leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s external
relations (1895 to 1945), and of Japan’s experiences with technology, development, and
external relations in this period, what are some of the main lessons and conclusions that
may be possible for Japan’s current foreign aid and development policies? Here I will
explore general tendencies, but will save the exploration of more concrete linkages for
the concluding chapters (9 and 10). Regarding sociocultural issues, on the role of
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ideology on social change, development and security in this era, various imperialist
doctrines, such as hakkô ichiu, were used by Japan’s government and military to
convince Japan’s citizens that Japan’s actions in other countries were practically,
intellectually, and divinely justifiable. Thankfully, this is not the case in Japan’s current
ODA policy. In addition, images of biology, evolution and indigenous ideologies (i.e.
Shinto) colored the visions of imperialism and colonialism of some of these leaders
(Hirohito, Kato). Certainly some particular images, even if not imperialistic ones,
influence the views of current Japanese aid workers, images such as globalization, free
trade, self-help, and others.
In this period, Japan had close relations with a wide variety of nations and world
regions, including its Asian neighbors, the West, and geoculturally distant places such as
Africa and Latin America. Though Japan enjoyed peace with many of these nations
during much of this era, it also had horrifically painful conflicts, such as World War II.
Japan’s overall foreign relations in this era seem painful, and filled with many
misunderstandings. Japan’s leaders had various misunderstandings about other nations
that influenced the policies they enacted. Hirohito’s views of other nations were highly
colored by racist, biological notions. On the policy level, his problem was not one of
inaccurate information or a lack of it—it was a worldview problem. How could this have
been corrected? The political worldviews of most of Japan’s leaders in this period stress
conservative ideologies and various forms of competition between nations. Their views
have various racial overtones, hint of evolutionism, Japan’s superiority, and the desire for
empire (the exception is Yanagita). All of the views have a degree of realism. Some
conservative ideologies emerging in this era suggested that Japan had the right to control
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certain resources in neighboring regions, or a duty to unite Asia and lead it against
Western domination. This thought influenced some of Japan’s leaders. Another major
issue here, again, is the further rise of Japan’s military and its powerful grip on Japan’s
economy, society, politics, and its international relations. Mistakes in these two areas—
misreadings of international conditions by Japan’s top leaders, based partly on (in my
opinion) faulty worldviews, and the unhampered power of Japan’s military, had
disastrous consequences for Japan, Asia, the Pacific, and the United States, costing tens
of millions of lives, and partially enabling the victory of communism in China and
elsewhere in Asia, which would cost tens of millions of more lives after the war.
There are at least two important, basic lessons for ODA and development
policies here. First, the worldviews of leaders will influence the kinds of foreign policy
they support and enact. This was the case in prewar Japan, and also is for contemporary
LDCs. Japan’s current aid policies inevitably reflect a complex mix of the worldviews of
Japan’s current policymakers, bureaucrats, and aid staff, and competing political and
economic forces, pressures and interests, domestic and foreign. Similar forces will shape
the development and aid policies of LDCs, though in different ways from Japan. A key
question is, where leaders of an LDC have inaccurate worldviews which misread
domestic or foreign conditions, how might they be corrected? Access to accurate
information is obvious, but how can leaders be helped when they are influenced by faulty
worldviews, as Japan’s leaders were before World War II? Frequent change of
leadership, as in a democracy, seems the simplest answer. The second issue concerns
controlling a nation’s military so that it does not abuse its power. It seems that
encouraging democratic governance and controls on abuse of power and militarism are
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fundamental for ODA and development policies, to prevent help prevent problems like
these in today’s LDCs.
In its external economic relations in this period, for the first thirty years, Japan
had extensive trade with the outside world, Western and Asian nations and others, and
benefited immensely. Earlier wars such as the Russo-Japanese War and World War I
expanded Japan’s economy, though World War II destroyed it. Trade built up the
Japanese nation and the wealth and prosperity of its people, to a very widespread degree.
Yet because of its new global connections, when the Great Depression hit in the late
1920s, Japan also suffered. The expansion of the power of Japan’s military in domestic
society, and its aggressive actions caused great damage to it and other nations.
International isolation for Japan in the 1930s and early 1940s greatly harmed its
economy. The strong state emphasis on heavy industrialization and trade failed to deal
with the issues of small and medium enterprises. The views of the only leader studied
here, Yanagita, also emphasized the issues of local and more regional business, and more
on the domestic side. Today Japanese economic policy has more balanced emphases and
examines both domestic and international issues. The more advanced an LDC’s economy
becomes, likely the greater its engagement with international trade. Aid and development
plans for a particular country should be geared around this fact. LLDCs should therefore
have a lesser degree of openness to the international economy than more advanced LDCs.
So economic openness to international trade should be geared to an LDC’s actual
economic conditions. This idea seems based on Japan’s actual experience, and fits well
the Japanese concept of customized development for LDCs. It also fits Japan’s actual
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ODA policy, which has sought to encourage bilateral trade and investment based on
LDCs’ actual conditions.
In the period 1895 to 1945, the study of foreign and Western cultures seemed to
have somewhat of a liberalizing effect on Japan through the early 1930s (the period of
Taisho democracy), both in popular culture and in some intellectual trends. In the late
1920s to 1945, due to conservative pressure from the Japanese government, there was
much censorship and oppression against these “decadent” Western influences, but they
could not be totally eliminated. Interactions with foreigners in this era had big impacts on
Japan’s relations with other countries, some lasting until today. Japan’s anger against the
United States was provoked when the latter passed the racist anti-Japanese immigration
exclusion act in 1924, and Japanese cruelty against the Chinese in China in World War II
and Koreans in Japan during and after the war have had long-lasting effects on Japan’s
international relations. Foreign employees and experts who brought Western knowledge
to Japan, starting in the Meiji period, had huge impacts on Japan’s knowledge. Rather
than contaminating Japan, ultimately this contact with foreigners greatly enriched it.
The wise policy ideas of Yanagita Kunio, designed to protect Japanese identity
and culture against the onslaught of Western influences, did not affect Japan’s cultural
preservation policies until later in the postwar period. Yanagita’s policies stressed
understanding and protecting Japan’s culture from the bottom–up, while Hirohito’s and
official views supported more of a top-down approach. Both leaders supported the role of
government in this process. Japan’s aid has also demonstrated more of a top-down
approach in many issues, even toward cultural issues. The global aid agenda has also
historically supported a top-down approach when it has paid any attention to cultural
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issues, but lately it is beginning to emphasize a bottom-up approach, at least in its
discourse. Japan is now also attempting to incorporate more such bottom-up approaches,
in line with the global agenda. But can it really do so?
Leaders who were most influential for most of this period supported more
conservative cultural values, though some supported more liberal ideas during the period
of Taisho democracy. We also see rather conservative approaches in Japan’s general aid
philosophy—conservative economic approaches, loans, the emphasis on selfhelp/reliance, and so forth. As noted in Chapter 2, other countries’ development
approaches also reflect their own beliefs and experiences. Hirohito and the Japanese
government also supported the conservative, imperialist ideology of hakkô ichiu, the idea
that Japan could bring peace and Confucian virtue to the world. This ideology was
somewhat implicit in official Japanese propaganda in the 1930s and 1940s. This may be
seen in current Japanese ideas about Japan’s role as a cultural and development bridge
between East and West, and North and South. True, Japan’s aid approach has been rather
distinctive. But is it really such a bridge?1724
What are the possible implications of Japan’s experiences and its leaders’ views
of colonialism and imperialism for Japan’s aid policies? By 1895, Japan incorporated
Hokkaido and Okinawa as integral parts of the nation. Japanese colonialism went into full
swing in Taiwan in 1895, soon followed by parts of Southern Manchuria, Sakhalin and
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Korea (the last in 1910). Japan began massive infrastructural investment in each of these
regions. Later, Japan acquired many new territories in mainland China and Southeast
Asia. In some places, its rule was quite brutal; in others, it was barely present. From the
early 1940s, Japan created new policies for both its older colonies and newly conquered
territories. They were designed in principle to grant more autonomy to some colonies,
and to strengthen the empire, but most of the policies had little impact. Japan’s impacts
on its colonies and territories were sometimes positive (in terms of economic
infrastructural development), but often harsh or negative. As noted already, many
millions of lives were affected, both foreign and Japanese.
What were the cultural impacts and implications of Japanese imperialism?
Japanese colonialism often created widespread resentment in indigenous populations,
including from the Okinawans and the Ainu in Hokkaido. Koreans felt even greater
resentment toward Japan’s long, harsh colonial rule. Japan’s cruel behavior in mainland
China helped to unite China’s peasants under Chinese communists for nationalist
resistance.1725 In many of these places, the Japanese imposed the use of the Japanese
language, State Shinto, the Japanese education system, and other
imperialistic/nationalistic ideologies. Current international ODA policies, including
Japan’s, prohibit imperialistic, hegemonic influences such as these.
In Japan proper, from the late 1920s to 1945, Japan’s government heavily
promoted the glories of imperialism and its past military victories in Japanese society,
and ideologies supporting such ideas. This eventually had a large impact in generating
much popular Japanese support for World War II and Japanese imperialism. In Japanese
1725
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thought, Western imperialism and colonialism were negative, and should not be
permitted. Japan felt that it was a stronger non-Western country, so it should help other
Asians defend themselves against Western outsiders/invaders. Supposed economic and
political benefit for Japan was an added bonus.
Most Japanese felt that indigenous peoples in the colonies were racially inferior,
and debates over colonial identity and the role of colonists in the empire followed.
Colonies were seen as “inferior” (mere “satellites”) to more developed/advanced nations
such as Japan (Kato). In the view of Japan’s leaders, including Hirohito, there should be a
“hierarchy” of Asian nations and colonies, with Japan at the front, like the “flying geese”
pattern mentioned in an earlier chapter. Contemporary aid suggests that LDCs are inferior
to donor countries, and that donor countries like Japan have a right to continue to lead
them. Donor countries support this position. It is doubtful that aid from Japan or
elsewhere can challenge this.
What are the (economic) implications of Japan’s imperialism (1895-1945) for
Japan’s current ODA? Japan’s pattern of offering mainly infrastructural help in its ODA
follows not only Japan’s own pattern of development, but also the development pattern it
followed in the colonial regions it held for a fairly long time. Japanese could not tolerate
a foreign or colonial presence in their midst, and Japan’s colonies generally felt the same
about Japan’s presence. This is especially true among young people in most other Asian
countries that were Japanese colonies. While Japanese infrastructural investments laid the
foundation for later development of colonies such as South Korea and Taiwan, many of
these populations deeply resented former Japanese control, and the tremendous damage
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of World War II. This anti-imperialism attitude common in the postwar world has made
imperialism deeply resented, and prohibited in international law.
But while today imperialism is illegal and condemned by global public opinion,
are the attitudes of more advanced countries, including Japan, still “imperialistic” in their
development and aid policies? The idea of more advanced countries “helping” LDCs to
develop is very much a part of the global development agenda, common in Japan and
other advanced OECD nations, and hints at colonial and evolutionistic ideas of a
hierarchy of nations. Various “non-Western” countries, such as China, Japan, and the
Soviet Union/Russia have shown a desire to help LDCs in other parts of Asia, Africa and
elsewhere to develop. Japan desires to help them come into the global trading system.
Japan and China display the attitude that aid to these LDCs will benefit the domestic
economies of the former (i.e. their aid to Africa). The ideal of helping LDCs to resist
Western “imperialism” (or the “West”) was also strong in Chinese and Soviet aid in the
late twentieth century.
Non-intervention in the internal affairs and sovereignty of other nations is also a
strong principle in contemporary international relations and law. Advanced nations such
as Japan hope to set a “positive” example for LDCs, and through aid and development
plans, hope they do so. Ito Hirobumi hoped to “help” Korea develop in the early
twentieth century, and tried to arrange for many Japanese experts to be dispatched there.
Today, Japan and other advanced nations show a similar attitude through their
dispatching of technical assistance and volunteers in programs like the Peace Corps, and
JICA’s JOCV. Do these programs perpetuate ethnocentric attitudes of national
superiority? “Advanced” nations like Japan still feel “superior” to LDCs, economically
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and culturally, perhaps even racially. How much cultural and economic control over
LDCs is still generated by contemporary aid, even from non-Western donors like Japan
and China?
On the second key question of the dissertation, the development related concept
of internationalization an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with technology and
development?1726 Regarding internationalization and Japan’s external political relations,
most of the leaders discussed in this chapter were politically conservative,1727 and
expected Japan to get involved in race wars with the West. Their thought is mostly
realist, and influenced by evolutionism. All wanted Japan to lead Asia against the West.
As Japan’s domestic politics turned increasingly militaristic in the 1930s and 1940s, more
assertive attitudes in its foreign relations emerged, having great effects on the countries
with which it interacted. Internationalization does not really apply to Yanagita’s views on
external economic relations (the only leader studied on that topic for this period). His
major concern was protecting Japan’s domestic, especially rural, culture from destructive
cultural and economic influences from abroad. His policies emphasized strengthening
local and regional industries, such as agriculture, so local regions could be empowered.
Internationalization only has limited relevance for external cultural relations. Yanagita
and Hirohito, the two leaders studied, were mainly concerned about how international
cultural forces would affect Japan’s domestic culture. But on internationalization, since
Hirohito accepted most of the nationalistic and emperor ideologies, it is likely that he

1726

The concepts of “modernization” and translative adaptation are not considered here, so I do mention
them.
1727
The exception is Yanagita, who was politically liberal.
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accepted the hakkô ichiu ideology too.1728 But there is no strong evidence that hakkô
ichiu affected other countries in Asia, or that Hirohito strongly believed it could.
Internationalization is extremely relevant to Japanese imperialism. Three leaders see
Japanese imperialism as positive,1729 and two see it as doubtful.1730 Several think of it in
terms of the benefits it may bring Japan or to other countries/colonies.1731 Only Yanagita
showed concern for negative effects it might have on other regions. As we considered
what the effects were, there were several that were positive, but we also noted the
overwhelmingly devastating consequences of World War II.
From my earlier survey of Japan’s external political, economic, cultural
relations, and relations with its empire (1895 to 1945), what contextual factors relevant to
Japan’s experiences with technology, development and foreign relations emerge that are
important for the issue of internationalization? There are many issues covered in these
contexts relevant to the concept, since internationalization concerns the economic and
cultural effects occurring as weaker regions are absorbed into the world market. What
happened here as both Japan and its empire entered the global economy?
In this era, Japan exercised increasing political, economic and cultural influence
on surrounding regions, including Korea, Taiwan, southern Manchuria, and others.
Aggression occurred at many points, especially during conflicts. Earlier in the period,
major Western powers tolerated Japan’s actions against its neighbors. But from the 1920s
to 1940s, as Japan faced increasing opposition from Western powers for hostilities in
1728

According to the hakkô ichiu ideology, Japan would become a beacon of world peace and Confucian
wisdom,
1729
Kato, Yamagata, and Hirohito.
1730
Ito and Yanagita.
1731
Hirohito, Ito, Yamagata, and Kato.
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Asia, it gradually decreased its political, economic and cultural ties with the West and
increased them with its Asian sphere of influence. Japan slowly became more aggressive
toward its neighbors. Though the West was the international provider of the knowledge
that Japan craved for its survival in the early to mid- Meiji period, as well as Japan’s
chief threat, now the Western powers were seen as Japan’s chief obstacle to wealth,
power and survival in Asia. While Japan’s military exercised influence over Japan’s
politics, especially during war, this influence greatly increased in the 1930s, with
devastating impacts on Japan’s international relations, even on the economic and cultural
levels, with its empire and Asian neighbors.
Economically, Japan’s trade and economic ties with the empire and Asia greatly
increased during this period. Economic factors and survival were among the main factors
contributing to Japan’s involvement in Asia. Most of the trade, development and
economic activity with the colonies were carried out mainly for the benefit of Japan.
Though Japan had significant trade relations with several Western nations, increasing
political tensions toward the end of the period strained these ties. The withdrawal of the
Western powers from East Asia during World War I helped increase Japan’s ties with the
mainland as it strove to supply the needs of Asian markets. Through the 1920s, Japan
quickly mastered large-scale industrial production and trade with the rise of the zaibatsu
and major trading companies. Increasing trade with the colonies further cemented its ties
with Asia. In the 1930s, the increasingly militarized nature of Japan’s economy and its
colonial ties meant that the colonies would also be leashed to Japan’s wartime fate.
Japan’s cultural ties with the West continued to be great, though direct ties
decreased in the 1930s and 1940s. Intellectual influences in many areas were strong,
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though the totalitarianism of the Japanese government in the 1930s reduced their impact.
Cultural tensions with the United States over immigration increased general hostility
between the two nations, reinforcing to some Japanese that the United States and other
Western nations were fundamentally racist. This was one more factor encouraging Japan
to cast its gaze to the East, not the West, for the future. Japan’s cultural relations with
neighbors like China and Korea were extensive during the period, and filled with tension.
Though teachers from the West exercised decisive influence in Japan until the 1930s, two
other groups of foreigners in Japan, the Chinese and the Koreans, experienced intense
discrimination.
Through its expanding empire, Japan exercised increasing influence on the lives
of other Asians, economically, culturally and politically. The influence of jingoistic,
imperialistic ideologies in Japan also increased. The Japanese government heavily
promoted these ideologies, which were economically motivated but culturally tinged by
racism. They reinforced the worldviews promoted by the state, encouraging the Japanese
public to support its extremist actions. As Japan’s economic and political ties with its
colonies increased, it attempted to impose Japanese identity on them, through language,
education, citizenship, State Shinto, and the military draft, but the colonized were not
given full political rights. Examining the cultural conditions in colonies such as Korea
and Taiwan under Japanese imperialism, we see that Japanese rule was often oppressive,
in Korea, to the extreme. The ultimate irony was that Japan’s non-Western colonialism
was just as exploitive and violent as the West’s was.
In sum, in Chapter 8, Japan represents both an example of and an exception to
internationalization. It is a good example in that it actively, aggressively exercised
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domination and control over its weaker neighbors, with broad cultural, economic and
political impacts upon them. Japan is somewhat an exception in that it was not a Western
power, and the definition assumes that acts of aggression that occur as non-Western
regions enter the global economy will be committed by Western nations. This is not
always the case, as seen in Japan’s actions in Asia at this time, and in contemporary
China’s powerful economic interventions in Africa and Latin America in the 2000s. Also,
Japan did not passively react to the threat of the West, but aggressively and assertively
responded on many levels. In these ways, Japan does not fit the conventional definition of
internationalization.
What, if anything, do we see in the historical and worldview evidence presented
here about how Japanese spirituality and religion may have affected policies during this
period? While this chapter has fewer references than some previous chapters, above I
noted how spirituality and nationalism mixed in the views of both Hirohito and
Yanagita.1732 Hirohito’s mixing of spirituality and politics blinded him on the effects of
Japanese actions in China and other overseas regions in the 1930s,1733 and he supported
nationalistic, spiritual ideologies such as State Shinto and hakkô ichiu in reaction to the
external cultural influences that he felt threatened Japan. The government used
spirituality and spiritual values in national education and State Shinto to increase citizen
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Remember how Hirohito and his court emphasized the connections of nationalism and spirituality in
the enthronement ceremonies (in 1928) (Bix, Hirohito), and how Yanagita connected ujigami spirituality
and the emperor with true Japanese (national) identity. Hirohito also assumed that state-defined ideologies
such as State Shinto represented who Japanese really were. In addition, he was surrounded by nationalistic
and spiritual input in his education and upbringing, greatly affecting his future policy stances and
outcomes.
1733
See my comments in Chapter 9 on Hirohito’s attitude toward Japan’s actions in China in the late 1930s.
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support for militaristic policies, and to minimize resistance to them.1734 In the policy
lessons offered above, I argued that based on the Japanese experience in this period,
while the state of a developing country should not endorse any religion, positive spiritual
values, apart from the state, can sometimes encourage a nation to seek humble paths of
service in the international arena. This is not what happened in Japan in this era.
Japan’s leaders also used material means (military technologies, industries, and
aggression) to try to transform Japan’s external environment—to expand Japan’s
overseas influence, control, wealth, and to help “defend” Asia against Western
encroachment. Japan also used these material means to gain access to additional
territories and natural resources for “defense” purposes. These actions were also justified
in terms of the benefits that Japanese influence would bring these newly conquered
regions. Yanagita did not concur with these actions. Instead, he argued that Japan must
use material means (regional industries and agriculture) to defend its indigenous rural
culture and spirituality, what he saw as the foundation of Japanese culture, identity, and
survival, against the flood of Western material and spiritual products (technology and
culture). In reality, the aggressive material actions of the Japanese state, undergirded by
forced acceptance of State Shinto in conquered territories and Japan itself, greatly
alienated foreign populations against Japan, and nearly destroyed both.
What are the implications of possible conflicts between views of spirituality and
science and similar issues for policy matters in this period? What emerges is that the
main leaders studied here, including Hirohito and Yanagita, and the Japanese
1734

Earlier in this chapter I also noted how Bix argues that Japan’s aggressive military and the “religiously
charged” throne helped fuel its invasive actions in China and elsewhere in the 1930s (Bix, Hirohito, 310312).
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government, did not see essential conflicts between spiritual and material concerns,
including nationalism, patriotism, and encouraging citizen support for state goals. These
leaders and the Japanese state saw no essential conflict in drawing on either material or
spiritual tools to accomplish their purposes. Again these seem to be manifestations of the
practical Japanese attitude toward spirituality, to use any means necessary, spiritual or
material, to accomplish important, pragmatic goals. In actuality, the Flaw of the Excluded
Middle does not seem to be at work here. The conflict between Western and Japanese
values is of much greater concern for these leaders than any conflict between the spiritual
and material realms.
What are the possible effects of these issues for Japanese aid? Though leaders of
this era were not afraid to consider spiritual and material issues in tandem, according the
constitutionally mandated separation of religion and state in contemporary Japan, the
state does not routinely consider religious issues, unless they explicitly affect policy
matters, as in the case of the Aum Shinrikyo terrorist attack on the Tokyo subway system
in 1995, and the continuing controversy over the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo.1735 But as I
noted in the previous chapter’s conclusion, religion and spirituality are increasingly
important features in contemporary international relations. More scholars are beginning
to investigate the implications of these issues, and how they can be handled.1736 How the
issue of religion and spirituality may affect contemporary Japanese aid policy, and what
might be done to equip Japanese policymakers to better handle this aspect of Japanese
aid, will be addressed in Chapter 9.

1735
1736

I have referred to both of these cases elsewhere in the dissertation.
For example, see the discussion on books on religion and international affairs in Chapter 1.
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Part Four
Conclusions
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Chapter 9
Conclusions, Part I: Key Findings
Introduction
In this chapter, I offer final comments on several important subjects and
questions explored at length in earlier chapters. I will consider key findings on the three
key research questions of the dissertation and the working hypothesis. As a reminder,
these questions concern lessons from Japan’s historical experiences and leaders’
worldviews of technology, development and foreign relations for contemporary Japanese
aid policy (1850 to 1945), whether the concepts of “modernization,” internationalization,
and translative adaptation present an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with
technology and development, and the possible effects of spirituality and religion on
Japan’s contemporary aid policies. In the conclusion of the chapter, I review and explore
primary implications of these key findings for contemporary aid policy and international
affairs in Japan and beyond, including lessons from the Japanese case on religion and
international development cooperation.
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Lessons from Worldviews and Experiences with Technology, Development, and
Foreign Relations (1850 to 1945) for Current Japanese Foreign Aid Policies
The first key question of the dissertation is: how have Japan’s experiences with
technology, development and foreign relations (and key leaders’ worldviews of those
issues) from 1850 to 1945 affected its current foreign aid policies? What conclusions
about these impacts can we draw from the research in this dissertation? Is the working
hypothesis of this dissertation true, that Japan’s experience (seen in the beliefs of several
key leaders) somehow has affected its current aid policies? Third, what lessons for
current aid can be drawn from those views and experience? Of course the effect of
prewar trends on today’s aid policies has been greatly mediated by what happened after
1945, but in-depth consideration of postwar factors must be saved for another study.
Concerning the impacts of Japan’s experiences and leaders’ views (1850 to
1945) on current Japanese ODA policies, I will divide my comments into three broad
categories: cultural/social issues; politics, foreign policy and political relations; and
economic policy issues. On each issue, I will begin by commenting on lessons emerging
from Japan’s historical experiences. General remarks about the influence of leaders’
views and later ODA will be found at the end of each issue section.
On historical experiences, I will comment on general trends, and then on
possible sources for key concepts in contemporary Japanese aid policy. On a general
level, on many issues that emerge in Japan’s historical experiences, what Japan’s ODA
policy is today often seems related to what it should not be, based on negative
experiences of Japan in the prewar period. In some cases, positive prewar experiences
seem to have influenced, to some degree, what Japan’s aid does or seeks to do today. But
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negative lessons seem common, especially in the cultural and political areas. On
economic issues, historical influences seem more positive.
Sociocultural Issues
On cultural/social issues, policies based on negative results from prewar
experiences include the negative role of nationalist, propagandistic development
ideologies and their impact on Japanese education from the 1880s through 1945, and the
failure of the Japanese government to concretely consider and enact policies to
effectively protect Japanese culture from negative Western influences in the prewar
period. Regarding nationalistic propaganda, from 1850 to 1895, the Japanese government
developed and then imposed State Shinto on the nation as a mandatory spiritual/patriotic
practice, starting in the education system. This damaged human rights and freedoms, and
helped justify extremist military policies and civilian sacrifices on behalf of the nation in
World War II. Though the government studied and considered the important role of
religion and spirituality in economic development, this resulted in repressive, coercive
policies. It also utilized several other ideologies, such as the emperor ideology, for similar
purposes.
On protecting Japanese culture, several leading leaders and thinkers, such as
Fukuzawa, Mori, and Yanagita, reflected deeply on Western technology and culture, and
how they should be adopted by Japan. But in the prewar period, from the early Meiji
period through the 1920s, the state first placed priority on national economic
development and trade promotion, and through 1945, on industrialization and
mobilization to support Japan’s increasing militarization. In these pressures for national
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survival and expansion in the hostile global environment, serious government policy for
protecting Japan’s heart and soul got lost.
The government also failed to enact effective policies that proactively enhanced
the nation’s adjustment to the massive social and economic changes resulting from the
rapid economic development and reform processes. As the nation moved closer to World
War II in the 1930s and 1940s, government repression against culture got worse. The
massive mobilization of society in support of militarization and the war effort at various
times, during the Russo-Japanese War and especially World War II, had grave costs, both
economic and social, though the nation enjoyed a huge economic and cultural boom
during and right after World War I.1737
While Japan developed important economic infrastructure in long-term colonies
such as Korea and Taiwan, it also imposed elements of Japanese identity, including
language, State Shinto, and education on those colonies, so its presence was often
resented. The idea of more “advanced” countries “helping” weaker ones was strong in
Japan’s imperialistic ideologies, and remains so in today’s global foreign aid policies,
even from Japan. “Helping” and “aid” may sometimes hint at national ethnocentrism and
“superiority,” even from non-Western donors such as Japan and China, toward other
(non-Western) nations.
On the positive side, regarding cultural/social issues, from the late Tokugawa
period forward, the Japanese state took numerous efforts to help Japan import many
crucial areas of technology and other areas of knowledge needed for the nation’s survival,
1737

I discussed the positive economic effects of World War I in Japan, from acting as chief industrial
supplier to the Asian markets and colonies that the West had fled, and also the cultural stimulation during
the Taisho democracy movement, in earlier chapters.
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including sending scholars and missions abroad, and importing foreign experts, books
and technology into Japan. As noted earlier, Japan had tremendous cultural and
geographic barriers to overcome to master this knowledge, and what it accomplished as
an LDC in the late 1800s and early 1900s was truly amazing. Cultural barriers greatly
affected the effective transfer of foreign knowledge into Japan in the Meiji era and later,
creating a great chasm between what Japan was and what it needed to access foreign
knowledge in order to effectively change and develop. These barriers are equally great, if
not greater, for today’s developing societies. This is a major issue in ODA and
development policy, and there are certainly valuable lessons for other LDCs to be gained
from Japan’s transfer experience.1738 While interaction with foreign cultures and
technologies greatly stimulated Japanese politics, economy, and society through the
1920s, the isolationist turn of Japanese society from the 1930s to 1945 had a highly
negative effect on these processes.
Regarding possible sources for specific concepts in contemporary Japanese aid
policy, on sociocultural issues, main concepts can be organized into four main themes: 1)
how aid reflects Japan’s own experience and culture; 2) how aid should be customized
for each aid recipient, and local conditions respected;1739 3) using aid to enhance Japan’s
face or (global) image; and 4) possible conflicts between Japan’s development/aid goals
and the West’s.1740

1738

Many of these lessons are explored further in Hayashi, Japanese Experience.
As noted earlier, these ideas are a variant on the concept of translative adaptation.
1740
When I say the West’s, I mean the goals of the currently Western-dominated global aid and
development agenda.
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Table 9.1 Sources for Contemporary Japanese Aid Concepts: Sociocultural Issues
Note on sources: PRW: pre-World War II sources and influences are likely present here.
PTW: post-World War II sources and influences are likely present.
Idea/Concept

Thematic area(s) Possible source(s)

Offer aid based on lessons
from the Japanese and Asian
development models

How aid
reflects Japan’s
culture,
experience
How aid
reflects Japan’s
culture,
experience
How aid
reflects Japan’s
culture,
experience
How aid
reflects Japan’s
culture,
experience
How aid
reflects Japan’s
culture,
experience
How aid
reflects Japan’s
culture,
experience
How aid
reflects Japan’s
culture,
experience

Long-term regional emphasis
on Asia
Japan’s aid stresses goals of
self-help, reliance through
mostly giving loans, requestbased aid
Many goals1741 for Japan’s aid
reflect Japan’s political
culture, development and IR
experience
Size of Japan’s aid budget
usually parallels its overall
economy
Philosophy of “pragmatism”
and “opportunism” in Japan’s
aid
Long-term goals:
commercialism and self-help,
first for Japan
Goals from Japan’s private
sector: influential in ODA
policy
Japan’s ODA often reflects
competing goals of different
public ministries, agencies
Global 1742 poverty reduction
goals may conflict with Japan
1741

How aid
reflects Japan’s
culture,
experience
How aid
reflects Japan’s
culture,
experience
How aid
reflects Japan’s

Japan’s prewar, postwar dev. experiences,
Asia’s recent experiences. PRW, PTW.
Japan’s historical, cultural, geographic
linkages to Asia. Historically, Japan had the
closest economic links with these countries.
PRW, PTW.
Japan’s work culture of self-help,
perseverance and hard work; their role in its
own development. PRW, PTW.
PC: strong state involvement; dev: 1 st nonWestern country to industrialize; IR: Japan
has grown most through peaceful trade, not
aggression. PRW, PTW.
For most countries, size of ODA budget is
partly determined by state of overall
economy. PTW.
Likely reflects the strong business sense and
spirit of hard work in Japanese culture since
pre-World War II times. PRW, PTW.
Likely reflects the strong business sense and
spirit of hard work in Japanese culture since
pre-World War II times, putting Japan’s
national interests and survival first. PRW,
PTW.
Japan’s political and corporate cultures that
often mix public, private sectors; tremendous
wealth of Japan’s private sector. Mainly
PTW.
Inevitability of bureaucratic politics shaping
aid’s outcomes. PTW.
Economic infrastructure goals reflect Japan’s
own development experience (since Meiji

These goals include the presence of ODA loans, request-based aid, and various political and economic
goals in Japan’s aid program.
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ODA’s economic
infrastructure/growth
promotion goals
Implicit goal: to not mix
religion with Japan’s aid,
especially not overseas

culture,
experience;
Conflicts:
Japan’s, global
aid agendas
How aid
reflects Japan’s
culture,
experience

Specific goal to customize aid
for each country (emerged
since 2000)

Customizing
aid for local
conditions

Goal for Japan’s aid to be
more aware of ground level
conditions

Customizing
aid for local
conditions

Goal for Japan’s aid to not
interfere in recipients’ internal
affairs (i.e. politics, religion)

Customizing
aid for local
conditions

Goal to increase aid to Africa
(1970s, 1990s, 2000s)

Enhancing
Japan’s face,
image through
aid
Enhancing
Japan’s face,
image through
aid
Enhancing
Japan’s face,
image through
aid

Goal for Japan and its aid to
be development “bridge”
between different global
regions
Domestic/international image
problems: Japan no longer an
econ. superpower, scandals,
less support from business,
LDP, pressure by Western aid
agenda
Goal to greatly increase
Japan’s aid budget
MDGs seem to conflict with
many of Japan’s ODA aid
philosophies
1742

Enhancing
Japan’s face,
image through
aid
Conflicts:
Japan’s, global
aid agendas

era); tradition of charity (beyond one’s
family) has no long historical or cultural
background in Japan. Especially PRW.
Long tradition of separation of religion and
state in Japan (except for 1868-1945), 1947
Constitution that mandates this separation,
postwar desire not to intervene in the internal
affairs of other states (based on negative
experience of prewar imperialism). PRW,
PTW.
Goal in line with global aid agenda, and
concept of translative adaptation, based on
Japan’s own unique dev. experience. PRW,
PTW.
In line with current global aid agenda goals
for improved social development and
recipient participative aid approaches;
somewhat in line with translative adaptation
concept. PRW, PTW.
Based on Japan’s negative experiences in pre1945 imperialism, negative reactions of other
states, postwar global standard in int’l law.
PRW, PTW.
In line with global aid humanitarian agenda;
desire to impress the West and to compete
with China for African resources. PTW.
Desire to impress other nations by serving as
global leader in aid, belief that Japan’s unique
experience as 1st non-Western nation to
develop can help other LDCs. PRW, PTW.
Strong sense of face, reputation and honor and
honor in Japanese culture. Shame: a major
theme in the culture. Desire for honor of the
nation. Mainly PTW.
Desire for Japan’s national honor, strong
national concept of face, recycle huge budget
surpluses, win LDC support for Japan’s
foreign policy goals. Mostly PTW.
Difference in aid philosophies and experience.
Japan’s experience: successful economic
development preceded its capacity to address

Here I mean the poverty reduction and alleviation goals of the global, Western-dominated development
and aid agendas.
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its social development needs, but MDG goals
mainly focus on relieving poverty, other
problem areas, and using concrete measures
first, without much consideration of
stimulating growth. PRW, PTW.

From the above table comparing sociocultural issues of Japanese ODA with
their possible sources, several possible trends emerge. In the main ideas from
contemporary Japanese ODA identified here, possible causes in both the prewar and
postwar periods often occur. It is likely because this category emphasizes cultural and
historical connections. In the largest subcategory (“how aid reflects Japan’s culture and
experience”), possible prewar and postwar causation also appears often. In the third
largest subcategory, “customizing aid for local conditions,” a highly cultural one, all of
the ideas have likely occurrences in both the prewar and postwar periods. In the
sociocultural area, there are only a few key ideas whose source(s) mainly or exclusively
occurred in the postwar period, and only one idea I identified whose source mainly
happened in the prewar era. On key ideas on sociocultural issues in Japanese ODA in the
early 2000s, it appears that there may be a fairly high degree of historical continuity of
influence or similarity of occurrence between the prewar and postwar periods.
Concerning the relationship of leaders’ views/ideas on sociocultural issues and
later ODA policies, an important theme in sociocultural concepts in current Japanese aid
policy identified above is how Japan’s aid reflects its own culture and historical
experiences. Key current ideas in the sociocultural area on Japan’s aid reflecting this
theme include the fact that some aspects of Japan’s aid are based on lessons from the
Japanese development model, Japan’s long-term emphasis on aid to Asia, encouraging
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values of self-help and self-reliance in recipients, and an emphasis on economic
infrastructure. Japan’s development model stresses, in part, a primary emphasis on
economic growth and the development of industrial infrastructure. Among the leaders
studied, Fukuzawa in particular stressed this emphasis. Ito, Yanagita, and Hirohito
stressed close relations with Asia. Fukuzawa and Mori stressed the necessity of importing
superior Western technology and knowledge so that Japan might once again become selfreliant economically and politically, and remain independent.
On the theme of customizing aid, key ideas include the goal to customize
Japan’s aid for each recipient’s unique conditions. The one leader here whose thought
represents this genre is Yanagita. I am not sure if Maegawa Keiji drew directly on
Yanagita in developing the concept of translative adaptation, but since Yanagita is a
leading pioneer of Japanese ethnography, it is quite possible.
On the “enhancing Japan’s (international) image through aid” theme, important
ideas include the desire for Japan to be a development “bridge” between different
regions, and the desire for Japan to be perceived as great. Ito, Yanagita and Hirohito all
embody, to some extent, the desire for Japan to encourage and/or lead fellow Asian
countries, in Yanagita’s case, quite positively. The first two leaders also embodied the
idea, in some respects, that Japan, as the superior Asian power at the time, could serve as
a model and example of development and modernization for the other Asian countries,
and help them to develop. All seven leaders studied in this project felt a pride and belief
in Japan’s greatness, even if the West had temporarily overshadowed it.
Concerning the theme of conflicts between the Japanese and global agendas for
aid, above I noted that many of the MDGs seem to conflict with Japan’s own aid
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philosophies, especially with Japan’s historic stress that economic growth must come
before concern over social and cultural issues. Fukuzawa was greatly concerned about
cultural issues, and about how to translate Western technology into Japan’s context. But
overall, he emphasized the importance of economics as the single most important area of
knowledge that Japan must master to survive.
In general, on sociocultural issues, all the leaders from 1850 to 1895 struggled
with how Japan could effectively import Western technology and knowledge needed for
development without compromising Japanese culture and identity. Many of their views of
society and social change were colored by “scientific,” evolutionary thought. Similar
notions of change and “progress” have also been embodied, historically, in most concepts
of development. Science also colored some, not all, of these leaders’ views of religion
and spirituality related to development. Several of them identified important spiritual and
cultural values they believed to be important for encouraging successful development in
Japanese society.
Although current Japanese (and international) law tends to mandate the
separation of religion and state, more international development bodies and international
organizations are considering possible contributions religion and religious values can
make to international affairs, conflict resolution, and international development
cooperation. Yet the global/Western international affairs and international development
establishments tend to suffer from the Flaw of the Excluded Middle in their worldviews,
without knowing it. In their formalized legal and political structures, to a great extent,
Japan’s leaders do too, though in their daily lives and practice, most everyday Japanese
(and many other non-Westerners) do not. Though spirituality may naturally connect with
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daily life, practice, and worldviews for most non-Westerners, separation of religion and
the state at formal, legal, and institutional levels seems important. If not, an LDC may
make mistakes similar to those Japan made with State Shinto before World War II, a case
where one of the state’s chosen development ideologies, based on spirituality, became a
weapon of coercion that damaged the religion, the nation overall, its empire, and Japan’s
future international relations.
A rather unique, important idea that these Meiji era leaders supported was the
conviction that Japan must import, study and master selected items of foreign technology
and knowledge in order to survive. In practice, they and many other Japanese struggled
with how they could successfully interact with the foreign carriers of this knowledge,
interpersonally and intellectually. This was a huge struggle for Japanese in this era, and
today, many other LDCs also struggle with overcoming cultural barriers to successful
technology and knowledge transfers for development.
Sociocultural struggles similar to those seen in the views of the leaders studied
for 1850 to 1895 emerge in the views of leaders studied for 1895 to 1945. The leaders for
the latter period, Yanagita and Hirohito, strongly embodied spiritual concepts in their
general and sociocultural worldviews, Yanagita on the levels of daily and local life, and
Hirohito on the levels of imperial duty, personal practice, and the role of spirituality in
national life. While Yanagita saw foreign technology as a threat to Japanese cultural
integrity and survival, Hirohito viewed it as a means to secure Japan’s survival in the
hostile global environment, through military and industrial strength. Yanagita, through
his years of ethnographic study, developed sophisticated concepts about the nature of
Japanese identity and culture that exceeded the understandings of most other Japanese
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scholars and policymakers of his era. He believed both were based on local spiritual
practices, rural culture, and social and kin-related bonds.
In contrast, similar to the practices of other nations like France, the United
States, Great Britain and others, from 1895 to 1945, the Japanese government’s process
of encouraging nationalism and national unity for Japan’s development and national
security presumed that local and regional differences must be minimized, and the entire
“nation” united around common bonds of such things as language, ethnicity, identity,
geography/particular places, patriotism, ideology, and in some cases, spirituality.
Hirohito and most of Japan’s leaders supported this top-down approach to nationalism
and social change that generally failed to appreciate or nurture local differences, as
Yanagita wished. At the national level, the Japanese state attempted to create a national
identity for all Japanese that made them unique from all other countries, incorporating
tools as State Shinto and the emperor ideology. Hirohito was thoroughly trained in,
supported and participated in these efforts.
On Japan’s external cultural relations (1895 to 1945), Yanagita stressed that
Japanese must know themselves, and that the Japanese government must support policies
for local cultural self-awareness and protection as the basis for Japan’s success in other
international policy arenas. The government did not acknowledge these proposals, but
advocated nationalistic, conservative views similar to those of Hirohito and of many
other conservative leaders. Hirohito and the government were wary of the influence of
Western decadence on Japanese culture. While Yanagita stressed strengthening Japanese
cultural integrity from the bottom up, Hirohito and the government focused on protecting
it from the top down.
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Among the valuable lessons here for LDCs are that, as they seek to develop, the
threats to their cultural integrity and survival will be great, as they were for Japan. LDCs
need basic skills in ethnographic study and knowledge, so that they may know
themselves and their own societies. If they do not, how can they proactively protect their
own social integrity during development? Top down approaches did not work for Japan,
nor will they work for other LDCs. LDCs have also struggled profoundly with
constructing their own national identities, especially many nations in Africa, where their
borders are more arbitrary and artificial than Japan’s. Adopting coercive or
propagandistic ideologies of nationalism, such as State Shinto and hakkô ichiu, ultimately
damaged Japan, and will damage other LDCs too. Today, Japan’s and global ODA
policies should seek to incorporate cultural knowledge, awareness and ethnographic
research skills into their ODA and development policies. While the global aid agenda is
now generally encouraging this (using ground level research skills for development),
Japan’s long-term aid emphasis on economic infrastructure seems to contradict it. While
developing these capabilities is not easy or cost-free, their use is more consonant with
customized approaches to development and the principles of translative adaptation that
many Japanese development experts advocate.1743 Their application, however valuable,
does not seem easy.1744

1743

Ohno and Ohno, Japanese Views; Maegawa, “Continuity of Cultures.”
On the issue of applying translative adaptation, see “Vietnam’s Industrialization Strategy in the Age of
Globalization: Overview and Key Proposals (Main Page);” http://www.grips.ac.jp/module/vietnam/
main.html; accessed 3 October 2008; and “Vietnam’s Industrialization Strategy in the Age of
Globalization: Translative Adaptation”; http://www.grips.ac.jp/module/vietnam/ materials/ adaptation.htm;
accessed 3 October 2008.
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Political Issues
Regarding general trends in Japan’s political issues from 1850 to 1945, most of
the lessons and impacts emerging here for ODA come from negative experiences. On the
domestic front, the Japanese state tended to turn toward repression and nationalistic
ideologies to shore up support for the state, to unify the nation politically and socially for
development, and to build the nation. Reliance on repression and negative ideologies
intensified as the nation moved closer to World War II. In promoting political reform in
LDCs, ODA policies should encourage political diversity, along with the goals of
building national unity and freedom. To help LDCs evolve a civil society that can help
put a check on repressive tendencies of the state, it is good if ODA policies for political
development encourage the growth of democracy. Democracy was too weak in Japan
from the 1920s to 1945, and the end result was disastrous. Concerning positive lessons
from Japanese politics (1850 to 1945) for today’s ODA policies, conservative political
and strong state approaches allowed Japan to develop rapidly. This has often been true in
other East Asian states from the twentieth century until today. ODA policies should allow
conservative (non-repressive) politics in LDCs, and acknowledge that they may be
positive for encouraging development.
In its political relations with Asia, Japan was generally hostile. It repeated many
mistakes of Western imperialists. In its ODA policies today, Japan seeks to not repeat
past mistakes of hostility and aggression. It also often refuses to offer aid to states that
have large arms build-ups (China is a notable exception). From 1895 to 1945, two major
dangers emerged concerning Japan’s international relations. In my opinion, leaders’
faulty worldviews damaged their policy decisions, resulting in faulty policy outcomes.
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Second, unhampered military power damaged both Japanese society and Japan’s
international relations. To try to control these problems in other LDCs, ODA policies
should encourage the development of democratic accountability in LDC political
systems; at a minimum, frequent change in political administrations, and limits on
military power in society.
Japan also had mixed success in policies for it colonies and conquered
territories, some positive results, and many negative ones. One positive result was the
economic infrastructure Japan developed and left in many longer-term colonies, such as
Taiwan and Korea. Negatively, Japan often turned to political repression in the colonies
and, during wartime, gross oppression and violence in conquered territories. This
generated angry reaction in most of the territories, and continues to often hamper Japan’s
international relations with them today. Imperialism is universally condemned in
international law today. In both imperialism and foreign aid, “advanced” countries have
tended to view colonies or developing countries as inferior, believing they have a duty to
lead and teach them. It is very hard to break this pattern. ODA policies should seek to
discourage such relations that hint at dependency. Rather, advanced countries, such as
Japan, should seek to serve and learn from LDCs, not just teach them.
On possible sources for specific concepts in contemporary Japanese aid policy
for issues in politics, main concepts may be organized into four main groups: 1) aid for
strategic goals, both political and economic; 2) Japan’s external political relations; 3) the
desire to cooperate with global aid agenda goals; and 4) goals to reform Japan’s
government and its ODA programs.
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Table 9.2 Sources for Contemporary Japanese Aid Concepts: Political Issues
Note on sources: PRW: pre-World War II sources, influences present here. PTW: postWorld War II sources, influences present here.
Idea/Concept
Japan becomes assertive,
denying/giving aid based on its
goals, behavior of other states.

Thematic area(s)
Aid for strategic
(political,
economic) goals

Increase global distribution of
Japan’s ODA

Aid for strategic
(political,
economic) goals

Political goals emerge in Japan’s
ODA: promoting democracy,
human rights, etc (early 1990s)

Aid for strategic
(political,
economic) goals

Contribute to world peace and
peacekeeping through
contributing to global economic
infrastructure (1980s, 1990s and
after)
Use aid to help other countries,
build Japan’s global reputation,
and solve economic problems at
home (1980s)
ODA: strongly connected with
Japan’s economic interests,
security and development
(since early 1950s)
Goal of Japan’s ODA: to
support Japan’s national
interests

Aid for strategic
(political,
economic) goals

Goal to vastly increase Japan’s
aid budget

Aid for strategic
(political,
economic) goals
Japan’s external
political
relations

Goal to use aid to improve
Japan’s image/relations with the
US/other Western allies, partly
by partially supporting their aid
agendas
Use aid to build positive
relations with other Asian
and distant nations, to emerge

Aid for strategic
(political,
economic) goals
Aid for strategic
(political,
economic) goals
Aid for strategic
(political,
economic) goals

Japan’s external
political
relations
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Possible source(s)
Similar to prewar Japanese assertiveness
in foreign policy and acting in its national
interests, Japan now wishes to pursue its
own security goals, not be a “political
dwarf.” PRW, PTW.
New Japanese foreign policy
assertiveness is similar to its prewar
assertiveness, desire for peaceful trade,
enhance Japan’s global image, honor,
obtain resources. PRW, PTW.
Increased assertiveness in Japan’s foreign
policy (like prewar behavior), enhance
Japan’s global image. Some PRW, mainly
PTW.
Peaceful global environment is key for
Japan’s trade and prosperity, goal for
Japan’s national survival (like prewar
survival goals). Some PRW, mainly
PTW.
By helping other countries, Japan also
helps itself: global prestige, recycle
surpluses, win support for its foreign
policy goals. PTW.
These postwar goals: like Japan’s primary
prewar national goals (national survival,
based first on economics). PRW, PTW.
Japan: not ashamed to put national
interests first, both prewar and postwar
eras. Postwar era: much concern about
what other nations think. PRW, PTW.
Increase Japan’s international prestige,
influence, markets, resources, support for
its foreign policy goals. Mostly PTW.
Increase Japan’s international prestige
with Western allies, Asian countries;
decrease foreign hostility against Japan’s
trade, investment. PTW.
Through aid, gain better relations with
Asian, distant nations, gain better access
to trade, resources, win more support for

as regional/global leader, join
UN Security Council
Use aid to build Japan’s general
int’l reputation, security

Japan’s external
political
relations

Support global aid agenda’s
political goals: promote
democracy, human rights,
peace, etc

Cooperate with
global aid agenda
goals

Elevate additional global aid
agenda goals in Japan’s ODA:
humanitarian, environment,
famine goals (1990s)
Japan seeks some degree of
aid coordination with other
aid donors (from 1980s)
Goal for increased aid
cooperation, assertiveness
through multilateral and IFI
channels: “ideas, not just
money” since the 1990s

Cooperate with
global aid agenda
goals

Goal for Japanese aid to become
more aware of ground level
conditions

Cooperate with
global aid agenda
goals

Goal for Japan to better
coordinate aid with other
bilateral (especially Western)
donors
Goal to increase aid to Africa
(late 1970s, 1990s, 2000s)

Cooperate with
global aid agenda
goals

Goal for Japan’s aid to serve
as a development “bridge”
between world regions

Cooperate with
global aid agenda
goals

Global poverty reduction goals
may conflict with Japan ODA’s
economic infrastructure/growth
promotion goals

Cooperate with
global aid agenda
goals

Cooperate with
global aid agenda
goals
Cooperate with
global aid agenda
goals

Cooperate with
global aid agenda
goals
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Japan’s foreign policy goals. Mainly
PTW.
Use aid to enhance Japan’s int’l image,
support for Japan’s foreign policy goals,
create more options for trade, getting
resources. PTW.
Increased assertiveness in Japan’s foreign
policy (like prewar behavior), enhance
Japan’s global image. Increased public
pressure for accountability, desire to use
aid to actually solve world issues, do
global good. Mainly PTW.
Enhance Japan’s international prestige,
Japanese public’s desire to contribute to
global good, int’l stability. PTW.
Enhance Japan’s int’l image, increase
aid’s efficiency, please Japan’s allies,
fellow donors. PTW.
Desire of Japan to increase its int’l
prestige, influence, image; desire to
contribute more to success of int’l
development by contributing from its own
development successes/experience.
Somewhat PRW, mostly PTW.
Desire of Japan to comply with int’l aid
agenda, enhance its int’l prestige;
somewhat in line with translative
adaptation concept. PRW, PTW.
Desire to partially comply with demands
of Western allies/global aid community,
enhance Japan’s int’l image, improve
global aid to the degree possible. PTW.
In line with global aid humanitarian
agenda; desire to impress the West and to
compete with China for African
resources. Mainly PTW.
Desire to impress other nations by serving
as global leader in aid, belief that Japan’s
unique experience as 1st non-Western
nation to develop can help other LDCs.
PRW, PTW.
Economic infrastructure goals reflect
Japan’s own development experience
(since Meiji era); tradition of charity
(beyond one’s family) has no long
historical or cultural background in Japan.
Especially PRW.

Goals to increase efficiency,
accountability, openness and
accomplishments of Japan’s
aid, from early 1990s
Goal to cooperate more with
Japanese public, civil society,
NGOs, from early 1990s
The ideas in Japan’s aid, and
underlying its aid philosophies,
are an integral factor in
determining its capacity for
innovation and reform, among
other things (Rix 1993)

Governmental,
aid reforms
Governmental,
aid reforms
Governmental,
aid reforms

Domestic and int’l pressures for reform of
Japan’s aid; aid policymakers’ fight for
aid programs’ prestige, budget, public
support, survival. PTW.
Domestic public pressure, need to make
Japan’s aid more flexible, open, reform
pressures. PTW.
Ideas: one important source for Japan
ODA’s policy decisions, goals, outcomes,
and its ability to change. PRW, PTW.

From this table comparing political issues in Japanese ODA with their possible
sources, we see that with most of the ideas, joint possible pre-World War II and postWorld War II causation occurs only a few times. This joint causation occurs the most
often in the “aid for strategic goals” subcategory. The ideas here are divided between
possible joint prewar and postwar sources, and mainly/only postwar sources. In the
“cooperation with the global aid agenda” subcategory, mainly/only post-World War II
causation occurs only a few times, while joint pre-, post- World War II causation and
mainly/only prewar causation occurs even less. The sole case of mainly/solely prewar
causation occurring within political issues happens in the “cooperation with the global aid
agenda” subcategory. So in political issues that concern primarily external politics, it
appears that postwar influences may predominate. Given the enormous political influence
of the United States on the Japanese political system in the postwar period, this should be
no surprise. Joint prewar/postwar influences occur most often in a subcategory (“aid for
strategic goals”) that tends to be heavily influenced by Japan’s domestic interests, which
seek to ensure Japan’s survival and to enhance its political interests in the international
system. While external influences such as the United States influence the issues of
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Japan’s aid system and its overall strategic goals to some degree, given the huge overall
American influence on Japan’s postwar political system, and the great changes that
occurred in the postwar structure of Japanese politics compared with the prewar system
(1868 to 1945), it is no surprise that occurrences of joint prewar/postwar causation and
mainly/solely prewar causation seem so low in the political issues area.
Regarding the relationship of leaders’ views/ideas on political issues (1850 to
1945) and later ODA policies, on a general level, in the first period (1850 to 1895), the
overall political climate, both internationally and in Japan, was conservative. Japan was
also conservative in its ideological climate. All five of the leaders studied for this period
(Fukuzawa, Mori, Ito, Yamagata and Kato) were highly supportive of Japanese
nationalism, a strong, effective state, and national unity. The need for a strong, effective
state, so important in Japan, is also crucial for LDCs, to help aid succeed. For all, Japan’s
national survival was the overarching goal. For that, Japan’s leaders scoured the globe to
determine the most culturally relevant political institutions and effective military
technologies needed to unify Japan and make it strong. There was also a need for the best
possible, most appropriate political knowledge to help both Japan grow. The need
remains for today’s LDCs. The leaders varied on their views of various issues, including
the appropriate pace for political reform, on how much the state should exercise its
power, how many freedoms should be allowed, and on the best type of foreign sources,
almost universally Western, for Japan’s political reforms (more liberal or more autocratic
sources). In Japan in this era, there were disagreements on many political issues and
sometimes on ideologies. There is a need, at some point, for agreement among a
developing society’s leaders about the most effective path for development. Even if there
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is agreement, the chosen approach must be appropriate for the society’s current
conditions. It must actually work, and be effective. Japan’s economic approaches worked
very well, though its political path went astray, and nearly destroyed the nation.
Japan’s political reforms (1850 to 1895) reflected its political and ideological
climate, as much of its aid does today. Japan’s overarching goal in the Meiji era was
national survival, and ultimately, it is today too (seemingly related to Japan’s perpetual
view of itself as a small, resource-poor nation). It is no surprise that aid should be
affected by this “do-or-die” mentality. As we have already observed, benefiting Japan
economically, politically (and enhancing its economic and political survival) has been
one of the key aspects of its aid. National survival is also often one of the key goals for
LDCs.
One also notices the strong influence of evolutionistic thought in some of these
leaders’ views of politics and the international system. At various points, evolutionistic
thought colors their thinking about political development and reforms, especially Kato’s.
This thought is similar to some bias present in the ODA and development programs of
Japan and other advanced countries, which often see themselves as superior. The bias
here toward political knowledge that incorporates scientific and technological knowledge
also reminds one the bias of today’s LDCs toward the same. But this latter bias is logical.
Science and technology formed an important basis for Japan’s survival, over the longterm, and also seem important for LDCs.
For these leaders (1850 to 1895), realism and Western thought commonly
influenced their views of international relations, and in several cases, evolutionism was
influential. Kato in particular was quite creative in how he combined political ideas of
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German Social Darwinism and evolutionism with Confucian thought to form new
concepts about the future of Japan’s international relations and global politics. All five
leaders acknowledged that Japan needed to borrow Western knowledge to survive in the
international system. All five borrowed various aspects of Western thought, science and
technology to explain and address what Japan should do politically and militarily to
survive in the Western-dominated international system. For Japan and today’s LDCs,
there is need to effectively import appropriate, expert, practical foreign knowledge, and
to effectively combine it with indigenous ideologies. This should strengthen the LDC’s
development process. It is also important not to distort indigenous ideologies as they are
remade for this new purpose, which is what happened with State Shinto, that they not
become too ethnocentric, violent, or ultranationalistic.
Three of the leaders’ views were influenced by concepts of religion and
morality, Kato’s in the most complex fashion.1745 All of these leaders looked down on the
rest of Asia, and saw Japan and the West as its superior. It is inevitable that a developing
society’s culture, including religion and spirituality, should at some level affect its
leaders’ views of everything, including international relations. Awareness of these issues
would be helpful in ODA policy, including Japan’s. The religion factor should be

1745

These comments relate to Meiji era leaders’ views of morality and religion, including the thought of
Kato that Japan needed more “scientific” morality. The Meiji state also desired to have more scientific
bases from which to intellectually promote Japan’s development. Perhaps these issues connect with the
desire of modern Japanese, from 1868 onward, to have “scientific” approaches for everything, including
development. This affects contemporary Japanese, who have “scientific” educations, use the latest
technologies, and who often practice Shinto and other spiritual rituals on a daily or regular basis. This may
be an interesting dichotomy. Does this relate to the Flaw of the Excluded Middle? Do we have a similar
dichotomy in the United States? Realistically, it is very possible to be both “scientific” and “spiritual” or
“religious” in one’s daily practices and worldview(s). It must also be possible for aid policy staff, including
those in Japan.
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included. If the overall effect of the indigenous spirituality is leaders’ emerging views of
international relations is negative, means should be determined in ODA policies to try to
counteract it.
Regarding the political thought of the leaders studied for 1895 to 1945
(Yanagita Kunio and Emperor Hirohito),1746 in a broad, though imperfect manner, each
may perhaps represent two major streams of political thought influential in early
twentieth century Japan, first, demands for democratic change and liberal political values
(Yanagita), and second, pressure for oligarchic, autocratic political control (Hirohito).1747
Yanagita worried that national political consolidation was trampling the rural solidarity
that he saw as the foundation of Japanese identity and unity, while Hirohito preferred
only limited democratic and popular input in politics. This contrast in views (between
democratic versus oligarchic control of politics) is also seen in the two leaders’ views of
political institutions, where they again supported similar positions to those they held on
overall domestic politics. This broad contrast is also seen between postwar Japanese
politics (more democratic), and prewar politics (more autocratic). This is also a major
theme in today’s ODA programs, both Japanese and global. Both seek to actively
encourage democratic development in LDCs, and to discourage autocratic trends.
On political ideologies, both Yanagita and Hirohito had generally conservative
viewpoints (especially Hirohito), often connected to Japanese identity, spirituality and
1746

I originally chose Yanagita because he deeply engaged several of the major themes of this project,
among others: how Japan should handle the massive influx of Western technology and culture, and how it
might develop without destroying itself. Hirohito was chosen because he was the most influential political
leader of the twentieth century, and is an excellent representative of the autocratic, oligarchic stream of
Japanese politics from the 1920s to 1945. Hirohito in particular was hugely influential on many
developments in Japanese politics toward the end of this era, both domestic and international.
1747
This does not include a third important stream of thought that was particularly influential among
intellectuals and in academia: Marxism, the trends of which I briefly discussed in earlier chapters.
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kinship, though in different ways. But Yanagita remained more populist and concerned
for local identities and solidarity. Hirohito also strongly embodied the heavily statesanctioned, highly influential ideologies of nationalism of this era, including State Shinto.
Though nationalism may be a natural trend in any LDC as it develops politically, the
propagandistic nationalism seen in prewar Japan (1930s and 1940s) should not be. ODA
policy should discourage this. Japanese ODA seeks to encourage democracy and human
rights, but also strives to not intervene in the internal affairs of LDCs.
While both Yanagita and Hirohito were willing to permit some mixing of
religion and politics (Hirohito, to an extreme degree), Yanagita was more cautious, and
did not support the unlimited influence of the emperor or State Shinto over Japanese
society and politics. His stance was much wiser. Japanese aid tries to not mix religion
with aid at all. This is safe, but some cognizance of the role of religion in the overall
development of LDCs would be wise, and could only help improve the quality of
Japanese aid.
On Japan’s external political relations and imperialism (1895 to 1945), views
are more complex, since I studied a slightly larger number of leaders on these issues.1748
Regarding Japan’s external politics, on foreign relations and the world, all the leaders’
views were mostly conservative, except Yanagita’s. Conservative political beliefs and
ideologies have also been dominant in postwar Japanese political culture and Japan’s
ODA culture.

1748

To repeat, on external political relations (1895 to 1945), I studied the views of Ito, Yamagata, Yanagita,
and Hirohito, and on imperialism issues (1895 to 1945), the views of Ito, Yamagata, Kato, Yanagita, and
Hirohito.
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All of the leaders supported Japan’s leadership in Asia to help other Asian
powers resist Western imperialism. Hirohito held the most hardened views of several
neighboring regions, including China, Russia, Manchuria and Southeast Asia. The idea of
Japan leading and helping Asia hints at a vision of “mission.” This reminds one of
postwar Japan’s desire to exercise its leadership and influence in Asia for the benefit of
both. Other Asian nations resist it, part of the residue of World War II). What is the
reaction of other regions, such as Africa, to Japan’s aid today? Perhaps they can
encourage aid competition between the West, China, Japan and India, for their own
benefit.
These leaders were generally fearful and cautious in their views of major
Western powers in this period, including the United States, Britain, and Russia. The fears,
attitudes, and beliefs of Japanese leaders toward the West, especially of Hirohito, led to
horrific war. While relations were friendly with different Western powers at various
points, and some treaties signed, terribly damaging, costly wars with the West were
fought, including the Russo-Japanese War and World War II. So today Japan is totally
committed to encouraging peace through its ODA policies, among other means. On
international conflict, three of these leaders, including Hirohito, saw war in largely racial
terms. Practically speaking, Hirohito took a more positive view of these conflicts than the
other leaders studied, and only supported peace when he strongly felt it was in Japan’s
own interests. In particular, Hirohito’s attitudes matter, since as an autocratic emperor, he
had such an enormous influence over the nation and its politics. How should Japan’s aid
work to discourage or correct faulty perceptions in LDCs and their leaders that may help
lead to conflict? As Japan was fearful of the West, today’s LDCs often are fearful and ,
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angry toward it. In aid and other areas, what lessons can Japan offer the LDCs about
learning to work successfully with the West?
Concerning imperialism and colonialism, images about Western imperialism are
mostly negative, and images of Japanese imperialism positive. All of the leaders studied
wanted Japan to remain free. Most of them focus on what imperialism and colonialism
can do for Japan’s domestic affairs. Ito and especially Yanagita want Japan to genuinely
help other Asian regions develop and resist the West. Kato and Hirohito’s thought about
imperialism contains ideology with evolutionary, biological, and Shintoistic overtones.
For both, there was a strong connection of the emperor with imperialist ideologies. The
effects of Japan’s imperialistic ideologies were extremely negative. These ideologies
included racist distortions of both science and religion. In postwar Japanese aid, these
negative effects encourage Japan to seek to use technology and science in positive, nonideological ways to help the growth and development of LDCs. Today Japan’s aid does
not really consider religion or spirituality, since it is too controversial an issue. But it
would be positive for Japanese aid policymakers to consider the role of religion and
spirituality in general ODA and development, in Japan’s aid, and in how they affect other
countries. To not do so ignores the ground level issues now important in the Japanese and
global aid agendas.
Hirohito’s views became highly influential for policies that affected millions of
people in China, Northeast and Southeast Asia and beyond. Most of his influence was
negative. These leaders had varied views of Japan’s colonies, as “mere satellites” of
Japan, places with genuine, valuable resources, or as regions that Japan could really help
to develop, defend and protect. Throughout the postwar period, Japan has desired and
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needed to improve its relations with the rest of Asia. The prewar legacies have made this
very hard. Yet Japan has learned some very valuable lessons, about how, as a nonWestern country, to work positively with the West and the U.S. How can Japan do so
now, through its international relations and aid with LDCs, and help them also learn how
to successfully work with the West?
Great fear about competition between nations and races, influenced by
evolutionistic thought, colors the thought of Yamagata and Hirohito, while Ito and
Yanagita offer more support for peace and international cooperation. One senses the
influence of evolutionism in the hierarchical view of international relations present in the
views of Hirohito, Kato, and others. This view also influences the views of nations as
developed/undeveloped, weak/strong, advanced/not advanced, as seen in aid relations
today. What steps could be taken to encourage increased mutual respect between aid
donors and recipients, and two way learning? How can Japan learn to view LDCs more
positively, not as mere satellites, resource depositories or needy, inferior aid recipients?
How can Japan genuinely help them, and how can it learn from and be helped by them?
Economic Issues and Impacts
On general trends in Japan’s economic issues from 1850 to 1945, there are
mostly positive and a few negative impacts and lessons for ODA. From 1850 to 1895,
Japan was willing to borrow foreign economic ideologies and ideas to aid its economic
growth. It also used indigenous ideologies to aid its growth and management. This is a
very positive lesson that all LDCs should learn, and which should be encouraged in ODA
policies. Also positive, on international trade, Japan has many wise lessons (1850-1895)
for LDCs: seeking equal trade opportunities, to identify and focus on areas of economic
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strength, developing a strong economic infrastructure, and placing priority on positive
international relations and trade. Japan has always emphasized these lessons, based on its
experience, to LDCs in its aid policies. Since they worked for Japan, and have worked for
many other Asian nations, it seems wise that Japan continue to do so, though these
policies must be modified for the varied conditions of other regions and economies.
Also positive, from 1895 to 1945, is the issue of balance in domestic economic
growth: the need to balance large-scale industrialization with promotion of smaller-scale
business and regional economic development. Related to aid and development,
Yanagita’s two ideas that there are multiple paths to development and that each nation’s
path should be customized according to its own conditions, plus the concept (not his) of
the appropriateness of strong state intervention at early stages, are all important. Though
Japan did not balance its economic development very well in this period,1749 on many of
these issues, it presents a strong example and important, positive lessons for LDCs and
ODA policies. There is also the irony that both Japanese and Western/global aid agendas
have argued, in practice, for universalizing approaches to development for most of their
history. Yet lately, in its rhetoric, the global agenda seems to support customized, local
approaches more than the Japanese one does. The latter still strongly supports the
economic infrastructural approach in practice, though in rhetoric, it also advocates local,
grassroots involvement.

1749

On the negative side, Japan did not pursue balanced economic growth from 1850 to 1895, but focused
on large-scale infrastructure. Growth in an LDC needs to be more balanced, tailored to its local and
regional conditions. It should also not open its economy to international competition too soon. Aid should
learn from these lessons.
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Another positive lesson, based on Japan’s experience in international economics
from 1895 to 1945, is that an LDC should place a high priority on trade as soon as it can.
Economic openness to international trade should be geared to an LDC’s actual economic
conditions. This idea is based on Japan’s actual experience, and fits the Japanese concept
of customized development very well, as well as Japan’s actual ODA policy, which has
sought to encourage bilateral trade and investment based on LDCs’ actual conditions.
On the negative side, ODA policies should limit the promotion of arms and
military build-up, based on Japan’s negative experience in this area from 1895 to 1945,
and its near destruction in World War II. Today Japan’s aid complies well with this
lesson. In addition, based on Japan’s negative experiences before World War II, ODA
policy should not use negative, propagandistic ideologies to promote development.
From Japan’s experience with imperialism, a key lesson on development and
ODA policy is that aid that focuses at least partly on the promotion of economic
infrastructure, that will promote actual economic growth, is positive, but it must be
welcome in the LDC, and not violate the wishes of its people. On the negative side, Japan
used various coercive ideologies, especially from 1895 to 1945, to impose its
development and security goals on the Japanese people and many others in the empire.
Concerning likely sources for concepts in current Japanese aid policy for
economic issues, I have organized key ideas four main areas: 1) concepts related to
Japan’s domestic economic growth, development, and (war) recovery; 2) Japan’s external
economic relations; 3) general ideas related to economic development; and 4) Japan’s
ODA budget.
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Table 9.3 Sources for Contemporary Japanese Aid Concepts: Economic Issues
Note on sources: PRW: pre-World War II sources, influences present here. PTW: postWorld War II sources, influences present here.
Idea/Concept
Aid from US, World Bank
used by Japan to rebuild the
nation after World War II
war damage
Goal to use Japan’s aid to
build Japan’s economy, late
1950s to early 1980s

Thematic area(s)
Domestic
economic
growth,
development,
recovery
Domestic
economic
growth,
development,
recovery

In Japan’s aid, goal for
participation of private
sector also

Domestic
economic
growth,
development,
recovery

Goals from Japan’s private
sector have been influential
in Japan’s ODA policy

Domestic
economic
growth,
development,
recovery

Aid used to promote Japan’s
exports, and potential
imports for Japan from
resource rich countries

Japan’s
external
economic
relations

Goal to connect ODA with

Japan’s

Possible source(s)

US desire to quickly rebuild Japan as its key anticommunist ally in Asia. Japan’s desire to recover
and rebuild after the horrible war destruction;
desire for national survival, to rise from despair
of the war. Almost totally PTW.
Intense global economic competition and exports
to the US: seen as Japan’s only path to survival.
Early postwar era: most other goals subsumed to
Japan’s need to rebuild and survive. Somewhat
similar to the hard work and sacrifices of
Japanese for national survival during Meiji era.
Also, the tendency to relate everything (even aid)
to Japan’s overarching goal of recovery and
survival. PRW, PTW.
Economic pragmatism: the private sector, in
Japan’s and int’l experience, has much greater
capacity to grow and generate wealth than the
public sector. The latter can shepherd the
process; the former empowers, makes the
economy grow. Belief that int’l scene will
parallel Japan’s experience. Somewhat PRW,
mostly PTW.
Pragmatism: public sector cannot effectively
fund ODA without private participation. Great
wealth, success of the private sector. Desire of
business to benefit from gaining access to and
exposure to foreign markets. Japan’s heritage:
blurring of public-private boundaries in
government, business. Somewhat PRW, mainly
PTW.
Pragmatism, desire for economic survival:
subsuming nearly everything to the national goal
to survive, recover from war. Japan’s prewar
economic heritage: importance of trade in prewar
economic growth, success. PRW, PTW.
Economic pragmatism, Japan’s desire to survive,
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Japan’s international trade
(since 1950s)

external
economic
relations

Goal to help LDCs too, not
just Japan

Int’l
economic
development

Major long-term goal of
Japan’s ODA: help LDCs
develop economic, financial
infrastructure
Global poverty reduction
goals may conflict with
Japan ODA’s economic
infrastructure/growth
promotion goals
Goal to vastly increase
Japan’s aid budget

Int’l
economic
development
Int’l
economic
development
Japan’s ODA
budget

grow, excel; important role of trade in Japan’s
economy (1868 to 1945), centrality of economics
in most Japanese worldviews of the nature of the
world and the global system. PRW, PTW.
Desire to enhance Japan’s int’l prestige and to
“fit in,” to be a productive, important,
contributing member of the int’l system. New
desire to “help” the global poor, especially by
helping them transition into the global econ.,
trade, and to help Japan economically too.
Somewhat PRW, mainly PTW.
From Japan’s own dev. experience, and other
Asian countries’: view that econ. infrastructure is
the heart, basis for development. PRW, PTW.
Economic infrastructure goals reflect Japan’s
own development experience (since Meiji era);
tradition of charity (beyond one’s family) has no
long historical or cultural background in Japan.
Especially PRW.
Increase Japan’s international prestige, influence,
markets, resources, support for its foreign policy
goals. Mostly PTW.

From the preceding table comparing economic issues in Japanese aid with their
possible sources, there is only a small number of ideas/concepts. I cannot really judge
what is happening in terms of the period of causation. Joint pre-World War II and postWorld War II causation and mainly/only postwar causation appear to occur only a few
times here. In the mainly postwar occurrences, there seems to be a strong, but not
dominant, presence of prewar causes in several occurrences. Among economic issues,
there appears to be only a single occurrence with predominant prewar causation. In the
largest subcategory here, “domestic economic growth and development,” most of the
occurrences have mainly or only postwar causes. The main comment that I can make is
that from the analysis here, for economic issues in Japanese aid, postwar causes seem to
be slightly more dominant than prewar causes.
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On the connections between leaders’ views and ideas about economic issues
(1850 to 1945) and later Japanese aid policies, on Japan’s domestic economy, in Chapter
4, I studied three leaders (Fukuzawa, Ito and Kato). They were all highly impressed about
the successes of Western economics and believed Japan could learn valuable economic
lessons from the West. They observed that the West’s economic development was
currently superior to Japan’s, and that Japan must learn from this superior model, as it
had learned from China for centuries. The thought of all three was affected by
evolutionary principles, especially Kato’s. Both Fukuzawa and the government strongly
supported the development ideologies of fukoku kyôhei and shokusan kôgyô. Fukuzawa
emphasized the role of economics in the private sector, while Ito and Kato focused more
on the public sector. The impact of Fukuzawa’s thought on the economy, especially the
private sector, was large.
Evolutionistic thought, which presumes that some nations are more highly
developed, more advanced, and therefore better than others, has also been influential in
the worldviews underlying some of the economic aspects of Japan’s aid. In contemporary
Japanese aid, a similar thought, on Japan’s domestic economic growth and development,
is seen in the goal that aid should be used to help Japan’s economic growth. In the early
postwar period, somewhat similar to the hard work and sacrifices of Japanese for national
survival during Meiji era, intense global economic competition and exports to the U.S.
were seen as Japan’s only path to survival. Like the Meiji era, in the early postwar period,
most other goals subsumed to Japan’s need to rebuild and survive. While several of the
five leaders studied for the period 1850 to 1895 embody this type of thought, that
economics must be the nation’s top priority for its survival, Fukuzawa did so the most.
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Concerning Japan’s external economic relations (1850-1895), Fukuzawa and Ito
observed the power of Western economics in Japan and abroad. Early education and
overseas exposure to Western economics impressed these leaders, and motivated them to
work hard, study Western economics, and begin to apply these lessons to Japan. ODA
policies for economics must also consider what will motivate LDCs to learn economics.
Early exposure through education and study abroad are optimal. Japan seeks to encourage
this by bringing thousands of young trainees to Japan for technical training each year
through JICA and other aid programs. Such an approach, of hard study and work in
applying basic economics, reflects the actions of several of the leaders studied here,
including Fukuzawa and Ito. Fukuzawa shared what he learned through his many
writings, and applied many of the principles in the institutions and businesses he founded,
including the Yokohama Specie Bank, Japan’s first international bank, which greatly
influenced Japan’s international financial dealings. Ito tried to apply some lessons about
Western economics and development to Korea. In this case, Japan took what it learned
from the West and tried to apply it in another country. In doing so, it repeated some of the
West’s mistakes. Japan should be careful not to repeat some of the mistakes of the West
in its aid programs. Here we again see evolutionistic influence, in the economic thought
of Fukuzawa and Kato, especially the latter. The evolutionistic influence in Japan’s
current ODA and foreign economic relations is also seen in Japan’s pragmatic goal, for
most of the postwar period, to connect ODA to international trade, to subsume nearly
everything to the national goal to first survive, and then grow and excel.1750 It also
reflects the core conviction in the worldviews of many Japanese, since the late Tokugawa
1750

The goals to grow and excel are also connected to Japan’s overarching goal to survive economically.
711

and early Meiji eras, of the importance of economics in the nature of the world and the
global system.
On leaders’ views of Japan’s domestic market (1895 to 1945), I mainly focus on
Yanagita.1751 His views stress the effects of the international economy (Western
technology and culture) on indigenous Japanese culture and its domestic economy. He
desired balanced development across rural and urban regions, so that the heart of Japan’s
culture, the countryside, would not be destroyed. Yanagita also asserted that there were
multiple paths to development and the market, and insisted they be humane. As
mentioned earlier, this has likely formed part of the basis for anthropologist Maegawa
Keiji’s work on the concept of translative adaptation. Given the importance that this
concept and similar ones such as “modernization” and internationalization receive, at
times, in the thought of contemporary Japanese development economists,1752 it seems
ironic that their principles have not been more systematically applied in Japanese ODA
policy before now, though Japan has recently expressed the desire to support the
participatory, customized aid goals inherent in the MDGs and the current global aid
agenda.1753 Yanagita also highly supported workers’ and human rights, and opposed
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I found the most data on Yanagita’s views of Japan’s external economic relations during this period.
For example, see Ohno and Ohno, Japanese Views, and several additional essays in that volume.
1753
Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid. It is interesting to note that the basic goals of customized development and
translative adaptation, while noble, do not really appear among the key economic goals and ideas behind
Japanese ODA that have been noted by David Arase (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid) and many other
scholars, and which I outline in Table 9.3 in this chapter. This brings up an interesting question: although
Japanese aid scholars, activists or policymakers may express support for elements of the concepts of
customized aid and translative adaptation, in practice, how much are they really applied in Japanese aid?
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economic development that was too large-scale. His overall impact on Japan’s domestic
economy was small.1754
On Japan’s external economic relations (1895 to 1945), Yanagita opposed
Japanese government policies in place from about 1900 through the 1920s. They placed
heavy emphasis on heavy, large-scale industries for export. Yanagita favored smallerscale industries, agriculture, and the domestic market. Yanagita felt that despite the
arrival of an era of true international trade, nations still mostly pursued their own selfinterests, with the strongest countries devouring the weakest. So evolutionism also
influenced his views on international economics, somewhat. Yanagita also supported
strong state economic involvement through national economic planning. Only limited
elements of Yanagita’s views have been embodied in Japanese economic policy and its
external economic relations, namely the stress on strong state involvement in helping to
shepherd Japan’s overall economy and trade. Yanagita chafed at the government’s
emphasis on large-scale industrialization and heavy trade for Japan’s economic
development. Yet some of the evolutionistic assumptions in his overall economic
thought, and additional ones, are reflected in both Japan’s long-term economic policies,
and in its ODA programs.1755 Beyond this, almost no element of Yanagita’s thought is
present in the key ideas of current Japanese ODA policy as summarized in Table 9.3

1754

Given its extreme ideological conservatism from the late 1920s to 1945, the chances that the Japanese
government would pay attention to or apply the insights of a scholar like Yanagita in the prewar era were
small. But, as noted earlier, in the postwar period, the government has applied aspects of his general
thought about preserving rural elements of Japanese cultural traditions.
1755
I am referring to the idea that only the strongest nations survive, and that stronger countries will devour
weaker nations. Other evolutionary assumptions present in the thought of developed countries and their
ODA programs, noted earlier, are that developed nations are “advanced” and “superior” to LDCs.
713

earlier.1756 However, the aid ideas in Table 9.3 reflect economic infrastructural goals,
historically very strong in prewar Japanese economic policies and its postwar ODA
programs, very well.
Yanagita had the heart of an engaged, activist scholar, one who cared deeply
about applying his knowledge for the well-being of his nation and its people. In this vein,
he well fits the traditions of several socially engaged disciplines, such as applied
anthropology and social work. It is interesting that while his thoughts about balancing
Japan’s economic development and its external economic relations with its cultural
integrity were not applied much by the government in the prewar period, thus far, neither
have the insights of anthropologists been very well applied to Japanese ODA policy as a
whole.1757
Working Hypothesis
What conclusions may be reached about this project’s working hypothesis, that
Japan’s experience with technology, development, and foreign relations (1850 to 1945),
as seen in the beliefs of several of its key leaders, has affected its current aid policies? I
wish to argue, in a qualified sense, that it is true that the beliefs of several of the leaders
studied here, and reflected in Japan’s experiences, have affected Japan’s current aid
policies. In reflecting on these leaders’ ideas, it seems apparent that in many cases, rather
than a particular leader’s thought contributing directly to later trends in Japan’s current
ODA, leaders’ thoughts more often likely reflect particular intellectual currents that have
1756

The only principle present in this table that reflects Yanagita’s thought is the idea that Japanese aid
should help other countries (LDCs) too, not just itself.
1757
For more on the challenges of applying anthropology to Japan’s contemporary ODA policy, see
Matsuzono, “International Cooperation Activities,” (discussed earlier). Earlier I also noted the program in
development anthropology at Tokyo’s Waseda University, presently led by Kikuchi Yasushi, which
hopefully can help to encourage more anthropological input in Japanese ODA policy.
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evolved over time, and that, in some contemporary form, have influenced current ODA.
We have identified several possible streams of influence, though they are usually not
direct. I also argued earlier in this chapter that it is challenging to identify absolutely
direct lines of influence since the project’s current stream of historical research only
extends through 1945, leaving an historical gap of over sixty years between the past and
the present.
Despite this gap, what are some of the most important lines of influence we may
be identify here? Of the seven leaders studied, which offer evidence of the strongest lines
of influence of contemporary Japanese ODA policy, and on which areas of policy? The
four leaders who appear to have had the strongest influence on ideas in Japan’s current
ODA policy are Fukuzawa, Ito, Yamagata, and Hirohito. I can identify two possible
levels of influence, on both the general and more specific levels (ideas that seem more
closely related to those in current Japanese aid policy).
On the general level, Fukuzawa’s most significant possible connections to ODA
policy occur in two main areas, sociocultural issues and economics. His most important,
significant connection occurs on the theme of learning and absorbing general knowledge
from foreign cultures: encouraging Japanese to do so on a broad, popular level, and to
effectively translate foreign concepts and ideas that were often highly alien, in ways that
average Japanese could understand. Second, he contributed greatly to the common
understanding and practice of modern business and economics in modern Japan. These
emphases on the necessity of learning useful knowledge from foreign cultures, and of
mastering pragmatic economic and technological skills, have deeply affected both
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Japan’s own development process, and the approach to aid that it seeks to encourage in
its aid recipients.
Ito’s general connections with later Japanese ODA policy flow from his work
on the Meiji Constitution of 1889, which exercised great influence on the everyday lives
of millions of Japanese in prewar Japan through the laws and policies it encouraged. This
influence extended to many areas of politics and culture, including education. It allowed
the creation of an authoritarian, conservative political system that eventually became
heavily militaristic, nearly destroying the nation in World War II. On a second level, Ito’s
connection emerges through his involvement in Japan’s international relations, as a
diplomat, foreign minister, and major actor involved in crucial political and economic
negotiations on multiple occasions.
Yamagata’s connections with Japanese ODA policy stem from his role as the
architect of the Japanese military, his direction of the military’s modernization and buildup in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, his role in directing Japan’s
involvement in several wars, especially the Russo-Japanese War, and the long-term
impact he had on Japan’s culture of politics through his service as a genro1758 in the early
1900s. Through 1945, all of these encouraged to Japan to move toward a more
authoritarian, aggressive political system. The aggressive military moves that Yamagata
encouraged against Japan’s neighboring states, including Russia and Korea, also had
long-term effects on Japan’s foreign relations with its neighbors, and on future conflicts.
These excesses resulted in Japan’s defeat in World War II, the American invasion and
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Genro refers the elder statesmen who served as long-term advisors to the emperor in the prewar
Japanese political system, from the Meiji period through 1945.
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occupation, and the creation of a new culture of politics in Japan that has historically
strongly rejected the militarism and imperialism of the prewar era.1759 All of these
developments have strongly affected the domestic culture of politics from which Japan’s
aid emerged and in which it continues to operate.
As noted earlier, there is no other Japanese actor who had a greater influence on
Japan’s domestic and international affairs in the twentieth century than Hirohito. Though
Hirohito did not cause the authoritarian, militarized culture of politics in which he served
before 1945, he did nothing to contest or change it. Deeply affected by the spiritual and
scientific dynamics in his worldviews, he served as a shrewd, all-powerful and usually
rational policy actor in the prewar political system, promoting policies and decisions that
affected the lives of hundreds of millions of people across Asia, the Pacific, North
America, Europe and beyond. Given his unique, unmatched power in prewar Japan as its
autocratic, influential ruler, it seems likely that his policies did more to destroy Japan and
East Asia in World War II than anyone other single individual’s. His postwar survival
and reemergence as a strong symbol of peace and constitutional monarchy, still deeply
loved and revered by many Japanese, is a supreme irony, but also a compliment to his
(and the Japanese government’s) extreme political shrewdness and highly skillful image
management abilities. His strong prewar support for such ideologies as Japanese
nationalism, State Shinto, hakkô ichiu, and the emperor ideology, and his overwhelming
desire to assure Japan’s (and the throne’s) survival in a hostile international environment,
contributed to the seeming necessity for Japan’s continuing colonial involvements in Asia
and the Pacific. As one example of Japan’s strong, unavoidable connections to Asia,
1759

This is not to imply that postwar Japan has a totally new culture of politics. It certainly does not.
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these reemerged in postwar Japan’s aid policies in both negative and positive fashion. For
all of the postwar period, the necessity of Japan’s economic involvement with Asia, and a
peaceful environment so that all in the region may flourish, has been countered with
general Asian resistance to Japanese influence on multiple levels, partly due to past
Japanese political and cultural aggression with which Hirohito had much connection.1760
These challenges have unavoidably affected the progress of Japan’s aid to, and economic
relations with, Asia in the postwar period.1761
Lessons Learned
What are some of the main lessons learned for aid and development policy that
can be drawn from this exploration of Japan’s experience with, and key leaders’
worldviews of, technology, development and international relations from 1850 to 1945? I
organize my insights into three main areas: sociocultural lessons, political lessons, and
economic lessons, especially focusing on lessons for Japan. It is more challenging to
relate these lessons to today’s LDCs, since Japan was never an LDC.1762 Yet a few of
these lessons may relate to them, on an institutional, though likely not a cultural, level.1763
There are many historical strengths in Japan’s economic approaches to its development
and current aid strategies. In terms of economic infrastructure, both Japan’s internal
development efforts and its external aid schemes can be called highly successful.
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Of course this situation was also greatly affected in the past by Cold War politics.
One example is riots in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and in China in the 2000s over potential or actual
Japanese economic involvement in those regions.
1762
I mentioned this point in Chapter 1.
1763
Chalmers Johnson and Peter Evans argue that certain institutional elements of Japan’s development
experience should be transferable to other countries, though not on a cultural level. See Johnson, MITI and
Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Indutrial Transformation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1995).
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However, consideration of the political and especially the social factors related to Japan’s
aid remains weak, in comparison with the economic ones.
Regarding sociocultural issues/lessons, science and technology policy for
Japan’s development was largely tackled on the national level, and the government had a
key role. It sought the most advanced technologies that it believed were appropriate,
since they were viewed as key for Japan to maintain its freedom and survival. On society,
culture, and development, Japan’s leaders pondered how entering the global economy
would affect its politics and society. Yet there was overwhelming emphasis on increasing
Japan’s economic wealth and technological strength, so practical consideration of how to
protect Japan’s culture was lacking. The Meiji state chose to manipulate a particular
indigenous spiritual tradition, Shinto, into a national ideology to motivate Japanese in
their development and modernization efforts. The state’s coercive methods trampled
many freedoms, including freedom of religion. The perversion of Shinto into State Shinto
helped plunge Japan into World War II, which nearly destroyed the nation. A lesson for
LDCs is that though there may be positive values in religion that can help promote
development, the state must not trample on religious freedom to encourage them, or some
type of painful destruction may result.
On political issues, national survival was Japan’s supreme goal, for which it
made aggressive efforts. Japan’s leaders considered Japan’s political and economic
independence as even more important is its domestic development. Without that, all else
would fail. High priority was also given to Japan’s political and military development.
For that, learning from more advanced systems was essential. Among its first priorities,

719

Japan also emphasized building its own governmental and institutional capacities, on
which security and all else depended.
For Japan’s economic development, practical ideas, material and spiritual, were
important. Japan’s government sought to learn the most advanced technologies it could.
The government placed a high priority on education as a primary sector to encourage
development. To aid in this, foreign experts and scholars were brought to teach in Japan.
Students studied both technical and cultural/linguistic knowledge. Japan was highly
successful in this education effort. Building Japan’s wealth and economic development
were seen as important for its security and national survival. Encouraging wealth,
business and economics was also crucial for Japan’s growth and security. The Japanese
state also did all it could to encourage the growth of the private sector. It sought to
carefully intervene in the economy, to encourage cooperation among sectors, and to
provide overall guidance and key economic knowledge it helped import. It made
mistakes, but overall, its efforts were successful. Strong state involvement in
development seems appropriate in the early stages of an LDC’s development, where a
strong state exists. In Japan’s case, it did.
Japan placed first priority on its own internal development, before trade. It
sought growth it believed to be focused and strategic. Yet Japan now knew it could no
longer be mostly economically isolated. Yet Japan’s leaders knew they should not open
the country to excessive free trade until it reached an adequate level of maturity from
which to compete. Perhaps more, rather than less, state guidance in the economies of
LDCs may be appropriate, especially at earlier stages. Japan’s government also sought to
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protect the nation from excessive economic and cultural exploitation from abroad; its
success varied, especially in the cultural arena.
“Modernization,” Internationalization, and Translative Adaptation:
An Accurate Picture of Japan’s Experience with Technology and Development?
Regarding the second key question of the dissertation, do the concepts of
“modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation present an accurate
portrayal of Japan’s experience with technology and development from 1850 to 1945? If
so, how much are they seen in Japan’s aid policies of today? On “modernization,” did
what happened with the West cause Japan to be increasingly absorbed into the global
economy during this period? On the issues of technology and development, did Japan’s
culture become “Western,” on the surface and/or in its core, or did it remain essentially
“Japanese?” It is challenging to draw absolute conclusions here, since even the concepts
of “the West” and “Japanese” can be problematic. It is best, of course, to avoid cultural
stereotyping.
Concerning technology, development, and “modernization,” Japan imported a
great deal of Western technology into its society to rapidly industrialize, for the purpose
of national survival. The purpose of the massive importation and intense study of these
technologies was to quickly build up the nation, to help it become wealthy enough to
afford the huge arms build up and military reform that Japan’s top leaders and oligarchy,
typified by Yamagata Aritomo, believed was necessary for the nation’s defense. These
events follow the ideology of fukoku kyôhei (“rich nation, strong army”) fairly well. In
the first period, 1850 to 1895, Japan embarked on the massive project of learning and
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importing foreign technology and knowledge. The first period represents Japan’s
accelerating absorption of foreign technology and knowledge, their application to
Japanese industries, economy and society, and then to the build-up of Japan’s new,
modernizing military.
At the start of the second period, 1895 to 1945, this intensive, domestic
absorption of foreign knowledge began to be externally applied. Japan defeated its two
greatest neighboring powers, China and Russia, and the rest of the world took shocking
notice. On many levels, the basic goals of fukoku kyôhei succeeded. The process of
economic growth based on Japan’s expanding industrialization continued into the early
twentieth century, and was accelerated by Japan’s industrial boom during World War I.
Japan continued importing much foreign knowledge, though not as frenetically as during
the first period. The economic expansion brought in part by the wars with China, Russia,
and World War I continued into the 1920s. This boom accompanied the cultural
flowering and relative openness of the vibrant Taisho democracy period.
After World War I, Japan’s leaders began to feel more tension with the world,
especially the West, when they discovered that the West continued to view Japan through
ethnocentric, racist eyes. Japan encountered a world dominated by the West, a region that
was not very prepared or willing to open up and share the world stage with a virtually
unknown, mysterious, isolated non-Western power. As Japan’s leaders applied their new
worldviews influenced by modern science and evolutionism, they determined that for
Japan to continue to survive and flourish, it must not stop applying the fruits of its new
power against the hostile West. As Japan’s leaders observed the West’s actions in Asia
and China, it seemed that aggression must be met by aggression. For its survival and
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independence, Japan determined that it must increase its presence and intervention in
Asia, to help weaker nations seemingly unable to defend themselves against the West.
Unfortunately these worldviews, and Japan’s rising military power and actions, led to
increasing repression in Japan, more aggression and atrocities by Japan across East Asia
and the Pacific, and great destruction and death in World War II. “Modernization” asks,
through all of these events, did Japan become more “Western”?
What if we consider events in Japan (1850 to 1945) through the lenses of
development and “modernization?” In the anthropologically-based definition of
“development” offered in the Glossary, development has three major components: 1)
increasing a society’s capacity for industrial production, capitalism and its products, and
the society’s movement toward “modern life;” 2) improving a society’s quality of life,
standard of living, and reducing/eliminating the presence of poverty within it; and 3)
building a society’s capacity for local participation in these decisions. The first part of the
definition largely encompasses an increase in industrialization and industrial capacity, the
second part the improvement of a society’s social and quality-of-life components during
processes of economic change, and the third, improving a people’s capacity to decisively
participate in these changes on the local level. What happened in Japan from 1850 to
1945, and through these events, again, did Japan become more “Western,” or stay mostly
Japanese?
If we reexamine events in Japan from 1850 to 1945 in the light of development
and “modernization,” it is clear that Japan went through massive economic and social
changes as it moved through and toward “development.” In this period, the Japanese state
defined development in terms of the first part of the above definition: large-scale
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industrial production supported by increasing international trade. By this standard, from
1850 to 1895, economic development was a great success. The economy experienced
great industrial expansion, the development of many new industries, expanded trade,
employment, and the increase of capitalism and industrial products. Ironically, in the
second period, 1895 to 1945, these industrial successes were virtually obliterated by
Japan’s actions and the foreign responses in World War II.
Yanagita’s conceptions of holistic development, discussed earlier, while
acknowledging the presence and importance of industrialization in development, stress
the second and third components: enhancing quality of life (in Japan, social solidarity and
communality in rural areas), and increasing/maintaining local capacity for participation in
these important decisions. From the evidence presented here, in the prewar period, Japan
failed greatly in these last two aspects of development. In this midst of its rapid
industrialization from 1850 to 1895 and into the early 1900s, social change issues were
largely ignored, except when violent protest, extremist or democratic movements erupted.
Japan’s conservative culture of politics usually brought this response from the state. From
1895 to 1945, the situation did not improve. Continuing rapid industrialization and
growth into the 1920s and wars with China, Russia and World War I brought further
social change and disruption. Yet these changes cannot compare with the socioeconomic,
political and material destruction hitting Japan from the late 1920s to 1945, as it went
through depression, increased militarization, war in China, Southeast Asia, the South
Pacific, with the United States, Great Britain and finally, the Soviet Union. The damage
and social disruption hitting Japan also affected other regions such as China, most of East
Asia, and the United States. Japan’s industrial achievements from 1850 through the 1920s
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were destroyed by late 1945, and its society, rural and especially urban regions, were
greatly damaged.1764
Though Japanese society changed in multiple, painful ways through the huge,
traumatic events from 1850 to 1945, adopted many Western technologies and cultural
phenomena during this period, and experienced massive social changes over the century,
it did not change in the core of its identity or worldviews, in the essence of what makes it
truly “Japanese.” Though Japanese adopted numerous forms of Western technology,
dress, economic structures, communication, transportation, fought in huge wars that
nearly destroyed the country, and brought massive changes to their daily lives through
rapid economic growth and industrialization, the basic, core social structures of their
society did not change that much. Neither did many core elements of the Japanese
worldview and one of its most important aspects, the most essential views and practices
of religion and spirituality, change in their basic nature.1765 Though elements of Japanese
identity and worldview were influenced and altered by Japan’s interactions with the
West, I wish to argue that its cultural core and base society remained mostly intact, both
through 1945 and in the many traumatic changes to follow, in the American occupation
and years of rapid economic growth and today’s economic recession. In terms of
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For a treatment of the social conditions in Japan at the time of its surrender in 1945 and through the
period of the American occupation, see Dower, War Without Mercy.
1765
I say this while acknowledging the vibrancy and incredible variety of religious and spiritual activity in
Japan’s spiritual landscape, seen in the amazing diversity of its new religious movements. For studies on
these, see H. Neill McFarland, The Rush Hour of the Gods; A Study of New Religious Movements in Japan
(New York: Macmillan, 1967); Mark Mullins, Susumu Shimazono, and Paul L. Swanson, Religion and
Society in Modern Japan: Selected Readings (Berkeley, Calif: Asian Humanities Press, 1993); and Susumu
Shimazono, From Salvation to Spirituality: Popular Religious Movements in Modern Japan (Melbourne,
Vic: Trans Pacific, 2004).
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technology and development issues, the concept of “modernization” represents Japan’s
experiences from 1850 to 1945 very well.
Does the concept of internationalization well portray Japan’s experiences with
technology and development from 1850 to 1945? Remember that internationalization
focuses on what happened economically and culturally on the international level, as the
West absorbed peripheral countries like Japan and others into the global economy. To
apply this concept here, I will focus on Japanese colonialism and on Japan’s international
reaction to the West’s actions, as both Japan and Asia were brought into world trade from
the mid-1800s to the mid-1900s.1766 Readers in the United States are more familiar with
how the West “forced” Japan and other non-Western regions into the global system. It is
more interesting to address what Japanese colonialism did, partly in response to the
West, since that approach to internationalization is more relevant to what Japanese aid is
doing today.
On the issue of technology, from 1850 to 1895, as Japan imported and mastered
more Western technology and industrial products, it was increasingly enabled to turn its
gaze to nearby Asian regions. More Japanese wealth and military strength empowered
Japanese assertiveness as Japan began to increase its presence in both northern and
southern regions, including Hokkaido, Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, and the Ryukyu
Islands. As these regions were incorporated, in varying degrees, into Japan proper, Japan
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This does represent a slight variant of the definition of internationalization that is in the Glossary and in
K. Ohno, “Overview,” 11-12, since according to that definition, internationalization involves what the
active West does to passive non-Western nations as it forces them into the world economy. Here I apply the
concept to what Japan, a non-Western country, has done in its colonial processes involving other nonWestern nations. Usually Japan is not considered to be part of the West, geographically or culturally,
although it is often allied with western Europe and North America in various political and economic
dealings.
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extended its gaze beyond, to Korea, China, and Taiwan. Soon Japan’s rising industrial
prowess enabled the growth of its military and technological capabilities, which it used to
attack China, Russia and Korea. Technological and industrial capabilities and extreme
discipline enabled Japan to achieve costly victories over these nations, and to acquire
colonies in Taiwan, Southern Manchuria (China), and Korea from 1895 to 1910. Japan
also used its techno-industrial prowess to begin to assess and build industrial capabilities
in each of these regions. Its economic investments in Hokkaido, Taiwan, Korea and
Manchuria were great. Japan’s rule in different regions varied, but sometimes grew harsh
when it encountered much resentment or resistance. Japan also imposed its language,
education system, and State Shinto on Taiwan and Korea. Japan’s military and
technological capabilities also enabled it to conquer additional regions through 1945,
including eastern China, Southeast Asia, and regions in the South Pacific. But it did not
have the capacity to consolidate these holdings for very long.
Based on the definition of development, Japan invested the most heavily in
developing key segments of industrial production and transportation in Manchuria,
Taiwan, and Korea, and some agricultural production. Japan did not show much concern
about improving the living standards of indigenous populations in its colonies, and it did
not do much to increase the local capacity of these populations to be involved in Japan’s
development decisions for their regions. As the conditions of Japan in World War II grew
worse, conditions for the colonies were often more repressive and difficult, especially for
newly conquered territories.
In terms of technology, development and internationalization, as Japan resisted
the West’s attempt to coercively and exploitatively absorb it into the global economy, it
727

ironically did a similar thing to many of its neighbors in attempting to conquer them.
Japan’s economic and cultural impact on its colonies in the short term was not as huge as
the impact of European empires on their colonies. This is likely because the period of
Japan’s major colonization1767 was shorter than Western colonization. But in the postwar
period, the legacy of Japan’s industrial investment in these regions has gradually become
massive, as has the example of Japan’s economic growth and development for other East
Asian nations. Many of them, including South Korea, Taiwan, and China, have had
among the fastest rates of economic growth in history, and some are entering the ranks of
the world’s wealthy nations. Compared to the legacy and long-term impacts of Western
and European colonialism on their former colonies, this is a stark difference indeed. Even
so, this is not to minimize the pain or suffering these regions suffered because of
Japanese imperialism. It was often huge. I conclude that internationalization does
represent well what Japanese colonialism did to its colonies as it absorbed them into its
economic and cultural universe in the period 1850 to 1945. Japan most certainly
“actively” engaged and conquered these territories, though their reactions were not so
passive, and the process certainly did involve a great deal of subjugation and exploitation
of these regions by Japan. In these senses, Japanese imperialism and colonialism seem
similar to their Western counterparts.
Does translative adaptation present an accurate picture of Japan’s experience
with technology and development from 1850 to 1945? Was Japan able to properly match
and adjust its own culture to imported Western items? With the presence of the new
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I am referring to colonies besides those that were absorbed into Japan proper, the latter being Hokkaido
and the Ryukyus/Okinawa. Japan held Taiwan, the longest held colony, for fifty years.
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Western technologies, did Japanese cultural items continue, or were many of them
destroyed? Did Japan develop “well”?
On technology and translative adaptation, one of the major issues with which
various Japanese leaders struggled (here, Fukuzawa, Mori, Ito, Kato and Yanagita) was
how Japan could import needed Western cultural items and not destroy its social and
cultural integrity. On technology issues, the work of Fukuzawa and Yanagita is the most
significant. Though Yanagita articulated the basic concept of translative adaptation
decades ago, the work of Fukuzawa on this issue had the most long-term, widespread
impact on Japan. What happened in Japan from 1850 to 1895 and from 1895 to 1945 in
terms of translative adaptation? Many surface cultural features of Japanese life changed,
for example, clothing, technologies used in daily life, modes of communication and
transportation, and large-scale public architecture. Many social institutions changed and
evolved as well: the postal system, education, health, agriculture, transportation,
communication and governmental institutions all encountered massive change.
But what happened to the most enduring parts of Japanese culture, its core or
base cultural features, including social organization, family structure, interpersonal
behavior, gender roles, worldviews,1768 and views of religion and spirituality? Many of
these have changed to varying extents. But as even a brief review of many areas of
Japanese social life will reveal, they have proven extremely enduring within the generally
conservative base of Japanese society. Various ideologies and features of Japanese
society follow this trend, such as the influence of the Confucian ie system and bushido
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Here I mean worldview in the more conventional anthropological, holistic sense, not my own narrower
definition of worldview as a cognitive framework. See Worldview (anthropology) in the Glossary section.
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values on prewar (1850 to 1945) and postwar Japanese corporate life, the presence of
Confucian-influenced, hierarchical social roles in Japanese life, the use of hierarchical
and honorific terms in the Japanese language, the heavy influence of group-based
behavior on individuals, and so forth.1769 This is not to deny the highly fluid, rapidly
changing nature of Japanese society, as complex and dynamic as any society on earth,1770
nor the contested, fragmented nature of culture as commonly conceived by contemporary
social and cultural anthropologists. But in sum, from 1850 to 1945, I wish to argue that in
general, most of the deepest core features of Japanese culture proved enduring.
Technology greatly affected them, but it did not change or eliminate them at the most
fundamental levels.
Is translative adaptation an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with
development from 1850 to 1945? Despite traumatic social changes in that century
brought by Japan’s economic development and subsequent destruction in World War II,
did core “Japanese” cultural features, amid “Western” influences, continue intact? Did
Japan develop “well?” Considering the three main aspects of development defined
above,1771 the first level of development, industrial production, had large impacts on
Japanese society at many levels, as outlined earlier. Quality of life in Japan suffered,
especially during World War II. Local capacities for civic participation were not
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For a well-known treatment of this hierarchical, Confucian aspect of Japanese culture, see Nakane,
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encouraged by the top-down development approaches that the government supported. In
the 1930s through 1945, repression became more common. The base societal elements of
Japanese life continued intact, despite the great changes brought by development and by
technology. Though Japan’s economy developed and grew greatly through the 1920s, it
did not develop very “well,” not in terms of how anthropologists and Yanagita Kunio
would define well: improved quality of life for most people and chances for local
participation in development decisions. In the 1930s to 1945, with the onset of militarism
and World War II, everything related to quality of life and local participation declined
even further.
Above I argued that the Japanese development concepts of “modernization,”
internationalization,1772 and translative adaptation all, on a basic level, accurately
describe Japan’s experience with technology and development from 1850 to 1945. How
do they relate to contemporary Japanese aid policies? Is “modernization” also valid for
Japanese aid? That would mean that as LDCs are drawn into trade with Japan, they
hopefully develop, but also retain their unique, indigenous features, and do not become
Western or Japanese clones at the core level. To seriously answer this question, we would
need to do ethnographic fieldwork on the cultures of various recipients of Japan’s ODA.
Barring this, I can reflect briefly on a few cases. One of the most interesting is Malaysia.
Former leader of Malaysia Mahathir Mohamad (prime minister from 1981 to 2003)
strongly advocated the nation’s adoption of a Japanese style development model, and
Malaysia has also received much aid from Japan. Under Mahathir’s efforts and policies,
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Here I mean internationalization modified to refer to the impacts of Japanese, not so much Western,
colonialism.
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Malaysia enjoyed mostly high levels of economic development and growth.1773 This
growth did not cause Malaysia to become Western or Japanese in its core cultural
identity. While it is impossible, without ethnography, to definitively judge whether most
Japanese aid recipients effectively retain their core identities despite receiving Japanese
aid or investment, my suspicion is that they do. Two other significant recipients of
Japanese aid, China and Indonesia, have also retained their core cultural features.
“Modernization” is likely a valid concept for what happens to the core cultures of many
Japanese aid recipients, at least Asian ones. The principles of “modernization” are also
embodied in Japan’s aid goals to customize aid for local conditions, not interfere in other
countries’ internal affairs, to enhance Japan’s image,1774 to build positive relations with
other countries,1775 and to benefit LDCs, not just Japan.1776
What is the relevance of internationalization for Japanese aid? Here the question
becomes what has happened to recipients of Japanese ODA, economically and culturally,
as they have been drawn into the global economy? This is an important, complex
question that could be studied on a general level, or for individual countries. Considering
one example in Chapter 2, most Japanese aid experts who know China well conclude that
Japanese aid to China has greatly helped China to develop economically by helping lay a
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For more on the economic development of Malaysia, see K. S. Jomo and Yun-chung Chen, Southeast
Asia's Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Policy and Economic Development in Thailand, Malaysia and
Indonesia (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1997); Ishak Shari,“Economic Growth and Social Development
in Malaysia, 1971-98: Does the State Still Matter in an Era of Globalisation?” in Development and
Structural Change in Asia-Pacific: Globalising Miracles or End of an Era? eds. Martin Andersson and
Christer Gunnarsson (London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 108-24; Hua Sing Lim, Japan's Role
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Haider A. Khan, “Japanese Aid: Comparative Analysis,” 224-234. Of course, Malaysia’s growth was
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strong infrastructural foundation, and that Japan’s ODA has increased China’s diversity
and possible openness to later political change.1777 The perspectives of Chinese experts
concur on the significance of Japan’s ODA as helping lay a basis for China’s
development, though they disagree on some other points.1778 In studying the issue of
internationalization for Japanese ODA, both donor and recipient perspectives should be
considered. In terms of ideas in current Japanese ODA policy, those which support the
study of recipients’ economic and cultural conditions, during or after they received
Japanese aid, are relevant to internationalization: goals to customize aid for local
countries’ conditions,1779 goals to use aid for Japan’s strategic interests,1780 Japan’s goals
to use aid to support its external political relations and the global aid agenda,1781 and
Japan’s economic goals for its ODA related to international economic development.1782
From this brief review, internationalization seems relevant for analyzing contemporary
Japanese aid.
Is translative adaptation useful for Japan’s ODA policy? Leading Japanese
development economists believe it is.1783 In general, it must be applied to single country
case studies. To apply the concept to Japanese aid, one must ask, as a particular LDC
receives Japan’s aid, how well is it adjusting culturally to the process? Is its core culture
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being destroyed, or are its indigenous cultural features able to survive alongside imported
items? If the recipient’s base society is still intact, is development working? In the case of
larger countries, Japanese aid, in many cases, as only a small part of a nation’s entire
economy, has likely not fundamentally altered or eliminated the core cultural features of
the recipient society. As noted above, in Malaysia and China, Japanese aid has not altered
most of the core cultural features of these two societies. For these two cases, Japanese aid
has decisively contributed to each nation’s development. Clarifying the situation is likely
more complex if one seeks to study cases in regions beyond Asia. Again, to confirm what
has happened for other countries, ethnographic research is a must. If we compare the
principles of translative adaptation to key ideas in current Japanese ODA, the ideas and
themes that most naturally support translative adaptation include: customizing aid for
local conditions, enhancing Japan’s image/face,1784 improving Japan’s relations with
other countries,1785 and Japan’s recently articulated goals to genuinely help LDCs with
their infrastructural and additional aspects of development.1786 Japan has often seemed to
put its own interests first in its aid, but this may be changing. New pressures and goals
from both domestic and international sources require Japan to be more sensitive to the
genuine, ground level needs of its aid recipients.
Possible Effects of Spirituality and Religion on Japan’s Foreign Aid Policies
How has Japanese spirituality affected Japan’s foreign aid policies? In Chapters
1 and 2, I presented several arguments for how worldviews are one important factor,
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among several, in determining what a country’s aid policy outcomes will be.1787 Religion
and spirituality are one of the most fundamental parts of worldview,1788 so it is logical
that they must be influential, to some extent, in helping shape aid policy outcomes. There
are also other cultural, religious and historical factors mentioned in earlier chapters that
relate to Japan’s aid.1789
What evidence do we see in the historical data presented here?1790 From 1868 to
1945, religion and spirituality played somewhat important roles in policies to “protect”
Japanese culture from foreign, Western influences. In this period, as the Meiji state
created State Shinto, there was an atypical (for Japan) fusing of politics and religion to
promote national development and Japanese nationalism. The state made State Shinto a
national ideology for that purpose. Most leaders supported it; a few preferred
Christianity. State Shinto was also used to strengthen the Japanese national sense of
identity. This also connected with the highly kin- and locality- based traditions of folk
(“traditional”) Shinto. How can the negative experiences that Japan experienced in
mixing religion and the state in this period, seen in how State Shinto as nationalistic
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propaganda and as a tool for state coercion, serve as positive lessons for development and
ODA policies today? This is a key task for Japanese aid policymakers and scholars of
development to consider. Part of the value of Japan’s experience is the lesson of how
dangerous it is for religion to mix too closely with politics for development.
In the late Tokugawa period, Japan’s leaders and government valued certain
areas of Western knowledge (Dutch learning) and science as helpful for Japan, such as
medicine and military weaponry. They also rejected a leading non-material ideology,
Christianity. Japan sent trade missions abroad to obtain desired technical knowledge, but
at first rejected religious (Christian) missions and missionaries the West sent to Japan,
until forced to accept them early in the Meiji period. A leading motivator for national
isolation during this period was the desire of the Tokugawa regime to prevent Western
imperialism and takeover of Japan. Christianity and European trade were seen as two of
the chief Western means to achieve this end; therefore the first was totally banned and the
second severely curtailed. Confucianism and its ideals played an important role in the
ethics of late Tokugawa Japan, and continued to be influential in helping to motivate the
nation for development through Confucian-influenced, bushido-type work values in the
Meiji period and beyond. Neo-Confucian ideologies also contributed ideologies and
thought helpful for Japanese business and industries. And in 1855, the state founded the
Bansho Shirabasho, the first public facility in Japan for the study of Western languages
and sciences. From this point in early modern Japan, the state’s involvement in the
importation of foreign knowledge, both cultural and technical, became more important
and decisive. In today’s aid, the Japanese state continues to play an important role, but
unlike in the late Tokugawa period, the state’s role is increasingly dependent on the
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private sector. Also different from the late Tokugawa era, the state’s legally mandated
separation of religion and state policy now discourages Japan from considering the role
of spirituality in ODA and development very deeply.
In the late Tokugawa period, religion played an important role in Japan’s
education system, in the form of shrine and temple-based schools (terakoya). Somewhat
similarly, in the Meiji era, State Shinto was placed into the national consciousness
through the new national education system. Through 1945, Japan’s national system of
education supported state-sanctioned nationalistic propaganda drawing on elements from
Shinto and Confucianism. In education for women and private education, Christianity
made important contributions from 1895 to 1945. Education is one of the most important
components in an LDC’s development, as it was in Japan’s, but it can be used either
positively or negatively. Japan’s ODA, especially JICA, continues to place a strong
emphasis on technical training for Japan’s aid recipients. What lessons can be drawn
from the manipulation of State Shinto in Japanese education, as a tool for promoting
nationalistic development, for other LDCs? One of the most important lessons is that here
the state abused its power, damaged religion, education, and the nation in the process.
How can ODA policy discourage such abuses of power in other LDCs? Can it or should
it? If we support Japanese and global aid goals for the promotion of democracy, human
rights, and freedom, we can say that ODA policy should discourage manipulation of
education and other cultural features for state ends.
In the Meiji era, in general, Japan rejected its “ethical,” Confucian heritage,
seen as inferior, and Christianity, and coveted “scientific” Western knowledge. Japan
accepted technology and knowledge it deemed useful, but sought to reject what it
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considered harmful. Contrary to Tokugawa policy, to avert Western imperialism, Japan
began aggressively importing Western knowledge and technology, as rapidly as possible.
For the same purposes, some leaders (here, Fukuzawa and Mori) strongly supported
Japan’s adaptation of Western values, and even Christianity (Mori). Most Japanese
strongly resisted the temptation to adopt Christianity as the new national religion or
development ideology. Like Japan, today other LDCs struggle with how to integrate
development and aid with their own spiritual heritage. Japan’s painful lessons here may
serve them well. This should also be an encouragement for Japan to consider more deeply
the impact of religious forces on its aid.
The United States had profound influence on Japan from 1868 onward, more
than any other foreign power. Interestingly, two of the greatest areas of American
influence on Japan, were educational: the sharing of science and technology, and Western
religion (Christianity), both often through the vehicle of English. When English was
chosen as the most important Western language for study, it became the seminal
linguistic vehicle for the transference of both Western scientific and cultural knowledge,
including religion, into Japan. Like the U.S., Europe brought much influence, including
science, technology, and Christian-influenced ideologies, religious and secular, cultural
and political features, which were significant in the Meiji period. Foreign experts,
scientists, teachers and businesspeople who came to Japan brought much-coveted foreign
knowledge, but they also brought Western cultural values, and often, Christianity. The
impact of foreign teachers on Japan in many areas of knowledge, including science,
technology, and religion and philosophy, was great. Through Japan’s attempts to develop
in this era, it had to interact with foreign nations and foreigners. In the process, it
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received science, technology, and foreign religious influence, though most Japanese
would have preferred only the first two. No matter how hard an LDC desires to limit
certain cultural influences from abroad, doing so is extremely hard, as these lessons from
Japan show. Rather than resorting to repression, the LDC should more fruitfully direct its
efforts at deciding how it can positively benefit from religious input, even from foreign
countries. This would be a positive question for Japanese aid officials to concretely
ponder as they deepen their consideration of how religion affects Japan’s ODA projects,
not to merely focus on negative questions such as religion and the promotion of
terrorism.
From 1895 to 1945, the Meiji state continued to use the Kokugaku School of
learning, and influences from Shinto and Confucianism, to heavily promote nationalism.
The influence of various nationalistic ideologies, often fused with religious and spiritual
overtones, was huge in this period, especially from the 1930s to 1945. Most of these drew
on Shinto or Confucian values to some degree, not so much on Buddhism.
The emperor exercised huge power and influence in the political system. The state
encouraged the mixing of religion and politics through several ideologies involving the
emperor, including State Shinto, kokutai and kôdô. State Shinto exercised a higher
influence on Japanese politics, education, and society during this period. It was
established to provide Japanese with a powerful, alternative form of identity to counter
Western influences, and to promote Japanese nationalism. The effects of this continue to
haunt Japan’s relations with other Asian nations. These negative experiences in Japan
have made it harder for the religion factor to be easily considered in Japan’s ODA
assessments today. But this issue deserves more concrete attention.
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Christianity had a broad, if diffuse, influence on several areas of Japanese
culture in this period, such as ideologies of pacifism, socialism, and philosophy. It had
larger impacts on other areas like education, women’s rights, democratic thought, human
rights, and various liberal areas of cultural influence, through the Taisho democracy
period. But as Japan moved closer to the 1930s and World War II, repression against all
religion besides State Shinto increased, and these liberalizing influences in Japanese
culture decreased. During the period of national cultural and scientific isolation in World
War II, Japanese R&D also suffered. In national isolation, an LDC’s cultural and
scientific development will suffer, as Japan’s did in such periods. This is strong support
for the Japanese argument that openness to cultural exchange and training are paramount
for successful aid and development.
Externally, from 1895 to 1945, Japanese spirituality was imposed on long-term
colonies (such as Taiwan and Korea) as emperor ideology and forced participation in
State Shinto. This created a great deal of resentment among these colonized populations,
especially in Korea. State Shinto contributed to the nationalistic ideologies that were used
to justify Japan’s aggressive actions in various conflicts and wars in Asia and the Pacific.
This was a state-sponsored corruption of an indigenous form of spirituality that
historically had no connection to such practices or ideologies. Extreme spiritual
ideologies clouded the beliefs and policy actions of some of Japan’s top leaders,
especially Hirohito’s. These had horrific consequences both for Japan and other nations,
as he delayed surrender in World War II. The connections of State Shinto and Japan’s
external economic relations are only indirect, and relate to the fact that politically, State
Shinto helped provide ideological justification for Japan’s aggressive political actions
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against other Asian nations. From these actions, some economic benefits, especially for
Japan and somewhat for the colonies (economic infrastructure), resulted. The main lesson
for ODA here is that extremist ideologies, including religious ones, can cause a nation’s
politics to go asunder. One more factor for donors and recipients to consider, as they
assess the religion factor in aid, is how ODA can be used to discourage political
extremism in LDCs.
What possible evidence is there from my study of leaders’ views of religion,
spirituality, economic development, science, technology, and international relations on
how spirituality may be affecting Japan’s current ODA? In the leaders’ general views of
religion and spirituality, especially from 1850 to 1895, science is generally assumed to
underlie everything in the universe. These leaders believed that they must learn advanced
technology from the West (not from “unscientific,” philosophical Asia), and that they
need supportive “spirits” to help them do so. If possible, they preferred to get these
“spirits” (or spiritual sources) of inspiration and hard work from indigenous sources. The
general views of spirituality in the late Tokugawa era leaned more toward emphasizing
ethical issues, while those of the Meiji period emphasized more material concerns. This
was especially true of the views of economic issues. Though in the “traditional” Japanese
worldview there was little separation of the material and spiritual realms, in Japan there
has long been a separation of religion and the state, except for 1868-1945, which was an
historical aberration.
One sees this emphasis on the material in the leaders’ worldviews and cultural
logics (1850 to 1895 and beyond) of the domestic state and market, international political
economy, and on the issue of technology transfers. Concepts and images emphasize
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material power and values, and include the power of Western technology to conquer
China, other Asian countries, and the strength of science, technology and economics to
help save Japan. Money and material things drive the world. A basic lesson here is that it
is much harder to transfer the soft, value-laden, “spiritual” aspects of technology.
Transferring the “hard,” material aspects of technology is easier in many respects. LDCs
can learn how Japan attempted to balance the material and ethical/contextual aspects of
imported knowledge. Religion can make various valuable contributions to an LDC’s
development, but these entail some cultural risk. Some of Japan’s Meiji leaders, such as
Mori and Fukuzawa, were good students of development. They effectively identified
positive things that Western religion gave the West for development, but this does not
mean that everything was successfully or uniformly applied in Japan.
A third important area is the leaders’ view of the role of religion and spirituality
in economic development. The leaders in the first period (1850 to 1895) did not mind
using religion and spirituality to encourage social change in support of Japanese
nationalism and development, though many did not want to use Christianity. Most of
them, and the Meiji state, preferred to use Shinto. Religious and moral underpinnings
were recognized as influencing the West’s strength over Japan and Asia, so these leaders
admitted the possible contributions of spirituality to economic development. Though
many Meiji leaders connected some values of Christianity with Western economic
development, the domestic market worldviews and logics identified in this study seem to
deemphasize non-material knowledge like religion. Most Japanese in this era disliked
Christianity. Some of these leaders were impressed by what Christianity had done in the
West (i.e. its moral strengthening of individuals, and historic role in promoting the
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scientific and technological discoveries). But they were perplexed by the seeming
conflicts of Christianity with Japanese culture. Even so Christianity was among the most
important global cultural products to be brought (back) into Japan at this time. An
implication is that today’s LDCs should reflect carefully on whether they wish to restrict
foreign religion, since its contributions can be great, but risky.
From 1895 to 1945, on spirituality’s role in development, Yanagita stressed the
impacts of spirituality on the nation’s politics and society on the local level, and Hirohito,
on the national level. Both thought spirituality was important, but neither was capable of
changing the damage state coercion through State Shinto ultimately inflicted on the
Japanese polity and society. For ODA policy, LDC leaders need a clear idea of how
religion affects the state and development. Without that, potentially great damage can
result. Based on Japan’s negative example here, LDCs should be aware of religion and
spirituality’s potential positive effects for economic development, as long as freedom of
religion is maintained. Donor and recipient aid staff and LDCs’ leaders should include
religion as a potentially positive tool in their development arsenal.
From 1895 to 1945, some leaders’ actions in international relations were
affected both by religion and by science. Hirohito’s foreign and military policy actions
were at times colored by his devotion to maintaining Japan’s sacred spiritual traditions
and the throne (the delay of the decision to surrender in World War II), and by rational
policy decisions about progress in battle (his guidance of battle plans in various South
Pacific locations) (Bix 2000). Earlier, from 1850 to 1895, while the influence of
evolutionistic, scientific thought on Japan’s international relations helped provide leaders
such as Yamagata with justification for Japan to prepare to attack “backward” neighbors
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seen as blocking Japan’s progress, other leaders (Kato in particular) worked hard to
devise scientific, evolutionistic and spiritual arguments to justify the Meiji state’s plans
for Japan’s development and international relations.
There were several potentially significant conflicts in the leaders’ views of
spirituality and science. Despite the ethical emphasis of many late Tokugawa leaders’
views and the more material leanings of Meiji leaders (already noted), daily spiritual
practice continued in Japan, both among leaders and the general population. There were
several potential conflicts affecting the use of spirituality and science for Japan’s national
policy goals in this era: conflicts between Western “scientific” knowledge and Asian
“ethical” knowledge, Western religious values and Japanese ones, and Western and
Japanese cultures. Though the separation of religion and state is a much longer tradition
in Japan than in Europe, in the Meiji state’s pro-religion and pro-science ideologies of
nationalism, the Flaw of the Excluded Middle and “conflicts” between the material and
the spiritual are not really seen. From 1850 to 1895, another conflict emerged concerning
which spiritual source might provide the best inspiration for Japan’s development. While
most leaders preferred Shinto or Confucian sources, a few like Mori chose Christianity.
Japan was totally open to accepting “useful” Western technologies, but generally not
willing to accept foreign ideologies that seemed too conflicting with Japanese culture,
such as Christianity. Another potentially important conflict (1850 to 1895) concerned the
spiritual and material realms. Several leaders (Kato, Yamagata, and Ito) found Western
culture and technology superior to East Asia’s, though not the West’s spirituality. In
approaching the technical and ethical/cultural dilemmas of development, any LDC must
seek a balance between the spiritual and material aspects of the process. In this era, the
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power of the West’s technologies and Japan’s rejection of “weaker” East Asian models
may have made it harder for Japan to do this.
From 1895 to 1945, conflicts between the spiritual and material realms in the
leaders’ worldviews can be seen, first, in some of their policy implications. The leaders
here, and the state, saw no essential conflict between spiritual and material concerns, or
in drawing on either for policy needs. This, again, is an example of pragmatic Japanese
spirituality. The conflict between Western and Eastern cultures was of much greater
concern to these leaders. While essential dichotomies between the material and spiritual
realms are likely assumed in the worldviews of most Western aid workers, what about
Japanese aid staff? Perhaps at their conscious, operational level of policy such a
dichotomy may be assumed, but likely not at the level of their personal spiritual practice
(this would need to be confirmed ethnographically). Integration of the material and
spiritual is seems to be a likely reality in the lives of many non-Western aid recipients.
How do presumptions about the spiritual and material in aid workers’ worldviews affect
the delivery of aid and its effectiveness? Aid staff should know their own operational
presumptions, because they will surely affect their decisions, policies, and interactions
with recipients. Knowing the worldviews of recipients, in general and regarding these
issues, would also help in improving aid effectiveness.
From 1895 to 1945, conflicts also occurred in the leaders’ material and spiritual
interventions in policy. Japan’s leaders used material means to transform Japan’s external
environment, and to obtain access to territories and natural resources they perceived to be
needed for Japan’s “defense.” Yanagita argued that Japan must use material means to
defend its indigenous culture and spirituality, the foundation of its culture, identity, and
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survival. But the aggressive material actions of the Japanese state, supported by forced
spirituality, greatly alienated foreign populations against Japan, and nearly destroyed
Japan and its empire. Coerced development is never the answer. Successful ODA policy
must draw on both hard (material) and soft (spiritual) aspects of development to be
effective.
What are the possible impacts of these leaders’ views of spirituality and/or
science on their general policy actions and impacts? From 1850 to 1895, many of their
views supported policies that would encourage science. Many Japanese and the state
were willing to use religion and spirituality to support science and defense if the clash
with Japanese culture was not too great; there was a definite tendency to mix religion and
spirituality with politics in this era. In the leaders’ worldviews of the domestic political
economy (1850 to 1895), there was more of an emphasis on the material realm, and less
on the ethical/philosophical side. Religion was only seen as useful if it could be used to
resist the West. The heavy material emphasis in Japan’s views of technology in this era
caused Japan to emphasize large-scale industrial development, to chose State Shinto as
the state spiritual ideology, and to partly reject its Confucian heritage. But the state did
not apply State Shinto to international relations until the next era (1895 to 1945). Leaders
here (from 1850 to 1895) stress how positive spiritual values might strengthen Japan’s
cultural core, its development process, its scientific and technological growth, and its
position in the international system. Yet despite the wise insights of Fukuzawa and others
about the great things appropriate scientific “spirits” and values could give Japan, there
were great pressures against importing Western religion into Japan. Japan’s leaders
struggled to balance various extremes here, including transferring intangible cultural
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values versus technical hardware, material and spiritual aspects of technology, values of
hyper-Westernization and pro-Japanese nationalism. Perhaps the proper balance between
all these extremes was never found before 1945.
Regarding the general policy impacts of leaders’ views of religion and
spirituality from 1895 to 1945, the later in the period one examines, the greater was the
role of spirituality in Japanese politics and nationalism. Since Hirohito was emperor, of
course his views had a larger impact than Yanagita’s. The government’s choice of State
Shinto as the state religion likely standardized local spirituality. For ODA policy, from
this we learn that religion should be separate from the state, but the state cannot ignore
consideration of the social effects of religion. As they affect policy, they inevitably affect
aid, especially in highly religious societies. Spirituality and nationalism both mixed in the
worldviews of Hirohito and Yanagita. Hirohito supported ideologies such as State Shinto
and hakkô ichiu in reaction to foreign influences threatening Japan. The government used
spiritual values in education, such as State Shinto, to increase citizen support for
militarism. LDCs should learn from Japan’s negative example here. While there were
seemingly not many conflicts in the worldviews of Hirohito and Yanagita between
spirituality and the material, they seem slightly stronger in Hirohito’s case.1791 The
worldviews of LDC aid recipients, their leaders and other relevant actors, including their
views of spiritual and material phenomena, will affect how the LDC receives a
technology or development intervention, and it succeeds. Knowledge of these issues by
aid donors should help an ODA program or policy succeed.
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From 1868 to 1945, Japan was happy to use spirituality to support nationalism
and national goals, including control of all religious groups in the 1930s and 1940s. State
policy (from 1895-1945) to use religion as needed resembles popular Japanese
spirituality: a willingness to use religion for whatever practical needs one has. It may
seem crass, but ODA policy should be willing to do the same—to call on religion
whenever it can help development, and is willing.
What about the possible later policy impacts of these worldviews on religion
and spirituality, related to science and development, on later ODA policies? In the period
1850 to 1895, both the European ideal of integrated church and state and the Flaw of the
Excluded Middle seem somewhat present in the worldviews of domestic state and
market. Given the Meiji state’s choice of State Shinto as the national spiritual practice
and development ideology, it does not seem that this was a secularizing force. Daily
spiritual practice continued, though regional forms may have been squelched. Since
ground-level spirituality continued underneath Meiji State Shinto, such a practice may
underlie today’s ODA policy, too. What do Japan’s leaders do, not just say? Consider
what most recent Japanese prime ministers and other top leaders have done at Yasukuni
Shrine.1792 The presence of spirituality in daily practice is likely present in their lives, but
must be confirmed ethnographically. What would this mean for ODA policy today? It
would mean that there are spiritual influences, at some level, in their ODA policy actions,
however subtle.
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Most recent Japanese prime ministers have gone on a regular basis to worship at Yasukuni Shrine, to
the great consternation of other East Asian nations such as China and South Korea.
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In this era, there were also many pressures in Japan against considering the
contributions of religion and spirituality for development, and against using Christianity
for this purpose. There was great pressure to overemphasize the material and deemphasize the spiritual in policies. Does the Constitution of 1947 bring similar pressure
to today’s ODA in Japan? Are there “secularizing” forces today attempting to pressure
policymakers from considering “spiritual” features in today’s aid? If so, how?
From 1850 to 1895, it seems Japan leaned more toward the material side, while
choosing State Shinto as the national ideology for development, but from 1895 to 1945, it
became more “spiritual” in its leanings, I would argue. Today, I suggest that Japan is
more “material” in its approaches to ODA, but that it needs to become more
knowledgeable of the “spiritual,” given the rise of Islam, global terrorism, and so forth.
There are some signs it may do so. Attitudes similar to the practical attitudes of several
leaders here toward spirituality, development, technology and knowledge1793 are also
seen in Japan’s contemporary aid, i.e. the emphases on self-help and self-reliance in
recipients. These attitudes evolved in ways that are connected over time, and which relate
to what Japan aid is today and will ultimately become. Though the leaders of 1895 to
1945 were not necessarily afraid to marshal spirituality in support of the state’s material
goals, today Japan’s constitution prohibits such a practice. The Japanese state does not
routinely intervene in religious affairs unless there is a pressing policy reason to do so
(i.e. terrorism). It is time to bring consideration of religion and spirituality into Japan’s
aid, for many of the reasons recognized by more international relations scholars today in
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the West. To not do so ignores a significant piece of the puzzle of international relations
and development.
Hirata Keiko offers additional, valuable insights concerning the relevance of
cultural, historical and spiritual values in Japan for today’s Japanese ODA policies.1794
The first set of insights concerns NGOs in Japan and how they relate to the Japanese
government and the ODA system.1795 Though Japan’s ODA community is younger and
less well funded than NGOs in the West, its connections with the global NGO
community are helping to bring an expansion of Japan’s civil society. The Internet has
enabled a huge increase in transnational communication and networking between NGOs
in different countries, and enabled NGO staff to increase their knowledge and skill levels
about global and development issues. Both of these factors have combined to create
attitudes among NGO activists that are less deferential to authority (a Confucian-based
norm, strongly encouraged in Japan’s developmental state era), and more willing to
question or protest against corruption or abuse.1796 Globalization has also brought more
knowledge to Japanese society and to NGOs. It has empowered both citizens and NGOs
so they do not have to be as easily deceived by state propaganda. They are more willing
to organize themselves collectively and demand accountability from the government and
its ODA.1797
Additional insights are seen in how NGOs cooperate with the Japanese
government in current ODA policy. Despite the noble goals of NGOs to increase their
1794
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cooperation with the Japanese government in ODA, these NGOs, including religious
ones, often struggle with the increased bureaucratic and financial accounting
requirements associated with seeking more cooperation with MOFA, to the point where
even some of the NGOs’ own goals are hampered. According to Hirata, these
partnerships can nevertheless be beneficial, but must be carefully managed by both sides.
NGOs tend to support grassroots development efforts, and the global aid agenda goal of
poverty reduction, more than MOFA does. MOFA supports the use of aid for Japan’s
kokueki (its national and diplomatic interests, i.e. its security and economic needs and
status in the international community).1798
Second, Hirata also offers insights on the issue of religion and spirituality in
Japanese ODA in her examination of NGOs, both secular and religious, and how they
relate to aid. According to Larry Diamond, religious, ethnic and communal groups that
promote collective rights, values, faith, and beliefs are legitimate NGOs, while religious
or racist hate groups, such as Aum Shinrikyo, are not.1799 Virtually all NGOs are nonreligious, with only a few exceptions.1800 There are a limited number of Buddhist or
Christian groups. Of these, virtually none do proselytizing along with their charitable
work in Japan, so these NGOs have a very high reputation.1801 According to Hirata,
historically, Japan has no deep Christian tradition, and little regarding volunteerism or
1798
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charity. Before World War II, many NGOs in Japan were Christian-affiliated. Various
Christian groups from abroad entered Japan after the war to assist with rebuilding the
country, and many remained after the American occupation ended. The largest Christianrelated NGO that does development work, World Vision Japan, was established in
1987.1802
Third, Hirata offers additional valuable insights about how historical cultural
values relate to contemporary Japanese aid policy. Historically, Confucian ideological
influence in Japanese society has encouraged three primary cultural values: “… 1) respect
for hierarchy and authority, 2) emphasis on conformity to group interests rather than
individual needs, and 3) emphasis on order and stability.” These values have encouraged
citizen deference to state authority, and helped the state to subordinate Japan’s civil
society when it has desired, as in the national goals for economic development that were
pursued in late twentieth century Japan.1803 Today more Japanese are less willing to
subscribe to Confucian values of sacrifice, hierarchical deference to authority, and
conformity, but prefer independence and freedom.1804 Therefore they are more willing to
participate in volunteer activities with NGOs. A significant non-Confucian value, the
uchi-soto (inside-outside) tradition, relates to the group-oriented nature of Japanese
society.1805 People usually see a great difference between those who are within their
group, and those who are not. This has encouraged them to only give charity to those who
are in their family or neighborhood, and not to support those who are outsiders. This was
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also encouraged by the values of filial piety and ie (Confucian family-like connections)
influential from 1868 to 1945. Japan’s developmental state discouraged citizens from
exercising civil activism, and their dependence on the state.1806
Fourth, Hirata briefly explores the influence of contemporary cultural and
spiritual values on Japanese aid. With modern Japan’s affluence, “catching up with the
West” is no longer one of the national goals. Young Japanese have begun looking for
more meaning in life, even from spiritual and religious sources. Hirata argues that the
postmaterial values that political scientist Ronald Inglehart identified in Western societies
are also developing in Japan.1807 While older Japanese were willing to sacrifice, work
hard and save, young Japanese value “social equality, self-expression, personal freedom
and the quality of life.” Hirata calls this the “crumbling” of developmentalism and the
developmental state. This makes Japanese more willing to volunteer or explore
religion.1808
Hirata argues perceptively that many Japanese have undergone a spiritual crisis
since the collapse of Japan’s bubble economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Several
of the development ideologies that drove Japan since the Meiji era, including the goals of
catching up with the West, achieving a higher GNP, called “GNPism,” and rapid

1806

Ibid., 25.
Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1990) and Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and
Political Change in 43 Countries (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), quoted in Hirata, Civil
Society, 28-29, 94, 95.
1808
Ibid., 28-29. In Japan’s economic recession of the 1990s and 2000s, the strong alliance between
Japanese business and government has weakened. People are looking for more meaning and fulfillment
beyond sacrifice and single-minded commitment to Japan’s ideology of national development. People want
to find meaning and personal happiness beyond corporate Japan, so they are more willing to participate in
NGOs and volunteerism (Ibid., 74).
753
1807

economic development, no longer hold sway.1809 The state ideology of “GNPism”
generated a postwar corporate culture in Japan that encouraged the ultimate of samurailike devotion, creating such terms and phenomena as karôshi (death from overwork),
môretsu shain (fierce company employees), kigyô senshi (the enterprise warrior), kaishashijô-shugi (company-firstism), and chichioya-fuzai (children growing up “with father
absent”). As Japan has become more affluent, younger Japanese have been less willing to
make such sacrifices of their health and families. The economic recession has not allowed
material concerns to disappear, but economic issues no longer consume most people’s
lives as in the late twentieth century. Fewer people are willing to sacrifice their lives for
authoritarian developmentalism.1810
The “spiritual crisis” generated by Japan’s economic recession in the 1990s and
early 2000s has had two principle social effects. First, “traditional” norms in Japanese
society have been weakened, including the weakening of patriarchal families and
closeknit neighborhood and community connections, bringing unprecedented social
problems. New problems include increasing youth violence, rebellion, juvenile
delinquency, and with a minority of people, destructive spiritual cults such as Aum
Shinrikyo.1811 Effects on youth are largely the result of their maturing in a materially
affluent society that has generally lacked a solid moral or spiritual mooring. Second, as
Japan has achieved its affluence, many more Japanese are looking to new postmaterial
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values beyond economic survival, including democracy, freedom, and life significance,
and willing to give themselves to serving others in citizen volunteering. Many young and
even older Japanese are embracing these values, and more willing to engage in citizen
and grassroots activism, including helping people in other countries, or traveling and
serving abroad. As the sacrificial values encouraged by Confucian ethics have weakened,
fewer Japanese are willing to submit their personal well-being to the goals of the
developmental state.1812
Hirata concludes that the onset of postmaterial values in Japan and increasing
globalization, since Japan’s economic recession in the 1990s and 2000s, has contributed
to the rise of several new values in Japan. More Japanese see themselves as chikyûjin
(global persons), concerned for the welfare of people around the world, able to transcend
the past limits of uchi-soto (inside-outside) mentality. Fewer people trust the
effectiveness and ethics of Japan’s developmental state. Hirata argues that all of this has
weakened the state, increased space in civil society for citizen activism, even on a global
scale, and political pluralism in Japanese politics.1813 There has been a postmodern crisis
of spiritual and material values. Once Japan achieved its goals of economic development
and affluence on a par with the West, many Japanese realized that they had little life
outside of corporations and work; “…they lacked meaning in their lives.” Japanese now
demand more freedoms and are no longer willing for Japan to be dominated by the iron
alliance of state and business. With continuing political and business scandals, and
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prolonged, endless recession, Japanese are less willing to recognize the validity of the
developmental state.1814
Conclusion
For the first research question,1815 I argued that much of what Japan’s aid is today
is based on Japan’s negative prewar experiences, a few positive, because of the great
destruction Japan and East Asia experienced in World War II, the desire not to repeat past
mistakes, and postwar policies imposed by the American occupation. Yet Japan has had
much choice in how its postwar system has been implemented. In Japan’s own choices,
of course, cultural and historical influences from the prewar period remain.
In the sociocultural area, I explored how Japan’s government placed
overwhelming priority on Japan’s need to survive in the hostile international system. This
need was driven by politics and economics, not by society and culture. As a result, the
state continually placed top priority on political and economic issues, not social ones,
despite wise observations by leaders like Fukuzawa and Yanagita who wrestled with the
social meanings of Japan’s interactions with the West, and preserving the essence of what
Japan was. The leaders studied struggled with significant social issues: how Japan could
develop without culturally imploding, and the role of intangible values and spirituality in
development and technology transfer. Sadly, in the prewar period, the state’s adaptation
1814
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of State Shinto as a coercive development ideology contributed to the destruction of
Japan and East Asia in World War II. These experiences offer rich lessons for LDCs on
development, aid, and spirituality.
In comparing ideas in current Japanese aid policy with possible sources, there is
much continuity between the prewar and postwar periods. Many ideas are based on
Japan’s development experience. The experiences of Japan and other East Asian nations
are distinct from the experiences of many Western nations. This may be a source of
tensions between the Japanese and global aid agendas. A related theme is Japan’s
continuing sense of international image. Despite how Japan has used aid to help its
image, and massive aid budget increases through the late 1990s, aid has not met these
expectations.
If Japan had had a stronger civil society and religious institutions in the prewar
period, there may have been some checks on the destructive policies of the prewar
political system. Since civil society was weak, much damage occurred. Tension between
oligarchic rule and democratic desires was a main theme in prewar Japanese politics. In
the prewar system, the oligarchs won. The wartime destruction of the prewar political
system enabled the development of postwar democracy that now guides Japan’s aid. Now
the aid bureaucracy must be accountable to public demands. On democratic
accountability, Japan’s postwar political system is totally different from the prewar one.
Japan’s weak prewar civil society enabled the state to manipulate State Shinto as a
nationalistic ideology, to the nation’s peril. Although Japan’s contemporary culture of
politics is more liberal than the prewar system’s, it is still heavily conservative. Yet the
character of the recent institutional reforms of its ODA system can be called quite
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progressive, in terms of various administrative moves, including the creation of the
“new” JICA agency in October 2008, under the leadership of Ogata Sadako. These
reforms have resulted from both internal and external pressures. Japan’s small NGO
community and the public also exercise increasing influence over Japan’s aid.
Strategic and foreign policy interests are important in contemporary Japanese
aid, and were also in Japan’s prewar politics. Some of the key features of that system
were its authoritarian nature, political and ideological conservatism, the strong nature of
the state, the powerful influence of the military in politics and government (especially
from 1895 to 1945), and the overarching goal of the state to assure Japan’s survival. A
major theme in Japan’s prewar politics was national survival. Though Japan is much
stronger and more stable today, national survival remains an important undercurrent in
the national psyche. It is no surprise that even postwar aid has always been strongly
connected to Japan’s political and economic kokueki (national interests).
In the prewar system, ultimately its economic policies were more successful
than its political ones. I found that Japan’s economic system and economic development
experience has many wise lessons for LDCs, including how to borrow foreign economic
knowledge and mix it with indigenous ideologies. Other lessons include the importance
of hard work, education, a strong state, and how to learn and improve valuable economic
knowledge from foreign powers. Early in its development, Japan had a strong state,
which purposely took a strong role in national development and trade. Limiting an LDC’s
openness to international trade near the beginning of its development, until different
sectors and industries are mature enough to face international competition, is one of the
most important lessons. Trade was imperative for Japan’s growth, and likely is for other
758

LDCs. Japan’s growth in the prewar system was heavily imbalanced toward large
industries and urban areas. Postwar Japan continues to pay the price of congestion and
other problems because of these mistakes. As Yanagita wisely argued, more balanced,
cross-regional development is needed.
Japan, as the first non-Western nation to develop economically, offers valuable
insights for other non-Western nations, though most Western aid and development
experts fail to recognize it. The challenge is to apply these lessons wisely in different
regional environments and cultural conditions. Although many Western aid experts seem
to have trouble believing that this can be done, Asian nations do not. This crucial issue
deserves much more attention by the global aid and development communities. It should
be possible to transfer, on some level, elements of what Japanese has done, to the
development experiences of other developing nations today. As mentioned earlier, this
must usually be done on an institutional level; it cannot be done on a cultural level.1816 It
must also be done very carefully, following the ideas of translative adaptation. Lessons
from any foreign development model or experience, including Japan’s, must be carefully
applied and offered according to the unique conditions of each recipient nation. Each
LDC’s own people are the best experts in helping an aid donor to offer effective aid that
matches their nation’s actual needs and conditions.1817 Local peoples and experts, perhaps
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aided by applied social scientists who know how to effectively listen and facilitate, seem
the most capable of determining the local particularisms of applying Japanese or other
foreign development and aid models to their local situations.
There were strong currents of evolutionistic thought in many of the prewar
worldviews we have studied. Evolutionistic thought was influential at various levels in
most of the leaders’ thought on social, political and economic issues, and is present in
many assumptions of technological progress and notions of “development” that remain
influential in the postmodern world, including in foreign aid. Such thought was partly
used to justify imperialism and aggression by the West against non-Western nations, and
by Japan against its temporarily weaker neighbors. These values often run counter to
much less influential religious and ethical thought in Japan’s development and aid
programs. The influence of evolutionism in current views of aid remains, though it is less
overt and less racist than in the prewar period. Some degree of ethnocentrism, based
partly on evolutionistic thought, continues in Japan’s aid. But overall, Japan now
manifests a much healthier desire in seeking to help LDCs at multiple levels. Over the
long-term, a science-based type of morality, such as desired by various Meiji leaders
including Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato, emerged in Japan, albeit in modified form. The
influence of evolutionism on various aspects of Japanese leaders’ thought is also seen
here. One hopes that it is less racist than past Japanese thought was.
One of the most profound insights emerging from Japan’s development
experience is the concept of translative adaptation, that each nation’s development plans
must match its actual, unique conditions. It seems so simple and obvious.
“Modernization” and internationalization are similar. It seems logical that such insights
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would emerge from Japan’s rather unique development experience.1818 Translative
adaptation offers many significant lessons for LDCs, so it is unfortunate that it has not
been more carefully or systematically applied in Japan’s ODA policies to date.
I conclude that my working hypothesis is basically true. Japan’s experience with
technology, development and foreign relations, seen in the beliefs of several important
leaders, has affected its current aid policies, despite the fact that linkages between
historical experiences and ideas usually seem indirect. Rather they are evidenced through
the gradual evolution of several different streams of thought over time. Of the seven
leaders I studied, I concluded that the ideas of Fukuzawa, Ito, Yamagata, and Hirohito
seem to be the most influential on the thought in current ODA policy. These leaders each
exercised different, important influences over Japanese society and politics, domestically
and internationally, that affected the postwar environments in which Japanese ODA
emerged and in which it continues to function. Based on Japan’s positive and negative
development experiences from 1850 to 1945, there are also many valuable applications in
politics, economics, and culture for LDCs.1819 Japan’s experiences, even on this general
level, offer many valuable insights for LDCs.
On the second key question of the research, whether the ideas of
“modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation present an accurate
picture of Japan’s experience with technology and development from 1850 to 1945, I
concluded that in all three cases, they do. On “modernization,” although Japan adopted
numerous forms of Western culture and technology, and encountered tumultuous social
1818
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change on many levels, the true core of its identity and most basic social structures did
not fundamentally change. Japan’s imperialism in East Asia well represents the concept
of internationalization, since Japan actively conquered, absorbed, exploited and brought
other Asian nations into its economic and cultural universe, as it was able. On translative
adaptation, although imported technologies and ideologies greatly changed many surface
(infrastructural and cultural) features in Japan, they did not fundamentally alter the
deepest parts of Japan’s core culture, including its social organization, family structures,
and core spiritual convictions. How do these concepts apply to Japan’s aid? Barring indepth ethnographic research, at present, “modernization,” internationalization, and
translative adaptation all can be used to better understand the conditions of various
recipients of Japanese aid.
On the third research question, the effects of spirituality on Japan’s
contemporary aid policies, I argued that religion and spirituality, important components
of worldview, have likely played an important though indirect role in shaping Japan’s
ODA. But the question is how. Religion provides valuable lessons for today’s aid
policies, but in Japan’s case, many of its applications flow from negative experiences in
the prewar period. We find valuable lessons for LDCs in how Japanese leaders attempted
to balance the “soft” (philosophical, spiritual) and “hard” (material) components of
technology as they transferred many forms of foreign knowledge into Japan.
The Meiji state coercively mobilized a new spiritual ideology, State Shinto, to
encourage support for nationalism and development in Japan. This indirectly encourages
contemporary Japanese aid to steer clear of religion and spirituality, given Japan’s past
interference in the affairs of other Asian states, partly by the Japanese government’s
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imposition of State Shinto on them and on Japan. The danger here for Japan and today’s
LDCs is mixing religion and state too closely for the purpose of development. Second,
Japan’s government manipulated the education system with State Shinto and similar
forms of nationalistic propaganda for state ends. This should be discouraged by ODA
policies. Japan sought to import technologies believed to be useful for development, but
discouraged the importation of ideologies believed to be harmful for Japanese culture,
such as Christianity. But accepting certain desired technologies and filtering out
accompanying cultural features is hard. LDCs should not resort to repression. In Japan’s
case, an “indigenous” ideology, State Shinto, not a foreign religion, became the true tool
of state repression and damage for the nation. LDCs should consider the dangers of
foreign and indigenous extremist ideologies, whether secular or religious. This is an
additional argument for promoting democracy, pluralism and freedom in aid and
development policies, including freedom of religion.
An irony in Japan’s culture of spirituality is that while Japanese politics has
discouraged mixing religion and state for centuries, most Japanese, including politicians,
engage in spiritual practices on a regular or daily basis, even in public life.1820 Is this an
interesting twist on the Flaw of the Excluded Middle? It is not. There is a difference in
how the Japanese language defines religion and spirituality that I described in an earlier
chapter. The Japanese state has long legally discouraged the manipulation of and
involvement in politics by various religions (“shukyo,” sect-teachings such as different
1820

Here I am referring to the periodic visits of national politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. Some
prime ministers visit that shrine on an annual basis. While many Japanese pray at household Shinto shrines
and/or Buddhist family altars on a daily basis, they visit public Shinto shrines or Buddhist temples on
regular occasions too. Shinto shrines are typically visited on New Year’s Eve or New Year’s Day,
December 31 and January 1. Thus the concept of “public” or “private” religion and spirituality seems rather
murky in contemporary Japanese consciousness.
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branches of Buddhism), but it did not formally proscribe the involvement of spirituality
(seishin, spirit) or spiritual practices such as Shinto until after World War II. Politically,
these were not viewed as “sect-teachings” until Japan’s postwar American occupiers
forced that interpretation on the nation. Most Japanese still do not view Shinto as a
“religion,” any more than most Americans view stopping at a Starbucks for coffee or
putting up a Christmas tree as religion. Most Japanese see Shinto, the “way of the gods,”
as it has been viewed in Japan for millennia, as a daily, regular ritual or custom of
heartfelt gratitude to the kami, a natural part of everyday life. The prewar Japanese state
refused to call State Shinto a religion.1821 It called it a patriotic (aikoku)1822 practice that
Japanese should see as their natural duty of devotion and love for the nation. These
examples reveal the diverse concepts of religion, spirituality and politics in different
cultures, and how sensitively they must be handled in effective ODA and development
policies.1823
Japan’s leaders struggled with deciding which spiritual ideology could best help
motivate Japan for development. Because of perceived cultural conflicts, most chose
Shinto over Christianity as the preferred aid.1824 States may use spirituality as a useful

1821

The term for State Shinto is Kokka Shinto, which may be directly translated as “National Shinto” or
“Shinto of the National House.”
1822
The literal meaning of aikoku, a common word for patriotism, is “love the nation” (country). Today the
term has a negative connotation of prewar propaganda and jingoism that it did not have before World War
II.
1823
Other examples of this spiritual complexity are seen in the research of Yanagita Kunio on Japanese
spirituality that we explored earlier. Consider the “traditional” Japanese connections of spirituality with
local identity, place, and kinship, very different from contemporary American views that often connect
religion with beliefs or doctrine. Another example is the close non-Western connection of the spiritual
realm with the material realm, as explained in the Flaw of the Excluded Middle concept (Hiebert, “Flaw of
Excluded Middle,” and Anthropological Reflections).
1824
The Meiji state also did not choose Buddhism as the preferred spiritual practice to motivate Japan’s
development. In the Tokugawa period, Buddhism was often seen as a less indigenous source of tradition
than Shinto (Buddhism originally entered Japan from overseas). This occurred as Tokugawa scholars
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tool to promote cultural cohesion during development at either the national or local
levels, but freedom of religion must be maintained. A few conflicts emerged in these
leaders’ views of spirituality and science, especially over alleged conflicts between
Japanese and Western cultures, but not really about spiritual and material aspects. To
assess spiritual and religious issues in aid and development, aid workers need training in
how to be sensitive to the spiritual (and secular) aspects of the worldviews of both aid
donors and recipients.
From 1895 to 1945, the role of spirituality in Japan’s politics increased. The
state drew more on State Shinto to promote nationalism, through education and other
vehicles. The state’s willingness to use spirituality for its own purposes is similar to the
pragmatic Japanese attitude of drawing on religion whenever it can help with practical
needs. When the state chose State Shinto as the national spiritual practice, it likely had a
somewhat homogenizing effect on local spirituality, as Yanagita feared, though daily
spiritual practice remained alive throughout Japan. The same is likely true for Japan’s
political actors, prewar and contemporary. Regardless of public statements about religion
and spirituality, personal practices continue. The Flaw of the Excluded Middle does not
seem to be in operation here. Likely the spiritual practices and convictions of even aid
staff, at some level, play out in their views of aid and in their aid policymaking, though
exactly how needs to be determined through ethnographic research.
On the relationship of religion and spirituality with Japan’s contemporary aid
policies, we learned that in various respects, especially regarding “postmaterial” values,

struggled to identify indigenous, genuine sources of tradition for the nation. Shinto was seen as such a
tradition, while Buddhism was not.
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Japanese are not so different from persons in other advanced nations. “Traditional”
values, many from Confucianism, are being changed through the rise of new values that
encourage people to seek freedom, purpose, and self-fulfillment. Many Japanese,
especially the young, have lost their drive to achieve economic development at all costs.
This has created a spiritual vacuum in increasing numbers of Japanese, making them
more open to seeking personal meaning through human service or religion. Although
Japan’s NGO community is small compared to those in most Western nations, it is a
vibrant example of the expansion of Japan’s civil society, of how Japan is becoming
more diverse, pluralistic, and how Japanese citizens are demanding greater public
accountability on ODA and other issues. Increasing globalization and connections of
these NGOs with their overseas counterparts have also strengthened their ability to
pressure the government and its ODA programs, and provided further avenues for service
and fulfillment for postmaterial Japanese.1825
Though there may be formal, legal or cultural pressures in Japan that discourage
aid policymakers from considering spiritual factors in aid, they need to, given the rise in
the importance of religion in international affairs since the 1990s, including terrorist
attacks in Tokyo in 1995 and the 9-11 incident in New York in 2001. The question is how
this can be practically done. Training development and aid workers and policymakers in
practical research skills and approaches such as applied ethnography and holistic
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A good example is a recent graduate of the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International
Studies, Kimura Hiroshi. Before graduating, Kimura did a development-related internship in Bosnia with
World Vision International. Returning to Japan, he served with both secular and religious NGOs in the
Osaka area. Kimura now works as the international coordinator for a Tokyo area research institution.
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anthropology is one way.1826 Like every major aid donor and advanced industrial nation,
Japan needs to improve its consideration of the human, ground level factors and
conditions that affect aid, diplomacy, security, and numerous other issues in international
affairs. Let us hope that various efforts underway, both in Japan and globally, including
new graduate programs in international development, organizational reforms and research
improvements in aid agencies such as the “new” JICA, and cross-disciplinary efforts to
bridge the social sciences in training for international affairs can help encourage this.

1826

Yanagita Kunio’s ethnographic research of Japanese religious life and the resulting policy implications
is one concrete example. Aid workers need training in practical, rapid ethnographic methods so that they
can do this in overseas development research. Possible examples of such training include W. Penn
Handwerker, Quick Ethnography (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2001); and James Beebe, Rapid
Assessment Process: An Introduction (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2001). On a general level,
giving aid policymakers and decision-makers basic training in applied cultural anthropology, which is
commonly holistic in approach, can encourage awareness of these issues in development policy.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions, Part II: Policy Implications
Introduction
Chapter 10 explores this study’s possible policy implications for domestic and
international issues.1827 I will often discuss worldview policy implications for both
historical time periods studied1828 consecutively, though sometimes they will be
considered together. Next, I will briefly examine possible future trends for Japan’s ODA
policy. Finally, the chapter considers policy applications from this project for the social
sciences (applied anthropology, political science and international studies) and
development policy. What has Japan’s ODA accomplished in practice? Koppel and Orr
argue that while the amount of actual ODA may seem “small” compared with value of
private sector flows flowing from Japan, ODA is the main instrument through which
postwar Japanese foreign policy has developed the capacity, via bilateral and multilateral
channels, to broaden its goals and activities beyond mere trade and economic issues.1829
In the conclusion, among several key insights, I stress the importance of applying
improved social research methods to the Japanese aid system, and the urgency for the
1827

Note that these policy implications and lessons are largely conjectural, offered from my own reflection
on these issues.
1828
The time periods studied are 1850 to 1895 and 1895 to 1945.
1829
Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 365.
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Western-controlled, global aid system to acknowledge and better understand the
significance of the East Asian development experience, in general and for other regions.
Worldview Policy Implications for Domestic Issues
Policy Implications of Technological Development Worldviews
For the time period 1850 to 1895, Fukuzawa Yukichi helped other Japanese to
absorb knowledge about Western science, technology, and culture through his university,
writings, and business ventures. Fukuzawa, along with Mori Arinori, was one of the
leaders of the bunmei kaika movement, which stressed the need for Japan’s pragmatic,
liberal adaptation of Western science and knowledge. Mori Arinori later went to
Washington as Japan’s first diplomat in the U.S. from 1871-1873 to prepare for the
Iwakura mission, a high level delegation of Japanese officials and students sent to study
U.S. and European “intellectual technologies” in science, business, education and
government. It soon had a big influence on Japan’s industrialization.1830 In the early
1870s, during his service in public works, Ito Hirobumi helped initiate various
infrastructural improvements.1831 As a major political and military leader in Meiji and
Taisho Japan, Yamagata Aritomo used certain “traditional” ideologies and values,
coupled with Western ideas and institutions, to reform and strengthen Japan. He was
particularly influential in contributing to reforms in the military, local government,

1830

Van Sant, Mori Ariniori, xviii, xx-xxi, xxv.
Hamada, Prince Ito, 62-63. These improvements included Japan’s first railway and additional lines,
telegraph lines, docks, lighthouses, mining, postal, and printing systems (Ibid.).
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constitutional politics, and in Japan’s international relations,1832 including Japan’s
adoption of the most advanced military technologies then available.
In the process of modernizing to repel Western invasion, Japan imported
numerous forms of Western culture, science, politics, and technology. The government,
suspicious of Western influence, attempted to limit it almost exclusively to the areas of
science and technology, to maintain the distinctiveness of Japanese culture. Along with
these goals, the government and some intellectuals sought a “scientific” theory that could
allow rapid modernization and social change. Social Darwinism met that need. Kato
Hiroyuki was one of the chief intellectuals who helped to develop and apply the theory
for that aim.1833
The five leaders examined during 1850-1895 vary in their direct involvement in
policymaking and in how their views of science and technological development affected
policy. Four of the five leaders served as policymakers during at least a part of their
careers, in education, local government, the military, and foreign policy. Only Fukuzawa
never had direct policy involvement, though he worked briefly as a government
translator. Concerning policy impacts for technological development, many of these
leaders’ impacts were direct: Mori on education, Ito on public works (in the 1870s), and
Yamagata on Japan’s military and local governments. Kato’s influence was broad, since
he helped to apply Social Darwinism to Japan’s general context. Through that, the
government hoped to limit Western impacts to mainly the science and technology sectors.
The influence of Fukuzawa and Mori, members of the Meirokusha debate society, was
1832

Dickinson, War and National, 40-42; Hackett, “Meiji Leaders,” 268-269.
Unoura, “Samurai Darwinism,” 236-240. Yet as they received Darwin’s theory, many Japanese felt
racially inferior to Caucasian Europeans (Ibid.).
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also broad. Fukuzawa had great impact on Japan’s perception of the West through his
popular writings and work in education and business.
In the time period 1895 to 1945, early in his career, Yanagita Kunio had broad
exposure to domestic and international policymaking, leading him to later study how
interaction with Western technology and culture affected Japan’s core identity and
culture, through the relatively new methodology of ethnography.1834 This was unlike
many Meiji leaders, whose concern for Japan’s defense preceded their policy
involvements. Yanagita proposed many kinds of policy applications designed to preserve
elements of Japanese “traditional” culture that he identified through his research across
rural Japan. But they seem to have had limited impact on actual government policies in
Yanagita’s era.1835 The second major leader studied, Hirohito, was inspired by his love of
science, by 1928, to establish two personal biological research facilities, and to pursue a
scholarly scientific career as an avocation.1836 Both government propaganda (at times)
and his personal worldview reconciled modern science with divine accounts of the
national polity.1837 While Hirohito’s scientific bent was modulated by his obligations as
emperor,1838 scientific rationality also influenced his significant policy actions

1834

As noted above, early in his career, Yanagita served as a bureaucrat in several ministries, in the Diet
(1914-1919), as a journalist for a major newspaper, and then as one of Japan’s delegates at the League of
Nations in the early 1920s. His use of ethnography began about 1930 (Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 1-3,
81, 110-111).
1835
While beyond the present study, it seems Yanagita’s policy impacts were greater in the postwar period,
when the Japanese government began actual campaigns to preserve many unique aspects of Japan’s cultural
heritage, and in the 1970s, when rural Japanese culture was widely promoted by the Japanese travel
industry.
1836
Hirohito became a naturalist and student of marine biology, collecting marine samples his whole life
(Bix, Hirohito, 199-200).
1837
Government propaganda connected with Hirohito’s enthronement celebrations in 1928 claimed that
modern science and the kokutai (Japan’s national polity) were compatible (Ibid.).
1838
Ibid., 60-62.
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surrounding World War II. He was a shrewd, rational political actor, and yet his stubborn
commitment to divine ideals nearly destroyed the nation.1839
While Yanagita was critically aware of the implications of Western technology
and culture for Japan, and devoted much of his career to researching related phenomena,
and offered policy applications, before 1945, their impact is questionable. Though
Hirohito’s reflections on these issues were less overt, his policy implications were
massive. He experienced conflicts in his worldviews and policy actions based on his
scientific rationality and his commitment to divine, imperialistic ideologies. Both of
these elements of his worldview influenced each other. Given his position as the top
political and military leader in the nation, his decisions and actions had huge effects on
Japan. His divine obligations nearly destroyed the nation, but his scientific-based
rationality enabled both him and the throne to survive the turbulent politics of postwar
Japan. On their views of technology and policy, Yanagita’s focus tended toward the
domestic effects of technology on Japanese society (translative adaptation), while
Hirohito’s approach leaned toward the threat of Western internationalization. Yanagita’s
policy applications were weaker than Hirohito’s. Given Yanagita’s concern with limiting
the effects of Western technology on Japanese society, his views were more
anthropological than Hirohito’s. Hirohito’s wartime militaristic technology policies were
unsustainable. The use of destructive Western technologies, including the atomic bomb,
nearly destroyed Japan.1840 While pragmatic concerns and tones of scientific rationality
1839

The influence of elements of Japanese religious tradition and the emperor ideology clearly also had a
great influence on Hirohito’s actions, and are better known.
1840
The effects of this destruction continued after World War II, in the number of people wounded by the
atomic bombs who finally died, the utter devastation of the Japanese economy at the war’s end, and the
widespread suffering, poverty, and starvation of many Japanese in the early postwar period. For more
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guided many of Hirohito’s policy responses to war with the United States, the conflict
between his religious and scientific worldviews, and his spiritual duties as high priest of
the nation, prolonged the war and contributed to Japan’s near destruction.1841
Policy Implications of Domestic State Worldviews
Examining the period 1850 to 1895, Fukuzawa’s comments on politics were
extensive.1842 He stayed largely independent of direct political involvement. His popular
writings had a broad, indirect impact on Japanese politics and public opinion. But his
belief in liberal political values, supported by the bunmei kaika movement, likely
increased their appeal in society. Ito’s policy impacts were also broad and more direct
than Fukuzawa’s. Ito had extensive involvement in domestic Japanese politics, and many
impacts upon them.1843 He affected areas of politics that broadly influenced people’s
daily lives, not specific policy issues so much.1844 He also researched Western political
systems, their implications for Japan, and was the major author of Japan’s first
constitution. Mori Arinori was a broad thinker, heavily involved in national policy. He
thought and wrote about the nature of politics, Western politics, and their applications for
Japan.1845 Yet his life was cut short. Ultimately his major policy impact, only short-term,
was on national education policy, examined below. Yamagata Aritomo stressed national
details on this situation, see Dower, Embracing Defeat. In the postwar period, Japanese technology
policies enabled the restoration of the national economy. Perhaps technology ultimately became Japan’s
“salvation” for the rebuilding of the country, largely through the exports of improved technology to the
market of the United States, the Western nation that used technology to both open Japan in 1853
(Commodore Perry’s “black ships”), and then nearly destroy it at the end of World War II.
1841
This point is explored further below in my discussion of the policy applications of Hirohito’s views of
Japan’s external political relations.
1842
His comments included foreign political systems, and how they applied to Japan.
1843
Ito offered reforms for the legal system, the national government’s authority and structure, and
democratic political participation, gradually somewhat warming to the idea.
1844
The former included legal and constitutional areas (human rights and rights for political participation).
1845
Mori supported limited public political involvement in Japan, evolutionary principles on political
development, and a rather powerful central government, somewhat limited in authority.
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unity as the nation’s first political goal, and accompanying military and political reforms.
He judged Japan’s national survival, in the face of huge external threats, as the supreme
task for Japan’s leaders. He also introduced several important reforms for Japan’s
domestic politics.1846 Ultimately, he did not hesitate to get involved in policy, fighting
strongly for what seemed best for Japan. Yamagata had some of the most assertive policy
involvements of the five leaders. While his impacts on Japan’s domestic politics are not
insignificant, they were eclipsed by his actions affecting Japan’s external relations. Kato
Hiroyuki served in several national ministries and as the president of Tokyo Imperial
University.1847 Relevant to this study, his most significant impact stemmed from his
mature political thought in writings such as Jinken Shinsetsu, which, in the 1880s, gave
the Japanese government an intellectual, “scientific” justification for its extensive reform
programs for Japan’s domestic affairs. Kato applied Social Darwinism to support official
arguments against popular democratic movements.1848 He provided mainly intellectual
arguments in support of the national state’s reform policies.
How did the interaction of each leader’s domestic political worldview with the
surrounding environment affect each one’s policy judgments, actions, and outcomes?
The environment of all five leaders was at first rather closed, because of national
isolation. To Fukuzawa, the forbidden West seemed the source of true power and
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Hackett, “Meiji Leaders,” 243, 268-269; Dickinson, War and National, 40-42. Yamagata’s impacts on
domestic politics included major reforms and innovations in local government, the military and
constitutional politics (Hackett, “Meiji Leaders,” 243, 268-269; Dickinson, War and National, 40-42). In
domestic politics, he strongly supported strengthening the central government’s authority over local affairs
to support national unity.
1847
Davis argues that his greatest concrete policy impact, as a public servant, was in the national Ministry
of Education (Davis, Moral and Political, 12).
1848
For a time, Kato’s thought was fairly influential, until he was eclipsed by more appealing writers.
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practical wisdom.1849 This, plus his observances in journeys to the West, led him to favor
Western-oriented solutions in his policy reflections. The Tokugawa period was a
conservative age. Fukuzawa, Ito, and Mori sensed the corruption of the Tokugawa
regime. Ito supported imperial restoration. The outlook of the Meiji government was
conservative, despite rapid reforms. At first Ito was wary of Western influence, but soon
recognized the West’s power, and that Japan must reform quickly. The conservative
environment, domestically and internationally, encouraged Ito’s conservative policy
responses, as he modeled the Meiji constitution on the conservative Prussian model, and
sought to limit popular political participation. Mori’s journeys to the West and training
in Western science and technology powerfully exposed him to the dynamism of Western
knowledge, and led him to advocate strongly for Western-oriented reforms, at first,
radical ones. Gradual policy experience tempered this, later leading him to offer more
conservative, pragmatic policy responses. Similar to Mori, at first Kato preferred more
liberal, Western-oriented policies. But in a few years, he underwent a conservative
transformation, and developed conservative yet evolutionary based arguments for the
Meiji government’s policies. Like Ito, he adapted Western models of thought as
conservative policy responses. Yamagata responded to the hostile external policy
environment pragmatically, by seeking to use the West’s knowledge and technology
against it, to build and unify Japan so it could resist Western imperialism. While perhaps
radical in terms of the pace of change and the degree of state intervention, ideologically,
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Remember that both Fukuzawa and Mori received early exposure to Western knowledge due to their
upbringing in southwestern Japan, the region most open to Western influence during the Tokugawa period.
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the outcome of these worldviews and policies on the domestic state was generally
conservative.
In the time period 1895 to 1945, Emperor Hirohito emerged as Japan’s single
most influential leader. Yanagita’s views of domestic politics (briefly explored in Chapter
7) stressed the need for strong local, grassroots political involvement and democracy. But
they had little impact on how domestic Japanese politics unfolded through 1945. On the
other hand, Hirohito’s views about domestic politics, his own policy actions, inactions,
and decisions, and how the government chose to represent him to the nation (his public
images) all deeply affected Japan’s domestic politics. Long before he became emperor,
the state engaged in careful image management on his behalf.1850 As emperor, he used
divine myths to justify his actions and to strengthen his political position. At times, he
utilized religion as a tool of power.1851 One important example of the state’s image
management of the emperor occurred in Hirohito’s enthronement. In 1928, the
government spent huge sums for the event, reviving emperor ideology.1852 Enthronement
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For example, in the Meiji era, Japanese citizens were taught that they must work hard, and give full
allegiance to the emperor (Bix, Hirohito). From 1918 to the early 1920s, public indifference to the throne
increased, and the status of monarchies declined abroad. Examples of this included the collapse of
dynasties in Russia, Germany, Austria, and elsewhere, and pressures from the United States to spread
democratic ideals abroad through the League of Nations and other institutions. As regent, Hirohito
completed a tour of European countries (1921) to strengthen the public image of the throne. The public saw
a vigorous crown prince, meeting with leaders in Europe. When Hirohito became regent in 1921, the press
portrayed him as an energetic prince on military maneuvers and meeting with foreign dignitaries. To
strengthen his image, aides urged him to study and work harder. Aides urged Hirohito to do this since they
were concerned about his ability to perform. The government experimented with bringing the throne a bit
closer to the people by allowing his photo in newspapers. Hirohito privately expressed his doubts about the
divinity of emperors, but finally followed the official ideology in his future rule (Ibid., 84, 110, 112-114,
119-122, 127-128, 135-136).
1851
Bix, Hirohito discusses these issues at some length.
1852
Ibid., 186-191. The rituals and intense media coverage of the Enthronement showed Japan as divine,
and Hirohito as closely connected with his subjects. In the climax, events across Japan and its colonies
reinvigorated people’s support for the emperor and the state (Ibid.). In the events, Hirohito was “deified,”
united with the sun goddess, and watched massive military displays, uniting his images as the national
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activities greatly influenced Japan’s political culture, strengthening the indoctrination of
leaders and the people into the national morality, the fusion of religion with politics and
the end of Taisho democracy. The enthronement helped close Japan to Western
influence, strengthened the expansionary slogan of hakkô ichiu, and encouraged the
emergence of emperor worship through 1945.1853 But Hirohito’s image was not always
uncontested.1854 By 1940, the emperor image and ideology were used to justify other
ideologies of militarism, war, Japanese fascism, and colonialism.1855 Through the state’s
prewar national image work regarding the emperor, Hirohito and the Japanese people
evolved a symbiotic relationship of shared emotions, ideology, and experiences with war.
Before the postwar period, he looked down on them as their exalted, benevolent father,
with whom they were not to disagree, though some always did.1856 Yet in reality,
Hirohito was terribly isolated from them.1857
How Hirohito’s prewar worldviews and images influenced policy is seen the
most strongly after he became emperor. In a setting like Japan, with a “divine” ruler, the

religious leader and supreme military commander. His weak personal image, national unity, and his
symbolic connection with the people were strengthened (Ibid., 191-195).
1853
Ibid., 198-202. Hakkô ichiu, eight corners of the world under one roof, based on a quotation in the
seventh century chronicle of Nihon shoki, emerged as a philosophy during the Tokugawa era. It reemerged
from 1850 and in Meiji Japan, and became an important government slogan during World War II.
According to this ideology, all corners of the world would eventually unite under the rule of Japan’s
benevolent emperor (Ibid., 200-201; Japan, “Hakkô ichiu,” 491).
1854
In 1933, Hirohito’s image was attacked from several domestic quarters. Those attacking his image
included some in the military, the Privy Council, the Seiyûkai (a leading political party), and civilian rightwing groups. Some criticized him as limiting the military, as manipulated by his advisors, or overly
interested in his recreational pursuits (Bix, Hirohito, 283).
1855
Ibid., 283, 374, 384. For example, within official emperor theory there had long existed two competing
images of the emperor: the pragmatic image of the emperor as a “jewel” to be manipulated to provide
political legitimacy, and an ideal image that supported the idea of actualized, “direct imperial rule.” By the
2,600th anniversary of the Japanese state, November 10, 1940, the emperor also emerged as the colonial
symbol of the “New Order for East Asia” (Ibid.).
1856
Ibid., 10.
1857
Bix, Hirohito. In another example of image management, to counter this isolation, the court had
Hirohito initiate a rice planting ceremony, to improve his popular image (Ibid., 182-183).
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nation viewing itself as a superior race, and supreme authority vested in the state,
Hirohito and his court were free to directly influence politics in decisive ways.1858 In
domestic politics in the mid- to late-1920s, conflicts emerged over the nature of Japan’s
national polity, and oligarchic versus popular control of Japan’s politics.1859 Amid fierce
Diet debate, Hirohito and the court found it hard to remain aloof.1860 The small,
sophisticated, elite court group, operating beyond constitutional limits, assisted him.1861
The court policymaking process was complex.1862 The elaborate politics forced the court
group to develop methods for Hirohito to influence policies before their formal
presentation to him by ministers. The court group also tried to prevent his involvement in
partisan debates.1863 This encouraged secrecy and manipulation by high officials and the
1858

Ibid., 11-12. For example, early in his reign, from a distance, Hirohito enthusiastically influenced the
behavior of his first three prime ministers, hastened the downfall of political party cabinets, and resisted
mechanisms for peace at the League of Nations (Ibid.).
1859
Briefly, in the 1920s, Japanese at every level of society, including military, religious and academic
leaders, debated the meaning of Japan’s kokutai (national polity or essence). Leaders in the government,
court, and Hirohito clung to slowly eroding, Meiji era images of the national polity, while political liberals
and reformers in every sector hoped to make kokutai compatible with modern scientific thought and
bureaucratic politics. Conservatives resisted democracy and Japan’s subjugation to the West, arguing that
“sacred” notions of the kokutai and the emperor were eternal. Concerning pressures from liberals for
increased democratic representation, in 1925 the Diet’s lower house passed the Peace Preservation Law,
making anarchist, communist or republican movements almost inconceivable (Ibid., 159, 161-163).
1860
Ibid., 157-163.
1861
Ibid. Court group members were representatives of the most wealthy, powerful classes in Japan.
According to Bix, they must be studied in conjunction with, not in contrast to, the military and the imperial
family. Their views, characteristics, strategies, and actual members shifted over time. Hirohito directed
their actions; they had little opportunity to operate outside his will (Ibid., 178-179). From 1927, the court
group sought to erect a new ideological framework where he could exercise true supervision over politics,
prime minister appointments, and the cabinet (Ibid.).
1862
The court policymaking process included naisô (informal reports from the prime minister, cabinet
members and the military), gokamon (questions and responses from the emperor), and behind-the-scenes
maneuvering for Hirohito’s approval. He influenced policymaking, high-level military appointments and
promotions. While Hirohito was interested in the military, the court group preferred he focus on domestic
issues, hopefully his greatest legacy. They assumed that he must both reign and rule, and hoped to revive
his strength and image as authoritative, like the Emperor Meiji (Ibid.).
1863
To limit party influence, Hirohito and the court group strongly affected prime ministers’ policies,
including Tanaka Giichi. Hirohito and the court group fired him, and promoted his successor, Hamaguchi
Yuko, in 1929. The court group privately praised Hirohito’s desire to resist parties and to assume stronger
oversight over politics. Yet he hesitated to exercise the strong control over the military required by law.
Such interventions caused resentment by the right wing and the military from 1929 on (Ibid.).
778

court. Hirohito was interested in political action, often indirect, influencing cabinet
decisions, political party and Diet disputes.1864
Policy Implications of Domestic Market Worldviews
For 1850 to 1895, what were the major policy impacts and implications of the
three leaders whose domestic market worldviews I studied?1865 Fukuzawa initiated
influential ideas for both private and public sectors, but his stronger impacts were on the
private sector and Japanese culture at large.1866 In the 1870s, Ito initiated several policies
important for the foundation of Japan’s modern economy.1867 They were designed to
modernize Japan’s national economic system, and help it better function in the global
economy. Both Ito’s political and economic views were conservative. In the Meiji
Constitution, he believed that Japanese society must be broadly supportive of needed
economic reforms.1868 I saw no evidence that Kato’s economic policy impacts were great.
In their overall impacts on policy affecting the domestic economy, Fukuzawa’s
seem the broadest and deepest, on the place of economics and business in the general
culture, and on the private sector. The economic policy impacts of Ito and Kato both fell
1864

Ibid., 178-181, 184-185, 206-208, 218-219. In the late 1920s, two additional important events affected
domestic politics. Conflict between Japan and China over the status of Manchuria began, and the Showa
financial panic occurred. Reports about the conflict over Manchuria emerged in Japan’s press in 1927
(Ibid., 205). The Showa financial panic occurred in 1927 in the context of economic growth that seemed to
mainly benefit the zaibatsu and urban areas, to the detriment of rural areas and smaller businesses. Both
the financial panic and the Showa economic depression (the latter caused by the 1929 New York stock
market crash) brought confusion and decreasing public confidence in Japan’s economy (Japan, “Showa
Period,” 1417-1418).
1865
The three leaders were Fukuzawa Yukichi, Ito Hirobumi, and Kato Hiroyuki.
1866
Fukuzawa had broad cultural impact through his writings on economics and business, his establishment
of several important businesses and Keio University, and his advocacy of modern principles on currency,
banking, and other business issues. His strong impacts on the private sector were demonstrated in his
advising of two important zaibatsu, and his founding of the Yokohama Specie Bank, which laid the
foundation for the Bank of Japan, Japan’s central bank.
1867
Hamada, Prince Ito, 62. These policies, modeled after Western economies, included revising the
coinage system, adopting the gold standard, initiating the national mint and the Bureau of Taxation (Ibid.,).
1868
The Constitution gave the Emperor and other political actors wide encouragement to intervene in public
finance and (indirectly) in the marketplace.
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mainly in the public sector. But evolutionary economic views provided a quiet
undercurrent for the thought of all three leaders, in how they placed more economically
developed countries in a higher position of respect, more worthy of emulation. Such
views affected what economic policies were adopted and how the economy developed.
They influenced decisions of what systems would be imitated, and which would not.1869
How did the interaction of each leader’s domestic market worldview with the
surrounding environment perhaps affect each leader’s policy judgments, actions, and
outcomes? Fukuzawa and Ito were raised in southwestern Japan. They grew up in the
presence of Western cultural influence and trade, helping them to see the dynamism of
the West and its economic influence.1870 This led them to later prefer Western models as
the strongest and best for Japan. Kato’s choice of German as his main foreign language
greatly influenced his later worldviews and politics. For all three, their early exposure to
Western culture and knowledge had profound impacts on their later thought and policyrelated recommendations. Through his writings and the founding of Keio University,
Fukuzawa’s domestic economic legacy for Japan seems the greatest of these three
leaders.
For 1895 to 1945, we also briefly studied the domestic economy worldviews of
Yanagita Kunio and Hirohito. Yanagita’s views, which stressed the importance of
regional development and agriculture as a foundation of Japan’s national life, were
contrary to the general economic development policies pursued by the Japanese
government through 1945, which mostly stressed large-scale industrialization and foreign
1869

Western countries, with authoritarian systems most similar to Japan (i.e. Prussia), emerged as the
preferred model for Ito and Kato.
1870
Although the region also traded with Asia, the West seemed more powerful.
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trade. Yanagita’s wisdom in this area was not well recognized until later in the twentieth
century, when rapid urbanization began to threaten the economic viability of rural regions
across Japan. In contrast, I found no evidence that Hirohito’s economic thought was
either intrinsically significant or important in application to the domestic economy.
Policy Implications of Domestic Society Worldviews
In the period 1850 to 1895, most of Fukuzawa’s writings of the 1870s and
1880s were meant to help Japan in the task of worldview change that he identified as
crucial for Japan’s reform.1871 He also contributed greatly to the worlds of Japanese
business, journalism, politics and education.1872 Mori had extensive involvement in
national education policy.1873 He rejected state attempts to infuse religious nationalism
into the education system, and the state’s use of indigenous religious ideologies for the
purpose of nation-building.1874 His educational reforms included institutional, educational
and cultural standardization to create citizens who could be easily absorbed into the state.
His overall approach was pragmatic and utilitarian.1875 In addition to his service in
several national ministries, at their mature stage, Kato’s evolutionary based views of
morality were in line with the general government policy of supporting evolutionary
arguments for various imperial political institutions, the state, and for Japan’s origins. He
supported the government policy that Shinto was not a religion, but a patriotic practice, as
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Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 10-11.
Ibid., 168.
1873
This happened when Mori served as the national minister of education.
1874
This religious nationalism was based on “traditional” Japanese religious values drawn from Shinto and
Neo-Confucianism.
1875
His earlier calls for social reform included several “radical” proposals. Earlier in his public service,
Mori proposed that Japan adopt English as the official language, Christianity as the state religion, and that
non-government samurai give up their swords.
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well as the state’s general religious policies and views at the time. Kato also affirmed the
state’s use of nationalistic Shinto in his personal beliefs and practices.
As with domestic politics, Fukuzawa’s impacts on domestic Japanese society
were broad, through his writings, educational institutions and businesses he started. He
offered numerous suggestions for other areas of Japanese society, including institutions
of daily life, such as post offices, schools, business and banking. One of his long-term
impacts was to encourage Japan to adopt more attitudes supportive of science. It does not
seem that Mori’s views of society had significant policy impacts, but his beliefs about
social change evolved into specific education policies. His efforts at developing national
educational standards had some effect. These policies encouraged the development of
discipline and respect for the nation in students, and were not as nationalistic as those
adopted after his death in 1889, which cut short his long-term impact on education.
Kato’s policy impacts on domestic society were less direct than Fukuzawa’s or Mori’s,
more those of strengthening ideological support for state policies on nationalism, political
institutions, and religious nationalism. His views of religion were supportive of the
nation’s general religious policies. Did these leaders’ views and actions on society, social
change and morality/religion help Japan become more “scientific?” Through his popular
writings, Fukuzawa had the deepest impact on Japanese society, helping it to adopt
various technological, institutional, educational and economic innovations that affected
daily life for generations to come. His writings encouraged a very practical view of
science and technology.
We learn more if we compare the policy issues surrounding spirituality, social
change, and the attitudes of the three leaders on these matters. I wish to argue that
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generally the social institution of religion (specifically Shinto) was strengthened through
1945.1876 State Shinto received much public funding, support, and organization as it was
embraced as the state religion and became a chief ideological pillar of state nationalism.
The high level of support continued until the war’s end. Although Fukuzawa and Mori
argued for the adoption of some “Western” social values,1877 the Meiji state preferred to
reinterpret elements of Western culture and apply them in a selective manner.1878 Kato
supported this. The radical degree of social change that Mori supported in his earlier
recommendations for policy reforms was rejected outright by the state.1879 Interaction
with the West caused the Meiji state to attempt to formalize, institutionalize and/or
nationalize areas of social life that were previously conducted less formally, such as
education and Shinto. While social change resulting from the state’s reforms was often
rather sweeping, ideologically the state’s approach to social change seems conservative.
How did the interaction of each leader’s domestic society worldviews with the
surrounding environment affect each one’s policy judgments, actions, and outcomes?
Fukuzawa’s mindset and worldviews were deeply affected by his early journeys to the
West, and by his continued writings about Western ideas. As a leading public
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This depends on how one defines strength. Folklorist and ethnographer Yanagita Kunio would disagree
with my argument that Shinto was strengthened. He believed that the government’s formal
institutionalization policy of Shinto into a highly organized, hierarchical, state-supported spiritual
institution threatened to crush the genuine spirit of spontaneous, heartfelt worship that held Japan together
as a nation and people. See more detailed arguments earlier in Chapter 7.
1877
Fukuzawa and Mori supported the adoption of such values as individualistic “spirits” of independence
and religious freedom.
1878
For example, the Meiji state translated the European tradition of state religions or churches into the
adoption of Shinto as one of the state’s chief official ideological foundations to encourage nationalism and
patriotism.
1879
These recommendations included Mori’s suggestion that Japan adopt English as the official language,
and Christianity as the national religion. In the sixth century A.D., traditionally either 538 or 552, the
Japanese state and imperial court officially embraced Buddhism from mainland Asia as a positive force for
the country, and encouraged its spread.
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intellectual, aristocrat, educator and entrepreneur, Fukuzawa was thoroughly enmeshed in
domestic Meiji society. His reflections about the West did not diminish his
“Japaneseness.” His long-term impact on Japanese society was profound. He helped
familiarize Japanese with the thought and logic of many Western technological and social
innovations. As Japan adapted more of these innovations, it seems its “Japaneseness”
failed to diminish, and remained strong. Like Fukuzawa, Mori was deeply affected by
his many travels and lengthy stays abroad. Mori seemed, at first, more Westernized than
Fukuzawa in his basic outlook, and in his earlier policy responses. Later both of these
moderated. He became more pragmatic, conservative and nationalistic in his educational
policies. Their impacts were cut short when he was killed in 1889. Kato’s study of
German greatly affected his future worldviews, policy recommendations, and ideological
thought. While earlier he was attracted to liberal ideas from Anglo-American sources, in
the long run, concepts of Prussian conservatism, autocracy, and German evolutionism
prevailed in his writings. He adapted cutting edge principles of German Social
Darwinism into patriotic, conservative arguments for nationalistic political and social
innovations in Meiji Japan. His creative adaptation of foreign ideological currents for
Japanese society remained ideologically conservative when translated into the Japanese
environment. Ultimately he became more ideologically conservative, keeping his
“Japaneseness.”
In Chapter 3, when I assessed the implications of the three leader’s worldviews
of domestic society (1850-1895), I used two key questions regarding the relationship of

784

technology and culture in Japan in that era.1880 Modified for policy, the first question
becomes how the social conditions and contexts in Japan affecting its receipt of
technological and related social phenomena influenced its policies for those issues. The
willingness of the three leaders and the Japanese public to receive Western technological
and cultural input varied. They exhibited degrees of ambivalence. While desiring the
“fruits” of Western technology and knowledge,1881 they did not always wish to receive
influence from institutions, values, and effects associated with the technologies.1882 Both
policymakers and leading thinkers struggled to develop effective policies that would
allow Japan to import needed areas of knowledge, while enabling it to filter out
ideologies and cultural influences believed to be socially negative.1883 The second
question becomes how the degree of preparedness of Japanese society to receive certain
technologies from abroad affected its policies for those issues. Most policymakers and
the Japanese people displayed a receptive attitude to science and technology, since they
seemed necessary for Japan’s survival. Near the end of the Tokugawa era, forward
thinking intellectuals, feudal domains and the Tokugawa regime attempted to learn about
Western technologies through Dutch learning, schools for the study of Western
knowledge, and overseas missions.1884 The new Meiji state invested heavily in scientific
and technological research, education, and infrastructure, so that Japan might quickly
1880

The first question regarded how Japan’s social conditions (1850-1895) affected its receipt of
technological input from abroad. The second question concerned how socially prepared Japan was to
receive new forms of technology from abroad.
1881
These fruits included military power, increased comfort and safety in daily life, and wealth.
1882
I mean cultural influences such as democratic values, labor and women’s rights, increased urbanization,
pollution, and Christianity.
1883
The government’s policies for temporarily importing foreign instructors, its prohibition against
Christianity and foreign missionaries through 1873, and its attempt to use Kato’s theories to limit Western
influence to science and technology sectors are examples of such policies.
1884
See the section in Chapter 3 about the contexts of technological development (1850-1895).
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gain the means and wealth to defend itself against the West. So general social support for
scientific knowledge in Tokugawa and Meiji Japan eventually translated into strong
policies for the development of Japan’s scientific and technological capabilities.
On the period 1895 to 1945, Yanagita’s holistic views of the interconnections of
various facets of Japan’s domestic society are impressive, as are his observations of what
should be done to protect Japan’s cultural, rural heartland. In his views, there is a heavy
emphasis on the need to protect local, indigenous Shinto worship, what he saw as one of
the central cores of Japanese identity, and on the connections between the spiritual and
physical worlds, between which there is no essential conflict, and which can greatly
affect Japan’s development. Sadly, in this period, Japan’s government was very not
prepared to act on Yanagita’s recommendations, which seem so wise. Earlier in the
period, the government placed overall emphasis on Japan’s rapid economic growth,
military and industrial strength, and political independence, all of which seemed the most
necessary for Japan’s survival. Later, the dramatic events of the war crowded out quieter
concerns like these.
In contrast, Hirohito’s worldview of domestic society, which heavily supported
the state ideology of Shinto, was also affected by his scientific training in the natural,
policy, and military sciences. These created a subtle, under-the-surface conflict in
Hirohito that, while not impairing his rational ability to function as a policymaker, had
profound effects on Japan as his worldview “tension” played out in World War II. His
overarching commitment to the Shinto gods, imperial ancestors and throne led him to
take several destructive, less than rational actions that delayed Japan’s surrender. But he
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did not lose his overall shrewdness and rationality, as seen in the postwar actions he took
as Japan’s emperor who survived.1885
Hirohito also enacted several nationalistic cultural policies in the 1920s that
affected domestic society. Several events in Japanese society in the early to mid-1920s
also affected Hirohito.1886 His policies, while often not directly concerned with social
issues, affected society greatly. In the early 1920s, to Japan’s elites, the continuing
kokutai debate threatened national unity.1887 Responding to pressures for democratization,
and to strengthen the imperial throne, in 1923 the government formulated a cultural
policy, and in 1924, Hirohito established a “central association of culture” that religious
groups were encouraged to join. Nichiren Buddhism sought government recognition of
its campaign for “national spirit,” which it partially received.1888 The campaign affected
public opinion and the views of many military leaders during the Taisho era (1912-1926),
contributing to the rise of ultranationalism in the 1930s.1889
From the late 1920s to the early 1940s, Hirohito’s nationalistic images from
various sources, including the enthronement ceremonies, also had important effects on
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Bix, Hirohito traces these events.
Two more important events affecting Hirohito occurred in 1923, the founding of the Japan Communist
Party and the great Kanto earthquake (Bix, Hirohito, 139-145). The Communist Party was the first modern
group to press for the throne’s end. The Kanto earthquake was one of the worst natural disasters of the 20th
century (91,000 deaths and 104,000 wounded). Afterwards, Hirohito increased his charitable contributions,
partly to strengthen his image as a benevolent regent (Ibid., 140).
1887
The Kokutai debate is mentioned in Chapter 7.
1888
Nichiren Buddhism, the nationalistic ideology of hakkô ichiu (“benevolent” rule or “the eight corners of
the world under one roof”), and racist ideologies in Japan in the 1930s all contained universalistic notions
of the superiority of the Japanese nation and culture, and its ability to “purify” and “unify” the rest of Asia
and the world (Ibid., 168-169, 196, 200-201, 372).
1889
Ibid., 163-165, 167-169. Other extra-governmental organizations, such as right-wing groups, nationalist
“study organizations,” and the military, also attempted to influence public opinion. Some in the military
attacked the myths of Japan’s founding. Recent research by Japanese scholars suggests that there was
declining support among the public and the military for the foundation myths of Japan at that time (Ibid.,
164-166).
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Japanese society and politics.1890 First, they released huge popular patriotism and
enthusiasm, drawing people closer to the state and throne, as did supportive civic
groups.1891 Second, the state unleashed important campaigns and symbols that shored up
nationalism and the image of the throne, national “spirit” and education campaigns,
designed to encourage support for the kokutai, “Japanese spirit” (Yamato damashii), and
national worship of the emperor, and to discourage mass political movements.1892 Also in
this period, partly inspired by the enthronement, the Japanese government developed a
new racist construction of Japanese identity, based on race—people—nation, not class.
This simplifying, divine ideology of race helped fill Japanese nationalism with new
universalistic tendencies. The racist ideology of the 1920s hinted at later ideologies of
the 1930s and 1940s, where Japan faced the world as a racially pure country waging holy
wars to build “new orders” in Asia.1893
The nationalistic use of images and ideology (Shinto mythology and emperor
ideology) by Hirohito and the government in 1930s also affected society. Before conflict
broke out with China in 1931, Shinto mythology was taught as fact in Japan’s schools,
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For a discussion of the exact nature of the Showa enthronement and its activities, see the section on
domestic Japanese politics under Hirohito (1895-1945).
1891
This enthusiasm was generated partly because the 1920s was an era of literary and artistic celebration
of Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Supportive associations included youth and
neighborhood associations (Ibid., 201).
1892
Ibid., 201-202. These campaigns and symbols included the Rising Sun flag, and the placement of the
“sacred” photo of the Emperor and Empress in schoolrooms across the nation. Hirohito and his court group
enthusiastically encouraged emperor worship, in which the emperor was seen as the source of all morality,
including political, military and religious authority. The ideology of the emperor-as-divine-being
embodied various Shinto-derived dichotomies—clean versus unclean, and pure versus impure (Ibid., 197,
201-202).
1893
Ibid., 195-197. This new ideology developed amid conflicts over problems in the economy, rural areas,
tenant farmer-landlord tensions, and labor and industrial relations. Ethnological studies of rural areas in the
1930s suggest that despite great government effort at promoting nationalism, except for persons in
authority, such as schoolteachers and village officials, most people in rural areas placed family and village
concerns ahead of the emperor (Ibid., 281-282).
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and emperor ideology took a tone opposed to anti-Western imperialism.1894 In 1937, after
the February 26 incident,1895 the emperor and his court group directed the Ministry of
Education to develop the first of several educational tracts for schools. These tracts
emphasized the superior nature and immutable connection of the Japanese people and
their emperor, and their mutual duty to liberate the rest of Asia from Western
colonialism.1896 So, as Japan’s autocratic ruler, Hirohito’s own beliefs and actions on
domestic social issues had profound influences on Japan, Asia, and beyond.
Worldview Policy Implications for International Issues
Policy Implications of External Political Relations Worldviews
Most of the five leaders whose views of external political relations we studied
(1850 to 1895, Fukuzawa, Kato, Yamagata, Ito and Mori) were realists, and stressed
borrowing Western political ideas. Their views were driven by Japan’s pressing need to
survive in the international system. On the Japanese nation and its place in the
international system, all five supported Japan’s task of nation-building for its survival,
and the necessity of borrowing Western political and military knowledge for that
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Ibid., 283. A conflict in this ideology was slowly emerging, between the uniqueness of Japan, and a
pan-Asia identity uniting Japan with the rest of the continent (Ibid.). The conflict erupted with Japan’s
intentional provocation of China in the Manchurian incident. See Japan, “The Manchurian Incident,” 916.
1895
This was the famous coup d’état attempted by young army officers in central Tokyo that was
successfully suppressed.
1896
Bix, Hirohito, 313-315. The first tract, Kokutai no hongi (The Fundamentals of the National Polity,
1937), stressed the superiority, purity, and selflessness of the Japanese people and nation over all others,
the “centrality of the family-state, home and ancestors,” and the image of the emperor as military leader
and living god. It also embodied the philosophy kôdô (the “imperial way”) that allowed Japan to justify its
aggressions, and harassment of internal opposition by the military and the right wing. This tract also
offered Hirohito the opportunity to encourage massive public support, which might strengthen his relations
with the military. A second tract, Shimmin no michi (The Way of the Subject, 1941), was written in the
context of absolute fascism in Japan’s wartime society. It called for absolute sacrifice and devotion to the
emperor, in order to throw off Western individualism, to build a new order in East Asia (Ibid., 314-315).
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purpose. Kato’s views were the most creative, connecting evolutionary and Confucian
thought, and the government used elements of his thought for policy purposes. All five
leaders agreed that the West presently dominated the international system. Most saw Asia
as inferior to the West, and Asia beyond Japan as weaker than Japan. Most drew on
scientific and technological-influenced thought in their thinking about international
relations. Three of the five (Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato) drew somewhat on religion and
morality, Western or Asian, in their thought on international relations. Their key desire
was to find values to strengthen Japan’s development and survival. In this era, Ito and
Yamagata had the greatest policy impacts on Japan’s external political relations.
The four leaders studied for 1895 to 1945 (Ito, Yamagata, Yanagita and
Hirohito) had varied views of foreign policy, ranging from realism to pacifism to
international conflict between races. Most, except Yanagita, were politically
conservative. The greater each leader’s role in actual policymaking and foreign policy,
the greater his policy implications here became. Though all of these leaders believed that
Japan should help the rest of Asia combat Western imperialism, not all supported
Japanese aggression for that end. All of the leaders were cautious and fearful about the
West: what it might do to Japan and Asia. Hirohito in particular had a more positive view
of conflict compared with the other three leaders. Not surprisingly, Hirohito, through his
position as Japan’s emperor, had a greater policy impact on Japan’s external political
relations than any other leader studied here; Yamagata was second.
We can get a more in-depth handle on the policy implications of Hirohito’s
worldviews of Japan’s external political relations by briefly examining some of the main
contexts for his foreign policy actions from the late 1920s through 1945. In 1928, there
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were four key events involving Hirohito with lasting effects on both Japan’s domestic
politics and Sino-Japanese relations until the late 1930s, including the signing of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact (in August).1897 Hirohito was directly involved in various aspects of
these events.1898 In the late 1920s, he received a large amount of foreign policy
information, often secret, from various sources.1899 In the 1930s and 1940s, he played an
active role in planning and guiding the China and Pacific wars. A 1941 alliance between
Hirohito, his court group and hard-line militarist supporters of war against the United
States and Britain enabled the Pacific War to occur.1900 Through the war, Hirohito
exercised direct, often controlling influence on the Pacific battlefronts. He gave the
military continual feedback, an optimistic stress on offensive tactics, and careful
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See Chapter 8 for more details on the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
Ibid., 214-217. The other three events were the Jinan Incident (May), the assassination of Chinese
warlord Chang Tso-lin (June), and the first infusion of emperor ideology into Japanese society under
Hirohito through his enthronement and deification (second half of the year). The Jinan Incident involved a
reign of terror launched by 17,000 Japanese troops who surrounded the city of Jinan, Shandong, China, sent
there to protect Japanese residents in the city. In June 1928, officers of Japan’s Kwantung army
assassinated the warlord leader of Shandong, Chang Tso-lin (Ibid., 214-215). After Chang Tso-lin’s
assassination, some members of Japan’s military began uniting themselves with civilian right wing groups,
laying the groundwork for the Manchurian Incident in 1931 (Ibid., 219-220).
1899
Ibid., 178-179. For example, members of Hirohito’s court group gathered, analyzed and delivered
solely to him information on foreign affairs from many places, including the embassies of the United States
and Britain. Hirohito also received huge amounts of data from government and military officers. He was
like a “silent spider” receiving and remembering information from every government and military branch.
This was possible because the advisory organs of the state reported directly to him, yet were separate from
each other. These organs included the cabinet, the Diet, the Privy Council, the general staffs of the military,
and the bureaucracy (Ibid.).
1900
Concerning his relations with the military, around 1930, when their morale problems increased,
Hirohito avoided confronting the problem directly, passing it to his court entourage. During World War II,
he often had strained relations with military leaders, yet overlooked their acts of defiance when they
achieved victory (Ibid., 224-226, 15-16). Members of the military were angry with him for the signing of
the London Naval Treaty, which Japan signed in April 1930, along with Britain and the United States. It
limited the number of primary and secondary warships that each signatory could build and possess. Many
top leaders in Japan opposed this treaty, but especially the entire Washington treaty system, which they
viewed as erecting an Anglo-Saxon “iron ring” around Japan, so that it could not expand abroad. The
enthronement and exaltation of Hirohito had enhanced state power and its policies. Those who disagreed
had to somehow reverse those policies. The London Naval Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (signed in
August 1928) were Japan’s two top diplomatic ventures in the late 1920s and early 1930s (Ibid., 206, 210,
224-226).
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oversight for theater operations. He often visited war-related sites in Japan, though no
war front, encouraging production and sacrifice for the state. He developed a certain
charisma and determination that helped him to survive the war. But his leadership style
had problems. He was overly detailed, slow in decisions, not good with bureaucratic
rivalries, and cautious. In early 1945, his hesitation to continue fighting, and yet not break
with military supporters of fighting to the finish, delayed the war’s end.1901
Evidence of Hirohito’s policy impact on Japan’s external political relations is
seen in his role in actions on foreign and war policy in China, Manchuria, Southeast Asia
and the South Pacific from the 1930s to 1945. On September 18, 1931, the Manchurian
Incident began.1902 This set off a succession of international and internal events that
changed the course of the Japanese state. Hirohito could have intervened and stopped it,
but offered his “tacit” support.1903 On March 1, 1932, Japan proclaimed Manchukuo’s
independence.1904 In January 1932, the Shanghai incident occurred.1905 In this case,
Hirohito directed events, while on Manchukuo, he watched passively. 1906 In March 1933,
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Ibid., 15-16, 423, 439, 441-442.
Officers of the Japanese army staged an explosion north of Shenyang near a line of the Japanesecontrolled South Manchurian Railway, and blamed it on Chinese soldiers. Within a day, the Japanese army
ventured beyond the Japanese leasehold of Kwantung and seized key towns along the railway, preparing to
grab major cities of southern Manchuria (Ibid.).
1903
Hirohito could have intervened and stopped the incident, since the military was not yet too strong, and
public opinion was divided. He publicly praised the army, and failed to punish its members for acts of
insubordination. Through 1931, Hirohito’s rule over Japan was somewhat problematic, and the
Manchurian Incident is a good example. His behavior was often inconsistent and contradictory, since he
sometimes exercised his authority in “petty moments,” and caved in to army officers in more crucial ones
(Ibid.).
1904
Ibid., 235-236, 239-240, 245-247, 249. Manchukuo included territory from the regions of Manchuria
and Inner Mongolia.
1905
Japanese marines attacked near Shanghai, and faced much opposition from Chinese forces. The
Japanese army was called in (Ibid.).
1906
Ibid., 250-251.
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Japan withdrew from the League of Nations.1907 From late 1937 Hirohito influenced
many aspects of the planning for the war in China, including promotion of the top
military leaders. By late 1940, when decision-making processes were more efficient, he
was involved in every stage of policy review.1908 July 1937 marked the beginning of the
long China conflict. Hirohito exercised influence on various aspects of these events.1909
Nanjing fell on December 13, 1937.1910 The undeclared, difficult China war lasted eight
years.1911 Japan got bogged down.1912 It declared the “New Order in East Asia” in late
1938, and established a puppet Chinese regime in Nanjing in early 1940.1913
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Ibid., 261-262. At this same time, Hirohito issued a “bland and blind” imperial rescript wallpapering
over internal conflicts in Japan over the Manchuria and Jehol invasions (Ibid.). In April 1933, Hirohito
greatly opposed the invasion by Japanese troops of provinces south of the Great Wall. Manchukuo was not
an effective “buffer peace zone.” Japan’s presence there allowed its Kwantung army to attack and pressure
the five provinces in north China. But existence of the zone, plus the Soviet sale of China Eastern Railway
to Japan, helped Hirohito to believe that it was an effective “peace zone” (Ibid., 271-272). In addition to
withdrawing from the League of Nations, in 1936, two key foreign policy documents set forth radical goals
that would tax the empire if implemented concurrently. These documents, “Criteria for National Policy,”
and “Foreign Policy of the Empire,” projected an unrealistic combination of goals that would be impossible
to achieve, including Japanese control or influence in Manchukuo, North China, the western Pacific and
Southeast Asia, war with the Soviet Union, and naval competition with the United States. The influence of
the great Western powers was to be limited, and the influence of Japan’s benevolent emperor expanded
(Ibid., 308-309).
1908
Ibid.,12. Hirohito’s involvement extended up to the point of war with the U.S. and Britain, with him
finally getting carried away with the excitement of imperial expansion and conflict (Ibid.).
1909
Chinese and Japanese troops stationed near the Marco Polo Bridge southeast of Beijing exchanged rifle
fire. After a three-day skirmish, a local armistice was signed. A split occurred in the Japanese military’s
China policy that Hirohito had to resolve. At first, he was more concerned about the possible threat from
the Soviet Union against Manchukuo (Ibid.). Finally, Prime Minister Konoe’s cabinet decided to expand
the conflict. Hirohito quietly but actively approved. Chiang Kai-shek expanded the conflict south to
Shanghai to force a showdown with the Japanese there. Konoe and Hirohito approved attacking Chinese
forces strongly there, and across North China, to make the Chinese “reflect” on their mistakes. Hirohito
felt that the Chinese misunderstood Japan’s true intentions for “peace.” Japan, for fear of angering the
United States, a chief supplier of needed natural resources, could not declare war. Japan called these events
“the China incident,” a sacred struggle (Ibid.).
1910
Ibid., 333. Members of the Konoe government knew about the Nanjing massacre and the collapse of
Japanese military discipline there. Likely Hirohito knew too. As Japan’s commander-in-chief and spiritual
head, he failed to project concern about the collapse of moral or military discipline. Rather, he urged the
military to greater victories in China. While figures are disputed, over the next six weeks, approximately
200,000 to 300,000 people were executed in the Nanjing area. At least 1,000, and likely many more,
Chinese women were also raped until late March 1938 (Ibid., 334-338).
1911
Ibid., 342.
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Hirohito’s involvement in war policymaking from the late 1930s and 1940s
occurred as follows. In late 1937, an “Imperial Headquarters” was established, to
improve the command structure for the China war.1914 More frequent were “imperial
conferences” (gozen kaigi), where Hirohito had input on and approved major decisions
affecting Japan, its colonies and other countries.1915 He had final command over the
armed services, and exercised influence on the Headquarters through questions, repeated
instructions, and lectures. Hirohito sometimes involved himself in daily decisions on
campaigns and operations. At cabinet briefings, the Headquarters supported him as
supreme commander. Consensus decisions were often predetermined, reflecting his
thinking.1916 In reality, Japan had “a powerless cabinet, an emasculated constitution, and
a dynamic emperor participating in the planning of aggression and guiding the process,
by a variety of interventions that were often indirect but in every instance
determining.”1917 By summer 1941, Hirohito’s main court and military advisors began
working at court to support him as commander-in-chief in more frequent liaison

1912

Although Hirohito had several opportunities to press for a cease-fire or an early peace, he did not.
Early in 1938 the Konoe cabinet offered difficult terms for peace to China. When the Chinese delayed their
response, Konoe stopped negotiations. Hirohito’s silence at the imperial conference held on January 11,
1938 betrayed his support of a harsher China policy than the army’s General Staff supported. Although
Japan managed to gain control of most major cities and railways in northern, central and southern China in
1938, it could not control the vast countryside (Ibid., 342, 344-345, 347).
1913
Ibid., 347-348. At the end of 1938 Japan also initiated a new offensive in China, but resistance
strengthened, and the Nationalists withdrew their government to Chongqing (Ibid.).
1914
Soon after, an “imperial palace-government liaison conference” was created to better integrate the army
and navy branches (Ibid.).
1915
Neither law nor Japan’s constitution mandated the conferences, designed for Hirohito to offer his input
as a constitutional monarch, and to receive advice from his ministers of state. Hirohito received advice, but
only his chiefs of staff transmitted his orders (Ibid.).
1916
Ibid., 327-332.
1917
Ibid., 329.
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conferences, which became more important than the cabinet. Basic military policy was
still made by competing bureaucratic organs.1918
Hirohito supported the war and the “Southern expansion” of Japan’s forces into
the South Pacific and Southeast Asia, but worried about American and British
reaction.1919 He also worried that potential Japanese attacks on French Indochina and the
Dutch East Indies would harm his “benevolent” image.1920 Yet the China war was the
most important background factor influencing policy decisions in 1941, and enabled
Japan to mobilize forces to attack the U.S. and Britain.1921 As the Pacific war
commenced, both Hirohito and Japan’s top military leaders had many mistaken
assumptions.1922 Herbert Bix argues that Hirohito’s reactions to Japan’s losses against the
Americans in such battles as Guadalcanal, Saipan, Coral Sea, Midway and Okinawa are
key for understanding his role in World War II. He seemed to not comprehend their
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Ibid.
Ibid., 353, 357. Regarding Hirohito’s war responsibility over China, in the late 1930s and early 1940s,
he was directly responsible for allowing the use of poison gas and bacteriological weapons in the China
war. According to Bix, Hirohito also shares responsibility for the indiscriminate bombing of Chongqing
and other large Chinese cities from 1938-1945. Worst of all, he approved of massive “annihilation”
campaigns throughout China, starting in 1938, which killed many more people (approximately 2.7 million)
than the unplanned massacre in Nanjing (Ibid., 361-362, 364). The Chinese Communist Party called these
the “three alls policy” (burn all, kill all, steal all). In Japanese, they are known as sankô sakusen. Japanese
historian Himeta Mitsuyoshi estimates that more than 2.7 million Chinese noncombatants died in the
annihilation campaigns (Ibid., 365-367).
1920
Ibid., 367-368, 371-372. Bix notes the irony that although Hirohito approved gassing Chinese and other
atrocities, he worried about his image as benevolent emperor if Southeast Asia was invaded. Such actions
by leaders were not limited to the Japanese context, but have also occurred in the West (Ibid., 371-372).
1921
Ibid., 387-390, 392, 396. When presented with conflicting options, Hirohito rejected the findings, being
thoroughly familiar with the procedures that generated them. From 1941, the high command became more
complex, and the emperor received detailed reports daily. He was very well aware about the war, and the
deception of his subjects. He often viewed domestic and foreign press reports (Ibid.).
1922
They focused on naval battles in the central Pacific Ocean, and the Soviet Union as the primary enemy,
while the main naval battles unfolded in the south and southwestern Pacific, with the United States as the
chief threat (Ibid., 444, 447).
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gravity.1923 In monitoring many fronts, Hirohito directly intervened several times.1924 His
rigidity and attention to detail lengthened the war.
Hirohito’s surrender rescript is a significant example of image maintenance, the
first to reshape his national image as a peaceful, non-military, totally uninvolved ruler—
all false images.1925 He showed a lot of stubbornness in the face of criticism, including a
refusal to surrender.1926 From February 1945, Hirohito and his top advisors chose to
continue the war, despite terrible bombings of Tokyo soon after, and the atomic
bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August.1927 After hints from the allies on August
11 that his status might be maintained, Hirohito agreed to unconditional surrender on
August 14, which he announced to the nation on August 15.1928 His reluctance to accept
defeat, and his failure to act with certainty to end the conflict, “plus certain official acts
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For more details on Hirohito’s reactions in these battles, see Ibid., 444, 446-452, 456-464, 466-467,
470-471. For example, after hearing about Japan’s defeats at Coral Sea and Midway, Hirohito persisted in
various customary public duties and leisure activities. Later in the battle for Okinawa (spring 1945), he
stubbornly insisted that troops fight on, despite huge losses (Ibid., 451-452, 484-485).
1924
Bix, Hirohito.
1925
Ibid., 485-486, 525-529. Hirohito did not consider himself or the court group responsible for the final
defeat. In their worldview, acting in one’s own self-interest or according to one’s conscience was selfish.
One must sacrifice for and obey one’s leaders, for the good of the nation. This ideal was placed on citizens
since beginning of the Showa era (1926). Hirohito and the court expected this could continue in postwar
period. They could not connect the causes of defeat and the building of a new Japan (Ibid., 535-536). In
the surrender radio broadcast on August 15, 1945, he desired to confuse the issue of accountability, prevent
internal conflict and rage in Japan, and empower its unification around himself. On August 17, media and
new Prime Minister Prince Higashikuni showed Hirohito as a benevolent, wise, non-political king.
Hirohito blamed the bomb, the Soviet entry in the war, and preserving the national polity as the main
reasons for surrender. According to Bix, likely the last two reasons were true (Ibid.).
1926
Ibid., 475-480, 483-484. Some of the criticism came from some members of the imperial family, and
especially from leading members of Japan’s elites (Ibid.).
1927
Ibid., 487-496, 499-505.
1928
Ibid., 501-504. The Suzuki cabinet and Hirohito failed to come up with a strategy to save the Japanese
from the destruction of the war. They waited until the “face-saving” incidents of the atomic bombings,
Soviet invasion, and partial clarification of the emperor’s future status to surrender. They viewed the
clarification of the status as the absolute minimum condition. But the atomic bomb, the Soviet invasion,
and fear of popular uprising if the war was prolonged also prompted Hirohito and his aids to finally accept
the Potsdam Declaration (Ibid., 509-511).
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and policies of his government,” continued the war for so long.1929 He continually pushed
for victory and offense rather than peace and negotiation. When the surrender option
came, he delayed while the atomic bombs were dropped and the Soviets invaded
Manchuria and Korea. Ignoring the suffering they caused the Japanese and others, the
emperor and Japan’s leaders hoped for a means to “lose without losing,” to minimize
postwar criticisms and permit their political structure to be maintained. They missed
several opportunities to end the war since they were most concerned with the fate of the
throne and dynasty.1930 Hirohito failed to acknowledge his own war responsibility, since
he believed he ruled by divine right, as the center of the state. He also lacked any sense of
personal war guilt. After the war, this legacy continued. According to Bix, as long as no
one considered Hirohito’s responsibility, the Japanese people did not have to consider
their own. Serious inquiry in Japan of these issues did not begin until the early 1970s.1931
Policy Implications of External Economic Relations Worldviews
Two of the three leaders (Fukuzawa and Ito) studied in the era 1850 to 1895
were greatly impressed by what they observed Western economics doing long-term.1932
Their internationally-inspired economic actions were important and influential in several
ways. In his popular writings about economics and his founding of the Yokohama Specie
Bank, Fukuzawa had broad influence on Japan’s economic system, on both the domestic
and international levels. Second, Ito’s role in international economic negotiations, and his
attempt to import Japanese economic concepts during his brief service as Japan’s first
1929

But these actions do not account for the dropping of the bomb. That was due to the overwhelming
influence of the throne, the “power, authority and stubborn personality” of Hirohito, plus “the power,
determination, and truculence of Harry Truman” (Ibid.).
1930
Ibid., 519-521, 523-524.
1931
Ibid., 16-17.
1932
Remember they made these observations in as youths in Southwest Japan and in their overseas travels.
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governor-general in Korea, soon to become an important colony, are an example of
Japan’s projection of its own economic goals on another country, similar to what the
West had tried to do to Japan. But this is not to presume that Fukuzawa and Ito were
among the most important leaders in Japan’s external economic relations in this era. The
international economic thought of the third leader, Kato, was highly reflective of
evolutionary currents present in the thought of many Meiji intellectuals, but had no
notable policy impact.
Yanagita, the only leader whose views of Japan’s external economic relations
we studied for 1895 to 1945, believed that the first truly global age of international
economics had begun. Yet nation-states still acted in their own self-interest, seeking to
devour others in cutthroat competition. Yanagita believed in heavy state economic
involvement on the domestic and international levels, some protectionism, and a policy
emphasis on primary production, agriculture, and the domestic market. The Japanese
government, in its emphasis on heavy industrialization and trade, did not support his
arguments, however, beyond heavy state involvement and protection of Japan’s market.
Policy Implications of External Cultural Relations Worldviews
There are many wise observations about Western and Japanese cultures one
learns by studying the four leaders’1933 attitudes of and interactions with foreign cultures
for the period 1850 to 1895. Fukuzawa in particular seems extremely wise in many of his
observations of Western culture and life, and their lessons for Japan. He was especially
strong in highlighting positive aspects of Western culture that might be important for
Japan’s reforms, including education, individual duty, and freedom. The four leaders here
1933

The leaders studied here are Fukuzawa, Ito, Mori and Kato.
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observed and noted many aspects of Western life, positive and negative. Ethnocentrism
colors some of their observations, especially Kato’s remarks about Western and foreign
religions (Christianity). These leaders struggled intellectually and practically, as all
Japanese did, with their interactions with foreigners, Westerners, and Western ideas.
Given Japan’s general geographic isolation, and its extreme cultural isolation in the
Tokugawa period, how could this not have been the case in this period? These leaders
and the Meiji government wisely encouraged Japan to embark on an aggressive
international learning campaign during this era, in the most practical ways possible,
largely through learning foreign knowledge through foreign languages, technologies, and
ideas, especially through books. The single most influential leader here seems to be
Fukuzawa, especially through his popular writings, in helping numerous Japanese to
come to practical terms with their interactions with the world beyond Japan. Ito is second
most important, due to his long-term influence in writing the Constitution of 1889. Its
policies in many areas affected the lives of millions of Japanese through 1945.
For 1895 to 1945, the two leaders studied on Japan’s external cultural relations
were Yanagita and Hirohito. Both saw Western culture as a major threat against Japan,
and believed that the government must take systematic steps to protect Japan’s culture.
Yanagita’s thought on this issue was highly developed, perceptive, and pragmatic, on
what Japanese and their government should do to protect Japan’s cultural autonomy and
integrity. While Yanagita and Hirohito shared some common concerns, Yanagita’s was
more to protect Japan’s culture at the grassroots, from the bottom up, while Hirohito’s
concern was to protect it from the elite level, the top down. This was inevitable, given
Hirohito’s position and training. There is no evidence that the government heeded
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Yanagita’s wise suggestions before World War II. Rather, along with the government’s
intentions to spread State Shinto and other cultural influences throughout Japan and the
empire, Hirohito’s policy impacts on external cultural relations were ultimately deep. The
government’s standardization of rural spirituality through state Shinto likely meant that,
as Yanagita feared, local, indigenous, spontaneous spirituality was squelched before the
war. Second, the defeat of Japan in the war, to which Hirohito contributed greatly,
opened up Japan to an unprecedented flow of foreign ideas and cultural products in the
postwar period. Thus, Hirohito had a much greater impact on Japan’s external cultural
relations in this era than Yanagita.
Policy Implications of Worldviews on Japanese Imperialism
The leaders studied on imperialism (1895 to 1945) were Kato, Ito, Yanagita,
Yamagata, and Hirohito.1934 Regarding the policy implications of their views of
imperialism, most viewed it as positive (for the colonizers); only Yanagita saw it as
negative. All saw certain negative effects of Western imperialism on colonies, though
Kato saw some positive effects for both the West and colonies. These leaders universally
felt Japan should stay free. The views of several, notably Kato and Hirohito, are colored
with evolutionary images and additional influences from Japanese (Shinto and
Confucianist) ideologies. Racial overtones in the views of Kato and Hirohito are that each
nation and colony must take its proper place in the global hierarchy of nations. All the
leaders focused on what imperialism and colonialism might do for Japan and its domestic
affairs. Only two leaders, Ito and Yanagita, expressed much genuine desire for the well1934

Note that policy implications of leaders’ views of imperialism from 1850 to 1895 are not mentioned
here since they were not studied earlier. I did not find enough data to warrant coverage of their views in this
earlier period.
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being of the colonies, beyond helping them resist the West. Most of the leaders (Kato,
Yamagata, and Hirohito) regarded Japanese imperialism as positive, protecting Asia.1935
All of them also viewed the colonies as inferior to Japan, needing Japan’s protection.
Hirohito approved imperialistic adventures in several regions. Despite rhetoric suggesting
a desire for colonial self-determination and equality, Hirohito’s real concern seemed to be
for how imperialism could strengthen Japan internally, and the throne. Overall, Hirohito
had the most policy influence of any leader studied here; most of his impact was
negative.
Japanese Aid: Policy Implications, Possible Future Trends
Some key issues for the future of Japanese aid include its capacity to address
diverse needs and issues. How much can it encourage stability in the global system and in
Asia? Can Japan’s ODA contribute substantively and creatively to vital new goals in
North-South relations and international development? Or will it remain (in the eyes of
critics) crassly “mercantilist” or become more “globally responsible?”1936
What is the possible influence of long-term trends from Japan’s cultural and
historical legacies, as uncovered in the present study? How have these past views shaped
present views on a policy level? Are future trends likely to be a continuation or disruption
of those of the past and present? Until now, Japanese aid has been strongly influenced by
ideologies of its historic leaders.1937 I treat this issue (the evidence for the historical
influence of Japan’s past experience and aspects of key leaders’ views on today’s ODA)
1935

While Yanagita condemned Japanese imperialism, he supported Japanese strengthening and defense of
Asia against the West.
1936
Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 366.
1937
I thank Joseph Szyliowicz, University of Denver for his insights on these themes and general issues.
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at length in Chapter 9.1938 I argue there that it is challenging to trace the direct influence
of specific leaders from the period 1850 to 1945 on present aid policies, partly because I
could not include the period 1945 to the early 2000s in the present research, so there is a
gap of some sixty years. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify several significant streams
of thought within which the views of the key leaders studied fall, and which seem highly
influential on present aid approaches.
One of those streams is seen in Japanese aid’s continuous emphasis on
economic infrastructure. Related to this, from 1868 to 1945 in particular, the Japanese
government placed a heavy emphasis on developing the Japanese economy through
heavy industry and international trade. A second influential stream is evolutionism,
which was influential in the development- or security-oriented thought of almost all these
leaders, especially those of Kato and Hirohito. The assumptions of Japan’s superiority are
strong in prewar notions that Japan must lead Asia to counter the West, and in today’s
ODA, that Japan must help Asian nations to develop. Additional examples include
Japan’s prewar emphasis on economic relations with Asia, and its postwar regional aid
focus on the same.1939 The concept of self-help and self-reliance in Japan’s aid is based
on Japanese values of hard work and self-reliance that are centuries old, and which were
also heavily stressed in the writings of Fukuzawa. The concept of translative adaptation is
also based on Japan’s development experiences that are fairly unique compared to those
of the West. This basic concept is seen in the thought of Yanagita Kunio, though
1938

See Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 and the associated discussions in Chapter 9 for an in-depth treatment of how
specific ideas in the prewar and postwar eras relate to key ideas in contemporary Japanese aid policy, in the
areas of sociocultural, political, and economic issues.
1939
Both the Cold War and Tokugawa Japan’s national isolation policy caused unnatural disruptions in
Japan’s connections with Asia, but for most of history, its connections with continental Asia were stronger
than with any other global region.
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technically its reemergence in the work of anthropologist Maegawa Keiji is only since the
1990s. The image Japan of serving as a development “bridge” or model between or for
different world regions is also seen in the prewar hakkô ichiu ideology, where Japan
would serve as a Confucian beacon of peace and civilization for other Asian nations, and
in the early postwar “flying geese” paradigm of Japan leading Asia in development,
influential in the thinking of Japan development experts over much of the postwar era.
From my study in Chapter 10, I conclude that of the three major issues areas I explore,
sociocultural, political and economic, the sociocultural area shows the most influence
from prewar thoughts on important, contemporary Japanese aid ideas.
Some critics have continued to view Japanese aid in the light of Japan’s colonial
and possibly neocolonial intentions of economic hegemony, but Koppel and Orr argue
that it has meant much more. In their view, if one fails to consider broader themes, such
as the emergence of Japan’s concept of comprehensive security,1940 one does not really
understand Japan’s ODA. This concept sees economic development and political stability
in developing nations as foundational to needed natural resources and international trade,
key for Japan’s health and survival.1941 The concept is closer to the broadened concept of
development and national security that has emerged in American foreign affairs since the
9-11 terrorist attack, the idea that raising the level of development and well-being of
various regions can enhance national and international security by defeating poverty, one
of the possible root causes of terrorism.1942
1940

I would add the important issues of domestic reform pressures and the influences of culture and history
on Japanese aid, among many others.
1941
Ibid., 364-365.
1942
A former predominant American concept of foreign aid and security viewed ODA in narrower terms, as
contributing mainly to military security. Comprehensive security is also broader than the concept of
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An additional, significant, global yet historical force affecting the future of
Japan’s ODA is Japan’s interactions with the United States throughout the period studied
(1850 to 1945) and then especially in the postwar period. Relations with the United States
have had enormous effects on Japan at large, especially in the postwar period. This
project has mostly focused on prewar influences.
Religion and spirituality also exercised a strong, direct influence on Japanese
society and politics from 1868 to 1945 in the form of state-imposed Shinto. In the
postwar period, direct political effects of spirituality and religion on government in Japan
have been prohibited by the Constitution of 1947. The influence of spirituality on ODA is
likely indirect, though present. Today there is a distinction between the formal, legal
separation of religion from politics and policy and the spiritual practices of many
Japanese, including aid staff and policymakers, in their daily lives. This is not, as I argue
in Chapter 9, an example of the Flaw of the Excluded Middle.1943
The future of Japanese aid in the early twenty-first century is also related to
various reform proposals that have emerged since the late 1990s.1944 In the late 1990s and
early 2000s, the concept of “human security” was introduced into Japan’s diplomacy.
Several official reports centered on the interconnectedness of security and
development/poverty, plus the need for a broad approach to tackle the issues. Ogata
Sadako, JICA’s current director, argued that Japan’s ODA should be more human-

Japanese aid as mainly contributing to Japan’s economic security: more contracts for its trading and
construction firms (Ibid.).
1943
The issue of how spirituality and religion affect Japan’s ODA is discussed at much greater length in
Chapter 9.
1944
Reform proposals for the early 1990s and earlier are studied in Chapter 2.
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oriented, but that the goal was difficult under the request-based system for aid. In order to
begin to accomplish this, more aid must be developed for targets below the state level.1945
In late 2003, the LDP released a report that recommended several key reforms
in Japan’s ODA policy. These recommendations relate closely to several important,
current policy options for the future of Japanese aid, and reveal the significant influence
of the LDP on Japan’s aid. The first goal, beyond aid requests, was to increase the
opportunity for partnerships and policy consultations with aid recipients. The second
recommended reform was to consider goals beyond those expressed in Japan’s 1992
ODA Charter, including poverty reduction, peace building and human security. The third
objective was to improve policy coordination between aid implementation agencies (i.e.
JBIC, JICA) and the Japanese government, and among aid agencies themselves. A fourth
main goal was to upgrade the organization and roles of Japan’s ODA representatives in
the field (agency field offices and governmental diplomatic missions).1946
In the early 2000s, several pressing issues emerged in Japan’s ODA system.1947
These major challenges will help determine the future course of Japanese aid policy. In
addition to continuing administrative and budget reforms, Akiyama and Kondo identify
several of these issues as the need of Japan’s ODA for better coordination with the
Western-dominated global ODA system, the need to “put a human face” on Japan’s
ODA, securing Japan’s continuing national interests, and the need for better applied and
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Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 105-106.
Ibid., 106-107.
1947
These issues included contributing to global peace building, reforming the request-based principle for
obtaining aid, improving partnerships with other donors and international organizations, achieving better
balance in aid for economic infrastructure and social infrastructure, improving aid for governance, the
utilization of yen loans, preparing country assistance plans, and introducing new aid forms like budget
support and Sector Wide Approaches (Akiyama and Kondo, Global ODA, 154).
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coordinated development research.1948 In the likelihood of continuing aid budget
reductions for the near-term foreseeable future, these challenges seem great. On aid
coordination with other donors, earlier in Chapter 2 we noted several of the challenges at
length. Japan desires, on some levels, to respond to the global, Western critiques of
problems in its aid system, and also recognizes much of the value of the global aid
agenda. There are no doubt various opportunities for increased partnership between
Japan’s ODA and agencies from other countries.1949 Yet Japan desires to do more than
just donate funds and “…give away all other presence enhancing ‘juicy’ parts to other
donors.” Here Japan’s continuing concern for its international image again merges.
Coordination of Japan’s system is extremely challenging, for reasons identified above,
including Japan’s cumbersome aid bureaucracy, and the system’s basic goals that often
conflict with other donors’. 1950 Another challenge for Japan is to better coordinate the
loan and grant aspects of its ODA.1951 Since both of these functions are to be
incorporated, to a large degree, in the “new “JICA from October 2008, it would helpful to
examine how this merger affects this issue.
The “human face” issue relates to Japan’s concern for its international image
and “face.” Akiyama and Kondo comment that in the history of postwar Japanese aid and
economic relations, there are a small number of talented individuals whose faces have
largely come to represent Japanese development and aid to the outside world, including
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Ibid., 154-163.
In earlier chapters I mentioned examples of Japan’s partnerships with aid agencies from Canada and the
United States. Akiyama and Kondo mention the United Kingdom as another excellent possibility (Ibid.,
155).
1950
Perhaps administrative reforms in Japan’s aid system, such as the start of the “new” JICA, can help
improve coordination with other donors somewhat.
1951
Ibid., 156-157.
806
1949

the late Foreign Minister Okita Saburo and Ogata Sadako.1952 In addition, there is the
positive representation of Japan by numerous, vibrant young Japanese who have served
with (or applied to) JBIC, JICA, JOCV, and the UN Junior Program Officer program. In
recent years, Akiyama and Kondo charge that Japanese aid agencies have become
somewhat more assertive in “flag raising,” making sure that Japanese contributions are
visible and acknowledged in various aid projects. But ultimately, effective aid, not image,
is what really counts.1953
Akiyama and Kondo further lament the relatively small recognition of Japanese
aid and its contributions in the general world literatures on international development.
While acknowledging the problems of Japan’s aid often cited by its global critics, they
defend its valuable contributions to economic infrastructure and practical technical help
given by Japanese experts, “…never poorly valued by developing countries.”1954 Overall,
they emphasize the importance of serious, national effort by Japan to assure that Japan’s
ODA is recognized for its actual contributions, not just its amounts:
The challenge for us lies in how to improve Japanese aid while accepting these
problems as real constraints, how to showcase the merits of our aid, and how to
demonstrate to the world our intention to work on development assistance as a
member of the international community.1955
The concern for image and face, a perennial feature of Japanese culture, continues.
From the donor’s viewpoint, Akiyama and Kondo also stress that Japan must
better secure its national interests (kokueki) through aid. They argue that it is
1952

As noted earlier, Ogata is the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and the current director of
the “new” JICA aid agency in Japan.
1953
Ibid., 157-159. Concerning human resources issues, signs that Japan’s aid may be somewhat improving
its effectiveness include attempts to better train Japanese staff, hiring more local area staff overseas, and
increasing South-South aid cooperation in developing areas (Ibid., 158-159).
1954
Ibid., 163.
1955
Ibid.
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understandable that to gain public and business support for ODA, the Japanese
government must highlight how ODA contributes to Japan’s kokueki. There may be value
in the comparative study of different aid recipients, asking how each one perceives
Japanese aid, how the country and aid for it may contribute to Japan’s kokueki, how
aiding the country helps Japan, the productivity of investing in the country’s economic
infrastructure and how much the public in that country appreciates the aid.1956 Again we
see pragmatism and the concern for face and image.
There is also a great need for better study of the large-scale issues and policy
concerns that Japanese aid seeks to address. Continual, comprehensive analysis of these
issues at the national government level is needed, yet that analysis has been lacking.
Though a fair number of Japanese universities and think tanks study such issues, there
should be better coordination and communication of their efforts. National level study
groups that include experts with expertise in different regions, sectors, and themes should
be pursued. Another problem in Japan’s development research capacity is a common
mismatch between the research conducted and actual field needs. Research grants,
researcher interests and findings are not well coordinated with field conditions on the
ground. These problems partly result from the organizational culture of Japan’s ODA
system and agencies, which are commonly understaffed with overworked generalists who
lack adequate training in the increasing technicalities of the international development
field. Positively, while the World Bank has tended to heavily stress economics and
econometric analyses, Japan realizes the value of interdisciplinary research for
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development.1957 Though different agencies and committees in the Japanese aid
bureaucracy prepared study reports and plans to address these issues, Akiyama and
Kondo argue that greatly improved research, characterized by “…clear, coherent and
holistic ideas,” was needed to help improve the situation.1958 Among the key research
tools that could help to improve this situation, the holistic, clear suggestions of applied
anthropology seem particularly relevant.1959
Japan’s ODA system has continued to be characterized by competing goals
from its domestic side (economically driven goals, calls for reform, and conventional
foreign policy concerns), contrasted with the demands of the global aid community and
agenda. In the recent past, many of the economic-related goals of Japan’s aid have been
pursued through JBIC, while JICA has addressed many international norms. With the
appointment of Ogata Sadako as head of JICA in late 2003, many dynamic reforms have
occurred, including increasing the field presence of staff, poverty alleviation and conflict
resolution goals, cooperation with NGOs, African aid, and local capacity building
goals,1960 in addition to the merging of JICA and the OECO functions of JBIC into the
“new” JICA in October 2008. It remains to be seen how the new merger will affect the
actual operations and effectiveness of Japan’s aid.
By the early 2000s, both MOFA and JICA prepared recommendations for
improving the reaction of Japanese ODA to global poverty reduction goals, but this was
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only one of multiple goals for Japan’s overall ODA.1961 Part of the difficulty in
reconciling conflicts between Japan’s ODA and the global aid agenda has been that many
of the strengths of Japanese aid have not really matched the BHN focus of the global
agenda and the MDGs. Ohno Kenichi has argued that Japan should seek to cooperate
with the global aid agenda goals of poverty reduction, “…without losing its unique
perspective.”1962 Some of these unique perspectives include the capacity to encourage
actual economic growth, and to customize aid for the unique needs of each country.
Ishikawa Shigeru argues that these are something World Bank development methods
such as the PRSP have lacked.1963 Yet the economic and trade motivations for Japanese
aid, while possibly overlapping with its foreign policy functions, may somewhat hinder
goals that lean toward the international norms for poverty alleviation.1964 In reality, it is
likely that the unique combination of factors in Japan’s domestic politics combine to
prevent any full harmonization of Japan’s aid with the global aid agenda. Yet in addition
to South Korea, several Asian nations, including Taiwan, Thailand, and even China seem
to be imitating Japan in various aspects of their own emerging aid programs. Perhaps an
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Foreign, especially Western, aid experts have also actively critiqued many elements of Japan’s aid
system, and offered many suggestions for reform. Among these is Alan Rix. For more on the suggestions of
foreign critics through the early 1990s, see Chapter 2. In his 2005 comparison of ODA from Australia and
Japan, Rix argues that Japan should seriously consider merging grants, technical cooperation and project
planning into one agency like JICA, expand its aid beyond a request-based only system, give less emphasis
to economic infrastructure, and put more on social needs (Alan Rix, “Japanese and Australian ODA,” in
Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions, ed., David M. Arase [London and New York:
Routledge, 2005], 104-116). No doubt some of these foreign critiques are having an influence on Japanese
ODA’s reform process.
1962
K. Ohno, “Overview,” quoted in Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 112.
1963
Ishikawa Shigeru, “Hinkon sakugen ka seichô sokushin ka,” quoted in Yamauchi, “Trends in
Development,” 112.
1964
Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 13.
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unusual, hybrid system of aid, borrowing from both Western and Japanese elements, will
emerge in Asia.1965
David Arase has both lauded past Japanese efforts to take a lead in promoting
global development, and lamented the fact that economic difficulties in the 1990s and
early 2000s led Japan to scale back many elements of its massive aid program. Yet
evidence suggests that a modest, more focused effort by wealthy nations could go far in
aiding the developing world.1966 But major shifts in the world economy can affect both
the aid of major donors and the socioeconomic conditions in the LDCs.1967
What are several likely scenarios for the future of Japanese aid? Arase argues
that while it is likely that Japan will not return to the position of the world’s top donor, it
can be among the top donors, if not number two, for the foreseeable future. If Japan
wants to improve the international image of its aid, it will have to do a better job of
addressing the goals and concerns of the global aid agenda, such as the MDGs. Since the
late 1990s, Japan has expressed a desire to do just that, to contribute more to poverty
reduction, humanitarian aid, and conflict prevention resolution/prevention, amid
conditions of increasing economic austerity.1968 When Kawaguchi Yoriko, a former
METI official, took over as Foreign Minister in 2002, she pushed revision of the 1992
ODA Charter to not only include Japan’s commitment to pressing global and
humanitarian issues, but to expressly address its kokueki as well: “the objectives of
1965

Ibid., 275.
Ibid., 1-2.
1967
Ibid. This was seen in the major global economic downturn in late 2008, initially precipitated by the
collapse of the mortgage loan industry in the United States, followed by severe downturns in major stock
markets around the world. This crisis threatened not only the economies of major aid donors, but also their
capacity to offer foreign aid, in turn affecting the ability of major global aid organizations to address a
world food crisis.
1968
Ibid., 271.
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Japan’s ODA are to contribute to the peace and development of the international
community, and thereby to help ensure Japan’s own security and prosperity.” The 2003
ODA Charter also expresses goals for Japan to obtain access to needed resources, partner
closely with Asia, and the traditional aid goals of self-help, economic and physical
infrastructure and similar issues. While the 2003 Charter fails to even mention the
MDGs, the 2005 Medium Term ODA Policy Outline does, while also emphasizing aid
incorporating the East Asian development experience and Japan’s desire to cultivate
economic relations.1969
Koppel and Orr argue that ODA is a thread in Japanese international relations
that will likely remain important for some time into the future. However, it will also
likely continue to be a “burden,” not only economically, but also perhaps politically and
culturally. They conclude ODA is a tie that further binds Japan to the complexities of the
international system, with ever shifting issues and interests.1970
One thing we can say with fair certainty is globalization and other foreign forces
will increasingly influence the future of Japanese aid, more than ever before. These
international forces include such actors and phenomena as the United States, other Asian
countries and aid donors like China and Korea, and the effects of globalization on
domestic Japanese society. As I discussed in Chapter 9, globalization is having important,
gradual affects on Japan’s internal politics and civil society, including ODA policy. The
entry of diverse, global values into Japan, through many venues such as the Internet, is
strengthening Japanese civil society, increasing its pluralism and the capability of Japan’s
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Ibid., 272-273.
Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 366.
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small NGO community and the public to influence the government’s ODA policies. More
Japanese, especially young but also old, are turning to volunteering with such NGOs.
Young Japanese are more open to spirituality, due to new postmaterial values affecting
Japan, similarly to how they have affected other advanced, industrialized nations. These
forces sometimes lead young Japanese to seek international work or volunteer
opportunities with NGOs or public avenues such as JICA and JOCV in different areas,
including development and aid work. Some of these NGOs are religious.
Policy Applications for the Social Sciences and Development Policy
Applied Anthropology
In this section, I offer study and policy suggestions for the overall field of
applied anthropology. Recommendations for anthropologists in Japan are found in Table
10.1, while recommendations for anthropologists outside of Japan, Westerners and
others, are in Table 10.2.
Table 10.1 Policy and Research Recommendations for Applied Anthropology: Japanbased Researchers
Themes/
Policy Areas

Research or Policy Recommendation(s)

Professional skills
promotion, historical
study.

Yanagita Kunio is a wonderful example of an engaged scholar who
conducted significant studies and made many insightful policy
recommendations in the prewar period, though many were not
applied then (why was this so?). Lives of such scholars should be
studied, highlighted, and emulated. Mentoring programs and
networks for applied scholars in Japan should be developed and
strengthened.
Japanese and foreign anthropologists should ethnographically study
the effects of Japanese ODA on foreign societies and populations,
and how to better incorporate their viewpoints in Japan’s aid
policymaking, to improve the overall quality of Japan’s aid.

Improve policy through
ethnographic research,
study of aid recipient
views, study of aid’s
effects.
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Improved study of
anthropology and dev.
anthropology.
Improved application of
anthro to public policy
issues.
Improved application of
anthro to public policy
issues.
Improve policy through
ethnographic research,
study of aid recipient
views, study of aid’s
effects.
Improve policy through
ethnographic research,
organizational
ethnography.
Improve policy through
ethnographic research,
organizational
ethnography.
Network analysis,
organizational
ethnography.
Study of aid recipient
views.
Study of aid’s effects,
improve policy through
ethnographic research.
Historical study, study of
historical impacts on aid,
study of aid’s effects,
improve policy through
historical research.

Historical study, improve

More study of applied anthropology and its relationship to
international development globally.
Increased consideration of how to make anthropology more useful
for broad policy issues of the Japanese government, including
development and ODA.
Specific consideration of how anthropology applies to the specific
issues of Japan’s international relations, diplomacy, conflict
resolutions, and international trade, and development of ideas for
increasing the application of anthropological methods for such
concerns.
Study of the actual social and grassroots effects of Japanese aid
policies in Japanese aid projects and policies around the world,
including Asia, and how to improve them.
Ethnographic study of how to improve Japanese aid’s partnerships
with other donors, Western and non-Western, bilateral and
multilateral, and policy priorities of the global aid agenda, such as
the MDGs. This would likely include ethnographic study of the
organizational cultures of aid-related groups or agencies in Japan, to
identify policymaking and decisional bottlenecks.
Conduct organizational ethnographies of public aid-related groups
in Japan to identify structural weaknesses and recommend
opportunities for administrative and policymaking improvements.
Such study can be intra-organizational, or inter-organizational, to
better understand Japan’s complex ODA policy networks, how they
function, and how they may be improved.
Study the relations between Japan’s NGO and public
ODA/development groups, in order to improve their relations,
cooperation and mutual effectiveness.
Study of the perceptions of Japanese ODA and development in
recipient countries, and how they can be improved.
Study of the social effects of Japanese aid for economic
infrastructure in Japanese aid recipients, and development of
concrete policy recommendations for the government, so these
impacts can be improved.
More holistic study of the history of Japan’s development and
development ideologies, and their impacts on Japan’s former
colonies and the rest of Asia today. Based on these lessons, what
concrete policy lessons can be developed concerning the impacts of
state development policies and ideologies on human populations,
both domestic and foreign? How can other nations avoid Japan’s
mistakes? What positive applications from the legacies of Japanese
economic investment in former colonies and their successful
development today can be drawn for other regions and cases of
colonialism?
Based on Japan’s development experience, what can LDCs do to
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policy through historical
research, cultural preserv.,
protection.
Ethnographic study of
field conds., rapid social
change, improve policy
through ethnographic
research.
Improve policy through
ethnographic research.
Improve policy through
ethnographic research.
Improve policy through
ethnographic research.

Professional skills
promotion.

Study of aid’s effects,
improve policy through
ethnographic research.
Improve policy through
ethnographic research,
study of aid’s effects.

Historical study, study of
historical impacts on aid.
Historical study, study of
historical impacts on aid.

better protect their own cultures and identities during economic
development?
Study of the issue of how LDCs may better maintain their desired
and/or existing social structures, values and cultural features in the
midst of rapid economic change and rapid importation of new
technological items. Develop concrete policy recommendations for
LDCs and Japanese aid policymakers based on these findings.
Ethnographic study of Japan’s aid policymakers’ worldviews and
their decision-making processes. Use these findings to develop
recommendations for policymaking improvements.
Ethnographic study of how Japan does aid policymaking for the
issue of social infrastructure and for economic infrastructure. How
can these two areas be balanced and improved more?
Ethnographic study of the “spiritual” aspects and views of Japanese
aid policymaking and staff, the spiritual and religious conditions of
aid recipients, and consideration of how spiritual factors both affect
and are affected by the receipt of Japan’s aid. What are the impacts
of these issues for the effectiveness of Japan’s aid, and how can
they be improved? What about for Japan’s general diplomacy?
Study the cross-cultural adjustment challenges of Japanese aid
workers, based on lessons from Japan and similar aid systems such
as South Korea. A similar situation is the cross-cultural adjustment
challenges of Christian missionaries from both those countries.
Develop recommendations to improve the cross-cultural training for
Japan’s aid workers.
Conduct research on whether Japan is projecting itself and its
development experiences on aid recipients. If it is, is this bad? If so,
how can it be changed?
Study this issue ethnographically: does translative adaptation work?
Does it help Japanese aid and LDCs? Are the goals of customized
development achievable? Can they be balanced with universal goals
often preached by the World Bank and similar groups? Develop
concrete policy recommendations for Japanese aid from these
insights.
What are the legacies of Japan’s views of its colonies? How do
these views affect Japan’s aid and its relations with developing
countries?
How have the evolutionistic views behind Japan’s imperial legacy
affected Japan’s aid of today? If the results are negative, how can
they be improved?

815

In the above policy and research recommendations for researchers in Japan, key
themes that emerge relate to improving ODA policy and development research through
ethnographic research and increased understanding and use of anthropological
approaches, including organizational ethnography, network analysis, and similar
methods, in research on Japan’s ODA policies and programs. I suggest that these
methods to be applied to such issues as better understanding the viewpoints of aid
recipients, the social and political effects of Japan’s aid, cultural preservation issues,
LDC field conditions, rapid social change, and improving the social research skills of aid
agency staff and policymakers in Japan. A final area of application relates to historical
issues: the improvement of Japanese aid policy through study of relevant historical
issues, historical-oriented research for policy concerns, and study of the historical
impacts of Japanese aid. Key insights that emerge for Japan’s ODA policies and
programs include the possibility of further improving the delivery and effectiveness of
ODA policy through the use of applied social science methods. These research methods
should be applied to study of both Japan’s aid recipients, and to aid policy and
implementation bodies in Japan. Their use will further strengthen the large reform efforts
of Japan’s aid policy system currently underway.
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Table 10.2 Policy and Research Recommendations for Applied Anthropology:
Researchers based outside Japan.
Themes/
Policy Areas

Research or Policy Recommendation(s)

Expand anthro study of dev of nonWestern cases, comparative study,
cross-regional application of insights

Increased study of and consideration of non-Western
cases of development, including Japan, China, and
Southeast Asia. Effective incorporation of these
insights into mainstream anthropological theories of
development, both in academic anthropology and
applied/professional anthropology
Ethnographic and applied study of non-Western aid
donors and aid agencies, including their organizational
cultures and policies

Expand anthro study of dev of nonWestern cases, organizational
ethnography, improve ethnog research
for policy, comparative study
Expand anthro study of dev of nonWestern cases, study of aid’s effects,
improve ethnog research for policy,
comparative study, cross-regional
application of insights, study of aid’s
effects.
Expand anthro study of dev of nonWestern cases, improve ethnog research
for policy, comparative study, study of
aid effectiveness, cross-regional
application of insights, study of aid’s
effects, policy applications.
Study of aid effectiveness, study of nonWestern dev concepts, cross-regional
application of insights
Study of aid effectiveness, study of nonWestern dev concepts, cross-regional
application of insights, policy
applications.
Comparative study, policy applications,
cross-regional study and application of
insights.

Study of aid policymaking and
processes, policy applications.

Ethnographic study of the effects of non-Western aid
on developing countries and regions, such as Africa

Comparative ethnographic studies of Western and
non-Western aid donor systems, incorporating such
issues as the aid effectiveness of these systems, their
impacts on recipient populations and countries, lessons
for Western systems from non-Western systems (and
the reverse)
Study and analysis of the Japanese development
concepts of “modernization,” translative adaptation,
internationalization, and consideration of how these
concepts may apply to international development and
aid issues worldwide, especially in new cases
Ethnographic investigation of the validity of
“modernization,” translative adaptation and
internationalization. Development of policy
recommendations from these findings for global ODA
organizations and development.
Cooperative study with Japanese anthropologists of
the Japanese aid policymaking system. Development
of concrete, practical recommendations for
policymaking improvements and reforms, on Japan’s
domestic level and for Japan’s improved cooperation
with global aid groups and other donors.
Analysis and study of how development research is
done in Japan, by anthropologists and others, in order
to offer concrete recommendations for how it may be
improved.
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Policy applications, improved study of
anthro, training/professional issues.

Policy applications.

Develop specific policy recommendations for how
anthropological training and scholarship on spirituality
and religion can be fruitfully applied to the training of
American foreign policy makers and diplomats, so that
our consideration of religion and international affairs
can be improved. This may include incorporating
insights from missiology and mission anthropology,
despite present or past biases for or against such fields.
Study how views of “spirituality” and “science” affect
policies for foreign aid and development.

The key policy and research recommendations themes for non-Japan based
researchers include expanding anthropological and other social science study of nonWestern cases of development and aid, studying non-Western development concepts,
comparative study of Western and non-Western development models and aid systems,
and careful cross-regional application of insights that are generated. While many nonJapanese aid experts, many based in the West, have extensively studied and commented
on many aspects of Japan’s ODA, there needs to be more study of other non-Western aid
systems in countries like China, South Korea, and Taiwan. It is important that Western
aid experts seriously consider the meaning of the Japanese and Asian development
models and experiences, and what they mean for other regions. This must include
reflection on the meaning and application of important non-Western development
concepts, such as internationalization and translative adaptation that I explored in this
project. Other key issues here are standard to the consideration by social scientists of
development and aid issues everywhere: the study of aid’s effects, aid effectiveness, aid
policymaking, the use ethnographic and other social methods in development research,
policy applications, and training/professional issues.
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Political Science and International Studies
In Table 10.3 I present policy and research recommendations for the fields of
political science and international studies, mostly outside Japan. For research and policy
outside Japan, these recommendations focus on improving international studies,
diplomatic, development and aid policies and practices through further incorporation of
anthropological research methods and approaches, including the use of ethnography to
examine decision-making, local and global issues, and the effects of foreign and aid
policies. On a third level, I again recommend comparative and cross-regional study and
application of insights. For political science and international studies research in Japan, I
recommend the improvement of international studies and foreign policy through the use
of anthropological and ethnographic methods.
Table 10.3 Policy and Research Recommendations for Political Science and International
Studies.
Themes/
Policy Areas

Researcher
Location(s)

Improving international studies,
improving diplomatic practice,
improve policy through ethnographic
research, policy application of anthro
approaches, study of aid’s effects.

Outside
Japan

Improving dev policy, cross-regional
study and application of insights.

Outside
Japan

Improving diplomatic and aid
practices, organizational ethnography.
Improve policy through ethnographic
research, policy application of anthro
approaches, improve decision-making
through anthro approaches.

Outside
Japan
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Research or Policy Recommendation(s)

Increased incorporation of anthropological
methods and approaches in the study of
foreign aid and foreign policy, to understand
how foreign policies affect human populations
on the ground level, and how those impacts
may be improved.
Increased study of East Asian and Japanese
development models and experiences,
especially consideration of how their
significant lessons and experiences may be
applied to other regions.
Increased consideration of how
anthropological studies of organizational
culture and organizational ethnographies can
help improve the transparency, ethics and
decision-making processes of Western foreign
policy, diplomacy, aid policy and aid
implementing bodies.

Improving diplomatic practice.
Improve policy through ethnographic
research, policy application of anthro
approaches, improve decision-making
through anthro approaches.

Outside
Japan

Improving diplomatic practice,
improve policy through ethnographic
research, policy application of anthro
approaches, improve decision-making
through anthro approaches.

Outside
Japan

Improve study of local and global
issues in international studies,
improve decision-making through
anthro approaches, improving
diplomatic practice, study of aid’s
effects, comparative study, policy
applications, cross-regional study and
application of insights.
Improve decision-making through
anthro approaches, improving
diplomatic practice.

Outside
Japan

Cross-regional study and application
of insights, comparative study,
improving international studies.

Outside
Japan

Improving international studies,
improve policy through ethnographic
research, policy application of anthro
approaches.

Japan

Outside
Japan

Increased incorporation of cognitive
approaches from anthropology in research on
foreign policy, especially contemporary
policy, to enrich findings and understandings
of how foreign policy and similar decisionmaking processes happen and can be
improved.
Improvement of studies of decision-making
and foreign policy decision-making through
the incorporation of ethnographic methods for
the study of the worldviews and decisionmaking processes of individual political actors
and decision-makers.
Improved understanding of globalization and
its effects by including the study of local level
effects and their impacts on foreign aid
policymaking bodies and their decisions, and
the impacts of policies of foreign policy
policymaking bodies on local sites and
populations throughout the world.
Comparative study of these findings.
Improvement of the consideration of foreign
policy decision-making through incorporating
expanded, improved analytical concepts of
perception and cognition, based on cognitive
anthropological concepts such as worldview,
cultural logics, and image.
Better understanding of what colonialism,
imperialism and globalization mean through
improved consideration of these issues in the
Japanese and other Asian cases.
More incorporation of cross-disciplinary
approaches in policy studies and analysis,
including anthropological approaches.

Development Policy
In Table 10.4 I give policy recommendations for Japanese and Western
development policymakers, mostly those in Japan. For development policymakers in
Japan, I recommend the improvement of development policy practice and professional
skills through the application of anthropological approaches in such areas as social
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research skills, ethnography and organizational ethnography, and improved consideration
of local issues in development. Increased public accountability is also a possible dividend
from these efforts. My recommendations for development policymakers outside Japan
stress improving development policies through cross-regional and comparative studies of
Western and Asian development. I especially emphasize the consideration of Asian and
non-Western development concepts, such as translative adaptation, namely their viability
for development and beyond Japan.
Table 10.4 Policy and Research Recommendations for Development Policy.
Themes/
Policy Areas

Policymaker/
Researcher
Location(s)

Professional skills issues, policy
application of anthro approaches,
improving dev policy.
Professional skills issues, policy
application of anthro approaches,
improving dev policy, improving
study of local issues in dev policy.

Japan

Professional skills issues, policy
application of anthro approaches,
improving dev policy and practice.

Japan

Professional skills issues, policy
application of anthro approaches,
improving dev policy and practice.
Professional skills issues, policy
application of anthro approaches,
improving dev policy and practice
through anthro and ethnographic
approaches, study of aid’s effects.

Japan

Japan

Japan

Research, Policy Recommendation(s)

Incorporate more training in applied
anthropology, rapid ethnographic assessment
methods for Japanese aid staff.
Include training in basic cultural anthropology
and applied anthropology for Japanese
government policymakers, to increase their
sensitivity toward and capacity to better
incorporate consideration of human and
grassroots factors of development in their
policymaking.
Offer such training in JICA’s and other
Japanese government aid technical training
programs for overseas personnel or Japanese
volunteers preparing to serve overseas.
Offer brief training seminars in applied
anthropology and rapid research methods for
NGO staff and volunteers across Japan.
Improve the inclusion of the analysis of social
and cultural factors in Japanese aid
policymaking and aid analysis programs.
Incorporate such training in such venues as the
new JICA’s research and training institute.
This will help Japan to improve its
consideration of the grassroots aspects of its
aid policy in very tangible, practical ways,
improve the quality of its aid delivery and to
improve the impacts of aid on target
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Policy application of anthro
approaches, improving dev policy
and practice through anthro and
ethnographic approaches,
organizational ethnography.

Japan

Policy application of anthro
approaches, improving dev policy
and practice through anthro and
ethnographic approaches, improving
public accountability and ethics of
dev and aid policy.
Policy application of anthro
approaches, improving dev policy
and practice through anthro and
ethnographic approaches, improving
public accountability and ethics of
dev and aid policy.
Improving dev policy, crossregional study and application of
insights, comparative study.

Japan

Improving dev policy, crossregional study and application of
insights, comparative study.

Outside
Japan

Improving dev policy, crossregional study and application of
insights, comparative study.
Improving dev policy, crossregional study and application of
insights, comparative study.

Outside
Japan

Japan

Outside
Japan

Outside
Japan

populations and recipients. It will also make
aid more effective in actually accomplishing
what is intended.
Hire expert organizational anthropologists such
as Hamada Tomoko to study the organizational
cultures of Japanese aid agencies and
policymaking bodies, to offer policy
recommendations for further organizational
reforms to help improve the quality and
delivery of Japanese aid.
Employ social scientists to further study
Japanese public opinion of ODA through
surveys, focus groups, and other avenues, in
order to better understand public perceptions of
ODA, how Japan’s aid can be improved by
incorporating their suggestions.
Make Japan’s aid policy more democratic and
ethical by using more public participation and
insights for aid policy decision-making and
goal setting. Use recommendations from social
scientists for this purpose.
Increased study of East Asian and Japanese
development models and experiences,
especially consideration of how their
significant lessons and experiences may be
applied to other regions.
Study and in-depth consideration of the
concept of translative adaptation. Is this
concept valid? Should it be applied to aid
policymaking at the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, and at other
leading international and bilateral donors? If
so, how?
What are lessons from Japan’s and East Asian
development experiences for Western
countries?
What do the Western/global aid groups,
agencies and their policy agendas need to learn
from Japanese and other non-Western aid
agencies and donors?
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Conclusion
Here I will briefly review some of my key findings about the policy
implications for Japanese ODA policy generated from the study of historical leaders’
worldviews and Japan’s experiences related to technology, development, and foreign
policy (1850 to 1945). What are some of the advantages of such a cognitive approach to
policy analysis? What valuable insights does the consideration of “worldviews” bring to
the issue of policy application? Here worldview generates especially significant insights
into the behavior and motivations of Japan’s top political actor of the twentieth century,
Hirohito, among others. Use of the anthropologically-enhanced concepts of image,
worldview, and cultural logics, augmented beyond conventional political science
approaches, enabled me to uncover newer, deeper insights on the possible motivations
and understanding beneath these political actors’ actions. This approach seems richer and
more nuanced than many conventional forms of decision-making analysis in political
science. Applied to policy issues, it helps us to generate many additional insights about
what these actors did, why, and within what contexts. The approach used in this study
also draws extensively on historical and cultural insights that policy studies typically
lack. This further enriches and deepens our findings about policy at many fundamental
levels.
On policy issues in Japan’s domestic arena, I found that on technological
development, the key leaders studied (1850 to 1895) were generally successful in
applying their keen insights and study on various issues of transferring technology and
culture to Japan. Both the government and these leaders sought “scientific” approaches
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that would help support their efforts. That ideology was largely evolutionism. Most of the
leaders in this period had direct policy applications in various significant sectors. From
1895 to 1945, the seeming conflicts in Hirohito’s training and worldviews, both spiritual
and scientific, flowed from his immersion in State Shinto, his love of and training in
marine biology, and his duties as supreme autocrat, military commander, and high priest
of the nation. Despite these seeming conflicts, he was a highly shrewd, rational political
actor who helped to nearly destroy Japan in World War II, and yet personally survived
the war intact.
In their domestic state worldviews, most of the leaders studied in the first era
(1850 to 1895) were significant policy actors. Because of his authorship of the
Constitution of 1889, Ito Hirobumi was most important here. The range of policy actions
and influence of these leaders is impressive, within the conservative policy environments
of late Tokugawa and early Meiji Japan. In the second period (1895 to 1945), as emperor,
Hirohito emerged as Japan’s most significant political actor in the twentieth century, and
his influence on domestic politics, starting with the Japanese state’s careful cultivation of
his image, was huge. Once he became emperor, his actions and inactions, always behind
the scenes, had enormous impacts on the nation.
Examining the three leaders’1971 domestic market worldviews in the first period
(1850 to 1895), the policy impacts of Fukuzawa, through his writings, enterprises, and
founding of several schools, are the greatest of the three. Both ideological and
environmental factors were highly significant in formulating the domestic market

1971

The three leaders studied here were Fukuzawa, Ito and Kato.
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worldviews of these three men.1972 In the second period (1895 to 1945), the significant
thought of Yanagita on domestic economic policy, on the development of regional
industries across Japan, did not find application in the prewar period.
Concerning leaders’ worldviews of domestic society (1850 to 1895), I found
that as with economics, Fukuzawa’s writings had the longest, broadest impact of the three
leaders studied,1973 in encouraging wide popular support for science, technology and
economics throughout society. The ideological conservatism of Japan in this era was
consistent with the choice of State Shinto as the nation’s spiritual ideology for
development. The Meiji state also wanted Japan to eagerly embrace Western science and
technology, though not much of the cultural “baggage” that accompanied them. These
leaders generally supported that attitude. In the second period (1895 to 1945), as Japan’s
supreme leader, Hirohito’s actions and projected images yielded huge impacts on
Japanese society and education, especially through the encouragement of patriotism,
nationalism, and State Shinto.
Concerning international issues, on Japan’s external political relations (1850 to
1895), most of the leaders studied were political realists, borrowed political ideas from
the Western controllers of the international system, and urgently sought ideas for Japan’s
survival. The four leaders studied from 1895 to 19451974 had varied views of international
relations, and most were ideologically conservative. Hirohito had the largest impact on
Japan’s external political relations by far. On his involvement in Japan’s international
1972

Environmental factors here included the childhoods of Fukuzawa and Ito in southwestern Japan, where
the presence and influence of trade with the West was highly influential. Among important ideological
factors was Kato’s choice to study the German language and German studies, which led him to be heavily
influenced by German Social Darwinism and evolutionistic thought.
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The other two leaders studied on domestic society (1850 to 1895) were Mori and Kato.
1974
These leaders studied for 1895 to 1945 were Ito, Yamagata, Yanagita and Hirohito.
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relations before and during World War II, a key observation is his indecisiveness in many
crises. Though he had key power and influence in major and minor decisions, Hirohito
was conflicted, often failing to realize the gravity of significant defeats, and dangerously
delaying Japan’s surrender, costing hundreds of thousands of lives. Here Hirohito’s
scientifically-based policy rationality wavered amid many pressures and conflicting roles,
not the least of which was his daily devotion to military duties, his personal schedule, and
faithful attention to Shinto prayers and ministrations as the nation’s high priest. Through
all of this, the state’s management of his image continued unabated. And on Japan’s
external economic relations, though Ito Hirobumi emerges as the most influential policy
actor (1850 to 1945), from my study, I gained no highly significant, additional insights on
this policy area.1975
On external cultural relations (1850 to 1895), the leaders studied1976 reveal
many of the same intercultural struggles with foreigners that all Japanese in that era did.
Impacts of Fukuzawa and Ito emerge as the greatest, through Fukuzawa’s writings on
Western cultures, and Ito’s work on the Constitution of 1889. On international and
domestic issues, both had broad influence on the cultural attitudes, lives, and practices of
millions of Japanese. The policy implications of Hirohito (1895 to 1945) on Japan’s
external cultural relations were also enormous, through his impacts generated through
World War II (the damage Japan received from abroad), and the massive influx of
American influence through Japan’s defeat in 1945. The policy conflict in Hirohito’s top1975
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down and Yanagita’s bottom-up approaches to protecting Japan’s culture seems vaguely
symptomatic of the struggles of Japan’s aid to address policy issues today: a strong
emphasis on the national, state-to-state level, but not as much on ground level concerns.
This emphasis is gradually shifting, a good development.
On leader’s views of imperialism, the leader with the greatest policy impact
(1895 to 1945) was again Hirohito. All of the leaders1977 condemned Western
imperialism and yet wanted Japan to “help” its weaker Asian neighbors. Unfortunately,
this “help” repeated many of the West’s mistakes. Most of the leaders focused on what
the colonies could for Japan, though not all.1978 Though Hirohito could have done much
to improve conditions in colonies and conquered territories during the war, he did not.
Evolutionary influences heavily colored these leaders’ views of the colonies, of Japan’s
role as their “leader,” and of the position of all in the global hierarchy of nations. Though
evolutionistic views color some assumptions behind both prewar Japanese imperialism
and postwar ODA, in ODA policy, the negative, prewar aggressive tendencies seem to be
mostly gone, though perceptions of that likely vary, depending on who one asks.1979
On the future policy implications of Japanese aid, I noted trends in several
significant areas, such as the influences of Japan’s historical and cultural legacies in
development, including spirituality, and important reform issues and pressures, both
domestic and international. One of the greatest conflicts facing Japanese aid is between
its largely internal, economic and strategic needs and the pressures and goals of the
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global aid community. Due to the deep legacies of Japan’s experience as the first of many
Asian nations to successfully develop, and its own cultural background, Japan’s longterm emphasis on economic infrastructure likely will not change. The goal of the global
aid agenda for poverty alleviation and sensitivity toward grassroots needs also has
domestic support in the Japanese public, since it has many valid points. These facts, plus
the high value placed on image and face in Japanese culture, and the increasing diversity
of global influences hitting Japan, suggest that Japan will continue to evolve some type of
“hybrid” aid system incorporating both economic infrastructure and social/grassroots
goals, as David Arase argues.1980 I agree, though with continuous, sometimes rapid
administrative changes, one cannot say what final structure this hybrid system may ever
take. But it will likely be highly influential on the emerging donor systems of other
countries throughout East Asia.
For the social sciences and development policy, both in Japan and abroad, it is
imperative that more effective application of the practical research skills and findings of
applied anthropology be applied to the study of Japan’s aid and its effects on recipient
nations, their populations, how Japan’s aid is perceived, and how it can be improved. It is
even more urgent that foreign scholars and anthropologists outside Japan increase their
understanding of Japanese and East Asian development, Asian aid donor experiences and
their relevance for international development and international relations at large, for the
basic improvement of the human condition of millions in the developing world. Many of
the assumptions of Westerners regarding development, including those of Western
anthropologists, tend to be culturally bound, biased, and inaccurate at several
1980
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fundamental levels. The experiences of many nations in Northeast and Southeast Asia,
some of the most important, on-going cases of development in history, prove this. One
size does not fit all, in life or in development.
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GLOSSARY
Note: definitions marked with an asterisk (*) are simplified versions of the central
analytical concepts used for the dissertation, or they are a concept of central importance
for the research. Where several meanings of a concept from different fields are listed, the
streamlined version used for this project will be listed first.
Attitude(s): “predispositions to respond in a particular way toward a class of specified
objects [which] consist of both cognitive (beliefs) and affective (feelings)
components.”1981 Attitudes “…are a result of cognition, and include ‘knowledge.’”1982
Authoritarian developmentalism: “…a politico-economic system designed to
formulate and implement state-led development. It emphasizes institutions,
organizational structures, and policies that promote industrialization. It uses capitalism to
promote economic development, and state intervention in the economy. Once rapid
growth has been achieved, an authoritarian developmentalist regime should be replaced
with an open system. Examples of this system include Japan, South Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore, and China.1983 The system has been paramount that region’s rapid economic
growth, and it offers a useful regional model for catching up with the West. More
concrete study of this issue is needed.1984
Belief systems include a decision-maker’s beliefs about another actor’s strategies, tactics,
motivations, and goals.1985 Some political scientists in the 1960s argued that belief
systems are the same as worldview. They defined belief systems as the views that states
and citizens hold concerning the outside world and themselves, including conscious and
unconscious beliefs that are held to be true (the belief system) or false (the disbelief
system).1986 Martha Cottam draws a helpful distinction between belief systems and
worldview, arguing that worldview consists of belief systems, but that they are not
identical phenomena1987 (see Worldview—political science). Research on individual
belief systems has been driven by two presumptions, that “…reasoning consists of an
awareness of particular phenomena and determination of the relations that exist among
them…” and that all individuals process and perceive information similarly. Research by
Jean Piaget, 20th century developmental psychologist, argued that since cognitive
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development for each individual is unique, the assumption that all individuals reason in
the same way is faulty.1988
Bunmei kaika (civilization and enlightenment): In Japan, the slogan attached to the
process of adopting Western technology during the Meiji period (1868-1912). After
Japan was forced to open to the outside world, the Japanese were amazed at the superior
technologies of the West.1989
*Cognition (simplified version, used for this project): how we become aware, how our
brains get knowledge, organize and use it, or how we perceive (sense and think about
certain things in the world around us). It includes things like remembering, solving
problems, talking, thinking, and making pictures in our minds.
Cognition is the process through which we become aware, closely connected with
language.1990 More technically, it is “…a collective term for the psychological processes
involved in the acquisition, organization, and use of knowledge.”1991 In cognitive
psychology, cognition refers to “…all the information processing activities of the brain,
ranging from the analysis of immediate stimuli to the organization of subjective
experience. In contemporary terminology, cognition includes such processes and
phenomena as perception, memory, attention, problem solving, language, thinking, and
imagery.1992
Political science work on cognition has produced an abundance of empirical
studies and a shortage of general theory. Rather than studying worldviews, some
research focuses on how information is processed. Other areas of study include cognition
in elite decision-making and mass public opinion, image and self-image in policy, roles
in international relations, perceptions of power and control, and affective (feeling)
responses to cognitive images.1993
Cognitive anthropology is “…the study of the relation between human society and
human thought, …how people in social groups conceive of and think about the objects
and events which make up their world.” Cognitive anthropology is also the investigation
of cultural knowledge, seen in stories, artifacts, and words, which humans share and
learn. One of the field’s main achievements is its detailed, accurate description of
cultural representations.1994 Cognitive representations of various properties or objects
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provide mental maps of the world. Both culture and psychology mutually affect each
other.1995
Cognitive categories are “a number of objects that are considered equivalent;” “…a class
of events, objects, [or] ideas…. A given category invokes those attributes necessary for
the identification of each member of the class to which the category refers.”1996 They
form the foundation of our normal prejudgments and daily adjustments, and help us to
“organize and simplify the environment.”1997 Categories provide the basis of how people
organize their worldviews, information about “…what a part of the environment looks
like, the identity of the [category’s] typical member, how it behaves, and how… [the
perceiver] can respond.”1998
The internal characteristics of cognitive categories include an object’s perceived
attributes, images of events or movements, and “…patterns of behavior associated with
the object, and response alternatives.”1999 The judgment process of cognitive categories
includes two types of decisions, nominal judgments, where an individual makes a
decision about which category in which to place an object, and ordinal judgments, where
one positions objects relative to others in the category.2000 There are three levels of
abstraction in categories. At the highest level are less abstract categories, where the
objects may have only a few attributes in common, for example, pieces of furniture. The
second level is the basic level, the most commonly used in forming categories. The
shape, movements, attributes and functions of objects in the category define basic level
objects. Third is the subordinate level, whose objects share many fairly concrete
attributes with objects in other categories. Another kind of cognitive category,
psychological scripts, is recordings of events in the memory that assist the individual with
predictions and judgments of future events and outcomes. Political categories divide the
political environment from other phenomena in the decision-maker’s world, and “identify
basic level categories.”2001
Cognitive maps in international relations are a visual attempt to show how belief
systems of decision-makers relate to specific foreign policy issues, and to simulate their
thought processes concerning actions in possible future scenarios. They are one of two
major cognitive models for the study of decision-making in international relations (See
also Operational Code).2002 The purpose is to “…build models of policy-makers’
political worldviews and to use these models to explain decisions.”2003 The assumption
here is that thought processes are important in politics, and that beliefs and “interpretive
frameworks” of decision-makers influence and constrain their decisions. Cognitive maps
1995
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resemble diagrams used in systems analysis, and represent concepts (variables) and
causal beliefs (definitions of variable relationships) connected by arrows. Policymakers’
beliefs are analyzed through documents, interviews, and questionnaires. Several
problems with cognitive maps include their “…simplistic view of causality,” sole reliance
on written and/or oral data, and their inability to predict future events due to their focus
on past decisions.2004
Cognitive psychology is the branch of psychology that focuses on the study of individual
perception and decision-making. This field has generally not examined social or
aggregate level decisions.2005 Its main assumption is “…that any interaction between an
organism and its environment changes not only its overt behavior or physiological
condition but also its knowledge of or information about the environment, and that this
latter change may affect not only present response but also future orientation to the
environment.”2006 See also Political cognition.
Cognitive style: how individuals conceptually organize the environment;2007 how a
person organizes his/her beliefs and handles information, especially when they are
contrary to the person’s preexisting beliefs. Cognitive styles are based on information
processing and the organization of beliefs, so they influence a person’s images and
behavior.2008
Colonialism: in political science, has been called “the policy and practice of a stronger
power extending its control territorially over a weaker people or nation.” The term was
developed from the Latin word colonia, for country estate. One common meaning of
colonialism in political science refers to colonialism that has happened in the recent
historic past, where settlers feel as much a part of the territory where they now live as
those their ancestors displaced felt (for example, South Africa). Second, colonialism
refers to a sense of racial superiority and beliefs, practices and attitudes that result from a
feeling of ethnocentrism. It can also connote xenophobia and racism in domestic society,
not just overseas.2009
Anthropologists have studied colonialism extensively. Michael Watts calls it
“ …the establishment and maintenance of rule, for an extended period of time, by a
sovereign power over a subordinate and alien people that is separate from the ruling
power.” Colonialism is distinct from colonization, which refers to “ …the physical
settlement of people …from the imperial center in the colonial periphery.” Most colonial
situations involve legal and political domination over an alien people, economic
dependence, and regularized cultural and racial inequities. Colonialism is a variant of
2004
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imperialism (See Imperialism). Anthropologists studying colonialism have produced a
huge literature. Common bodies of theory contributing to this work include dependency
theory, neo-Marxism, and world systems theory. Western anthropology in particular has
focused on the study of non-European “Others” in local places, and the institutions,
practices, and peoples connected with those structures of Western domination. In some
senses, anthropology is inseparable from colonialism, since colonial states used
anthropology to help them understand and rule their colonies. Anthropology also
pioneered the study of race. Today anthropologists also study postcolonialism, the
broader contemporary situation of former colonies in the global system.2010
Colonialism and ideology: In global processes of colonialism, ideology is the
subordinate worldview of a people being colonized.2011 While the new hegemonic
worldview of the colonizer(s) provides overall form, ideology gives specific content.2012
See also Hegemony.
*Cultural logics (simplified version, used for this research): unspoken, shared
assumptions and cultural patterns under a people’s worldview about something global
(something that affects people across the world in many places). We can learn about
cultural logics by studying a people’s actions, stories, and religious beliefs, among other
things.
Cultural logics: the underlying rationalities of meaning (political, economic, and
cultural) that shape human and political responses to the processes of globalization and
transnationalism.2013 Different cultures contain varying logics of internal organization.
These “…logics are not hard-and-fast rules, but dynamic, shared predispositions that
inform behavior and thought. Cultural logics cannot predict particular behaviors, but
they …lend a sense of regularity and continuity to behavior….” They are based on a
shared comprehension of acceptability, and are “…received [and redefined] by
individuals through …socialization and …social interaction.” Patterns of cultural logics
are revealed in religious beliefs, observed behavior, metaphors, historical narratives, and
other forms. Cultural logics change very slowly since they are cognitively deep, but they
are shaped and changed through interaction, catastrophic events, and on differing
geographic levels—local and global—which connect with global economic processes.2014
Cultural theory: Political scientists and anthropologists have attempted to strengthen
the impact of the culture and political culture concepts in political science, policy studies
and other social sciences by developing cultural theory.2015 In a historical framework,
cultural theorists attempt to apply culture to a broad range of policy issues and political
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theories, based on the recognition that political and policy decisions are made in a context
of social values.2016 Cultural theory was also inspired by Wildavsky and Douglas’
pioneering work in the early 1980s on the influences of social context on risk perceptions
of environmental and technological dangers.2017 According to cultural theorists, culture
must be more clearly defined and measured.2018
*Culture (my definition, used for this project): is all learned behavior, knowledge, values
and attitudes, “… is a shared worldview held by a group or organization,” is distinctive,
and has three main parts: 1) technology, 2) behavior, and 3) knowledge.
Culture is all learned behavior and knowledge, as well as values and attitudes.2019 In
applied anthropology, “culture is a shared worldview held by a group or organization.
Cultures are distinctive, and have three main components: artifacts [technology]…;
behavior…; and knowledge….”2020
Culture of politics, a holistic analytical approach for the study of political life and
culture, was developed by political scientists and anthropologists in the 1990s. In her
work on regime change and democratization in Africa, Pearl T. Robinson argues that we
need to examine political phenomena more holistically, by looking beyond government
structures, to the contexts in which political life occurs.2021 Rather than focusing on
political attitudes of citizens alone, as the political culture approach does (see Political
culture), we need to use a wide variety of sources, materials and methods, including
surveys and analyses of contemporary cultural phenomena such as street protests,
political cartoons, rhetoric, dramas, and music. Angelique Haugerud's The Culture of
Politics in Modern Kenya (1995) fruitfully uses the “culture of politics” approach to
analyze how Kenya constructs its national political culture. Haugerud seamlessly and
creatively integrates multiple scales of analysis (local, national, regional and global) and
methods (from anthropology, politics, and economics).2022
Datsua-nyûô (leave Asia, join the West): In the Meiji period (1868-1912), Japan’s
leaders idolized the West. According to the Datsua-nyûô doctrine, to promote
development, some argued that Japan must follow the same path as the West, and that it
must divorce itself from its Asian foundations.2023
Decision-making and perception include rational and irrational factors, influenced by
perception. The basic steps include: “1) definition of the situation, 2) calculation and
evaluation of alternatives, 3) choice or selection of alternatives, and 4) implementation.”
2016
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Each stage is influenced by three considerations: desires, possibility, and obligation.
Decision-makers are influenced and constrained by their own perceptions, and sometimes
label their opponents as enemies.2024
*Development has several primary meanings—first, an increase in a society’s capacity
for industrial production and the products of capitalism, and movement toward being a
“modern” society. Second, it means improving quality of life, the standard of living, and
eliminating or relieving poverty.2025 In applied anthropology, it includes “attempts to
[build] …local capacity, and [encourage] …local participation and decision-making.
Development almost always involves multiple groups, and therefore, multiple cultural
perspectives.”2026
Development ideology: In the task of development, ideology is a “…means of
establishing symbolic relations between people and the state.”2027 It has also been called
“…a set of doctrines about the proper methods to attain economic progress.” While
ideology is often associated with state power, and seems to take a directive role in state
development planning, it is also contingent and malleable.2028 Contemporary
anthropologists working in all three major theoretical approaches to anthropology and
development (applied, postmodern, and actor-oriented) are making valuable contributions
to the analysis of ideological factors in development.2029
Historically, ideologies have played an important role in the development of East
Asia. Nationalistic ideologies used in promoting development in Meiji Japan included
fukoku kyôhei and shokusan kôgyô. In South Korea, “defeat communism and achieve
unification” and in Taiwan, “retake the mainland” were important ideologies that initially
motivated those nations’ postwar economic growth.2030 Since the rise of the West,
modern history has been a process of the gradual domination of the West (the core) over
the rest of the world (the periphery).2031 The ideologies of capitalism and communism,
both of which originated in the West, are examples of powerful development ideologies
that have had global significance.
Some of the recent slogans used by third world governments to promote
development include marketization, industrialization, and modernization. “Market” and
“democracy” are two of the most prized development ideologies today, and are
aggressively promoted by the West and many international organizations. These values
have great appeal—“…the market mechanism is genuinely attractive because it [often]
2024
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promotes economic growth.” International organizations encourage developing nations
to “convert” through programs like structural adjustment, peacekeeping, and election
monitoring.2032 See also Internationalization; “Modernization;” Translative adaptation.
Developmental state: a form of political economy that emphasizes state-led industrial
policy through strategic approaches. The government stresses “plan rational”
development in collaboration with the private sector, and structures that guide domestic
industry and enhance international competitiveness. Four key features of a developmental
state are: 1) a small, elite bureaucracy, 2) a political system where the bureaucracy is
given adequate space to intervene effectively in the economy, 3) perfection of methods of
state intervention which still respect the market, and 4) overall guidance through a pilot
agency like Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).2033 Limited
elements of this concept should be institutionally transferable to other regions.2034
Developmentalism is “…the ideology which places highest priority on economic
development.”2035 It is “…a conscious attempt to exploit the tendency toward dynamic
increasing returns regardless of who pursues it, whether a firm, a government, or any
other organization.” Developmentalism at the state level involves industrial policy.2036 It
is “…an economic system based on private property and the market economy, …where
the government is permitted to intervene in the market from the long-term perspective….
Clearly, the state …is the founding unit of developmentalism as a political and economic
system.”2037
Ethnography: a description of a single contemporary culture or a piece of culture, the
collection of data that describe a culture,2038 or “…the study of a community or ethnic
group at close quarters and the text (usually a monograph) which results.”2039
*Flaw of the Excluded Middle: According to this concept developed by anthropologist
Paul Hiebert, in their worldviews, Westerners often have a two-tiered view of the
universe that excludes a middle realm commonly seen by non-Westerners. Many
Westerners see two “worlds” or domains: the “seen world” of material, visible
phenomena in this world, and the transempirical world (supernatural worlds beyond this
present world, such as heavens and hells). Between the seen and transempirical worlds,
Westerners miss the “unseen” domain of this present world: invisible things such as
unseen powers (i.e. magical forces, the evil eye) and spirit forces in everyday life
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(demons, spirits) that are commonly recognized by non-Westerners.2040 Anthropologist
Charles Kraft makes a similar argument. Secular bias in common Western worldviews,
based on the influence of the French Enlightenment, often blinds Westerners to the reality
of the supernatural in everyday life. We fail to “see” or experience what we do not
believe exists. Yet many non-Western cultures recognize and experience the operation of
supernatural forces in this present world.2041
Foreign aid/assistance: “…a transfer of real resources or immediate claims on resources
(such as foreign exchange) from one country to another, which would not have taken
place as a result of market forces or in the absence of specific official action… by the
donor country….” The OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development) definition of 1973 includes grants, official loans, and credits with
maturities over one year. It excludes private export credits and private foreign
investment.2042 One important form of foreign aid is ODA (Official Development
Assistance) (see ODA, Japanese).
Fukoku kyôhei (rich nation, strong army): a powerful national slogan used in Japan
during the Meiji period (1868 to 1912) to promote the adaptation of economic capitalism
(fukoku) and a modernized military (kyôhei).2043 Richard J. Samuels traces the meaning
of this and similar ideologies in Rich Nation, Strong Army (1994).2044
*Globalization (simplified version used for this research) is speeded up and intensified
global connections, including economic, social, cultural, and political linkages. It can be
ethnographically and comparatively assessed on the micro-level (how it is perceived by
individual, human actors) or the macro-level (public, shared perceptions). It does not
spread from one center or cultural tradition, but from several.
Globalization is the process of speeded up and intensified global connections, especially
in economics, but also social, cultural, and political linkages. In anthropology, a wellknown portrayal of global cultural flows is Appadurai’s notion of “scapes:” ideoscapes,
ethnoscapes, financescapes, mediascapes, and technoscapes. Analysis of the experience
of specific actors, and the meanings they apply to globalization, is needed
(microglobalization). Or globalization can be experienced on a more public level
(macroglobalization).2045 Grounded, empirical, ethnographic studies of globalization’s
effects will allow a comparative theory of globalization to emerge. Globalization does
not spread from one center or cultural tradition. Rather, there are “multiple
globalizations.”2046 Globalization emanating from Japan is just as powerful as those of
the West.
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Hegemony: the dominant, finally naturalized worldview of a people in the process of
being colonized.2047 Usually this corresponds in some degree with the predominant
worldviews of the colonizer(s). Hegemony provides overall form for the new
worldviews in the colonized region.2048 See also Colonialism and ideology.
Ideology: Political sociologist Karl Mannheim’s concept of ideology has been influential
on later scholarship on ideology and worldview in both political science and
anthropology. He calls ideology “…the characteristics and composition of the total
structure of the mind of [an] …epoch or [a] …group.” Ideology combines concepts of
both individual interests and the “…the whole outlook of a social group.”2049
Ideology has many varied definitions in political science.2050 A common one
derives from Weltanschauung, or world-view, meaning one’s overall perception of the
social world and how it works. An ideology is a consistent set of beliefs, morals, and
attitudes.2051 Scholars of foreign policy argue that ideology can be viewed as a cognitive
map, worldview, or guide to action. It is often systematic, connects action and policy,
and helps to frame situations, establish goals, and legitimize authority.2052 This project
draws heavily on political scientist Richard Samuels’ notion of ideology, “…the ways in
which history and political structure conspire to constrain the strategic choices of
nations.” Ideas/ideologies alone do not drive political outcomes. Rather, ideas and
institutions interact extensively, and this interaction is finalized in the political economy.
Ideologies are malleable and contested, and are embodied “…in a concrete and particular
social history that has not only dates, but also names and faces.”2053
Anthropologist Michael Kearney argues that in their nature, content and function,
worldviews are influenced by ideological biases, and can also function as ideologies.
Kearney identifies two primary ideological orientations that have influenced worldviews,
cultural idealism and historical materialism. In the former view, ideas drive social
conditions, and in the latter view, social conditions cause ideas.2054 This debate is now
outmoded in cultural anthropology.2055 According to Ernest Gellner, ideologies claim
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ultimacy, but are “…formed and perpetuated within a broader framework of language,
values and discourse, from which they extract their meaning.” Ideologies must accept the
norms of the worlds within which they function, and seek to draw adherents.2056 For the
state, ideologies create official aspirations and help to structure them.2057
*Image (simplified version, used for this project): the basic ideas and pictures in our
minds about reality; how we organize these ideas and pictures in our minds about reality
and the world around us. A set of images can form a worldview.
Image (anthropology) has two general meanings, according to Kearney. One is “…a
visual representation in the mind.” The second is fundamental, general perceptions and
concepts of reality or schemata that together form a worldview.2058 Images of an object
are constructed through a selective process of memory, of remembering and forgetting.
The same is true of images of Japan constructed by Japanese expatriates and nonJapanese local peoples in foreign countries. Some tend to idealize Japan, others
minimize negative memories, and some focus on their bad experiences with Japan.
Historical experiences with Japan are sometimes not exploited, unless they are found to
be useful. Foreign governments may invoke either negative images of Japan (the case of
China) or positive ones (Prime Minister Tony Blair’s campaign in the mid-1990s to
promote state welfare in Britain) to suit their purposes. 2059
Image (political science) refers to “…perceptual filters that organize our environment
and enable us to predict and respond to that environment.” Like stereotypes, images
include both facts and emotional responses.”2060 They are also called “…cognitive
organizing devices, …information filters, …schema, …and …perceptual patterns. They
are frequently treated as synonymous with beliefs, … although … [they are not]. Images
are cognitive organizing devices, while beliefs incorporate cognition and affect….
Psychology indicates that environments tend to be organized into seven, plus or minus
two, images.”2061
There are several important types of images. The enemy image is a range or
collection of perceptions about an opponent.2062 In an international conflict, images of the
enemy influence a nation’s internal and external images of itself. An enemy will polarize
our images of good and evil.2063 Self-images “…serve the same function as images of
others: they facilitate information processing and environmental management, [and they]
…tend to hold more positive attributes than negative ones.”2064 A national image is
“…the totality of attributes that a person recognizes …when he contemplates [a]
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…nation.”2065 Images are a valuable tool through which states can achieve their
international goals without the use of costly resources. As rational actors, states attempt
to project desired, even deceptive, images at low cost. A state’s images are one major
determinant among several of the policies of other states toward it. We can study state
images on the decision-making level. They are often hard to change, since they include
immutable factors like geography.2066
Images have been studied generally as information screens and specifically as the
image of the enemy. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the concept of image was also
investigated in terms of stereotyping. Eventually “the analytical utility of the concept
expanded as efforts were made to explore the totality of images in the cognitive
worldview of foreign policy makers.”2067 Theoretical issues in the study of image are
complex. Investigators have tended to focus on smaller concepts rather than larger
theoretical frameworks.2068
Imperialism: in political science, has been defined as “…domination or control by one
country or group over others.” The exact nature, causes, clearest examples and other
aspects of the term are debated by social scientists. In political science, there are varied
arguments and positions on many of these issues. For example, some analysts contend
that equating imperialism with global capitalism is too inexact, that a wider variety of
politico-economic conditions are present.2069 Anthropologists have defined imperialism
as “ …unequal territorial relationships among states based on subordination and
domination, associated with particular expressions of industrial capitalism such as
financial monopolies and transnational capital flows.”2070 The anthropological treatment
shows more Marxist influence.
*Industrial policy (simplified version, based on Murakami Yasusuke’s concept, used for
this project): everything a government does in a country’s economy. It often includes
technology.
Industrial policy consists of all forms of government intervention into the economy,
such as protection of failing industries, trade policies that protect infant industries, and
promotion of high-tech industries.2071 The policy tools of industrial policy include: basic
policies (identification of industries), indicative, long-term or educative planning,
promotion and diffusion of technical innovation, broad policies of protection (trade
protection and subsidies), policies for the preservation of polipoly2072 (through the
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regulation of prices, investments and production), indirect financial controls, and entry
and exit policies for foreign firms.2073
Institutions are “organizational mechanisms that ‘remain relatively invariant in the face
of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and
expectations of individuals.’” Three important types of institutions are governmental
institutions, economic institutions, and those that connect society, economy and politics,
such as electoral systems and parties.2074 Institutions include rules, sanctions, legalistic
aspects, and means of enforcement.2075 According to the World Bank, they signify the
government’s ability to design and implement appropriate policies.2076
*Internationalization (simplified version, used for this project): refers to the process
where the “active” West absorbed the “passive” non-West, for the sake of its own
development. The non-West has included Asia, Africa, Oceania, and the Americas, and
much exploitation and subjugation.2077 Internationalization focuses on external,
international processes: what happens as the powerful “core” West absorbs other peoples
from the periphery into the global market. It looks at both economic and cultural factors:
what occurs as the periphery countries are absorbed into the “cultural universe” of the
West? Internationalization does not examine internal implications. It especially considers
what happened on the international level through historic processes of colonialism. It can
also study contemporary issues; i.e. what happens on the international level as Western
development ideologies affect non-Western countries?
Internationalization: as defined by some Japanese scholars, is essentially the same as
the process of “modernization” (see “modernization”). Specifically, it is “…the process
by which the militarily and economically superior West has subjugated other peoples in
the periphery, absorbing them into its own cultural universe, positioning them as inferior,
and exploiting them, if necessary, to the benefit of its own development.” The “active”
West dominates the “passive” non-West. The zenith of this movement was the
colonization of Asia, Africa and Oceania in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries,2078 though the earlier colonization of the Americas by Western powers is
similar. Internationalization continues today through the promotion of Western values
like free markets and democracy in international development (see development
ideology).2079 A second meaning of internationalization (kokusaika) is specific to Japan.
See Kokusaika.
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JBIC (Japan Bank of International Cooperation): a Japanese government agency
established in the late 1990s. Its purpose is to “…contribute to the sound development of
Japan and the international economy and community through undertaking lending and
other financial operations: for the promotion of Japanese exports, imports or Japanese
economic activities overseas; for the stability of international financial order, and for
economic and social development or economic stability in developing areas; in
accordance with the principle that it shall not compete with commercial financial
institutions.” Through September 2008, the two main components of the bank’s
operations were International Financial Operations (IFO) and Overseas Economic
Cooperation Operations (OECO), plus several supportive and administrative programs.
IFO programs primarily consist of “…export loans, import loans, overseas investment
loans, untied loans, [bridge loans, refinancing,] …and equity participation in overseas
projects of Japanese corporations.” OECO programs provided long-term, low interest
ODA (official development assistance) loans for the “…self-help efforts of developing
countries, including social infrastructure development and economic stabilization” (see
also ODA, Japanese). OECO used to exist as an important Japanese government agency,
the OEFC (see OECF). The primary areas OECO loans funded included socioeconomic
infrastructure such as telecommunications, gas, power, agriculture and transportation.
Additional areas include social development, human resource development, economic
stabilization, and environmental conservation. OECO also provided “Private Sector
Investment Finance” (PSIF) which “…supports the activities of private companies in
developing countries.”2080 On October 1, 2008, IFOs will be taken over by a new
Japanese organization, the Japan Finance Corporation,2081 within its international finance
area,2082 and JBIC’s OECOs will be absorbed into a new JICA organization.2083 JBIC had
a total budget of 1,777 billion yen for FY 2007,2084 and outstanding loans worth 19,351.7
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billion yen on March 31, 2007.2085 JBIC’s staff numbers about 865.2086 JBIC has 29
primary departments, sections and divisions in Tokyo.2087 There are also 29 branch
offices outside Tokyo, both in Japan and overseas.2088
JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency): a Japanese government-related,
independent agency established in 1974.2089 With JBIC, it has been one of the most
important Japanese agencies responsible for Japanese ODA policy (see also JBIC and
ODA, Japanese).2090 JICA handles the technical cooperation programs of Japan’s ODA.
Its aim is the transfer of technologies and knowledge to aid the socioeconomic
development and nation-building capacity of LDCs. JICA’s chief programs include
technical training of overseas trainees in Japan, a youth invitation program, dispatching
technical cooperation experts from Japan overseas, project-type technical cooperation,
development studies, provision of equipment, grant aid, the JOCV program (similar to
the U.S. Peace Corps), disaster relief, limited support for Japanese emigrants and ethnic
Japanese (mostly in Latin American locations), addressing aid effectiveness and global
issues, and a community empowerment program.2091 JICA has more than 1,300 full-time
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staff members. They serve at varied locations, including the Tokyo headquarters, an
additional 18 domestic offices including the Institute for International Cooperation, and
99 overseas offices. JICA’s budget (end of FY 2006) was 155.6 billion yen.2092 In
October 2008, the ODA activities of JBIC merged with JICA into a “new” JICA, creating
a larger bilateral aid agency with an estimated budget of $8.5 billion, offering technical
cooperation, grant and loan assistance within one agency.2093
Kokusaika (internationalization): an informal movement and way of thinking that was
strongly advocated by the public and private sectors in Japan starting in the late 1970s.
Kokusaika promoted international values in Japan through improved foreign language
education, international conferences and scientific exchanges, the media, and
international trade shows. It was promoted outside Japan through exhibitions of Japanese
culture in major world cities, the global spread of Japanese pop culture, Japanese foreign
aid, and public and private trade organizations. Examples of public vehicles that promote
internationalization are the JET program inside Japan, and the Japan External Trade
Organization (JETRO) abroad.2094 Some critics condemn kokusaika as a sham.2095
Kokutai: (national essence or polity), a scholarly line of inquiry in Japan in the
Tokugawa era, stressed the uniqueness of the Japanese polity, through such ideas as the
rule of Japan through the unbroken imperial rule, and Japan as a “family-state” (kazoku
kokka).2096 The debate over the meaning of the kokutai goes back to the nineteenth
century, and was, at its start, heavily influenced by different schools of Shinto. Central to
the concept of kokutai is the idea that the Japanese polity is unique, since the Japanese
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imperial line is descended in an unbroken line from the gods, and the concept of the
family state, that all Japanese are related to the emperor as their “father.” The debate
reemerged in 1935, and the concept was important through the end of World War II as
nationalist ideology promoted by Japan’s government.2097
*“Modernization” (my definition, used for this project) is the process where a rich
country in the core (center) of the world’s economy forces weaker, poorer countries in
the periphery to trade with it, so it can become richer and more developed. As a poor,
non-Western country is absorbed into the world economy, on the surface, its culture will
start to look more Western (like the cultures of the rich “core”). But the core of its culture
will not change much, but stay mostly non-Western.
“Modernization,”2098 according to certain Japanese scholars, is the process through
which the core West, which is economically and militarily superior, forces weaker
peripheral peoples into the global economic system, in order to exploit them for its own
development.2099 Anthropologically, “modernization” can be called “…the adaptive
acceptance of Western civilization [culture] under the persistent form of the existing
culture [of a non-Western society]….”2100 “Modernization” presupposes that nonWestern societies will evolve and eventually become like Western ones. A non-Western
society may adapt to Western civilization and the market principle, but core areas of nonWestern societies, such their social organization, will never become Western.
“Modernization” is not unilinear.2101 Japan’s “modernization” began with the arrival of
Commodore Perry’s “Black Ships” (armed steamships) in Japan in 1853, which helped to
force open the nation to trade. This process has continued through the Meiji Restoration
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(1868) up to the present. It was a process of adaptation to the global economic system
led by the modern Western nations.2102 See also Translative adaptation.
ODA, Japanese (Official Development Assistance): foreign aid that is coordinated by
the Japanese government. Japan’s ODA program began in 1954, while Japan itself
received aid from the World Bank to aid in the postwar reconstruction of its economy.
Japan’s aid has increased almost every year since that time. Japan’s aid has gradually
expanded to include recipients outside of Asia, and strategic, political goals, in addition
to economic ones. Japan’s ODA is divided into two forms, multilateral ODA and
bilateral ODA. Multilateral ODA consists of subscriptions and contributions to
international organizations, such as the Asian Development Bank. Bilateral ODA
includes grants (grant aid and technical cooperation) and loans. Grants are provided by
JICA, while loans are released by JBIC (see JICA and JBIC). The purpose of Japan’s
ODA is to contribute to global peace and prosperity through helping to stabilize the
international economy, by supporting “…economic infrastructures and social
development in developing countries.” In its aid philosophy, Japan emphasizes self-help
and self-reliance, often through the provision of ODA loans, as well as values of
democratization and human rights. Japan’s first ODA Charter was adopted in 1992. Its
goals included environmental conservation and development in tandem, the avoidance of
using ODA for military purposes or sending it to countries with increasing militarization
or arms trade, the strengthening of international peace and stability, democratization,
market-based economies, human rights and freedom. The second ODA Charter was
approved in 2003. According to the new charter, the effectiveness of Japanese aid must
be improved. The new charter defines the purpose of Japanese aid as “contributing to the
peace and development of the international community and thereby ensuring the nation’s
security and prosperity,” amid complex problems associated with globalization, including
human rights, pollution, terrorism, religious and ethnic conflicts, and the gap between
rich and poor. Japan’s new aid policy will also require increased oversight (and
monitoring) of the aid process on the part of Japan, the donor nation. Formerly aid was
provided on the basis of requests from potential recipients. The majority of Japan’s ODA
loans go to Asian countries. ODA loans from the Overseas Economic Cooperation
Operations of the JBIC account for 40 percent of Japan’s ODA, making them the
“…cornerstone of Japanese ODA policy.” Japan’s budget for total ODA for fiscal year
1999 was $15.385 billion.2103 Since then it has decreased significantly.
OECF (Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund): the Japanese government agency that
implemented Japan’s huge ODA (official development assistance) program from the
1950s through the late 1990s (Ohno 1998: 1). OECF provided “…so-called ‘two-step’
loans at concessional interest rates with long maturities to governments or public
2102

Ibid., 167.
Information about Japanese ODA was taken from the following websites (all accessed 17 September
2003): JBIC, available from http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/base/ about/overseas/A23/p15.php;
http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/base/about/profile/index.php;
http://www.japantimes.com/cgi-bin/getcd.p15?ed20030917al.htm; http://www.jica.go.jp/
english/about/01.html.
847
2103

financial institutions in developing countries. Loan funds [were] …on-lent by borrower
governments or public financial institutions in developing countries…. Two-step loans
[were] …one of the main vehicles for Japan’s ODA loans….”2104 In the late 1990s, the
OECF was absorbed into the newly created Japan Bank for International Cooperation
(JBIC). See also JBIC.
Operational code is one of two major cognitive models for the study of decision-making
in international relations (See also Cognitive maps).2105 It is “a guideline for describing
some of the political beliefs of policymakers; …a descriptive set of analytical
categories.”2106 When combined with theories of cognition, these beliefs suggest a
connection between beliefs and behavior.2107 An operational code attempts to provide a
“…general, non-situation-specific, framework of fundamental beliefs about politics and
the political world.” Beliefs are organized hierarchically, and scholars attempt to identify
those that are central (unchangeable). Two kinds of beliefs are seminal. Philosophical
beliefs are “fundamental assumptions” about politics, and instrumental beliefs are
assumptions of “…how politics should be approached, [and] what kinds of behavior are
appropriate.” The code has several problems, such as connecting beliefs and behavior,
and generating testable hypotheses. Several scholars, including Holsti, have developed
code typologies.2108
Organizational culture(s): “Organizations, like societies, have cultures of their own.
Although an organization’s culture may incorporate major elements from the society in
which it exists, it will differ in other ways. Organizations that contain members from
different cultures will reflect these differences to some extent.”2109 Also, organizational
culture is a subject studied by several different disciplines, including anthropology,
management sciences, policy sciences, sociology, linguistics, social philosophy, and
psychology. Anthropological studies of organizational culture fall within a wider
framework of comparative (ethnological) and single culture studies of work and human
relations in societies since human prehistory. Today’s organizational anthropologists
also apply the culture concept holistically to the study of formal organizations in complex
societies. The first anthropological studies were done in the 1930s.2110
Organization(s) are “…groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to
achieve objectives,”2111 “…collective actors who might be subject to institutional
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constraint,”2112 or “…a body of procedures by which participating members pursue
together a set of agreed goals through control of uncertainty.”2113 Anthropologically, an
organization can be defined as “…a socio-cultural system embedded in larger sociocultural environments.” Management is perhaps only one subculture among several of an
organization’s cultures. Organizational life is rather fluid, not linear, in the midst of
changing decisions, plans, actors, meanings, and statuses. Perception of organizational
values often occurs subconsciously. These values influence the reactions, behaviors, and
decision-making of persons in the organization. Many occurrences are ambiguous and
unpredictable. So we must examine not only events, but also their meanings. Because of
differences in perception, information processing, and interpretation, organizational
members vary in how they interpret events. Alliances formed by members do not
necessarily correspond with their ideational worlds.2114
Paradigm refers to “a pattern or model that guides thinking and action.”2115
Perception: Through the senses, we perceive certain elements of the world around us.
How we perceive the total environment around us is affected by the nature of that
environment. Perceptions are gradually and systematically organized into a worldview.
This worldview becomes the basis for how we interact physically and socially with the
environment, helps us to alter the environment, and is affected by changes in the
environment as well.2116 However, “perception alone does not explain behavior or set the
range of options available to the actor.” It is often a function of external stimuli and
political drama.2117 Perception is not a concept commonly used in political science.
Policy: Political scientists have defined policy as a government’s or organization’s broad
statement of intention, goals or objectives, implying theories,2118 or “…a hypothesis [by a
public or private organization or group] containing initial conditions and predicted
consequences.”2119 Anthropologists characterize policy as “an overall plan or course of
action, usually based on clearly-stated values or beliefs, intended as a guide for decisions
and plans”2120 or “…deliberate action in any sphere of human activity,” including public
and private realms. Some policies are “…institutionally sanctioned and have the
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potential for affecting large numbers of people.”2121 In general, the study of policy is
more systematic in political science than in anthropology.
Policy cycle/stages: Lester and Stewart identify six stages in a policy cycle: agenda
setting, policy formation, policy implementation, policy evaluation, policy change, and
policy termination.2122 According to anthropologist Erve Chambers, there are generally
thought to be four basic stages in policy decision-making: policy formulation, planning,
program implementation, and review.2123
Policy implementation means to complete, carry out, produce or accomplish a
policy.2124 It is “…a process of interaction between the setting of [policy or program]
goals and actions geared to achieving them; …the ability to forge subsequent links in the
causal chain [of policies and programs] so as to obtain the desired results.”2125 Policy
implementation is the second of the three traditional stages of policy identified by public
policy studies, the first being policy formulation/design, and the third policy
evaluation.2126 The process of implementation begins after new policy adoption,
provision of funding, and program agreement.2127 The process is inter-organizational,
entailing complex, joint actions.2128
Public policy theorists largely ignored implementation until Pressman and
Wildavsky’s Implementation (1973).2129 There is no certain model for successful policy
implementation, although a large number of approaches have been attempted.2130 The
“top-bottom” approach argues that policy is formulated at the top, and translated into
instructions for staff that implement the policy at the bottom. According to the “bottomtop” approach, “street level bureaucrats” determine success in implementation through
prioritizing and rationing policy as they serve their clienteles.2131 Or implementation is
seen as an evolutionary, interactive, negotiative process, where it is difficult to determine
the boundaries between policy and implementation,2132 which are viewed “…as a
policy/action continuum….”2133
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Political cognition: a field of study that evolved in the 1970s and 1980s that applies the
methods and theories of cognitive psychology to the study of political behavior. Specific
literatures examined from psychology include cognition, decision-making and social
cognition.2134 Psychologists conduct some studies, but political scientists also do many.
Scholarship is political cognition has suffered from several problems. According to
Martha Cottam, problems in political science work include a failure to adequately draw
on previous works or psychology itself, inadequate linkage of psychology and behavior,
problems in connecting social psychology and individual cognition, and confusion of
basic concepts such as belief, cognitive system, and worldview.2135 The first application
of cognitive psychology to political science examined the beliefs of foreign policy
makers about why certain events happened.2136 Other areas of investigation are
information processing, selective memory and selective perception. Scholars believe that
information-processing theories can be usefully applied to important political questions,
such as understanding political attitudes, ideologies, and reasoning processes of elites.2137
Political culture in political science refers to political attitudes and values. Almond and
Verba’s The Civic Culture (1963) surveys political beliefs of individuals in five nations
in order to predict political orientations and values conducive to democracy.2138 Almond
and Verba conclude that there is one predominant political culture for each nation. While
many political scientists discount political culture, since in the late 1980s, it has been
gradually strengthened. In 1990, Wildavsky, Thompson and Ellis developed their
political culture typology of social relations and shared values, called cultural theory (see
Cultural theory).2139 They apply this typology to numerous past studies. Wildavsky et al
argue that it allows improved analysis, and that it can be universally applied. They argue
that there are multiple political cultures within each nation, a significant advance over
The Civic Culture.2140 Putnam et al’s Making Democracy Work (1993) examines political
cultures and democracy in Italy, through significant triangulation of methods
(contemporary and historical statistics, and multi-sited ethnography). They find that
there are multiple political cultures in Italy, and that culture is a significant predictor of
potential for democratization and successful economic development. In Culture Matters
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(1997), Wildavsky, Ellis and Thompson apply cultural theory to a wide variety of policy
areas, and argue powerfully for the need to better operationalize culture.2141 To improve
political culture, we need to better integrate interpretive and predictive approaches,
quantitative and qualitative methods, and multiple scales of analysis.2142 See also Culture
of politics.
Alternatively, some scholars of political cognition define political culture
(“cultural system”) as “…all publicly common ways of relating in… [a] collectivity.” A
political culture/cultural system includes relationships among individuals, patterned
systems of relating, and ways of relating that are commonly known to all participants in
the culture. These ways of relating are the public norm for a society.2143
Positivism, a paradigm or group of philosophies with an extremely positive view of
science and the scientific method, stresses “…objectivity, hypothetico-deductive theory,
external law-like relations, exact and formal language, and separation of facts from
meaning.”2144 Positivism stresses the use of hypotheses, postulates, explanation and
prediction.2145
Postpositivism is a paradigm that attempts to address weaknesses in the positivistic
paradigm by following a critical realism that stresses that reality and truth exists, but can
only be imperfectly comprehended. It encompasses several theoretical approaches.
There are perhaps four main paradigmatic approaches in the social sciences today:
positivism, critical theory, postpositivism, and constructivism.2146 Objectivity is an
important goal, but can only be partly achieved, through the use of external aids, such as
critical theory and noting one’s biases. Methodologically, imbalances are addressed
through multiple methods, researching in more natural settings, and using more grounded
theory and qualitative methods.2147 In postpositivism, knowledge is built cumulatively.
The paradigm attempts to develop generalizable theoretical propositions built on
empirical research, but holds that such generalizations are only tentative. Human
phenomena can be best explained by causal relationships.2148 Postpositivism values
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explanation, prediction, control, and rigorous inquiry through quantitative and qualitative
methods.2149
Program(s) in development “… [are] distinct from either a policy or a project. [They]
…operationalize broad (and sometimes vague) policy directives by collecting resources
or various kinds, outlining sets of goals and objectives, and setting out timetables.”
These plans are refined and then applied to the grass-roots level by projects.2150 More
broadly, programs are “…governmental action initiated in order to secure objectives
whose attainment is problematical…. Considered as a whole, a program can be
conceived of as a system in which each element is dependent on the other[s]….
Programs make… [policy theories] operational by forging the first link in the causal
chain connecting actions to objectives.”2151
Project(s) in development are “…a planned series of activities, bound in space and time,
designed to achieve a stated set of objectives, using specific resources and employing
stated strategies or rationales. Projects are the predominant way in which development
assistance is delivered.”2152
Project stages: There is no universal consensus on the stages involved in development
and technology project decision-making. The World Bank identifies six stages:
identification, preparation, appraisal, negotiations, implementation and evaluation.
According to the United Nations, there are eight (conception, formulation, analysis and
evaluation, approval, implementation, reporting and feedback, transition to normal
administration, evaluation). Szyliowicz collapses them into five: initiation, appraisal,
approval, implementation and completion.2153
Reasoning is “…a structured pragmatic activity [which] …explains the nature and
development of structures of thought with reference to the general progress of intellectual
development” (Jean Piaget, 20th century developmental psychologist).2154 Rosenberg et
al argue that a general structure underlies each individual’s understanding of political and
physical events, and that the nature of this cognitive structure varies among people.2155
Religion is a complex social and spiritual phenomenon, challenging to define, that
incorporates behavior, symbols, beliefs, and organizational structures. Any of these four
primary features may be relatively simple or highly complex in different cultures. Across
cultures the variance is so great, it is challenging to generalize.2156 Religion is also closely
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connected with the cognitive: religion is “ …a symbolic and linguistic system that by its
nature is powerfully evocative—it triggers experiences and emotions and at the cognitive
level defines a meaningful universe including proper strategies for action.”2157
Social scientists argue that religion serves various social roles, including
strengthening individuals in the face of limitations that nature or society imposes on
them, and supporting and giving validity to other features of society, such as economic
and political issues. Religion can provide an integrative function, highlighting values and
norms in cultural identity that enable an individual to fit in well in society. Religion can
give answers and solace for many challenges of human existence, including illness,
death, stress, greed, and the afterlife. Other forms of human activity, such as business,
also involve behavior, symbols, beliefs, and organizational structures. Though one can
identify elements and terms common to religion that differentiate it from other such
activities, such as ultimate, transcendent, spiritual, sacred, and supernatural, these terms
are also challenging to define cross-culturally. Exactly what sets “religion” apart from
other human endeavors that may be more “secular” or “profane?” Though religion
appears to be a universal human endeavor in nearly all cultures, the West tends to draw a
harder distinction between “religious” and “non-religious” social systems than other
societies.2158 Many languages, such as Japanese, have no exact equivalent for the term
“religion,” though many peoples, again including the Japanese, do activities that can be
called “religious,” as defined in the West.2159 Monotheistic religions predominant in the
West (Christianity, Judaism and Islam) tend to stress God as an all powerful, male king,
judge and lawgiver, with the human problem defined as one of sinning against divine
law. Eastern religions (i.e. Hinduism, Buddhism) often include numerous gods, or none,
and stress meditation or devotion in pursuit of joy, freedom, inner peace,2160 material
prosperity or health.
Religion is studied by different fields in multiple ways, which also makes it
challenging to define. Anthropologists tend to take a holistic approach, studying any or
all of the four key components of religion identified above. Sociology focuses on the
social behavior patterns and organizational structures of religion. Theology, philosophy
and comparative religion tend to stress belief. Literature and art history look at religious
symbolism and art. Social scientists concentrate on how religion functions in different
cultural contexts. One issue that all disciplines examine is origins. This addresses how
religion became of concern in the human mind, individually and collectively. Scholars in
different fields have offered different answers, including arguments that religion
originated in dreams (anthropology), from feelings of guilt and fear (psychology), from
the human tendency to personify difficult natural forces (philosophy), for the purpose of
exercising elite control (philosophy), or from divine revelation (religion and religious
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practitioners). Sociologist Emile Durkheim focused on how religion operates in society as
a social institution. Anthropologist A. R. Radcliffe-Brown studied how religion supports
other social institutions, while Bronislaw Malinowski focused on how religion assists
people with daily issues that transcend scientific knowledge. Scholars such as Robert
Bellah have identified forms of civil religion, such as patriotism, which incorporate
beliefs, behaviors, organizational structures, and symbolism. Civil religion is present in
the United States,2161 and Japan’s State Shinto was a form of civil religion. Also related
to religion and politics, many scholars have been interested in how religion interacts with
ideologies. One example is the work of Max Weber on the role of Protestantism in
promoting capitalism, and on how other world religions relate to economic activity.
Contemporary questions include how religious fundamentalism affects national and
international politics, war, and global terrorism. Social scientists are also interested in
issues of religious participation, religion and ethnicity, and religion and gender.2162 While
formerly social scientists attempted to approach the study of religion in a scientifically
detached manner, today there is more tendency for reflexivity, to admit one’s own
religious biases and to consider how these may color one’s work.2163
New technological tools such as computers are expanding how religion is
studied, and how religions extend their reach globally. There are many thousands of
different religious systems today, and the impact of technology upon them is great. Some
religions have almost always transcended geography (Christianity, Islam and Buddhism),
while others have been more geographically tied (Hinduism, Shinto, and Jainism).
Increased globalization through technology and world travel only increases the
complexities of religion, including opportunities for expansion, interreligious dialogue,
conflict, and syncretism.2164
Schema/schemata: preexisting knowledge structures used by individuals to process
information. A schema is “…a hierarchical organization of knowledge in a particular
domain, which includes a category label, generic descriptions of the stimulus domain,
particular instances of it, and interconnections among these. For example, a politician
schema could include general information about all politicians, …higher level organizing
categories, …more specific …examples of politicians, and a specification of the
relationships of the various attributes of the schema.” Two classes of schemata important
for politics are role schemata, which focus on broad social groups, and person schemata,
which systematize knowledge about individuals. Schemata direct the storage and
processing of new information, and assist the recall and interpretation of information in
the memory. Researchers have used many different methods to measure political
schemata. An important issue is determining when particular schemata will be
utilized.2165
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Seiryoku tozen (the encroachment of Western powers in the East): an ideological
slogan that encouraged Japan to embark on the path of industrialization during the Meiji
period, in order to avoid colonization by the West. At that time, western capitalism was
the only model of economic development available to Japan. Yet also motivating Japan’s
development were indigenous ideologies of spiritualism and nationalism, not Western
individualism or utilitarianism.2166
Shokusan kôgyô (increase industrial production): One of two primary ideologies
influential in Meiji Japan (1868-1912) that promoted nationalistic industrialization. The
other primary ideology was fukoku kyôhei.2167
Social cognition and political behavior: while all actions pass through a cognitive
process, cognition is not a powerful independent variable. The connections between
cognition and political behavior must be assessed on different levels of analysis—social
(international and domestic), and individual (political decision-makers). There are
several problems with the “social cognition” approach. Sometimes people assess
problems rationally, other times rashly. This approach asks interesting questions, such as
how beliefs are related to each other, how beliefs and images form, and how they change.
A cognitive approach looks at an individual’s beliefs, values, and how s/he processes
information. Previous beliefs affect behavior and perceptions strongly. A very important
predictor of how a foreign policy decision-maker will view a situation is his/her beliefs
and expectations.2168
Spirituality is often considered hard to distinguish from religion, and hard to define.2169
It has been called “ …the concern of human beings with their appropriate relationships to
the cosmos.”2170 A simple dictionary definition renders it as an “attitude or principle that
inspires, animates, or pervades thought, feeling, or action,”2171 or the connections
between “ ...the human and the sublime, … the concrete and the abstract, and between
man and God.”2172 Spirituality suggests feeling, thought, and practice connected with the
inner, subjective world related to religion, and the meanings of the deepest parts of
human life and existence. It is the main motivating force of religion, on corporate
(organized or unorganized) or individual levels. Spirituality flourishes within living
religious traditions, which often involve text, story, myth, doctrine, ritual and/or symbols.
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Forms of spirituality vary according to social and personal conditions and tradition.2173
Although religious community or participation can generate spiritual power, social
contexts shape what form it will ultimately take.2174 In advanced industrial societies, there
increasingly seems to be a distinction between spirituality and religion. Many people in
the United States claim to be spiritual, but not religious.2175 Similarly, a distinction
between religion and spirituality exists in Japan also. For example, the Japanese word for
religion (shukyo) connotes “sect teaching,’ while the general word for spirituality
(seishin) suggests a more general form of “spirit.” Therefore many Japanese claim to not
be “religious,” though they regularly participate in “spiritual” activities or rituals, on a
daily or periodic basis.
In the social sciences, most academic research on spirituality is done in the
fields of psychology and sociology of religion, based on empirical studies. According to
Zehavit Gross, current research on spirituality in the West should be done in the context
of postmodernity, since contemporary spirituality in the West [and in Japan] suggests
increasing disenchantment with conventional religion. Increasingly, Western research
seems connected with “ …the secularization process in the postmodern era, accompanied
by the revival of privatization and individualization of religiosity…. [Spirituality] is
connected to the affective, the rational, the cognitive, and the unconscious symbolic
domains.”2176
Systems theory/analysis: a form of scientific analysis influential in technical/applied
sciences, such as engineering and space science, and in the social sciences, including
political science, policy analysis, and anthropology, starting in the 1950s and early 1960s.
Pioneers in the field include Maruyama Maguroh and Kenneth Boulding. Systems
analysis attempts to picture the dynamics and interrelationships of the parts of any
technical or social system through the use of systems diagrams, which graphically portray
the relationships within systems through various forms of inputs, throughputs, outputs,
and feedback loops. In political science, David Easton pioneered the concept of political
systems in the early 1960s, which attempted systemic analysis of politics in a dynamic,
rather than static, way. This form of analysis quickly became outmoded, due to its
inability to handle the complexities of real politics. The use of systems analysis for
policy analysis has been more influential, including the analysis of foreign policy
decisions. In anthropology, systems analysis has been used to analyze policy issues, and
uses of technology in contemporary societies, including agricultural and international
development issues. Somewhat related to systems analysis is world system theory,
developed by sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein in the early 1970s. Based upon
dependency theory, Marxist-influenced world system theory argues that the nations of the
world are interconnected in a worldwide system of trade in which powerful core
countries dominate and impoverish the developing countries of the periphery and semi-
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periphery. While influential in political science in the 1970s and 1980s, world system
theory continues its importance in anthropology up to the present.
Technological development: Japanese scholars have identified five basic stages in
technology development (not necessarily chronological): 1) acquisition of operational
techniques (operations); 2) maintenance of new machines and equipment (maintenance);
3) repairs and minor modifications of foreign technologies and equipment, both in the
system and in operations (repairs and modifications); 4) designing and planning (original
design and creation of a system); and 5) domestic manufacturing (self-reliance in
technology). Information and manufacturing capabilities are important throughout these
stages. 2177
*Technology (my definition, used for this research): Tools, knowledge, learning and
information that people use to live and survive.
*Technology (Glick’s anthropological definition, simplified version, used for this
project): an interconnected system of tools and knowledge used in a society or economy
to accomplish purposes in daily life and work.
Technology is “…ideas and practices which people use to maintain and enrich their
material existence,”2178 or “the means and agencies by which human societies cope with
and transform their material environment.”2179 More specifically, most western scholars
of technology define it as “…any kind of practical know-how” and “…any set of
standardized operations that yields predetermined results.” It includes routines,
procedures, methods, machines and tools, knowledge, skills, and forms of administration
and organization.2180 Technology is also a system of inputs, throughputs, and outputs.
Inputs include raw materials, parts, and knowledge, throughputs the organization and
control of the manufacturing process, and outputs the completed product.2181 Political
factors and cultural values are inherent in technological processes.2182
Japanese scholars of technology argue that while science tries to discover
universal principles and build on them, “…technology comprises all scientific knowledge
deliberately and purposefully used for production, distribution, consumption, and
utilization of goods, services, and information, especially that which concerns mechanical
apparatus and systems.” “Traditional” technologies also include (scientific) rationality.
Contemporary technology consists of five main elements (the five “Ms”), in addition to
money and information: 1) raw materials, resources, and energy; 2) machines and
equipment; 3) manpower (engineers and skilled workers); 4) management (technology
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management and management technology); and 5) markets for technology and its
products.2183
Technology was traditionally seen in sociocultural anthropology as tools, simply a
subset of cultural artifacts. It has been under-theorized.2184 One example of theory is
cultural ecology, the study of how human societies adapt to surrounding environments,
through technology and other means.2185 “Traditional” techniques were stressed, rather
than “modern” industrial technology.2186 Using systems theory, many recent scholars
view technology as a sociotechnical or technoeconomic system, examining how “people
employ artifacts to accomplish social purposes in everyday life.” Technology is seen as a
socially-constructed phenomenon closely connected with the organization of work. To
identify broader linkages, it may be better to include historical study of a technology’s
cultural and cognitive aspects.2187 See also Technology and culture.
Technology and cognitive factors: Since decision-makers often possess inaccurate
conceptions of technology, many errors are committed in technology transfer.
Disregarding complexities, they see technology as machines that can be easily
transferred. Cognitive factors in technology projects are also important. Sometimes the
viewpoints of decision-makers limit optimality factors; one project is considered better
than none. Belief systems of actors influence choice through project stages, and project
outcomes. Decision-makers’ beliefs can affect their decisions for decades. But we must
not minimize constraints imposed by actual situations. Mental maps become useless if
policymakers do not readjust them to changing conditions. Belief systems can be so
strong as to blind decision-makers to reality; “…perceptions tend to diverge from the
reality of the environment.”2188
Technology and culture: Technology shapes economics and history, but is itself a
product of culture.2189 Technology includes cultural values.2190 In the early postwar
period, some international organizations employed anthropologists to study how the
“traditional” social structures and cultures of developing societies constrained their
adoption of modern technologies, which were seen as a boon for development.2191
Studies in the 1970s examined how the adoption of new technologies affects social
change in developing and “traditional” societies.2192
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Science and technology are not neutral commodities, but inevitably influence the
social structures of societies where they go.2193 Even though applied according to
scientific principles, technology faces different natural and social conditions in each
society. The achievement of the same technological goal must be customized for each
society. The five Ms concept (see Technology) can help us to determine challenges in
the technological development process. The five Ms will differ in every society, firm and
factory. First, each society must select strategic areas and sectors for development, and
then nurture its own indigenous engineers and technologists, without over-reliance on
foreign experts for too long. For “…in spite of the diachronic, trans-cultural nature of
technology, it cannot function independently of the society and culture in which it is
expected to function.” Whenever a technology is transferred, the culture of the
technology, surrounding it, is not transferred with it. Indigenous technologists are best
suited to adapt a foreign technology to their society’s conditions.2194 The cultures and
structures of organizations are an important factor in technology transfer. These factors
influence technological choices and mastery by organizations.2195
Technology and development: The role of science and technology in development is
complex, difficult to measure, and not automatically determined. Development
represents a complicated journey between “tradition” and “modernity.” Only less
developed countries (LDCs) can answer how each can “… modernize without sacrificing
tradition, …or preserve tradition without compromising modernization.”2196 Truly
development has become an uncertain quest, involving many questions about costs,
benefits, and sacrifices that may be required. Science and technology is no “magic pill”
for solving development problems or value conflicts.2197 We are still a long way from
achieving a complete account of how science and technology interact with development,
especially given new social and environmental complexities.2198
Science and technology resources are crucial for a nation’s social and economic
development. Improving economic growth is central to improving the quality of life. A
wide variety of situations prevail in the LDCs concerning their science and technology
resources, and no single strategy will be effective for all. Social conditions and political
institutions determine how a nation is able to develop and absorb science and
technology.2199 Supportive conditions are important to encourage science and technology
activities in the third world. The effective flourishing of science and technology requires
nations with stable, democratic, open environments supportive of innovation.2200
Specific sectoral and development issues are also important. Both LDCs and
advanced nations face great challenges because of information technologies and rapid
technological change. Technical change and growth are not predetermined or
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inevitable.2201 LDCs need help in determining how new technologies can help them to
address crucial development issues, including social and environmental issues.
Information technology solutions may help to provide low cost solutions. While we have
unprecedented power to overcome poverty, technological and other gaps between
advanced nations and LDCs are increasing. For these gaps to be overcome rapidly,
science and technology issues must be thoroughly integrated into development strategies.
Customized strategies and new frameworks are needed.2202
Technology transfer: Although the term implies an automatic, painless system, it is a
costly, “…conflictual process involving many interactive dimensions—actors, mode
(joint venture, licensing, etc.), content (the technology itself), channel (manpower
training, plant construction, etc.), and impact.” This process moves through several
stages, and problems can occur at any point. If decision-makers do not perceive the
complexities, failure is more likely. Success demands much time, effort and funding
from both senders and receivers.2203
To avoid problems in technology transfer, we should choose a technology with
strong potential for enhancing and upgrading the links among a nation’s technological
sectors. We should also examine and adjust the quality and quantity of the transferred
technology, to make sure that it meets the needs of the region it enters. There are
different levels of development (the end), and also different levels of technology (the
means).2204 Some Japanese scholars argue that in order to determine how to best make
technology transfer succeed, we need to determine the general patterns of successful
cases, and minimize our consideration of political and value-laden factors.2205 On the
other hand, technology transfer is full of political and ethical dilemmas, and these issues
often lead to failure.2206 International actors in the external environment and domestic
political actors and states themselves have a large impact on the outcomes of technology
transfers and large technology projects.2207 Successful transfers require the necessary
pre-conditions and supporting systems, including management and workers’ skills. In
Japan, these factors were present.2208
*Technonationalism as ideology (my version, simplified, used in this project):
Technology is an important, basic part of protecting a country by making it rich and
strong. This idea has been an important part of Japanese thought for several centuries.
Technonationalism as ideology (Japan): According to Samuels, many Japanese feel
discomfort with the terms “technonationalism” and “ideology.” Technonationalism in
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Japanese suggests “technoprotectionism,” while ideology connotes nationalism,
militarism, the emperor, and fascism. Samuels uses the term technonationalism to signify
the belief that “…technology is a fundamental element in national security, that it must
be indigenized, diffused, and nurtured in order to make a nation rich and strong.” He also
believes that it is an appropriate summation of useful Japanese beliefs that have
influenced Japan through several centuries.2209
*Translative adaptation (my definition, used for this project): the process where a nonWestern country adjusts to Western culture as it begins “modernization” and
development. As this happens, the non-Western country must carefully match and adjust
its own culture and values to the imported cultural items. If it does this well, it will have
Western and non-Western items in its new culture, and it will develop well. If not, it may
not develop well, and its culture may be destroyed.
Translative adaptation, a concept developed from economic anthropology and
development economics, is the process where actors in a non-Western culture adjust to
new elements of Western civilization by “…reinterpreting each element of Western
culture” according to their own values, altering yet continuing their indigenous
institutions.2210 Japan is a prime example of a society that has done this. In order for a
non-Western society to develop, there must be compatibility between its indigenous
aspects (social institutions and values) and foreign aspects (imported organizational
structures, technology). If the two aspects are successfully merged, economic
development can occur. If they are not, the base society of the developing country may
be destroyed.2211 If the non-Western society develops successfully, it will continue with
a new dual identity. Three important conclusions follow: 1) a market economy is closely
connected with and embedded in the social structure of the surrounding society; 2) each
society’s social structure is unique, and some societies may not be compatible with the
imported market system; and 3) each society’s government must ensure that the path to
economic development is customized according to each society’s unique conditions.2212
This concept forms part of the ideological basis of the opposition of Japanese
development economists to the universalistic, neoclassical, free market approaches to
development advocated by the World Bank and other international development groups.
Wakon yosai (“Japanese/Eastern ethics, Western techniques) is an important ideological
slogan of the late Tokugawa period coined by Sakuma Shosan (1811-1864), a leading
scholar of Western learning at the time. Sakuma used the phrase to signify that Japan
urgently needed to learn Western science and technology, while maintaining its own
Japanese spirit.2213
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Weltanschauung is “…a particular philosophy or view of life; a concept of the world
held by an individual or a group.” It is often rendered “worldview” in English, from the
German Welt (world) and Anschauung (perception). Most scholars agree that Immanuel
Kant coined the term in 1790, essentially meaning “the sense world of perception.”
Many of Kant’s successors used the term, including Hegel and Goethe. Weltanschauung
stood beside philosophy as a companion concept, and was extremely influential in
German intellectual life through the early twentieth century. German scholars of word
history and the history of ideas have documented Weltanschauung’s history. Soon
Weltanschauung was adopted by scholars into the Romance, Slavic and Germanic
language families, and was first used in English in 1858 as “world-view.” Since then,
Weltanschauung and worldview have become seminal concepts in the intellectual life of
the Anglophone world, where they have received little attention in philosophy, unlike in
the social sciences and theology. As one of the central concepts in contemporary culture
and thought, this is surprising.2214 The concepts of worldview in anthropology and
ideology in political science are both related to Weltanschauung.2215
*Worldview (cognitive framework) (my definition, used for this project): a set of
pictures and ideas about the world, or a certain part of or thing in the world, that mostly
makes sense, but which may not be totally correct. It includes complicated pictures about
the world and how it works, based on deep, previously held beliefs. What people and
political actors see and believe affects what they do.
Worldview (anthropology) is defined as the set of psychological and cultural beliefs
held by members of a cultural group.2216 According to Michael Kearney, worldview is
“…a set of images and assumptions about the world, [a people’s] ...way of looking at
reality,” the way in which the world is seen. Worldview provides “…a mostly coherent,
though not always accurate way of thinking about the world.” It includes views of Self
and Not-Self, and the relationships between them.2217
Thomas Barfield argues that as anthropologists came to realize that since not all
members of a society share the same views, and because cultural belief systems are
constantly reshaped, the term worldview has been largely replaced with the term
ideology.2218 Michael Kearney disagrees. He argues that the concept of worldview is not
totally outmoded, but a vibrant area of theoretical investigation.2219 Anthropologists often
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study the particular worldviews of different peoples.2220 Contemporary worldview theory
is concerned with identifying universal structures that underlie all worldviews, so that
they may be studied comparatively.2221 While earlier scholarship focused on identifying
the worldviews of local communities and social groups, contemporary worldview theory
looks at the worldviews of peoples in unbounded communities, of migrants, diasporas,
and peoples influenced by the forces of transnationalism, global communication and
cyberspace. These profoundly challenge conventional anthropological notions of
“tradition” and “modernity.”2222
Worldview (political science): Applied to politics and foreign policy, general
worldviews/perceptions are “…not sets of beliefs so much as complicated bundles of
cognition organized as images of types of states.”2223 Worldview is formed by our belief
systems, “…a series of assumptions by which we explain the nature of man, our
environment, and the universe.” A formalized worldview consists of usually logically
related beliefs and ideas that are institutionalized and communicated authoritatively.2224
Michael Spicer defines worldview as “…pre-analytic cognitions or visions of how the
world works; …they provide a frame of reference for interpreting human action on the
basis of an almost instructive set of prior assumptions regarding why people act the way
they do.” Worldviews do not flow from reasoning or logic; but they shape the premises
and objects of our reasoning.2225 Interaction between a perceiver’s worldview and his
environment affects his final judgments. Political worldviews form a basis for policy
judgments, and consist of cognitive categories (see Cognitive categories).2226 Cottam
identifies seven primary categories in the political worldviews of foreign policy decisionmakers, images of foreign states: “…enemy, hegemonist, dependent ally of the enemy,
neutral, ally, dependent of the perceiver’s state, and puppet of the perceiver’s state.”2227
She argues that these state images form the natural basis of a foreign policymaker’s
worldview, and that how the policymaker categorizes a state will affect his/her
assumptions for that state’s characteristics and for predicting the state’s behavior.2228
Political scientists studying foreign policy argue that in order to know how to
behave, individuals must have a certain worldview that shows them the correct order of
the world, how people behave, and the role of the self. People act according to what they
believe to be true about themselves. Worldviews direct their perceptions, uses of
information, and role expectations, and reinforce actors’ understandings of events, their
causes and correct order. As cognitive structures begin to share a “…meaningful,
2220

Anthropologists also study factors that influence worldviews, including geographic environments,
social organization, and technological systems. Much of the work on the latter two areas is by Marxistinfluenced scholars (Kearney, “Worldview,” 1381-1382).
2221
While certain universals may be identified, worldviews about phenomena such as self, time, and space
differ significantly between and also within societies (Ibid.).
2222
Ibid., 1380-1383.
2223
Cottam, Images and Intervention, 10.
2224
Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, Enemies, 19.
2225
Hayes, Limits of Policy Change, 8.
2226
Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making, 26, 23.
2227
Ibid., 50.
2228
Ibid., 55-56.
864

cognitive whole,” they become the central deciding factor of the intrastate and
supranational system of [political] organization. Worldview serves the psychological
function of organization….”2229
Recent American public policy scholars identify two predominant worldviews of
political order, rationalist and anti-rationalist. The former worldview sees humankind as
perfectible, altruistic, and supports the capacity of science and government to solve
human problems. The anti-rationalists argue that humans are fallible and self-interested.
Social problems cannot best be resolved through unlimited government, but rather
through the spread of knowledge through economic systems, such as the free market.
Both of these worldviews evolve very different visions of equality, freedom, and
justice.2230
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APPENDIX
Timeline of Japanese History
(List of Historical Periods)
Jômon……………………………………………………….c. 10,000 BC to c. 300 BC
Yayoi………………………………………………………..c. 300 BC to c. AD 300
Kofun………………………………………………………..c. AD 300 TO 710
Nara, capital: Heijo (Nara) …………………………………710 to 794
Heian, capital: Heian (Kyoto) ………………………………794 to 1185
Kamakura, capital: Kamakura………………………………1185 to 1333
Muromachi, capital: Muromachi (Kyoto)…………………..1336 to 1568
Azuchi-Momoyama, capital: Azuchi, Momoyama (Kyoto). 1568 to 1600
Tokugawa (Edo), capital: Edo………………………………1600 to 1868
Meiji, capital: Tokyo………………………………………..1868 to 1912
Taisho, capital: Tokyo………………………………………1912 to 1926
Showa, capital: Tokyo………………………………………1926 to 1989
Heisei, capital: Tokyo ………………………………………1989 to present
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